TWO STRAINS IN BUDDHIST CAUSALITY

This essay will focus on the Buddhist metaphysics of experience which is generally glossed over due to the excessive concern for the ultimate goal in Buddhism, nirvīna , and in consequence of which the emphasis has been on the practice of; meditative discipline in aspiration for that goal. Yet neither nirvana nor meditative discipline can be understood properly without examining the full dimension of our ordinary experience. Such an examination should reveal to us the unique ways in which the Buddhist refers to the bounded and unbounded conditions of existence. All this is novel insofar as metaphysics goes and indeed it would have to be a unique form of metaphysics in order to accommodate the dual aspect of existence. The key to this metaphysics lodges in the Buddhist concept of experiential process,¹ technically known as pratītyasamutpāda which is variously translated as relational origination, interrelational origination or dependent origination. It refers to the Buddhist concept of causality but, as we shall see, it is a unique concept with more than the usual Western connotation.     

CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVES ON NEURO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN PERSON: PNEUMA AND PRATITYASAMUTPADA

Abstract. Recent discussions of the mind‐brain and the soul‐body problems have been both advanced and complexified by the cognitive sciences. I focus explicitly here on emergence, supervenience, and nonreductive physicalist theories of human personhood in light of recent advances in the Christian‐Buddhist dialogue. While traditional self and no‐self views pitted Christianity versus Buddhism versus science, I show how the nonreductive physicalist proposal regarding human personhood emerging from the neuroscientific enterprise both contributes to and is enriched by the Christian concept of pneuma (spirit) and the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada (codependent origination).     

Dependent origination and the dual‐nature of the Japanese aesthetic

As most commentators on Japanese aesthetics agree, the Japanese aesthetic is pervaded by a profound affirmation of things in their suchness or original uniqueness, and at the same time is tinged with an element of sadness or melancholy. While the responses of affirmation and melancholy seem rather subjective and may—at first glance—appear inconsistent with Buddhist notions like anatman, or non‐self and the Buddhist demand for non‐attachment, I shall argue that a more careful reading of certain Buddhist doctrines, specifically the doctrine of dependent origination or pratitya‐samutpāda, reveals that the basic tenets of Buddhism are not only consistent with these sorts of subjective responses, but in fact serve to help explain the dual nature of the Japanese aesthetic. Accordingly, I shall suggest that given the undeniable influence Buddhism has had on Japanese culture, it seems likely that the doctrine of dependent origination is not only compatible with, but also contributed to the formation of what we regard as the Japanese aesthetic.     

The Significance of the Buddhist 10-Membered Formula of Dependent Origination

The dynamic process of karmic activity is one of the key philosophical concepts of the Buddhist doctrine, and is traditionally explained as the operation of a chain of 12 mutually interlinked members of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Textual research, however, reveals that a series of alternative chains of members of dependent origination coexisted prior to the systematization of this earlier textual material into the standardized list of 12 members. Such an alternative list consists of 10 members. This article examines the importance of this particular list of 10 members in the development of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. This philosophy, the basic interpretation of the mundane world of which is that the world around us only xists as the working of the human mind, i.e. the domain of perceptual consciousness (vijñāna), matured in the late fourth–early fifth century CE. This examination of the 10-fold formula of dependent origination also adds to our knowledge of the region of origin of Yogācāra philosophy, and thus on the geographical diversities within the development of Buddhist philosophy.     

Towards a queer dharmology of sex

Lay practitioners of Buddhism, especially lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender/queer persons, are given little guidance by the traditional Dharmology (Buddhist theology) of sex. The most extensive discussions are the detailed prohibitions in the monastic rule, which focus on the mechanics of sex rather than on love and relationships. What advice there is on sex for lay persons is either vague or over‐determined by its cultural context. Christianity, despite being homophobic and mistrustful of sex, has developed a positive attitude towards sex within heterosexual marriage. An investigation of this suggests a Dharmology of sex as relationship, based on central Buddhist doctrines such as interdependent arising. This Dharmology can be strengthened by queering it with reference to Harry Hay's notion that gay subject–subject consciousness is more compatible with Buddhist non‐duality than the hetero subject–object consciousness. It can be claimed, therefore, that Buddha Nature, and Buddhism itself, is queer.     

To be or not to be: Buddhist selves in Toronto

Buddhist identity: a Buddhist by any other name?When we talk about a ‘Buddhist’ or ‘Buddhists’ in Canada and the United States, what exactly is our referent—a label or category, an identity, or perhaps something more? Is the term ‘Buddhist’ signifying a reified object (or subject?), one that subsumes all sorts of practices, beliefs, philosophies, and preconceptions under its umbrella? Or can the term be used to signify choice, personal commitment, motivation, partiality, and perhaps even struggle? We have a great many labels and categorizations of the differences among and between Buddhists, but can we really assume that the term ‘Buddhist’ itself is unproblematic? Calling someone a Buddhist in the West, or ‘naming’ them as such, appears initially and on the surface a fairly straightforward undertaking. And yet, the very act of naming itself is a composite of assumptions and expectations. In much of the anthropological literature on initiation rituals, the act of naming has been construed as more-or-less a societal quest for order and control of the individual. Naming marks who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. Being named is an important marker of social identity, socialness, and social belonging (inter alia, Jell-Bahlsen 1989; Jacquemet 1992; Cohen 1994).     

