Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

In search of lost time,Merleau-Ponty,Bergson, and the time of objects

The chapter on temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, is situated in a section titled, “Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World.” As such, Merleau-Ponty’s task in the chapter on temporality is to bring these two positions together, in other words, to articulate the manner in which time links the cogito (Being-for-Itself) with freedom (Being-in-the-World). To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty proposes a subject located at the junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, a subject which has an exterior that makes it possible for others to have an interior. This analysis will take Merleau-Ponty to an impasse where, on the one hand, there appears to be an objective world and the time of objects in that world, and on the other, there is the subject’s notion of events and the passing of time. Referring to Bergson’s notion of time, this essay proposes that there must be a temporal interval between perception, feeling and action in order for the subject to be “temporal by means of an inner necessity,” as Merleau-Ponty prescribes.     

Decision making, impulsivity and time perception

Time is an important dimension when individuals make decisions. Specifically, the time until a beneficial outcome can be received is viewed as a cost and is weighed against the benefits of the outcome. We propose that impulsive individuals experience time differently, that is with a higher cost. Impulsive subjects, therefore, overestimate the duration of time intervals and, as a consequence, discount the value of delayed rewards more strongly than do self-controlled individuals. The literature on time perception and impulsivity, however, is not clear cut and needs a better theoretical foundation. Here, we develop the theoretical background on concepts of time perception, which could lead to an empirically based notion of the association between an altered sense of time and impulsivity.     

Contrast, induction, facilitation, suppression, and conservation

Ten rats received all of their water in daily 1-hr sessions. Following a baseline phase in which lever and water spout were freely available throughout each session, subjects were trained to press the lever for water on mixed schedules composed of two alternating components. Each component gave access to water for a fixed cumulation of drinking time every time the rat cumulated a fixed amount of lever-pressing time. Changes in one component produced contrast and induction effects, both positive and negative, with respect to both lever pressing and drinking in the unchanged component. All schedules facilitated lever pressing relative to baseline. All schedules suppressed drinking relative to baseline, even though contingency sessions allowed ample time to perform the baseline amount of drinking. The entire pattern of results was predicted in quantitative detail by assuming that the total amount of a dimension apportioned to lever pressing and drinking is conserved between baseline and contingency sessions. Conservation theory was shown to predict several effects produced by simple fixed-ratio schedules, and was compared favorably with probability-differential (Premack, 1971) and response-deprivation (Timberlake and Allison, 1974) theory.     

Time, action, and consciousness

Time plays a central role in consciousness, at different levels and in different aspects of information processing. Subliminal perception experiments demonstrate that stimuli presented too briefly to enter conscious awareness are nevertheless processed to some extent. Implicit learning, implicit memory, and conditioning studies suggest that the extent to which memory traces are available for verbal report and for cognitive control is likewise dependent on the time available for processing during acquisition. Differences in the time available for processing also determine not only the extent to which one becomes conscious of action, but also provides the basis for making attributions of authorship to experienced acts. In this paper, we offer a brief overview of these different findings and suggest that they can all be understood based on the fact that consciousness takes time. From this perspective, the availability of representations to conscious awareness depends on the quality of these representations - the extent to which they are strong, stable in time, and distinctive. High-quality representations occur when processes of global competition have had sufficient time to operate so as to make the system settle into the best possible interpretation of the input. Such processes implement global constraint satisfaction and critically depend on reentrant processing, through which representations can be further enriched by high-level constraints. We discuss these ideas in light of current theories of consciousness, emphasizing the fact that consciousness should be viewed as a process rather than as a static property associated with some states and not with others.     

Grouping, chunking, memory, and learning

An example of grouping is dividing a long series of digits into two or more smaller units by, for example, pausing for a short time between items within groups but for a longer time between groups. Grouping, virtually neglected in animal learning, was examined in each of five rat investigations reported here in which a series of two or more runway trials was either grouped together with or apart from a terminal large reward trial. It was found that running speed on early small reward trials in the series was greater when prior trials were grouped together with rather than apart from the terminal large reward trial and this when the intertrial interval was short, 20 sec, or long, 20 to 40 min. Three possible explanations of the present findings were examined: a reward schedule view, a rule-learning view, and an anticipation view based on memory. The most feasible of these explanations, it was suggested, was the anticipation view. According to this view, when prior trials are grouped together with a terminal large reward, there is a tendency for the rat to anticipate the terminal large reward well before its scheduled occurrence, elevating running speed on earlier small reward trials. Such anticipation occurs, it was suggested, because when trials are grouped together the memory of each reward event in the series is retrieved on each subsequent trial, including the remote terminal large reward trial, where it becomes a signal for large reward. Thus the present results implicate not merely adjacent associations—associations between adjacent events—but also the highly controversial remote associations—associations between two events separated not only in time but by one or more intervening events as well.     

