Does Animal Ethics Need a Darwinian Revolution?

A frequent argument is that Darwin’s theory of evolution has or should revolutionize our conception of the relation between humans and animals, though society has yet to take account of that revolution in our treatment of animals. On this view, after Darwin demonstrated the essential continuity of humans and animals, traditional morality must be rejected as speciesist in seeing humans as fundamentally distinct from other animals. In fact, the argument is of dubious merit. While there is plenty of room for improving our treatment of animals, it is unlikely that these shortcomings can be blamed on scientific ignorance, or that knowledge of the theory of evolution has any clear moral implications for our treatment of animals.     

How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?

The standard formulations of the supervenience relation present the supervenience of one set of properties on another in terms of property correlations, without placing any constraints on the dependency relation concerned. This does not ensure that properties supervening upon phys-icalistically acceptable base properties are not themselves emergent in a way at odds with materialism. So physicalism needs 'superdupervenience'. I argue that, where supervenient and base properties are instantiated in the same individuals, Horgan's requirement of robust explanation is neither sufficient nor necessary for superdupervenience. His paradigm case is compatible with the supervenient property's being emergent. This and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by means of a metaphysical constraint on the supervenience relation, which must be internal. Each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property must be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. Satisfying this condition is all that is needed to render supervenience superduper. In fact a wide variety of non-reductive physicalist accounts are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem.     

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.     

Simul What? Toward a Grace for the Fearful

The doctrines of forensic justification and simul iustus et peccator assume a primarily moral theo‐cosmology. However, the former constricts the excessiveness of divine grace, while the latter fails to adequately capture the fullness of the human condition. Freeing divine grace and theological anthropology from the moral requires a shift in emphasis toward suffering and an acknowledgment that a deep root of sin is creaturely vulnerability. In this case, the incurved self might symbolize the fearful, pulling goods toward the self for protection. While accountability for sin remains important, the first response to the fearful, who act from a sense of deep vulnerability, is compassion rather than judgment. In this way grace attends to but ultimately exceeds the moral.     

Does a Real Albert Nolan Need Don Cupitt? A Response to Ronald Nicolson

In this paper, in response to Nicolson's claim that South African liberation theology is non-realist – or at least is non-realist in its language – I suggest that Albert Nolan's important book God in South Africa is not based on such an "exotic" philosophical basis but is a reflection using the populist Marxism of the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s. The clue here is Nolan's use of the Colonialism of a Special Type thesis, an integral part of ANC and Communist Party discourse since the 1960s. Nolan himself has described his work as "historical materialist" in its philosophical language. Such a position seems far removed from non-realism, although they certainly sound similar in Nolan's God-language.
I then examine non-realist theologian Don Cupitt's model of "militant religious humanism" (from his Life-Lines ) and conclude that a non-realist liberation or political theology along these lines suffers too much from a sense of relativism or absurdity for it to be of use to those who use liberation theology. From this I try to suggest how a non-realist liberation theology might be developed. In the end, however, I conclude that though such a theology could be constructed, it would probably not be effective: liberation theology requires a real God who really sides with the poor.     

Defining Creativity: Don't We Also Need to Define What Is Not Creative?

I argue that any attempt to define creative ideas cannot fully succeed without also defining uncreative ideas. This argument begins by defining three parameters that characterize a potentially creative thought: the idea's initial probability (p), the final utility (u), and the creator's prior knowledge of that utility (v). The three parameters then lead to a three‐criterion multiplicative definition of personal creativity, namely, c = (1 ? p)u(1 ? v), where the first factor indicates originality and the third factor surprise. Although creativity can only maximize as originality, utility, and surprise all approach unity, the same definition indicates that there are seven different ways that creativity can minimize. These alternatives were identified as (a) routine, reproductive, or habitual ideas, (b) fortuitous response bias, (c) irrational perseveration, (d) problem finding, (e) rational suppression, (f) irrational suppression, and (g) blissful ignorance. If the third parameter v is omitted, then the number of creative and noncreative outcomes reduces to just four, making creativity indistinguishable from irrational suppression. The alternative outcomes are then illustrated using the classic two‐string problem. Besides providing a more finely differentiated conception of creativity failures, the definition has critical implications regarding the processes and procedures required to generate highly creative ideas.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).     

Need there be a common currency for decision-making?

