Values,Beliefs, and Proenvironmental Action: Attitude Formation Toward Emergent Attitude Objects1

Discoveries in environmental science become the raw material for constructing social attitude objects, individual attitudes, and broad public concerns. We explored a model in which individuals construct attitudes to new or emergent attitude objects by referencing personal values and beliefs about the consequences of the objects for their values. We found that a subset of the major clusters identified in value theory is associated with willingness to take proenvironmental action; that a biospheric value orientation cannot yet be discerned in a general population sample; that willingness to take proenvironmental action is a function of both values and beliefs, with values also predicting beliefs; and that gender differences can be attributed to both beliefs and values. Our model has promise for explicating the factors determining public concern with environmental conditions.     

Comparative Study Between the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Value–Belief–Norm Model Regarding the Environment,on Spanish Housewives' Recycling Behavior

Environmental behaviors have been analyzed from different theoretical models. The theory of planned behavior emphasizes the attitudinal aspects associated with behavior, while the value–belief–norm model regarding the environment focuses on the importance of moral components when setting environmental behaviors in motion. The objective of this study was to analyze both models, comparing both their degree of fit and their predictive power regarding recycling behavior. To do so, we used a sample made up of 154 Spanish housewives. The results indicated that despite the fact that the theory of planned behavior is a general model for predicting and explaining behavior, it has a greater degree of fit and greater capacity to predict recycling behavior than the value–belief–norm model regarding the environment.     

A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism

Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism is the view that beliefs are constitutively governed by deontic norms. This roughly means that a full account and understanding of the nature of these mental attitudes cannot be reached unless one appeals to some norm of this type. My aim in this article is to provide an objection to such a conception of the normativity of belief. I argue that if some deontic norm is constitutive of belief, then the addressees of such a norm are committed to a potentially infinite number of norms. Furthermore, if addressees are in the position to fulfill all such norms, they must also be able to hold a potentially infinite number of logically independent beliefs. Both these consequences are problematic if compared with limited human capacities to act and believe.     

Relationship among values, beliefs, norms and ecological behaviour

The present study focuses mainly on the relationship between psychological constructs and ecological behaviour. Empirical analysis links personal values, ecological beliefs, consequences of environmental conditions, denial of ecological obligation, environmental control, personal norms and environment protection behaviour. Survey data from a path analysis of a Spanish sample of 403 individuals were used, showing that ecological beliefs, personal norms and eco-altruistic values have become the main psychological explanatory variables of environment protective behaviour. Ecological beliefs, when measured by the New Ecological Paradigm Scale, affected ecological behaviour decisively. Environmental and altruistic values were shown to be related to moral obligation, and a basic variable to understand behaviour. Personal norm mediated the effects of values and environmental control on ecological behaviour.     

Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action: Correlations With Demographic Variables and With Beliefs About Targets,Actions, and Economic Effects1

Two studies assessed beliefs and attitudes toward affirmative action in the workplace. Opposition to affirmative action was most strongly associated with respondent race (White) and political conservatism, the belief that it involves strong actions (preferential hiring and setting aside jobs), and the expectation that it will hurt company performance. Attitudes were also positively associated with perceived frequency of employment discrimination experienced by the target group and negatively associated with their resulting employment opportunities. Regression results revealed that economic consequences for the company overwhelmed beliefs about target group employment opportunities in predicting affirmative action attitudes. Respondents associated aftirmative action most strongly with Black and Hispanic targets, and White respondents whose affirmative action schemas featured these 2 targets had the most negative attitudes.     

Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation

Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non‐epistemic norm of belief formation. In this article I present an objection to unusability pessimism and argue that Robert Hopkins, the view's most prominent defender, fails to motivate adequately the claim that there are such non‐epistemic belief norms. The cases which putatively legitimize usability norms can be explained by appeal to more familiar norm types: epistemic norms of belief formation, and non‐epistemic norms which govern action other than belief formation. The intent of this article is not primarily negative, however, and I will also argue that understanding why the unusability position fails helps us to identify a promising new direction for the pessimist's opponents who wish to defend the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony.     

Biopsychosocial etiology of obsessions and compulsions: an integrated behavioral-genetic and cognitive-behavioral analysis

Accumulating evidence suggests that particular kinds of dysfunctional beliefs contribute to obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Three domains of beliefs have been identified: (a) perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty, (b) overimportance of thoughts and the need to control thoughts, and (c) inflated responsibility and overestimation of threat. These beliefs and OC symptoms are both heritable. Although it is widely acknowledged that OC symptoms probably have a complex biopsychosocial etiology, to our knowledge there has been no previous attempt to integrate dysfunctional beliefs and genetic factors into a unified, empirically supported model. The present study was an initial step in that direction. A community sample of monozygotic and dizygotic twins (N = 307 pairs) completed measures of dysfunctional beliefs and OC symptoms. Structural equation modeling was used to compare 3 models: (a) the belief causation model, in which genetic and environmental factors influence beliefs and OC symptoms, and beliefs also influence symptoms; (b) the symptom causation model, which is the same as (a) except that symptoms cause beliefs; and (c) the belief coeffect model, in which beliefs and OC symptoms are the product of common genetic and environmental factors, and beliefs have no causal influence on symptoms. The belief causation model was the best fitting model. Beliefs accounted for a mean of 18% of phenotypic variance in OC symptoms. Genetic and environmental factors, respectively, accounted for an additional 36% and 47% of phenotypic variance. The results suggest that further biopsychosocial investigations may be fruitful for unraveling the etiology of obsessions and compulsions.     

