The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments

Common sense recognizes emotion's ability to influence judgments. We argue that affective processes, in addition to generating feeling states, also influence how political cognition is manifested. Drawing on the theory of affective intelligence, we examine the role that anxiety plays in how and when people rely on predispositions and when they rely on contemporaneous information in making political tolerance judgments. We report on two experimental studies to test our arguments. In the first study we find that extrinsic anxiety generates a resistance response among subjects who hold a strong predisposition and a receptive response among those who do not. In the second study we present subjects with explicit "frames" exposing them to a pro- or anti-free speech message. We find that extrinsic anxiety enhances responsiveness to frames while an absence of anxiety diminishes the impact of these frames. Taken together these results show that affective processes shape how people make political judgments.     

How extending your middle finger affects your perception of others: Learned movements influence concept accessibility

Body movements both express and influence how people feel and think. Conceptualizations of this bidirectional influence assume that movement-concept associations can be innate or learned, although evidence for learned associations remained ambiguous. Providing a conservative test of learned movement-concept associations, two studies investigate the influence of culture-specific body movements, which involve an arbitrary relationship between movements and associated concepts. Paralleling the influence of hostility primes, extending the middle finger influenced the interpretation of ambiguously aggressive behaviors as hostile, but did not influence unrelated trait judgments (Study 1). Paralleling the effects of global evaluative primes, upward extension of the thumb resulted in more positive evaluations of the same target along all trait dimensions and higher liking of the target (Study 2).     

Predicting similarity judgments in intertemporal choice with machine learning

Similarity models of intertemporal choice are heuristics that choose based on similarity judgments of the reward amounts and time delays. Yet, we do not know how these judgments are made. Here, we use machine-learning algorithms to assess what factors predict similarity judgments and whether decision trees capture the judgment outcomes and process. We find that combining small and large values into numerical differences and ratios and arranging them in tree-like structures can predict both similarity judgments and response times. Our results suggest that we can use machine learning to not only model decision outcomes but also model how decisions are made. Revealing how people make these important judgments may be useful in developing interventions to help them make better decisions.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior

People often make judgments about the ethicality of others’ behaviors and then decide how harshly to punish such behaviors. When they make these judgments and decisions, sometimes the victims of the unethical behavior are identifiable, and sometimes they are not. In addition, in our uncertain world, sometimes an unethical action causes harm, and sometimes it does not. We argue that a rational assessment of ethicality should not depend on the identifiability of the victim of wrongdoing or the actual harm caused if the judge and the decision maker have the same information. Yet in five laboratory studies, we show that these factors have a systematic effect on how people judge the ethicality of the perpetrator of an unethical action. Our studies show that people judge behavior as more unethical when: (1) identifiable vs. unidentifiable victims are involved and (2) the behavior leads to a negative rather than a positive outcome. We also find that people’s willingness to punish wrongdoers is consistent with their judgments, and we offer preliminary evidence on how to reduce these biases.     

社会距离知觉对道德判断的影响研究

理论上,人们对不同个体行为是否违背道德的判断是完全一致的。本研究提出,人们对社会距离线索的知觉会影响对道德行为的判断。研究设计了两个实验,分别从社会距离直接启动和社会距离线索启动的角度对这一假设进行了检验。结果发现,较近的社会距离启动及社会距离线索都能促使个体采取更温和的道德判断,功利主义的色彩比较浓厚,而较远的社会距离启动促使个体采用更加严格的道德判断,表现出道义论倾向。文章最后讨论了这一结果对未来研究的意义。     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Accuracy and Bias in Social Perception Research

How do perceivers make accurate social judgments? A substantial amount of evidence suggests that perceivers' judgments are often quite accurate even when they do not have direct access to the truth, in part because they make judgments through biased processes. In the present article, we examine the dynamic relationship between bias and accuracy in social perception research. We outline how bias and accuracy are theoretically and empirically distinct processes and describe the importance (and difficulty) of defining and measuring both truth variables and bias variables in order to make empirical conclusions in accuracy research. Additionally, we examine how both bias variables (e.g., stereotypes, perceivers' own beliefs) and truth variables exert an influence on how perceivers make social judgments, as well as the extent to which judgments are accurate. Lastly, we provide steps that researchers can take in order to examine the relationship between bias and accuracy in their own research.     

How (far) can rationality be naturalized?

The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, including optimization methods. A standard way to defend the use of heuristics is by reference to accuracy-effort trade-offs. We take a different route, emphasizing ecological rationality (the relationship between cognitive heuristics and environment), and argue that in uncertain environments, more information and computation are not always better (the ??less-can-be-more?? doctrine). The resulting naturalism about rationality is thus normative because it not only describes what heuristics people use, but also in which specific environments one should rely on a heuristic in order to make better inferences. While we desist from claiming that the scope of ecological rationality is unlimited, we think it is of wide practical use.     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.     

Evaluating everyday explanations

People frequently rely on explanations provided by others to understand complex phenomena. A fair amount of attention has been devoted to the study of scientific explanation, and less on understanding how people evaluate naturalistic, everyday explanations. Using a corpus of diverse explanations from Reddit’s “Explain Like I’m Five” and other online sources, we assessed how well a variety of explanatory criteria predict judgments of explanation quality. We find that while some criteria previously identified as explanatory virtues do predict explanation quality in naturalistic settings, other criteria, such as simplicity, do not. Notably, we find that people have a preference for complex explanations that invoke more causal mechanisms to explain an effect. We propose that this preference for complexity is driven by a desire to identify enough causes to make the effect seem inevitable.     

