Aristotle on Choosing Virtuous Action for its Own Sake

While Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes, he also claims that many virtuous actions are to be chosen as instrumental means to securing further ends. It would seem that an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it would be choiceworthy whether or not it served further ends. How, then, can such virtuous actions be choiceworthy for their own sakes? This article criticizes John Ackrill's and Jennifer Whiting's answers to this question. I propose an alternative, linking the choiceworthiness of virtuous actions to the pleasure, nobility, and beauty to be found in them.     

Higher Education,Knowledge for Its Own Sake,and an African Moral Theory

I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of “blue-sky” knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in “tangible” or “concrete” social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are right insofar as they respect relationships in which people both share a way of life, or identify with one another, and care for others’ quality of life, or are in solidarity with each other. I argue that while considerations of identity and solidarity each provide some reason for a state university to pursue blue-sky knowledge as a final end, they do not provide conclusive reason for it to do so. I abstain from drawing any further conclusion about whether this provides reason to reject the Afro-communitarian moral theory or the intuition that blue-sky knowledge is a proper final end of public higher education. I do point out, however, that the dominant Western moral theories on the face of it do no better than the African one at accounting for this intuition.     

Metamers for Hammer-With-Ability Are Not Metamers for Poke-With-Ability

Studies on dynamic (i.e., kinesthetic) touch perception have shown that perception of many properties of wielded objects are linked to variables related to the rotational inertia of those objects. The broad nature of the sensitivity to such variables invites the question of whether various perceived functional properties of wielded objects are distinct (i.e., whether they map to rotational inertia via different functions) or whether they are perceptually equivalent (i.e., whether they map to opposite extremes of the same function). Two experiments investigated whether hammer-with-ability and poke-with-ability are perceptually equivalent (i.e., metamers) using a metameric matching strategy. The results show that metamers for hammering were not metamers for poking, and vice versa. The results suggest that haptic perception of poke-with-ability and hammer-with-ability are distinct percepts.     

Utilitarians Are Not Always Fair and the Fair Are Not Always Utilitarian: Distinct Motives for Cooperation1

This paper investigates the effect of utilitarianism and fairness motives on cooperative behavior in a real‐life, large‐scale social dilemma while also looking at the moderating effect of various situational factors on this relationship. Perceived criticality of the situation and high‐efficacy beliefs are shown to increase cooperation of utilitarians more than they increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive. Ownership of the problem and the expected cooperation of others on the other hand are shown to increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive more so than they increase cooperation of utilitarians. Implications of these findings for increasing cooperation in social dilemmas are discussed.     

Why Gamers Are Not Performers

I argue that even if video games are interactive artworks, typical video games are not works for performance and players of video games do not perform these games in the sense in which a musician performs a musical composition (or actors a play, dancers a ballet, and so on). Even expert playings of video games for an audience fail to qualify as performances of those works. Some exemplary playings may qualify as independent “performance‐works,” but this tells us nothing about the ontology of video games or playings of them. The argument proceeds by clarifying the concepts of interactivity and work‐performance, drawing particularly on recent work by Dominic Lopes, Berys Gaut, and David Davies.     

Not All Worlds Are Stages

The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivatedby the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in thecases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claimsthat there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory,it argues that these spacetime worms are not familiar particulars liketables and chairs. Rather, familiar particulars are the instantaneoustemporal slices of worms. In order to explain our intuitions that particulars persist for more than an instant, the stage theory drawson the counterpart theory of modal possibilism, which it is supposedto parallel. In this paper I show how the stage theory presupposes thattime can be divided into instants, which I call the atomistic view oftime. I do this by laying out an alternative theory of the nature oftime, the gunky view, and show that if time is gunky the stage theorycollapses into the worm theory. The deeper problem is that the merepossibility of gunky time would cause the stage theory's parallels topossibilism to break down. I therefore conclude that the stage theoryis committed to the view that time is necessarily atomistic. Finally,in the last section I argue that the fact that the stage theory rulesout a priori the possibility of time being gunky gives us reason toreject it as an account of persistence.     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

Zulu Mothers' Beliefs About Their Own and Their Children's Intelligence

Abstract

Zulu women (N = 133) were given a structural interview concerning their own and their children's multiple intelligences. The best predictor of their own self-estimated overall intelligence rating was mathematical and spatial intelligence. Mothers showed few significant differences in their estimates of their sons and daughters' overall or multiple intelligences. However, they rated their daughters' interpersonal intelligence higher than those of their sons, and their sons' bodily-kinesthetic intelligence higher than those of their daughters. The mothers believed that overall their children were about 6 IQ points more intelligent than themselves. Although mothers estimated their own spatial, inter-, and intrapersonal intelligence to be higher than those of their children, they also believed that their children had higher mathematical intelligence.     

Ranks Are Not Bypassed,Rituals Are Not Negated: The Dionysian Corpus on Return

Modern readings of the Dionysian corpus often subordinate its hierarchical treatises to its theological treatises. Two unfortunate consequences follow: one, the thetic positions and aphairetic removals of the Divine Names and Mystical Theology bypass or transcend the hierarchical ranks and hierurgical rituals of the Celestial Hierarchy and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. Second, the return to God occurs through apophatic abstraction rather than sacramental performance. This article interprets the Dionysian corpus differently, offering four arguments why Dionysian negative theology is not the means by which ranks and rituals are negated or abandoned but rather a means by which they are affirmed and accomplished.