Action,prediction, and temporal awareness

The brain needs to track changes in the relation between action and effect. In two experiments, participants made voluntary keypress actions. In an adaptation phase, these actions were followed after a fixed interval by a tone. During a subsequent test phase, the duration of the interval was unexpectedly changed. We used time perception as an implicit marker of the experience of participants' control over the effect, and confirmed a temporal binding between actions and effects. On test trials, participants perceived tones to occur as shifted towards their time of occurrence in the preceding adaptation phase. Therefore, the perceived time of a tone was partly based on learning of an internal prediction, rather than on the time of actual sensory input. This predictive model is rapidly updated over a few trials (Experiment 1), and requires attention to the tones (Experiment 2). The brain learns action–effect relations. This predictive learning influences the perception of effects, and underlies some temporal illusions associated with action.     

Expectancy, attention, and time

Seven experiments examine the influence of contextual timing manipulations on prospective time judgments. Subjects judged durations of standard vs comparison time intervals in the context of a preceding induction (context) sequence. In some experiments, the rate of the induction sequence was systematically manipulated relative to the range of to-be-judged standard time intervals; in others, the induction sequence was omitted. Time judgments were strongly influenced by the rate of an induction sequence with best performance occurring when the standard time interval ended as expected, given context rate. An expectancy profile, in the form of an inverted U, indicated that time estimation accuracy declined systematically as a standard interval differed from a context rate. A similar expectancy profile emerged when the context rate was based on a harmonic subdivision (one-half) of an expected standard interval. Results are discussed in terms of various stimulus-based models of prospective time judgments, including those which appeal to attentional periodicities and entrainment.     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Relations between timing,position, and grouping in short-term memory

This article is concerned with how information about time and position in a sequence is represented in short-term memory and expressed in the dynamics of serial recall. Temporal-distinctiveness theories of memory predict that isolating a list item in time will improve recall accuracy for that item. Although the majority of research in short-term memory has failed to demonstrate a temporal isolation effect (TIE), there are occasions on which a TIE is observed. The disparity in results has been explained by assuming that participants can adaptively weight temporal and nontemporal information at retrieval, with differences between experiments promoting or discouraging reliance on time as a source of episodic information. A particular focus of the present study is the finding that the TIE is substantially observed in standard serial recall only when participants are instructed to group the list into minisequences. The findings of two experiments using instructed grouping replicated this effect but showed that it is attributable to a longer gap at the group boundary enhancing the positive effect of grouping on recall accuracy. These results show that the hierarchical representations usually associated with temporal grouping are also elicited by instructed grouping but that an additional and nonspecific benefit to recall obtains from lengthening the pause between groups. An additional role for time is identified in the timing of responses: The dynamics of input sequences tend to be mirrored in output sequences for ungrouped lists, whereas the primacy pattern in grouped lists is for a longer duration to speed access to the following group when that duration occurs at an instructed group boundary.     

Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.     

Emotional Well-Being Related to Time Pressure,Impediment to Goal Progress,and Stress-Related Symptoms

We propose that emotional well-being in everyday life is partially related to the balance of positive and negative affect associated with everyday routine activities. Factors that interfere with positive affect associated with such activities would therefore have negative impacts on emotional well-being. Supporting that time pressure is one such factor, we find in Study 1 for a representative sample of Swedish employees (n = 1507) answering a survey questionnaire that emotional well-being has a negative relationship to time pressure. In Study 2 we test the hypothesis that the negative effect of time pressure on emotional well-being is jointly mediated by impediment to goal progress and time stress. In another survey questionnaire a sample of Swedish employees (n = 240) answered retrospective questions about emotional well-being at work and off work, experienced impediment to goal progress, experienced time pressure, and stress-related symptoms. Statistical mediation analyses supported the proposed hypothesis.     