Beyond Good and Evil? A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche

In what ways was Nietzsche right, from a Buddhist perspective, and where did he go wrong? Nietzsche understood how the distinction we make between this world and a higher spiritual realm serves our need for security, and he saw the bad faith in religious values motivated by this need. He did not perceive how his alternative, more aristocratic values, also reflects the same anxiety. Nietzsche realised how the search for truth is motivated by a sublimated desire for symbolic security; philosophy's attempt to create the world reflects the tyrannical will‐to‐power, becoming the most ‘spiritualised’ version of the need to impose our will. Insofar as truth is our intellectual effort to grasp being symbolically, however, Nietzsche overlooks a different reversal of perspective which could convert the ‘bad infinite’ of heroic will into the good infinite of disseminating play. What he considered the crown of his system—eternal recurrence—is actually its denouement. Having seen through the delusion of Being, Nietzsche still sought a Being within Becoming. Nietzsche is able to affirm the value of this moment only by making it recur eternally. Rather than the way to vanquish nihilism, will‐to‐power turns out to be pure nihilism, for nihilism is not the debacle of all meaning but our dread of that debacle and what we do to avoid it.     

Can the Created Co‐Creator Be Lutheran?A Response to Svend Andersen

Abstract : The author responds to Svend Andersen's article in this journal 43: 4(Winter 2004) 312–23, “Can Bioethics Be Lutheran?” in which Andersen criticizes the concept of humans as created co‐creators, particularly because it asserts an equality between God and humans; he recommends in its place Luther's concept of humans as God's co‐operators or co‐workers. It is argued here that the created co‐creator meets the critique offered. The concept can be both theologized and secularized, which Andersen overlooks. The concept can be integrated into the Christian theology of divine creation, but it introduces irony into theological formulation which is necessary, and which the idea of “God's co‐operators” fails to do. Finally, the chief and most difficult theological issues are framed: Why does God create co‐creators? and How can they receive grace within a Lutheran framework?     

Learning from experience: Bion's concept of reverie and Buddhist meditation: A comparative study

The author argues for a common denominator between Bion's view and the Buddhist view of mental development. In both thought systems, mental growth is synonymous to learning from experience. The author closely examines Bion's concept of attention and compares it to mindfulness, a major factor in Buddhist meditation. In both doctrines, attention must be isolated from other mental processes in order to attain learning from experience. The author compares reverie to the state of mind of equanimity. She argues that enhancement of the ability of reverie, or improving the inner container such that it can hold any content while unmoved by desire, is the purpose of Buddhist practice. Both view the mind as capable of transcending its own restrictions and 'the capacity to know anything' as attainable through disciplined practice.     

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY IN UNCOVERING THE MATRIX OF HUMAN MORALITY

Abstract. Theology and the life sciences are mutually dependent on one another in the task of understanding the origin and function of moral behavior. The life sciences investigate morality from the perspective of the historical and communal dimension of humanity and point to survival as the primary function of human behavior. A Christian ethic of self-sacrifice advances the preservation of the entire human and nonhuman creation and should not, therefore, be objected to by the life sciences. Religion, however, is more than a survival mechanism. It points to a preserving agency beyond humanity and prevents the life sciences from reducing life to its strictly biological side.     

Vasubandhu's treatise on the three natures translated from the Tibetan edition with a commentary[1]

Trisvabhāvanirde?a (Treatise on the Three Natures) is Vasubandhu's most mature and explicit exposition of the Yogcācāra doctrine of the three natures and their relation to the Buddhist idealism Vasubandhu articulates. Nonetheless there are no extent commentaries on this important short test. The present work provides an introduction to the text, its context and principal philosophical theses; a new translation of the text itself; and a close, verse‐by‐verse commentary on the text explaining the structure of Yogacara/Cittamatra idealism and comparing it to Western versions of transcendental idealism. In particular, I show how the doctrine of the three natures is used to make idealism coherent in a Buddhist context and how it sheds light on the structure and evolution of transcendental idealism in Europe.     

IMPERCEPTIBLE SIGNS: REMNANTS OF MAGNÉTISME IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSES ON HYPNOTISM IN LATE NINETEENTH‐CENTURY FRANCE*

In 1880s France, hypnotism enjoyed unique medico‐scientific legitimacy. This was in striking contrast to preceding decades when its precursor, magnétisme animal, was rejected by the medical/academic establishment as a disreputable, supernaturally tinged practice. Did the legitimation of hypnotism result from researchers repudiating any reference to the wondrous? Or did strands of magnetic thinking persist? This article interrogates the relations among hypnotism, magnétisme, and the domain of the wondrous through close analysis of scientific texts on hypnotism. In question is the notion that somnambulist subjects possessed hyperacute senses, enabling them to perceive usually imperceptible signs, and thus inadvertently to denature researchers’ experiments (a phenomenon known as unconscious suggestion). The article explores researchers’ uncritical and unanimous acceptance of these ideas, arguing that they originate in a holdover from magnétisme. This complicates our understanding of the continuities and discontinuities between science and a precursor “pseudo‐science,” and, more narrowly, of the notorious Salpêtrière‐Nancy “battle” over hypnotism.     

