共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
2.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
3.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
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David BraunEmail: |
4.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
5.
Learning from Minimal Economic Models 总被引:5,自引:5,他引:0
Till Grüne-Yanoff 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(1):81-99
It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world,
do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing
and analysing the model affects one’s confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed
for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering such relevant
possibilities may affect one’s confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. Thus, one can learn from minimal economic
models.
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Till Grüne-YanoffEmail: |
6.
Veronica Vasterling 《Human Studies》2007,30(2):79-95
In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which
approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced
by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is
due to her application of cognitive theory.
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Veronica VasterlingEmail: |
7.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
8.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
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Michael NelsonEmail: |
9.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
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Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
10.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
11.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
12.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
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Erin EakerEmail: |
13.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |
14.
Kenneth P. Winkler 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):507-509
I clarify Locke’s intentionalism and explain what we might gain by paying more attention to the role of linguistic intentions
in the work of the British empiricists.
相似文献
Kenneth P. WinklerEmail: |
15.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
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Bas van der VossenEmail: |
16.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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Melissa FrankelEmail: |
17.
Rauprich O 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(1):43-71
The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here,
I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these
works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for
theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and
empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its
normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification.
I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource
of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible.
Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality
theory.
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Oliver RauprichEmail: |
18.
Jesse R. Steinberg 《Sophia》2007,46(1):1-5
Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to
such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence
in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of
these examples and find it wanting.
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Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |
19.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
20.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
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Stephen MaitzenEmail: |