The Loss of Loss Aversion: Paying Attention to Reference Points

We agree with Gal and Rucker ( 2018 , in press) that loss aversion is not as firmly established as typically assumed. We affirm, however, the more general principle put forward within Prospect Theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979), which is that reference points increase people's sensitivity to objective changes in value. We show how the literatures on counterfactual thought, social comparison, and goal pursuit are consistent with the notion that reference points increase sensitivity to change in value, while not being consistent with loss aversion. We then examine, within the framework of Regulatory Focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998), how different reference points combine with characteristics of the actor and the situation to give rise to loss aversion (more sensitivity to negative outcomes than to positive outcomes) as well as to the reverse pattern (more sensitivity to positive outcomes than to negative outcomes). Our review suggests that the status quo, even when used as a reference point, is not necessarily neutral. It also suggests that anchor points other than the status quo may serve as reference points and that people may use more than one reference point simultaneously. More generally, we call for a critical examination of the “bad is stronger than good” principle.     

Bringing (Contingent) Loss Aversion Down to Earth — A Comment on Gal & Rucker's Rejection of “Losses Loom Larger Than Gains”

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.     

Skeptical Parasitism and the Continuity Argument

Abstract: Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do; we would be “insulated” from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique from within. Having given my argument for this claim (which I call the Continuity Argument), I consider and respond to two important objections. I conclude that the skeptic has a powerful meta‐argument to be deployed in defending the legitimacy of his skeptical conclusions against the slings and arrows of (those I call) the half‐true theorists.     

损失规避源于得失程数多于获得？——损失规避的得失程数变化视角的再检验

刘欢、梁竹苑 和 李纾（2009a）在证明损失规避的得失程数变化视角时所取的损益值取值范围、对安于现状偏差影响的控制以及所选取的得两程失一程和得三程失两程的决策对象这四个方面存在的缺陷。本研究通过弥补上述缺陷并设计无关变量得到更严格控制的得三程失两程的决策情景,对得失程数变化视角重新进行了检验。结果发现,寿命“得一程失一程”的属性并未导致损失规避消失;在广泛的损益值范围内以自由为对象的决策同样表现为损失规避;将自由感知为生而拥有和后天获得的人数大致相当;因而得失程数变化视角需作出重要修正,同时前景理论与情绪预测误差理论亦不可完全预测损失规避出现的条件。     

Perspectives,Perceptions, and Risk-Taking Behavior

Several organizational researchers have recently argued that the propositions of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory are in conflict with commonly held notions of risk taking for opportunities and risk aversion for threats. This investigation was an attempt to empirically separate threat and opportunity perceptions from loss and gain perspectives. Experiment 1 (N= 244) revealed that most decision makers, faced with a traditional framing problem, perceived the risky alternative as an opportunity when they were in the loss domain, but perceived it as a threat when they were in the gain domain. Experiment 2 showed that framing the same (loss and gain) problems as threats versus opportunities influenced risk taking, such that management students (N= 84) were more risk taking for opportunity-framed problems and risk averse for threat-framed problems. At the same time, the students took more risks for the loss problem than for the gain problem. We conclude that threat and opportunity perceptions are theoretically and empirically distinguishable from loss and gain perspectives.     

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.     

Switching points of view in spatial mental models

In six experiments, subjects read narratives describing varying spatial scenes with more than one point of view. They were probed with questions about objects located in six directions from each character's point of view. Subjects' response times were consistent with a one place-one perspective rule. They seemed to form separate mental models for separate places and to take a character's perspective when there was only one relevant character in a scene, but they seemed to take a neutral perspective when there was more than one probed point of view, rather than switch perspectives.     

Economic decision biases and fundamental motivations: how mating and self-protection alter loss aversion

Much research shows that people are loss averse, meaning that they weigh losses more heavily than gains. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that although loss aversion might have been adaptive for solving challenges in the domain of self-protection, this may not be true for men in the domain of mating. Three experiments examine how loss aversion is influenced by mating and self-protection motives. Findings reveal that mating motives selectively erased loss aversion in men. In contrast, self-protective motives led both men and women to become more loss averse. Overall, loss aversion appears to be sensitive to evolutionarily important motives, suggesting that it may be a domain-specific bias operating according to an adaptive logic of recurring threats and opportunities in different evolutionary domains.     