Buddhist Non-Cognitivism

The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I plan to argue that in light of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, it would be an inherent contradiction to the Buddhist tradition as whole to defend the cognitivist view that moral knowledge is possible. Quite the contrary, this essay will demonstrate that, in light of Buddhist theories of knowledge and metaphysical philosophies of no-self and emptiness, Buddhist ethics only makes coherent sense from a standpoint of non-cognitivism. Second, from the arguments that support a non-cognitivist reading of Buddhist ethics, I plan to show that such a standpoint does not entail moral nihilism. Rather, what we find in Buddhism is a middle-way ethic of pluralism. Herein I shall argue that the moral life of Buddhism non-cognitively arises within skandha of feelings, yet is conditioned by the cognitive nature of Buddhist wisdom.     

The nature and scope of global ethics and the relevance of the Earth Charter

This article presents global ethics as critical reflection on the nature, justification and application of a global ethic. Much of the article focuses on the nature of a global ethic as the content of global ethics, e.g. whether it is thick or thin, is about universal values or transnational responsibilities, is a set of values justified by a particular thinker, values widely shared or values universally accepted. Global ethics itself as a process is also examined. In the last part the Earth Charter is examined as an example of a global ethic, and a case is made for regarding it, both in respect to its content and in respect to the senses in which it is and is not a global ethic, as an appropriate subject matter for global ethics.     

Toward an understanding of meaning creation via the collective co‐production process

Co‐production has been traditionally studied in the context of industrial and service markets. This study investigates the consumer's search for meaning and fulfillment via one type of co‐production, collective co‐production. The case study method was utilized to examine knife making from kits. The findings unpack a three‐part co‐production process (design, production, and consumption) that results in significant identity ramifications for consumers. During the design stage of knife making, the informants shaped their self‐concept through social inspiration, creative self‐expression, and identification with the primal sense of self. The production stage provided internal validation of the self‐concept through a pseudochallenge that was achieved through learning activities. The consumption stage provided external validation of the self‐concept as the informants shared their co‐production experience with others. Theoretical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Buddhist Roots of Watsuji Tetsurô's Ethics of Emptiness

Watsuji Tetsurô (1889–1960) is famous for having constructed a systematic socio‐political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought (based on lectures given in the 1920s), in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine‐tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non‐duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities.     

Simplicity and Language: Bonaventure's Semiotic Asymptoticism

Luy engages in a close reading of Bonaventure's doctrine of divine simplicity. He offers this reading in light of a keen awareness of contemporary critiques of the doctrine, especially from philosophers of religion who suggest that divine simplicity either means that our human words really cannot say anything intelligible about God, or that divine properties that are surely distinct (such as justice and goodness) are in fact absolutely identical. In sum, Luy recognizes that the doctrine of simplicity challenges the intelligibility of religious language. He points out that medieval thinkers, too, recognized this challenge, but they regarded it as a salutary reminder that God is ultimately incomprehensible to finite minds, even though we can speak true things about God. In expositing divine simplicity according to Bonaventure, Luy shows that Bonaventure expects that creation itself is designed to reveal God's limitless self‐communication. Divine simplicity, then, serves to affirm divine perfection, in a manner limited by the effort of finite words to express the infinite; but divine simplicity also reflects the “semiotic universe” that allows for, and exalts in, the wondrous expression of the divine plenitude.     

试论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学的理论主旨

罗尔斯顿从整个西方伦理思想发展的角度出发,认为道德是人的存在方式,环境伦理的产生不是要推翻或取代人际伦理,而是要为自然共同体中的人类确立生存方式。人类道德之所以要观照自然生态系统,是因为自然生态系统具有自身的内在价值和存在目的,以文化方式生存于其中的人类须对此给予道德的尊重。环境伦理与人际伦理共同构成了完整的人之伦理,它们都是人的生存之道。     

ONLINE BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

I report the findings of a comparative analysis of online Christian and Buddhist responses to artificial intelligence. I review the Buddhist response and compare it with the Christian response outlined in an earlier essay (Tamatea 2008). The discussion seeks to answer two questions: Which approach to imago Dei informs the online Buddhist response to artificial intelligence? And to what extent does the preference for a particular approach emerge from a desire to construct the Self? The conclusion is that, like the Christian response, the Buddhist response is grounded not so much in the reality of AI as it is in the discursive constructions of AI made available through Buddhist cosmology, which (paradoxically), like the Christian response, are deployed in defense of the Self, despite claimed adherence to the notion of anatta, or non‐Self.