Surface features of utterances, credibility judgments, and memory

Information acquired in conversation is often not credible, which makes monitoring its credibility critical. Listeners of conversations often use surface features of utterances, such as pause and intonation, to guide their credibility judgments. In this research, we explore whether listeners' delayed credibility judgments about remembered information are affected by the surface features of the speakers' utterances. In addition, we examine some of the specific factors involved in this issue: (1) how listeners' listening strategies influence their subsequent credibility judgments and (2) how the type of surface features of the utterances influences listeners' ability to make delayed credibility judgments. The results indicate that intonation of the utterances continues to influence listeners' assessment of the credibility of remembered information, that the influences of intonation depend on listening strategies, and that people have difficulty using/remembering pause length when making a delayed credibility judgment. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory

Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend the opposite reaction. Contrary to what recent discussions lead us to expect, practical reason is not simply a philosophical fiction lacking empirical roots. Empirical research does not exclude the possibility that practical reason can play a substantive role; rather, there is evidence that it can help us both to determine our first personal moral judgments and to motivate us to act on them.     

Sample representativeness affects whether judgments are influenced by base rate or sample size

We investigated how people use base rates and sample size information when combining data to make overall probability judgments. Participants considered two samples from an animal population in order to estimate the probability of that animal being aggressive. Participants' judgments were influenced by subpopulation base rates when they were provided and linked to specific samples. When samples were not identified as coming from different subpopulations, judgments typically reflected sample size information. We conclude that 1) People can use base rates when combining samples to make an inference; 2) People can correctly use sampling information to determine when to use base rates, and 3) People are able to consider base rate and sample size information at the same time. Additionally, we found that individuals' numeracy correlates with the extent to which base rate and sample size information is used.     

When does feeling of fluency matter?: how abstract and concrete thinking influence fluency effects

It has been widely documented that fluency (ease of information processing) increases positive evaluation. We proposed and demonstrated in three studies that this was not the case when people construed objects abstractly rather than concretely. Specifically, we found that priming people to think abstractly mitigated the effect of fluency on subsequent evaluative judgments (Studies 1 and 2). However, when feelings such as fluency were understood to be signals of value, fluency increased liking in people primed to think abstractly (Study 3). These results suggest that abstract thinking helps distinguish central decision inputs from less important incidental inputs, whereas concrete thinking does not make such a distinction. Thus, abstract thinking can augment or attenuate fluency effects, depending on whether fluency is considered important or incidental information, respectively.     

Natural Compatibilism,Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.     

Contrast and Rater-Perspective Effects on Judgments of Sexual Harassment Severity: What He Thinks She Thinks,and Vice Versa

We looked at whether ratings biases can influence judgments people make about sexually harassing behaviors. Online participants (N = 176) read and rated the severity of complaint scenarios describing different incidents of alleged harassment. We manipulated: (1) contrast effects, by having people judge other, independent scenarios before judging a target scenario, and (2) rater-perspective effects, by having people judge from both a self- and then an opposite-gender perspective. For the former, we hypothesized that if judgments about harassment are qualitatively similar to judgments made in other areas (e.g., performance appraisal), they too should show contrast effects. For the latter, we hypothesized people would use stereotypes about the other gender, thereby overestimating the true (i.e., self-perspective driven) gender difference. Results supported both hypotheses, suggesting that decision makers should be aware of the possible influence of biases when judging whether behaviors constitute harassment.     

The Meaning of Brand Names to Children: A Developmental Investigation

We explored the way that children use brand names in making consumer judgments. Brand names can serve as a simple perceptual cue that identifies a product as one people are familiar with or one they associate with certain perceptual features. Brands can also be associated with symbolic or conceptual meanings, conveying status, prestige, or trendiness. We proposed that young children relate to brands on a perceptual level, whereas older children relate to brands on a conceptual basis as well. We examined this proposition in an experiment conducted with children 8,12, and 16 years of age. Participants were asked to evaluate an advertised product (e.g., athletic shoes) with a familiar brand name that was either popular (e.g., Nike^®) or less popular (e.g., Kmart^®). The advertised product was physically identical in both cases, allowing us to explore whether the brand name had meaning for children apart from its name familiarity or perceptual features. The use of conceptual brand meanings was assessed by asking participants to make several types of brand‐related judgments including evaluations of the advertised product, impressions of the owners of the advertised product, and evaluations of possible extensions of the popular brand name advertised. Results indicate that by the time children reach 12 years of age, they use brand names as an important conceptual cue in consumer judgments.     

美德是幸福的前提吗？

幸福研究方兴未艾,但当今研究着重于幸福的心理描述性层面,而通常忽视了幸福概念中的规范性或者评价性层面。在孔子和亚里士多德等哲学家眼中,美德是幸福的前提。心理学实证研究发现,实践美德行为,如志愿、捐助等活动能够使人获得幸福。同时,研究也发现,人们倾向于认为具有美德的人会更加幸福。虽然实证研究能够说明美德与幸福具有关系,但是在美德与幸福的因果联系确定上,以及美德对于幸福来说是否是工具性的问题上,还需要更多的研究。     

Grouping information for judgments

Models of cue weighting in judgment have typically focused on how decision-makers weight cues individually. Here, the authors propose that people might recognize and weight groups of cues. They examine how judgments change when decision-makers focus on cues individually or as parts of groups. Several experiments demonstrate that people can spontaneously pack information into cue groups. Moreover, group-level weighting depends on how people assess similarity or how they think of categorical hierarchies.     

Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask

Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. We still find systematic differences between confidence and accuracy, including an overall bias toward overconfidence. However, these effects vary greatly with the type of judgment. There is little general overconfidence with two-choice questions and pronounced overconfidence with subjective confidence intervals. Over- and underconfidence also vary systematically with the domain of questions asked, but not as a function of difficulty. We also find stable individual differences. Determining why some people, some domains, and some types of judgments are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how confidence judgments are made.