Hume's Surprise and the Logic of Belief Changes

If the logic of belief changes is extended to cover belief states which contain both factual and normative beliefs, it is easily shown that a change of a factual belief (an 'Is') in a mixed belief state can imply a change of a normative belief (an 'Ought') in the same state. With regard to Hume's so-called 'Is-Ought problem', this means that one has to distinguish its statics from its dynamics. When this is done, it becomes clear that changes of factual beliefs can, for rational reasons, have far-reaching normative consequences. Similarly, a change of a factual belief can imply a change of a value belief. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Temporal Binding,Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective “sense of agency.” However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause–effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.     

Introducing the Collective Action Recursive Empowerment (CARE) Model: How Small-Scale Protests Led to Large-Scale Collective Action in Armenia's Velvet Revolution

The current study examined the motivations and outcomes of the Armenian Velvet Revolution through the voice of 18 protesters with qualitative interviews, exploring their motivations for joining the collective action, their perceptions of its implementation, and resultant psychological changes. Participants distinguished between individual- and group-level processes and bypassed social divisions through a shared belief in the value of “Rejecting Serzh” (i.e., opposing then President Serzh Sargsyan). Results also illustrated a recursive process of collective action supporting the development of a new theoretical CARE (collective action recursive empowerment) model. The model understands successful social change as a function of both individual and group identity informing collective-action processes: Smaller acts of protest increase individual feelings of shared group identity and empowerment/efficacy beliefs, thus strengthening motivations for continued protest and making large-scale collective action achievable. By linking together multiple time points of a collective-action process in one recursive model, the current work maps out one specific case of successful collective action in recent history, which serves as a basis for broader theoretical generalization and future empirical research.     

Underlying dimensions of ecocentric and anthropocentric environmental beliefs

This study focuses on the cognitive components of general environmental attitudes. Taking as a starting point the scale of Thompson and Barton (1994) to identify ecocentric and anthropocentric motives in environmental conservation, the beliefs that guide attitudes in the person-environment relationship are analyzed. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to contrast the tripartite structure of these beliefs--based on egoistic, socioaltruistic, and biospheric aspects-with a two-dimensional structure that confronts ecocentric and anthropocentric orientations. The results obtained from two samples, a student sample (n = 212) and a sample from the general population of Madrid (n = 205), indicate the existence of a three-dimensional structure of environmental beliefs: an anthropocentric dimension based on the instrumental value of the environment for human beings, a biospheric dimension that values the environment for its own sake, and, lastly, an egobiocentric dimension that values the human being within nature as a whole.     

Representing,Running, and Revising Mental Models: A Computational Model

People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber , a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human‐like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low‐cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber ; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

Perceptual Entitlement*

The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called “entitlement”, that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti‐individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states–hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined.     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

Justification as the appearance of knowledge

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed.     

Identifying Salient Beliefs About Leisure Activities: Frequency of Elicitation Versus Response Latency1

Sets of 16 beliefs about the consequences of each of 6 leisure activities were selected in a pilot study by means of free elicitation. The beliefs varied in salience (salient vs. nonsalient), valence (positive vs. negative), and type (instrumental vs. effective). In the main study, 69 college students expressed their agreements with each belief, evaluated the consequences involved in the beliefs, and rated each leisure activity on 4 evaluative scales as a standard measure of attitude. The latencies of these responses were used to assess accessibilities of beliefs and attitudes in an effort to quantify degree of salience. Accessibility of beliefs was found to increase significantly with frequency of elicitation in the pilot study (salience) and with the judged favorability of the consequences. Salience was further found to be related to degree and extremity of agreement. Accessibility was also found to moderate the correlation between beliefs and attitudes posited in the expectancy-value model of attitude. The correlation between a given belief and the direct attitude measure increased with the belief's accessibility, and the correlation between a measure of attitude based on the set of salient beliefs and the standard attitude measures increased with the accessibility of the attitude. Implications for the identification and measurement of perceived benefits and costs of leisure are discussed.     

Cross-Cultural Testing of Three Social Cognitive Theories: An Application to Condom Use1

The aim of this study was to test the cross-cultural validity of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, and Triandis' theory of interpersonal behavior and to apply them to understanding the intention to use a condom with a new partner in three ethnocultural communities: Latin American, English-speaking Caribbean, and South Asian. All respondents were recruited from multiple ethnocultural-venues using predetermined sampling frames and quotas for each community. The results indicated that the three theories have cross-cultural validity, but the theories of Ajzen and Triandis performed better than the theory of Fishbein and Ajzen. It is recommended that role beliefs and moral norm (personal normative belief) be added to Ajzen's model to maximize its predictive and explanatory ability.