Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer

In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’ gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but, we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about.     

Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer

This paper addresses Peter Singer's claim that cognitive ability can function as a universal criterion for measuring moral worth. I argue that Singer fails to adequately represent cognitive capacity as the object of moral knowledge at stake in his theory. He thus fails to put forth credible knowledge claims, which undermines both the trustworthiness of his moral theories and the morality of the actions called for by these theories. I situate Singer's methods within feminist critiques of moral reasoning and moral epistemology, and argue that Singer's methods are problematic for moral reasoning because they abstract from their object valuable contextual features. I further develop this claim by showing the importance of embodiment for the construal of objects of moral knowledge. Finally, I develop the moral and scholarly implications of this critique. By showing that the abstract, universal methods of reasoning Singer employs cannot credibly construe the objects of ethical inquiry, I call into question the validity of these methods as a means to moral knowledge in general. Furthermore, since moral reasoning takes place within an embodied moral landscape, it is itself a moral enterprise. Singer's moral reasoning, and ours, must be held accountable for its knowledge claims as well as its concrete effects in the world.     

从分离到整合--彼得·乌尔利希的整合性经济伦理学述评

彼得·乌尔利希(PeterUlrich,1948~)现为瑞士圣·加仑大学经济伦理学研究所所长、教授,当代德语国家地区经济伦理学代表人物之一,曾任欧洲经济伦理网络组织执行委员、董事等职。曾多年从事企业咨询顾问工作,有丰富的经济活动实践经验。他的整合性经济伦理学自树一帜,在德语区的经济伦理学和企业伦理学界占有重要地位,在德国深有影响。他著述丰富,主要代表作有《整合性经济伦理学———服务于生活的经济学之基础》、《经济理性的转变———现代工业社会进步的远景》、《失去魔力的市场———经济伦理的定向》,2005年出版《文明化的市场经济…     

应用伦理学研究30年:回顾与反思

应用伦理学研究在中国兴起于改革开放之初,具有深刻的现实背景和理论背景,并大体经历了三个发展阶段：20世纪70年代末至80年代末的起步阶段、90年代的发展阶段和2000年之后的深化阶段。经过30年的发展,我国应用伦理学研究取得了令人瞩目的成绩,但也仍然存在着一些突出的问题,如学科定位和学科性质不明确、本土化程度较低、实际应用能力有待加强、学科体系尚不完善等。     

石里克伦理思想述评

本文探讨了逻辑实证主义维也纳学派石里克的伦理思想 ,认为他引入心理学方法而提出的动机形成律在解释人的道德问题上极具特色 ,分析了他的快乐情感的价值以及人合乎道德行动的动因等伦理观点 ,并通过将其与边沁的功利主义、康德的义务论以及中国的程朱理学、泰州学派等伦理思想的比较 ,进一步挖掘了石里克伦理思想的理论价值。     

The Modernist Fallacy: philosophy as art's undoing [1]

ABSTRACT The essay is concerned with the widely held view that contemporary fine art is obscurantist, shallow and unrewarding of attention. It is argued that the opposition between common opinion and the advocates of modernism rests upon a philosophical disagreement about the nature and value of art. An account of aesthetic experience is then presented and illustrated by reference to Raphael's The School of Athens. This account shows the reasoning implicit in modernism to rest upon a fallacy relating to the possible forms of explanation. The essay concludes by endorsing Augustine's claim that culcural intelligibility rests not on abstract reasoning but on shared affections. This sets a requirement for artists to return to making work that engages the interests of their fellow citizens.     

Dialectical Asymmetry: Commentary on an Article by Peter Shabad

ABSTRACT

In this article, I explore the radical asymmetry set forth in the ethical turn, but suggest that Shabad develops a more refined notion of asymmetry grounded in the dialectics of giving and receiving. He develops what I call dialectical asymmetry where the reciprocity of human exchange offers an ethical demand for both analyst and patient. I suggest a productive comparison between Shabad’s perspective and the double asymmetry of the ethical seduction developed in the French tradition.     

Ecclesiology and Ethics: A Critical Self‐Reflection1

This contribution is based on the welcoming remarks of the Most Revd Dr Thabo Makgoba, the Chancellor of the University of the Western Cape, who opened the conference on “Ecclesiology and Ethics: The State of Ecumenical Theology in Africa,” hosted by the Department of Religion and Theology and the Desmond Tutu Centre for Spirituality, held at the University of the Western Cape on 3–5 June 2015. It is included here in the form in which it was presented at that conference.