Compassion and purity: the ethics and boundary-making of Christian evangelicals

The paper explores the ethical attitude of Christian evangelicals in a church in Britain and how it affects boundary-making of their community. Evangelicals in the case study seek to be accepting of the person and to refrain from being judgemental. The paper distinguishes between the person-centred ‘ethic of compassion’ and the norm-centred ‘ethic of purity’. The ethic of compassion consists in accepting another and recognising the dignity of another based on shared humanity. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. In contrast, the ethic of purity privileges adherence to the moral order of the group over considerations for the person. The ‘compassionate’ frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the ‘pure’ frame of mind reinforces them. The boundaries of a community result from the interplay of the two ethics.     

Selfless Self-Love

This paper challenges the idea that there is a natural opposition between self-interest and morality. It does by developing an account of self-love according to which we can have self-regarding reasons that (1) differ substantially from the standard conception of self-interest and that (2) share enough crucial features with moral reasons to count as morally respectable.The argument involves three steps. The first step concentrates on the idea of a moral point of view as a means to distinguish between reasons that could be morally respectable and those we have reason to distrust as not morally respectable. The second step discusses Harry Frankfurt's work on love, in order to develop an attitude of selfless love as a source of morally respectable reasons. The third step introduces the idea of an alternative of oneself to show that selfless self-love is a coherent conception of an attitude that provides one with self-regarding and self-grounded reasons that are also morally respectable.     

Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics

In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics (NEMMS). According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed (at least in part) by non‐moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta‐semantics have in common, and how each one promises the Cornell realist a response to the Moral Twin Earth objection. I then argue that Cornell realists ought to be wary of adopting NEMMS. A naturalist realist who adopts this meta‐semantics confronts a trilemma. The proponent of NEMMS owes a meta‐ethical account of the relevant content‐fixing normative facts. Such facts are either reducible to recognizably natural facts or they are not. If they are not reducible, then NEMMS entails the denial of ethical naturalism (and so, the denial of Cornell realism). If such facts are taken to be reducible to facts about agents’ actual or hypothetical attitudes, then (among other problems) the account renders moral facts stance‐dependent. Consequently, moral realism is false. Alternatively, one might propose that the content‐fixing normative facts are reducible to attitude‐independent natural facts. However, such a proposal is refuted by its own Twin Earth objection.     

Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society

We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity‐sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent (attributing nonreproductive properties to differences in vaguely defined reproductive roles), but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex‐based discrimination.     

Perception of Easy–Difficult: Attitude or Self‐Efficacy?

This study investigates the semantic-differential item easy-difficult in order to evaluate whether it can be considered a measure of attitude or self-efficacy in relation to consistent condom use with sex partners. Using confirmatory factor analysis and comparing a set of logically nested models, our findings suggest that easy-difficult acts most like an attitude item in relation to this particular behavior, especially for males rating condom use with their main sex partners. However, for females and to a less extent males with nonmain sex partners, easy-difficult acts as a measure of both attitude and self-efficacy. Therefore, the use of easy-difficult items should be avoided or used with caution in this research context.     

Unlocking the beauty of the imperfect duty to aid: Sen's idea of the duty of assistance

This paper examines the links between acting upon a duty to assist, responsibility for these actions, and how such actions link with incremental moral duties that can amass as a consequence of such action. More specifically, this paper is concerned with practices of international aid and assistance, whereby public and privately funded donations enable the actions of parties outside of the territorial and jurisdictional boundaries of a community and state to directly influence the functioning of that community, and the incremental moral duties to which such action can give rise. Using a Senian account of the basis of moral duty, it explains how agents are responsible for the outcomes of their acts of assistance, even when mediated through international institutional actors, and how such acts can give rise to accumulative duties and obligations that are not bound or constrained by territorial boundaries or pre-existing special obligations.     

Heteronormativity and/as Violence: The “Sexing” of Gwen Araujo

This paper will examine the violence of heteronormativity: the violence that constitutes and regulates bodies according to normative notions of sex, gender, and sexuality. This violence, I will argue, requires more than a focus on gendered or sexualized physical harms of the kinds normally examined when studying violence against sexual minorities or women. Rather, it necessitates focusing on the multiple modalities through which heteronormativity performs its violence on, through, and against bodies and persons, including through the production of certain bodies and persons as inciting violence in their very being. To establish my argument, I explore the killing in 2002 of trans woman Gwen Araujo and the violence of the legal strategy (the trans panic defense) used in the legal trials that followed her killing. Both forms of violence, I suggest, operate in a similar way, albeit through different mechanisms, to maintain and extend the system of binary morphology that itself entails the perpetual violent materialization of sexed bodies.     

