“Dependency, subordination, and recognition: On Judith Butler's theory of subjection”

Judith Butler's recent work expands the Foucaultian notion of subjection to encompass an analysis of the ways in which subordinated individuals becomes passionately attached to, and thus come to be psychically invested in, their own subordination. I argue that Butler's psychoanalytically grounded account of subjection offers a compelling diagnosis of how and why an attachment to oppressive norms – of femininity, for example – can persist in the face of rational critique of those norms. However, I also argue that her account of individual and collective resistance to subjection is plagued by familiar problems concerning the normative criteria and motivation for resistance that emerge in her recent work in new and arguably more intractable forms, and by new concerns about her conceptions of dependency, subordination and recognition.     

On Two Versions of ‘the Surprise Examination Paradox’

In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a key step of the student’s reasoning. I then consider the condemned prisoner case in W. V. Quine’s paper ‘On a So-Called Paradox’. I argue that the prisoner’s reasoning as conceived by Quine is more relevant and reasonable than the student’s argument in the popular version of the surprise examination case. I also argue that Quine’s criticism of the prisoner’s reasoning is correct, and therefore that the condemned prisoner case, and the surprise examination case as well, would not generate any paradox.     

Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem

Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.     

The Paradox of Wuwei? Yes (and No)

This essay considers P. J. Ivanhoe's critical challenge to Slingerland's analysis of wuwei(‘effortless action’). While I agree with Ivanhoe that we should do more work to embody and understand the concept of wuwei, I will defend Slingerland's notion that wuwei involves paradox—particularly in the cases of Zhuangi and Laozi. The present essay is not a defense of the specifics of Slingerland's analysis. Nonetheless, this essay focuses on defending the notion of paradox. Ivanhoe offers an alternative view of wuwei, one that sees the paradox as a riddle. I argue that this kind of formulation would frame the problem of wuwei in an unhelpful manner. I offer several novel ways of overcoming, or at least qualifying, the experience of paradox that seems to be at play in nondoing.     

Subjects Without a World? An Husserlian Analysis of Solitary Confinement

Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has proposed the term “SHU syndrome” to name the cluster of cognitive, perceptual and affective symptoms that commonly arise for inmates held in the Special Housing Units (SHU) of supermax prisons. In this paper, I analyze the harm of solitary confinement from a phenomenological perspective by drawing on Husserl’s account of the essential relation between consciousness, the experience of an alter ego and the sense of a real, Objective world. While Husserl’s prioritization of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity underestimates the degree to which first-person consciousness is constitutively intertwined with the embodied consciousness of others, Husserl’s phenomenology nevertheless provides a fruitful starting-point for a philosophical engagement with the psychiatric research on solitary confinement.     

Russell＇s Paradox of Predicates

Russell＇s letter to Frege of June 16, 1902 contains the famous paradox of the class of all classes which are not members of themselves as well as a second paradox of the predicates that cannot be predicated of themselves. The latter paradox arises out of Russell＇s theory of classes and class concepts in Principles of Mathematics.     

Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint

Ever since Kant asked: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions.     

On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.     

Love and Justice: a Paradox?

Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.     

The Modern Construction of Childhood: What Does It Do to the Paradox of Modernity?

The examination of the modern construction of subject is not over yet. Although many thinkers have exhausted its conceptual ambiguities and practical consequences, its impact is far from fully understood without an analysis of the construction of childhood for the future subject. In this essay, I problematize five constructions of childhood that emerged in the modern time and scrutinize the impasses of logic or conceptual ambiguities within, along with the practical consequences thereof. I explore how the modern construction of childhood is problematic in and of itself, as well as the light it sheds on the deeply embedded ambiguities and aporia (Wagner in A sociology of modernity: liberty and discipline. Routledge, New York 1994; Zhao in Educ Theory 57(1):75–88 2007) in the construction of the modern subject. This paper will untangle the problems associated with each of these constructs and their respective implications for the making of the modern subject.     

Women and Leadership: A Developmental Paradox?

In this article, the author explores the nature of leadership from a gendered perspective, specifically addressing leadership challenges for women. Leadership challenges, gender stereotypes, and definitions of leadership are discussed. Recommendations for professional redefinition of leadership within the counseling profession and strategies for successful negotiation of leadership roles are provided.     

Witnessing and Passing. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

The author indicates that she has two voices. One voice speaks to the patient's loneliness and detachment and her expectation to not be seen, believed, or acknowledged. This voice, housing the knowledge that events that remain unprocessed continue to have an impact, wants Dr. Prince to risk intrusion and preemption. This voice believes that it is worth it. The author's other voice considers bottomless wounds and speaks to the patient's need to build up healthy aspects of personality that is necessary to do the holocaust work. This voice holds that this is not the time for Dr. Prince to witness what happened to the patient, what the perpetrators of massive crimes did to her or what the onlookers saw and chose not to do. This voice says that the patients lead should be followed. The author elaborates on her two voices and indicates what she would have done had she been working with the patient.     

Which Horse do You Ride? Trauma from a Relational Perspective. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

Discussing Dr. Robert Prince's clinical case example, the author presents a relational psychoanalytic perspective on working with the traumatized patient. She considers the presentation of his work with a Holocaust survivor from a relational perspective with particular attention to the dyadic interaction, the intersubjectivity and co-creations of patient and analyst, and finally, addresses the role of the “witness” in psychoanalytic work. The idea of the witness has particular currency in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. The author briefly examines the dimensions of the “witness” from a relational point of view. Consideration is also given to the necessary distinction between adult onset and childhood onset trauma and the repercussions of each for the analytic couple.     

Imagining the Truth. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

The discussion highlights the significant role played by imagination in representing the horrors that resist representation. It is Dr. Tylim's position that imagination assists patient and analyst in overcoming the limitations of memory. Imagination is the gateway to truth. In working with survivors, the therapeutic encounter may become a stage where unspeakable experiences attain presence in their absence. The silence or the gaps are then the victim's testimony.     

No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology

Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.     

The Paradox of Howard Becker’s Intellectual Identity

Howard S. Becker, best known as a sociologist of deviance, claims that he “never really did work on deviance as such.” Why does he say this? The fortuitous nature of his entry into the field, his belief that deviance is not an analytic category, and the amount of time, energy, and commitment he has invested in this as opposed to other fields, play a role in this stance. In all likelihood, contrary to his wish, Howard Becker will always be regarded as a deviance researcher.