Abstract

According to various theorists and empirical scholars of behavior and decision, including economists, utility theorists, behavioral ecologists, behavioral economists and researchers in the new field of neuroeconomics the value (typically understood as utility) of competing choices must be represented on a common scale in order for them to count as competing at all, and in order for orderly comparison to lead to actual choices. For some neuroeconomists this means that expected (cardinal) utilities are neurally represented by firing rates of cells in specific brain regions. In this paper some important statements of the ‘common currency’ argument are reviewed and critically examined. A rational reconstruction of the key argument is then subject to criticism informed by a variety of empirical and theoretical considerations. In a strong form it does not survive the criticism, and this fact points the way to a re-examination of the sense in which complex living systems, including people, are agents in any straightforward sense.     

Do We Need Toleration as a Moral Virtue?

In this essay, I reconstruct tolerance as a moral virtue, by critically analysing its definition, circumstances, justification and limits. I argues that, despite its paradoxical appearance, tolerance qualifies as a virtue, by means of a restriction of its proper object to differences that are chosen. Since this excludes the most important and divisive differences of contemporary pluralism from the scope of the virtue of tolerance, the moral model of toleration cannot constitute the micro-foundation of the corresponding political practice. However, if the political ideal of toleration must be founded on independent political reasons of justice, the moral model can bridge the gap between private morality and public reason, providing citizens with moral motives to supplement the political obligation to neutrality. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Do we Need a Special Ethics for Research?

Research is subject to more stringent ethical requirements than most other human activities, and a procedure that is otherwise allowed may be forbidden in research. Hence, risk-taking is more restricted in scientific research than in most non-research contexts, and privacy is better protected in scientific questionnaires than in marketing surveys. Potential arguments for this difference are scrutinized. The case in its favour appears to be weak. A stronger case can be made in favour of a difference in the opposite direction: If perilous or otherwise problematic activities have to be performed it is usually better to perform them in a research context where they are properly evaluated so that guidance is obtained for the future. However, retreating from current ethical demands on research is not a desirable direction to go. Instead, research ethics can serve to inspire the introduction of more stringent ethical principles in other social sectors.     

Does a quarterlife crisis exist?

In this study, the authors examined quarterlife crisis, defined in the popular press as an identity crisis that leaves recent college graduates depressed, anxious, and full of doubt. To determine if a unique crisis exists, 4 groups of young adults (recent high school [n = 23] and college [n = 117] graduates in the workforce, present undergraduate [n = 75], and graduate [n = 57] students) completed self-report measures assessing identity development, future time perspective, social support, coping, depression, anxiety, and job and life satisfaction. No support was found for a quarterlife crisis among these 4 groups. Working high school graduates displayed the highest anxiety, followed by present undergraduates. Depression was predicted by family support and identity commitment. Job satisfaction was associated with income and support from friends. Life satisfaction was associated with income, social support from friends and family, and identity commitment.     

What Does a Prophet Know?

This essay on Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy Without Contempt (2016) challenges her argument from two opposing sides. First, it critiques all jeremiads. It asks how a person uttering prophetic indictments, whether in the form of a classical jeremiad or the more moderate form that Kaveny argues for, can possibly know of what she speaks, given the otherness of God. Second, it calls for more jeremiads. It asks whether a person, whether religious or not, might indeed know enough to offer withering jeremiads, in those cases where she sees the target of her jeremiad making flagrantly incompatible commitments.     

Does everybody like a liker?

The primary hypothesis examined was that people giving positive evaluations are themselves regarded as more attractive than when they give negative evaluations. This research tests whether this holds when reciprocity is not at issue. Subjects in six experiments were presented with stimulus persons who varied in the proportion of positive to negative evaluations they gave of various attitude objects (political figures, cafeteria workers, cities, movies, and college courses). Giving predominantly positive evaluations did in fact lead to greater liking of the stimulus person in each experiment. This finding held over (1) audio or written interviews with the stimulus persons, (2) a variety of classes of attitude objects, and (3) both within-subject and between-subject designs. Greater liking for likers occurred even controlling for attitude similarity.     

Does Christianity make a difference?

The human person makes great demands on the physician and calls for unique attention. Hence the doctor-patient relationship calls for the highest ideals of kindness, patience, trustworthiness, generosity and skill. The Catholic physician brings to these demands a specific meaning: ministering to the sick is to see Christ in them and to show Him to them.