Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?

Abstract: In this paper ¹ 1 This is a slightly edited version of a paper that was pre‐circulated to members of the Society of Analtyical Psychology for discussion at the monthly meeting of the ‘analytic group’ on 4^th November 1991. Sub‐headings and some references have been added by the Editor, Warren Colman.
, written in draft form in 1991 and now posthumously published, the late Louis Zinkin ² 2 The late Louis Zinkin was a practising analytical psychologist and group analyst, a training analyst of the S.A.P., honorary consultant psychotherapist and senior lecturer at St George's Hospital, London, and associate of the Group‐Analytic Practice, London. He died on 13^th March 1993.
presents a constructivist view of the self. He considers some of the paradoxes in Jungian definitions of the self and compares these to Winnicott's ‘forbidden question’ regarding the transitional object: ‘Did you find it or did you make it?’. He argues that, for the purposes of a coherent scientific theory, these apparent paradoxes need to be formulated in an internally consistent way. Bemused by the many contradictions in Jung's thinking, he proposes making a fresh start by thinking in terms of people in social interaction with each other rather than as solitary subjects, as Jung did. This leads him to the view that the self comes into existence through continuing interaction with other people. Drawing on the work of Harré and Vygotsky, he suggests that the public self is prior to the private self and that one becomes real through recognition by other people in and through language and culture. The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Society of Analytical Psychology in November 1991 and an edited version of the taped discussion follows.     

Tell me, what did you see? The stimulus on computers

Most psychology experiments start with a stimulus, and, for an increasing number of studies, the stimulus is presented on a computer monitor. Usually, that monitor is a CRT, although other technologies are becoming available. The monitor is a sampling device; the sampling occurs in four dimensions: spatial, temporal, luminance, and chromatic. This paper reviews some of the important issues in each of these sampling dimensions and gives some recommendations for how to use the monitor effectively to present the stimulus. In general, the position is taken that to understand what the stimulus actually is requires a clear specification of the physical properties of the stimulus, since the actual experience of the stimulus is determined both by the physical variables and by the psychophysical variables of how the stimulus is handled by our sensory systems.     

Play it again: did this melody occur more frequently or was it heard more recently? The role of stimulus familiarity in episodic recognition of music

Episodic recognition of novel and familiar melodies was examined by asking participants to make judgments about the recency and frequency of presentation of melodies over the course of two days of testing. For novel melodies, recency judgments were poor and participants often confused the number of presentations of a melody with its day of presentation; melodies heard frequently were judged as have been heard more recently than they actually were. For familiar melodies, recency judgments were much more accurate and the number of presentations of a melody helped rather than hindered performance. Frequency judgments were generally more accurate than recency judgments and did not demonstrate the same interaction with musical familiarity. Overall, these findings suggest that (1) episodic recognition of novel melodies is based more on a generalized "feeling of familiarity" than on a specific episodic memory, (2) frequency information contributes more strongly to this generalized memory than recency information, and (3) the formation of an episodic memory for a melody depends either on the overall familiarity of the stimulus or the availability of a verbal label.     

Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you have, or both?

Rabbi Hyman Schachtel (1954) proposed that "happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you have" (p. 37). In two studies, we tested Schachtel's maxim by asking participants whether or not they had and the extent to which they wanted each of 52 material items. To quantify how much people wanted what they had, we identified what they had and the extent to which they wanted those things. To quantify how much people had what they wanted, we identified how much they wanted and whether or not they had each item. Both variables accounted for unique variance in happiness. Moreover, the extent to which people wanted what they had partially mediated effects of gratitude and maximization on happiness, and the extent to which they had what they wanted partially mediated the effect of maximization. Results indicate that happiness is both wanting what you have and having what you want.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

That’s the man who did it,or was it a woman? Actor similarity and binding errors in event memory

Mistakes in eyewitness identification frequently occur when incorrect associations are made between a familiar person and the actions of another person. The present research demonstrates that actors do not need to be similar in appearance for such conjunction errors to occur. The actors can, in fact, be very different in appearance, even of different sexes. Participants attempted to remember a series of brief everyday events, each involving an actor performing an action. Increases in actor similarity led to increases in conjunction errors in which participants incorrectly associated a familiar actor with a familiar action that was actually performed by someone else, but conjunction errors frequently occurred even when the familiar actor was of a different sex than the original actor, arguing against the hypothesis that these conjunction errors are due solely to mistaken identity.     

Divided attention during encoding and retrieval: differential control effects?

Previous studies have shown that divided attention (DA) during retrieval has little effect on recall of episodic memories, although DA during encoding has a large detrimental effect. One possible reason for this asymmetry is that stimulus presentation at encoding is under experimenter control, whereas retrieval operations and responses are under participant control. This experiment tested this possibility by presenting paired-associate word lists for learning and recall, either at a fixed 4-s rate or at a rate controlled by the participant. The results showed that the higher recall levels for DA at retrieval than for DA at encoding held under all combinations of experimenter and participant control. The implications of these results for a fuller understanding of encoding and retrieval processes are discussed.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Is schizophrenia what it was? A re-analysis of Kraeplin's and Bleuler's population

It has been noted that the term "schizophrenia" is now applied to a group in many ways dissimilar to Emil Kraepelin's cases of dementia praecox and Eugene Bleuler's of schizophrenia. No detailed explanation has been offered for the difference. This article offers evidence that Kraepelin's and Bleuler's concepts were derived from a population largely suffering from organic disorders including the Parkinsonian sequelae of encephalitis lethargica; it describes the conceptual confusion which followed the introduction of the concept of post-encephalitic Parkinsonism and discusses some implications for the modern concept of schizophrenia. It is suggested that the differences between earlier and later groups of schizophrenics may be accounted for by the decline in prevalence of post-encephalitic Parkinsonism and of the neurological and behavioral sequelae of other diseases, and by the parallel unsystematic development of the concept of schizophrenia.     