Pleasure in Epicurean and Christian Orthodox conceptions of happiness

The essay examines the central role that pleasure plays in a wide range of conceptualisations of happiness or ‘good life’, from Epicurean hedonism, to Christian asceticism, to contemporary cases of pastoral and philosophical counselling. Despite the apparent moral chasm between hedonists and ascetics, a look at the practices promoted by Epicurus and the Christian monastic fathers reveals striking similarities. The reason is that, at a fundamental level, both parties agree that one should reject the vulgar pleasures that society glorifies, and develop a refined attitude that seeks the appropriate and natural pleasures, while ignoring the harmful or unnecessary ones. And such an attitude can only be acquired through moral training, either by philosophical instruction and reflection, or by pastoral counselling. We highlight some important parallels regarding the connection between pleasure and happiness, as conceived by Epicureans and monastic fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. We begin by discussing elements of Epicureanism that can also be found in its rival philosophical schools and Christianity, mainly the emphasis on forming the right conception of happiness and acting in accordance with it. We then examine the connection between morality and happiness in the Christian Orthodox monasticism. We argue that Christian ascetic ethics not only condone some types of pleasures, but in fact require them as elements of happiness in this life that play an instrumental role for the Christian soteriological dogma. The argument has wider philosophical significance because it shows that pleasure is indeed a fundamental conceptual ingredient of happiness across different normative ethical contexts.     

The Media’s Sexual Objectification of Women,Rape Myth Acceptance,and Interpersonal Violence

A new trend has emerged in print advertisements by which women’s bodies are literally morphed into objects. This study begins to explore this phenomenon by examining the effects of viewing these types of advertisements on attitudes toward rape and violence, as well as rape likelihood. In addition, this study examined the degree to which moral disengagement and dehumanization influences rape likelihood through rape myth acceptance. Three hundred eighty participants viewed 1 of 3 conditions—control, sexual objectification of women, or women as objects—and then filled out a number of questionnaires to assess their rape myth acceptance, acceptance of interpersonal violence, rape likelihood, and moral disengagement. Results indicated that although viewing sexually objectified women in advertising did not increase any of the dependent variables for individuals in the experimental conditions compared to the control condition, there was a main effect of sex for several dependent measures, as well as a full mediation of moral disengagement and rape likelihood by rape myth acceptance in male participants. These findings suggest that education aimed at correcting men’s endorsement of rape myths might be a key pathway to decreasing rape likelihood. Despite these conclusions, this study’s primary limitation was that it was conducted with collegiate participants with an unequal gender distribution.     

The Baroness's Comittee and the President's Council: ambition and alienation in public bioethics

The President's Council on Bioethics has tried to make a distinctive contribution to the methodology of such public bodies in developing what it has styled a "richer bioethics." The Council's procedure contrasts with more modest methods of public bioethical deliberation employed by the United Kingdom's Warnock Committee. The practices of both bodies are held up against the backdrop of concerns about moral and political alienation, prompted by the limitations of moral reasoning and by moral dissent from state policy under even the most democratic of governments. Although the President's Council's rhetoric is often scrupulously conciliatory, recurring features of its argumentative practice are regrettably divisive. They order these things better in Britain.     

Conservatives are happier than liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction

Political conservatives are happier than liberals. We proposed that this happiness gap is accounted for by specific attitude and personality differences associated with positive adjustment and mental health. In contrast, a predominant social psychological explanation of the gap is that conservatives, who are described as fearful, defensive, and low in self-esteem, will rationalize away social inequalities in order to justify the status quo (system justification). In four studies, conservatives expressed greater personal agency (e.g., personal control, responsibility), more positive outlook (e.g., optimism, self-worth), more transcendent moral beliefs (e.g., greater religiosity, greater moral clarity, less tolerance of transgressions), and a generalized belief in fairness, and these differences accounted for the happiness gap. These patterns are consistent with the positive adjustment explanation.     

What Is ‘The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness’? Philosophy as a Way of Life in Nietzsche and Montaigne

Robert Pippin has recently raised what he calls ‘the Montaigne problem’ for Nietzsche's philosophy: although Nietzsche advocates a ‘cheerful’ mode of philosophizing for which Montaigne is an exemplar, he signally fails to write with the obvious cheerfulness attained by Montaigne. We explore the moral psychological structure of the cheerfulness Nietzsche values, revealing unexpected complexity in his conception of the attitude. For him, the right kind of cheerfulness is radically non‐naïve; it expresses the overcoming of justified revulsion at calamitous aspects of life through a reflective, higher‐order affirmative attitude. This complex notion of cheerfulness turns out to have roots in Montaigne himself, and it must (according to both philosophers) be thought of as a kind of second nature cultivated through practice, as a kind of second nature. Understanding the meaning of cheerfulness thereby sheds light on the conception of philosophy as a way of life in both Nietzsche and Montaigne.     

