The Problem of a Transcendent God for the Well‐Being of Continuous Creation

This year marks the 30th Anniversary of Lynn White's critique of Christianity, which set off the field of eco‐theology. At that time, apologetic theologians responded to the White critique, that the Genesis “dominion” command is largely responsible for the contemporary ecological crisis, through reformulating Christian doctrines to address ecological issues. These pioneers have brought us a long way in terms of addressing both how Christianity has been responsible in supporting harmful human‐earth relations and what resources within the tradition might be useful for addressing the contemporary ecological crisis. Building on this work, this article suggests that Christian theology (whether eco or not) will continue to support an understanding of the human being as rooted “outside of creation” as long as the concept of a transcendent, Omni, Creator‐God is left intact. In place of this theological discourse of transcendence which secularizes the natural realm, I suggest a “radical materialist” (Val Plumwood) understanding of Christianity that moves between idealism and reductive materialism (both are forms of transcendence) through a “planetary” (Spivak) understanding of Creation and a “bio‐historical” (Gordon Kaufman) understanding of anthropology.     

When Does Religious Racial Integration “Count?” A Caution About Seeking Ideal Ethnographic Cases

If the particular demographics of attenders, their storied backgrounds, and the peculiar aspects of their social and economic circumstances fail to conform to an “ideal scenario” of “ultimate” diversity, we might find ourselves disappointed. This appears to be one of the most important aspects of Richard Pitt's critique. Pitt desires a different “ideal” case for analysis, a church with black leadership and a clear black dominance that successfully integrates whites. Such an analysis is sorely needed, but this does not reflect the dynamics of Oasis nor does it address what has been one of the most pressing questions among scholars of diversity over the past decade. Given that any black‐white integration is rare, I would not so easily dismiss the specifics of this case. Indeed, rather than merely reverse the case, I want to radicalize the critique. It is time to more purposefully examine diversity beyond the “racial divide,” and I suggest here several ways we can expand the research agenda on diverse congregations.     

On the significance of Hannah Arendt's the human condition for sociology

Arendt's book is an analysis of the vita activa, which comprises the three human activities of labor, work, and action. Her presentation involves a critique of modern and current conceptions of them and of many other social phenomena, and an emphasis on distinctions customarily neglected. The interpretation of her book, disregarding the many factual statements it contains, proceeds in a theoretical vein, analyzing her major conceptions, and then turns practical, asking what we as social scientists who listen to her must do (focusing on “behavior” and “action”, “values”, the means‐end scheme, and man's historicity and dualism). The paper concludes with a brief explication of areas of research seen to emerge out of Arendt's work.     

Simone Weil on Labor and Spirit

This essay argues that Simone Weil appropriates Marx's notion of labor as life activity in order to reposition work as the site of spirituality. Rather than locating spirituality in a religious tradition, doctrine, profession of faith, or in personal piety, Weil places it in the capacity to work. Spirit arises in the activity of living, and more specifically in laboring—in one's engagement with materiality. Utilizing Marx's distinction between living and dead labor, I show how Weil develops a critique of capital as a “force” that disrupts the individual's relation to her own work by reducing it to the mere activity of calculable “production.” Capital reduces labor to an abstraction and thereby uproots human subjectivity, on a systemic scale, from its connection to living praxis, or what Weil calls spirituality. Life itself is exchanged for a simulacrum of life. In positioning living labor as spiritual, Weil's work offers a corrective to these deadening practices.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

Reflections on Feminist Merleau‐Ponty Skepticism

Shannon Sullivan's critique of Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is based on the argument that, due to his concept of the “anonymous body,” his theory of intersubjectivity omits the particularities of bodies, such as gender. 1 argue that Merleau‐Ponty's “anonymous body” (le corps phénoménal) is not in fact “neutral” as Sullivan suggests, and moreover that he does not ignore differences but rather provides us with the idea of difference as a process of differentiation. Additionally, I argue that Sullivan's concept of “hypothetical construction,” which is introduced as an alternative to Merleau‐Ponty, turns out to be a conscious construction, not reflecting upon its very conditions. Thus, Sullivan's account fails by presupposing what in fact needs to be explained: the particularities.     

Thought processes,Loneliness and Anxiety. Experimental and psychoanalytical investigations into creative thinking

The author questions whether Kernberg's suggestion that the interaction between splitting and other defence mechanisms—such as primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and denial [disavowal]—gives an adequate psychodynamic explanation of borderline personality structures. The author shows that the assumption of a splitting mechanism provokes contradictions and that primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and disavowal cannot be seen as genuine defence mechanisms. He argues that primitive idealization is a type of reaction formation and that the omnipotence of these patients can be put down to identification with the idealized ego-functions of their objects. He also maintains that the clinical phenomena can be understood as the outcome of a combination of an “equiparant” and “disequiparant” isolation, displacement, projection and primitive idealization, making the concept of splitting as an explanatory device superfluous.     