Emotional intelligence: what is it,and do Anglican clergy have it?

The development of the term “emotional intelligence” (EI), its conceptualisation and three attempts to measure it are outlined. The Assessing Emotions Scale is used as part of a longitudinal study with Anglican clergy in England and Wales in their 14th year in ordained ministry. Clergy by their role are expected to be pastors, counsellors and visitors. Contrary to expectations, the clergy scored lower on EI than any other group reported by the authors of the Assessing Emotions Scale.     

Morning or Evening person? Which type are you? Self-assessment of chronotype

A marked individual difference is the morningness–eveningness preference or chronotype. Presenting its high relevance in predicting human behavior, we stress the need to control for this dimension in different studies, suggesting that this can be easily and succinctly done since individuals are aware of their chronotypes. We tested this hypothesis selecting the self-assessment item from the rMEQ scale, demonstrating that the item by itself is capable of classifying individuals in the same category as the score obtained through the original scale.     

Escaping the recent past: Which stimulus dimensions influence proactive interference?

Proactive interference occurs when information from the past disrupts current processing and is a major source of confusion and errors in short-term memory (STM; Wickens, Born, & Allen, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2:440–445, 1963). The present investigation examines potential boundary conditions for interference, testing the hypothesis that potential competitors must be similar along task-relevant dimensions to influence proactive interference effects. We manipulated both the type of task being completed (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and dimensions of similarity irrelevant to the current task (Experiments 4 and 5) to determine how the recent presentation of a probe item would affect the speed with which participants could reject that item. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 contrasted STM judgments, which require temporal information, with semantic and perceptual judgments, for which temporal information is irrelevant. In Experiments 4 and 5, task-irrelevant information (perceptual similarity) was manipulated within the recent probes task. We found that interference from past items affected STM task performance but did not affect performance in semantic or perceptual judgment tasks. Conversely, similarity along a nominally irrelevant perceptual dimension did not affect the magnitude of interference in STM tasks. Results are consistent with the view that items in STM are represented by noisy codes consisting of multiple dimensions and that interference occurs when items are similar to each other and, thus, compete along the dimensions relevant to target selection.     

The dead donor rule: should we stretch it, bend it, or abandon it?

The dead donor rule--that persons must be dead before their organs are taken--is a central part of the moral framework underlying organ procurement. Efforts to increase the pool of transplantable organs have been forced either to redefine death (e.g., anencephaly) or take advantage of ambiguities in the current definition of death (e.g., the Pittsburgh protocol). Society's growing acceptance of circumstances in which health care professionals can hasten a patient's death also may weaken the symbolic importance of the dead donor rule. We consider the implications of these efforts to continually revise the line between life and death and ask whether it would be preferable to abandon the dead donor rule and rely entirely on informed consent as a safeguard against abuse.     

Naming the color of a word: is it responses or task sets that compete?

Subjects named the colors in which high- and low-frequency words and pronounceable nonwords, otherwise matched, were displayed. Color naming was slower for all three item types than for visually equivalent strings of nonalphanumeric symbols but was no slower for words than for nonwords, nor for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words. Unpronounceable letter strings had intermediate color-naming latencies. However, frequency and lexical status had large effects on latency for reading the same words and pseudowords aloud. Interference is thus predicted not by the strength of association between a letter string and its pronunciation but by the presence of word-like constituents. We argue that the interference from an unprimed noncolor word is due to, and isolates, one of two components of the classic Stroop effect: competition from the whole task set of reading. The other component, response competition, occurs only when lexical access is sufficiently primed.     

Processing redundant signals: coactivation, divided attention, or what?

The evidence for and against a redundancy gain in reaction time (RT) when the target is repeated in the visual display is reviewed. We consider the relevance of redundancy gains under these circumstances to the question of whether attention can be simultaneously directed to separate locations in the visual field. In the present experiments, two capital letters were the target stimuli in a two-alternative forced-choice RT paradigm. In addition to the usual conditions of single-target trials, trials on which the target is repeated in the display, and trials on which the target occurs with a noise letter, we introduced the innovation of a condition in which both targets occur in the display. In our two experiments, RT was fastest with single-target displays and slowest with displays containing a target and a noise letter. There was no significant difference in RT to displays in which the target was repeated and displays in which both targets were presented. Both conditions showed a redundancy gain when compared with displays containing a target and a noise letter. The lack of response competition in the both-targets condition and the overall pattern of the results were well explained by a unitary attentional focus that serially processed the letters in the display. Analyses of minima and maxima RTs were consistent with this interpretation.