Changing Attitude and Moral Obligation: Their Independent Effects on Behavior

It was hypothesized that the study of religion should distinguish between attitudes and religious values/moral obligations such that both aid in predicting religiously relevant behavior and changing either will change behavior. However, if they are distinct, then changing one will not necessarily change the other. For the 195 religious participants, attitudes predicted a church-sponsored blood donation and moral obligations increased that prediction. Using both posttest only and pre-post control group designs, an intervention to shift the effect underlying the attitude increased participants' attitude and donating behavior while a religious values intervention increased moral obligations and behavior. Zero to 4 percent of the control groups donated blood, while 13 to 48 percent of the intervention groups donated blood. Results confirm that psychology of religion should distinguish moral obligations from attitude because (1) additional prediction, (2) changing one does not necessarily change the other, and (3) changes based on religious values impact moral obligations.     

I—The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the 'relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain 'fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame , which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate— moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance.     

Determinants of intentions to practise safe sex among 16–25 year-olds

This study aimed at predicting intentions to avoid casual sex and to use condoms, through self-efficacy, attitudes, optimistic bias in perceived risk, knowledge and past sexual risk behaviour. To this end, a mixed-sex sample of high school and university students between 16 and 25 years completed questionnaires at two points in time. Intentions to avoid casual sex were predicted positively by the attitude towards avoiding casual sex and assertiveness in sexual relationships, and negatively by communication about sex. The intention to use condoms was predicted positively by the perceived benefits of condom use, and negatively by past sexual risk behaviour and fatalism. Gender and sexual experience were found to have a moderating influence, implying that AIDS education should use different messages for these target groups. Since the results show that condom use is quite a powerful habit and that sexually non-active subjects had more positive intentions towards safe sex, AIDS education should start at a young age in order to establish safe sex habits from the beginning. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE LOCAL NATURE OF MODERN MORAL SKEPTICISM

Abstract:  Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a good case against Annas' thesis. To accomplish this, it will be helpful to consider the Pyrrhonean attitude towards morality as expounded in Sextus Empiricus' work.     

Carol Gilligan's theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning during adolescence

Gilligan's work, which focuses on sex differences in moral reasoning, the perception of violence, the resolution of sexual dilemmas and abortion decisions, poses a major challenge to Kohlberg's theory by introducing a feminist perspective of moral development. Kohlberg had shown that the average female attained a moral judgment rating of stage three (good boy-nice girl), while adolescent males score at level four (law and order) and are more likely to move on to postconventional levels. Gilligan suggests that these findings reveal a gender bias, not that females are less mature than boys. Men and women follow different voices. Men tend to organize social relationships in a hierarchical order and subscribe to a morality of rights. Females value interpersonal connectedness, care, sensitivity, and responsibility to people. Kohlberg's scoring criteria give the interpersonal care orientations of females lower ratings than the principled justice orientation. Hence, Gilligan identifies different developmental stages for females. However, she does not claim that one system is better; both are equally valid. Only by integrating these complementary male (justice) and female (care) orientations will we be able to realize our full human potential in moral development.     

Using Augustine in contemporary sexual ethics. A response to Gilbert Meilaender

In response to Gilbert Meilaender's innovative interpretation of Augustine and of Roman Catholic teaching, the author suggests (1) that Meilaender attributes to Augustine a more positive view of sexual pleasure than the texts will support, (2) that modern Roman Catholic teaching suggests that love should have priority over procreation as a meaning of sex; and (3) that the moral logic of Meilaender's argument does not require a rejection of all reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the author agrees that a more critical attitude should be adopted toward the reasons for which technologically assisted reproduction is promoted and undertaken, as well as toward its social impact.     

KANT ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE: INDEPENDENCE OR INTEGRATION?

Abstract. Immanuel Kant's theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge tempt conclusion that natural science and religion are two independent discourses of a dualistic system. To be sure, knowledge is anchored in two kinds of causality. Theoretical knowledge is governed by physical causality. Practical knowledge is concerned with the human capacity to initiate a sequence of events that nature could not accomplish on its own—although in conformity with, not independent of, natural causality. Furthermore, the two realms presuppose a common totality of order not of humanity's creation. Without these presuppositions, we could not experience the world as we do, and it would never occur to us to engage in a scientific investigation of the natural world. Hence, we should first exhaust our attempts at explanation on the basis of physical causality before turning to the aid of teleology. The anomalous becomes an occasion to seek a physical law not yet known whereas the miraculous hinders search for a natural law. However, higher than knowledge of “what is” is our capacity to discern “what should be.” This is an inclusive moral capacity that establishes what it means to be human and unites all moral agents in an invisible kingdom of ends that constitutes a moral culture in the physical world uniting religion and science.