Theology as Conversational Event: Karl Barth, the Ending of "Dialogue" and the Beginning of "Conversation"

This essay deals with a commonly voiced concern with Barth's theology as expressed in the form that his theology illegitimately secures itself from critique, polices its narrow location assiduously and only lets in a few carefully vetted others when convinced that they can be useful. In contrast, through exploring John Milbank's distinction between dialogue and conversation it becomes possible to critique James Barr's and Clark Pinnock's understandings of “conversation” in a way that serves to hear Barth, and what it entails for theology to be “conversational”, significantly differently. Indeed, it will be maintained that “conversation” is an appropriate metaphor to apply to what Barth was doing with his theology.     

The Problem with “Caring” Human Rights

Although Daniel Engster's “caring” human rights are, on the surface, a compelling way to bring the concept of care into the international political realm, I argue they actually serve to perpetuate some of the same problems of mainstream human‐rights discourses. The problem is twofold. First, Engster's particular care theory relies on an uncritical acceptance of our dependence relations. It can, therefore, not only overlook how local and global institutions, norms, and the marketplace shape our relations of (inter)dependence, but also serve to further naturalize our current dependence relations. Second, Engster's caring human rights are only minimally feminist, which means that they do not pay attention to the way in which women's full and equal political participation is a necessary component to challenging and overcoming the oppression, marginalization, and exploitation of women and their caring labor worldwide. Although I am sympathetic to Engster's goals and some of his proposed policy solutions, I argue that we should not abandon the critical, feminist lens of care ethics in favor of “caring” human rights that cannot overcome the care critique of mainstream human‐rights discourses.     

MARTYRDOM: SELF‐DENIAL OR SELF‐EXALTATION? MOTIVES FOR SELF‐SACRIFICE FROM HOMER TO POLYCARP A THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION1

This article explores the theological understandings of martyrdom in the second century and how they might serve as a response to Nietzsche's critique that Christian martyrdom is not self‐abnegation but a self‐deluded assertion of the will to power. In reply to this objection, the article focuses on the early church's self‐conscious concern for the proper and improper forms of martyrdom as depicted in the Martyrdom of Polycarp. By contrasting the depiction of Polycarp's martyrdom “according to the gospel” with classical views of self‐sacrifice in Homer's Iliad and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, it will show how martyrdom, contra Nietzsche, can be an act of true self‐denial.     

Replies to Wallace,Queloz, and Kirwin

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self-undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the “unconditional will to truth,” which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal.     

CREATED CO-CREATOR IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHURCH AND ETHICS

Abstract Philip Hefner's work on created co‐creator is presented for consideration as a contemporary theological anthropology. Its reception within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America falls into three main lines, which are reviewed here because they are suggestive of its potential impact on Christian thinking. This review raises two major questions and leads to a critique. The first question is whether created co‐creator should be replaced by another term for the sake of more clearly encapsulating the ideas represented in Hefner's work. The second question concerns the moral “payoff” of created co‐creator. Such questions lead to the critique that Hefner's corpus gives insufficient attention to responsibility as integral to freedom and that it lacks a theory of obligation. I then sketch the amenability and benefit of linking created co‐creator with “responsibility ethics,” exemplified by the work of Hans Jonas.     

Discussion: Toward a social‐constructivist view of the psychoanalytic situation

The three papers by Modell, Aron, and Greenberg are discussed in terms of their relationship to a new paradigm for understanding the psychoanalytic situation. The paradigm is called social‐construct‐ivist to capture both the idea of the analyst's participation and the idea of construction of meaning. It is argued that these theorists, as well as many of the authors they cite as part of a broad movement in the field, do not consistently meet the criteria for this paradigm, although they seem to be aiming for it. An important source of inconsistency and confusion derives from the confounding of the two axes: drive‐relational and positivist‐constructivist. Many relational theorists who hold fast to the idea that analysts can grasp the truth of both their own experience and that of the patient are no closer to the constructivist point of view than was Freud. The call by Aron and Greenberg for greater attention to the patient's resisted experience of the analyst's subjectivity is discussed in terms of its potential benefits and problems. The ritualized asymmetry of the psychoanalytic situation is said to have important functions, including prevention of excessive involvement and protection of the unobjectionable positive transference and of a degree of idealization. Modell's notion of paradox, which makes the therapeutic relationship seem “real”; and “unreal”; at the same time, is seen as a special instance of the always precarious social construction of reality. It is argued, moreover, that the social and individual aspects of experience are interdependent. Neither is reducible to the other, and both should be understood, like many other issues in the new paradigm, in terms of a dialectical interplay of figure and ground in experience.     

Alterity in Simone de Beauvoir and Emmanuel Levinas: From Ambiguity to Ambivalence

This article is meant to stage an encounter, a kind of rendezvous, between Emmanuel Levinas and Simone de Beauvoir regarding how alterity seems to enable an ethical relation for Levinas while closing one for Beauvoir. I will argue that Beauvoir's reading of Levinas on “the other” is not a charitable one, and the ethical ambivalence in Levinas's notion of alterity can motivate the praxis Beauvoir seeks for undoing social forms of oppression. I will start with Beauvoir's interpretation of alterity as “feminine otherness” in Levinas's ethics that, for her, originates in the violent perspective of male privilege. Then I will move to Levinas's response to this critique in a set of interviews with Philip Nemo, and to consideration of how a more charitable reading of alterity, understood as a sort of ambivalence in the structure of subjectivity, creates a close proximity between Levinas's and Beauvoir's ethics of action. I contend that both Beauvoir and Levinas respectively developed their ethics of action, either of ambiguity or of ambivalent alterity, in order to free thought from the absolute seriousness with which normative standards are held.     