Reaction time, race, and racism

The claim (Jensen, 1975) that blacks are slower than whites in choice (but not simple) reaction time is examined. It is false. The claim (Jensen, 1985) that Muhammad Ali was shown to have a “very average” reaction time is examined. It is false. The claim (Vernon & Jensen, 1984) that an unpublished technical report showed blacks to be inferior to whites on a relatively content-free mental processing task is examined. It is false. Suggestions are made concerning relevant questions that might be addressed by students of race differences in intelligence.     

Self-control,motivational strength,and exposure therapy

Do people sometimes exercise self-control in such a way as to bring it about that they do not act on present-directed motivation that continues to be motivationally strongest for a significant stretch of time (even though they are able to act on that motivation at the time) and intentionally act otherwise during that stretch of time? This paper explores the relative merits of two different theories about synchronic self-control that provide different answers to this question. One is due to Sripada (Noûs 1–38, 2012) and the other to Mele (Irrationality, 1987; Autonomous agents, 1995; Motivation and agency, 2003). Special attention is paid to evidence Sripada offers for an affirmative answer to the question, and some guidance is offered on the project of finding evidence for an affirmative answer.     

Time reproduction, working memory, and behavioral inhibition in children with ADHD.

Barkley (1997a) proposed that the central deficit in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is in behavioral inhibition, resulting in deficits both in working memory and sense of time. To test this theory, 21 children with ADHD and a matched sample (ages 6-13) completed a variety of tasks that measured behavioral inhibition, working memory, attention, and time reproduction. Children with ADHD performed significantly below controls on measures of inhibition, attention, and time reproduction. They did not differ significantly from controls, however, on tasks of working memory. In addition, performance on the working memory tasks was not correlated with the time reproduction task. We discuss the relevance of these results in the context of current theories of ADHD.     

Social exclusion and the deconstructed state: time perception, meaninglessness, lethargy, lack of emotion, and self-awareness

The authors hypothesize that socially excluded individuals enter a defensive state of cognitive deconstruction that avoids meaningful thought, emotion, and self-awareness, and is characterized by lethargy and altered time flow. Social rejection led to an overestimation of time intervals, a focus on the present rather than the future, and a failure to delay gratification (Experiment 1). Rejected participants were more likely to agree that "Life is meaningless" (Experiment 2). Excluded participants wrote fewer words and displayed slower reaction times (Experiments 3 and 4). They chose fewer emotion words in an implicit emotion task (Experiment 5), replicating the lack of emotion on explicit measures (Experiments 1-3 and 6). Excluded participants also tried to escape from self-awareness by facing away from a mirror (Experiment 6).     

“时间流”:概念、维度及影响因素初探

"时间流"(timeflow)是指从行为体验的角度来定义时间,即个体在当前某项活动中所感知到行为体验的时间过程,塑造"时间流"的维度包括:外部场景的塑造、自身肢体动作的配合、活动规则的初步感知、目标情感的逐渐融入、文化喻义的深入联想。影响个体"时间流"的主要因素包括感知和情绪,"时间流"也会影响消费体验和幸福体验。未来应关注时间"双扭结"价值函数如何影响人们的行为决策及验证"时间流"五个维度之间的耦合关系。     

Time perception,attention, and memory: A selective review

This article provides a selective review of time perception research, mainly focusing on the authors' research. Aspects of psychological time include simultaneity, successiveness, temporal order, and duration judgments. In contrast to findings at interstimulus intervals or durations less than 3.0–5.0 s, there is little evidence for an “across-senses” effect of perceptual modality (visual vs. auditory) at longer intervals or durations. In addition, the flow of time (events) is a pervasive perceptual illusion, and we review evidence on that. Some temporal information is encoded All rights reserved. relatively automatically into memory: People can judge time-related attributes such as recency, frequency, temporal order, and duration of events. Duration judgments in prospective and retrospective paradigms reveal differences between them, as well as variables that moderate the processes involved. An attentional-gate model is needed to account for prospective judgments, and a contextual-change model is needed to account for retrospective judgments.