Commentary on Paper by Lawrence J. Brown

Brown's historical overview of post-Kleinian psychoanalysis traces key steps in the evolving and diverse practice of working in the psychoanalytic situation while regarding it as a two-person field. The Barangers' “The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field” is central to his narrative. I develop my understanding of the originality of their contribution in theorizing a situational unconscious, and of their continuing relevance for thinking about analytic listening and intersubjective collaboration. Brown presents a countertransference dream of his own along with the dream of a patient as an example of the Barangers' concept of the “shared unconscious fantasy” of the analytic couple. A detailed alternative reading of Brown's clinical vignette reveals an absence of fit with the Barangers' views on collaboration in the analytic situation. Some uses of Bion's “dreaming” and “becoming” are implicitly questioned as they risk encouraging the idealization of special states over process.     

Nietzsche and “we knowers”: Comments on Reginster's The Will to Nothingness

Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality is strikingly book-ended by the theme of knowledge-seeking: the Preface opens with the ominous claim that “[w]e are unknown to ourselves, we knowers”, and the Third Essay's climax is the assertion that scientific, scholarly activity does not stand in opposition to the ascetic ideal but is instead only that ideal's most recent and insidious instantiation. This feature of the text is absent from Reginster's The Will to Nothingness. Nonetheless, the interpretive machinery that Reginster develops in his reading of the Genealogy as a genealogy and critique of morality can also go a long way towards helping us to make sense of the text as, at the same time, a genealogy and critique of knowledge-seeking. Making use of Reginster's account in this way serves to illuminate both the interpretive power and some of the limitations of his reading.     

ONTOTHEOLOGICAL TURNINGS? MARION,LACOSTE AND LEVINAS ON THE DECENTRING OF MODERN SUBJECTIVITY

In this article, Schrijvers examines the decentering of the modern subject at issue in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Luc Marion, and Jean‐Yves Lacoste from the perspective of ontotheology. Schrijvers contends that in both Marion's and Lacoste's phenomenology an unexpected return to the subject‐object distinction occurs, and asks whether a simple reversal of the subject‐object distinction suffices to break out of the ontotheological scheme. In a second move, Levinas’ account of a “relation without relation” is developed as a solution to the problem perceived in the works of Marion and Lacoste. Via a critique of Levinas, Schrijvers suggests that what is at stake in reversing the subject‐object distinction entails less an “overcoming” of ontotheology and more a matter of comporting oneself towards it in an appropriate way.     

DIONYSIUS AND SOME LATE MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL THEOLOGIANS OF NORTHERN EUROPE

Though the authority of Dionysius as a virtually apostolic theological source remains unchallenged in the late Middle Ages, ownership of his inheritance is much disputed, in connection with two issues of “mystical theology” principally. The first controversy (broadly between “Intellectualist” and “affectivist” readings of Dionysius' Mystical Theology) concerns whether the soul, united to God by grace, is made one with God principally by knowledge or by love. The second controversy is well exemplified by the disagreement between Jean Gerson and Denys the Carthusian as to whether Ruusbroec's account of the nature of that union of the soul with God amounts to a heretical extinction of the identity of the created soul. But both Gerson's critique of Ruusbroec and Denys the Carthusian's rebuttal of it are equally superficial, and the theologies of Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa show why: Eckhart and Cusa retained, while Gerson and Denys had lost, their grip on the “dialectics” of “sameness” and “difference” expounded in Mystical Theology.     

Bioethics in the Making: “Ideal Patients” and the Beginnings of Face Transplant Surgery in Mexico

Medical teams around the world are increasingly gaining ethical clearance to utilise face transplant surgery as a reconstructive surgical procedure. Analysis of the beginnings of the operation in Mexico vis-à-vis the early uptake of the procedure in France reveals that this controversial experimental medical field has become loaded with national significance. The primary issue of dispute has been the dependence on life-threatening immunosuppressant therapy in a procedure that treats otherwise biologically healthy people. Attempts to resolve related debate has resulted in the emergence of what my interlocutors refer to as an “ideal patient”, a person whose particular state of health and suffering render them operable within the current biomedical constraints. Drawing together the idiom of coproduction with the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries shows how this imagined patient category was refracted and stabilised as it entered into the Mexican context whilst producing patients and surgical experts as particular types of bioethical subjects. The flexibility and normative value of the “ideal patient” mobilises and is mobilised by surgeons, who themselves emerge as national bioethical subjects responsible for saving the face of nations in the midst of broader changes surrounding how State's should respond to medical advancement.