Learning scenes from multiple views: Novel views can be recognized more efficiently than learned views

In two experiments, participants were trained to recognize a playground scene from four vantage points and were subsequently asked to recognize the playground from a novel perspective between the four learned viewing perspectives, as well as from the trained perspectives. In both experiments, people recognized the novel view more efficiently than those that they had recently used in order to learn the scene. Additionally, in Experiment 2, participants who viewed a novel stimulus on their very first test trial correctly recognized it more quickly (and also tended to recognize it more accurately) than did participants whose first test trial was a familiar view of the scene. These findings call into question the idea that scenes are recognized by comparing them with single previous experiences, and support a growing body of literature on the existence of psychological mechanisms that combine spatial information from multiple views of a scene.     

Loss aversion and perceptual risk aversion

We prove that, in cumulative prospect theory, the weak loss aversion for S-shaped value functions is equivalent to a notion of risk aversion that we define from the perceptual point of view. No additional assumption or condition on the probability distortion is needed. It is demonstrated that a power S-shaped value function does not satisfy weak loss aversion, i.e., a decision maker is risk seeking with respect to some mixed sign lotteries.     

Accuracy and perspective in involuntary autobiographical memory

This study investigated accuracy (veridicality) and perspective (point of view) in everyday involuntary memories (i.e. spontaneous recollections of the past). Using the naturalistic diary method, subjects were asked to give confidence ratings on the accuracy of their involuntary memories as well as contact others who were present in them, having them also give confidence ratings. Memory perspective was assessed by asking subjects to indicate whether their memories had a field (original) or observer (the perspective of another) point of view. The results showed subjects assigning high confidence ratings to involuntary memories, which did not differ from the confidence ratings given by others, or from the confidence ratings that they had assigned to their voluntary memories. The perspective query showed that involuntary memories come with both field and observer perspectives, and that their relative proportions did not differ from those reported for their voluntary memories. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidentialism and skeptical arguments

Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (??skepticism??) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world??e.g., my current belief that I have hands??aren??t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism??the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument??from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it??s clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than the Underdetermination Argument??s key premise. Next I examine ways of motivating each argument??s key premise. I argue that attempts to motivate them which appeal to one??s having the same evidence in skeptical scenarios, to skeptical hypotheses?? alleged ability to explain our evidence just as well as real world hypotheses, or to the fact that if skeptical scenarios were true everything would appear just as it does all fail to provide any motivation for the premises or for skepticism. But I close by considering a different argument for the key premises and skepticism that lacks the central defect of these other arguments. Future work on skepticism should focus on this final argument at the expense of the others.     

Skepticism: Impractical,therefore implausible

The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that skepticism is implausible because it is impractical. In particular, skepticism is implausible because it goes against the point of epistemic evaluation.     

Lessons from a Faraway land: The effect of spatial distance on creative cognition

Recent research [Förster, J., Friedman, R. S., & Liberman, N. (2004). Temporal construal effects on abstract and concrete thinking: Consequences for insight and creative cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 177-189] has identified temporal distance as a situational moderator of creativity. According to Construal Level Theory [Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological Distance. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: A handbook of basic principles (pp. 353-381). New York: Guilford Press], temporal distance is just one case of the broader construct of psychological distance. In the present research, we investigated the effect of another dimension of psychological distance, namely, spatial distance, on creative cognition and insight problem solving. In two studies, we demonstrate that when the creative task is portrayed as originating from a far rather than close location, participants provide more creative responses (Study 1) and perform better on a problem solving task that requires creative insight (Study 2). Both theoretical and practical implications of this finding are discussed.     

Sobel on Pleasure,Reason, and Desire

The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, is an instance of the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible.     

The new grammar of Otherness: Europe,the Shoah,and the Jews

The essay discusses the passage from an ideological, patriotic and anti-fascist memory of the deportations and the extermination to what the author describes as the “ethnic” memory of the Shoah, which has played, and continues to play, a central role in constructing the European historical narrative as that narrative depicts the Jews as Europe’s “other”. Theoretical reflection on memory is intertwined with historical analysis of the period between 1945 until the end of the twentieth century. Two, binary perspectives are featured, one, which examines memory from a cognitive point of view and the other, which examines memory from a cultural, ideological, moral and political perspective. These perspectives come to the fore in memoire-literature, movies, plays, historiographic and philosophical debates, which illustrate the two perspectives and their articulation, as well as they justify the essay’s periodization.     

基于预期理论的风险决策的神经机制

预期理论基于对期望效用理论的批判与发展,提出了价值函数与权重函数,对以往风险决策研究中所发现的现象进行了很好的预测与解释。预期理论的核心概念包括参照依赖、损失规避与权重函数。基于预期理论的一些决策偏差包括框架效应、禀赋效应和默认偏差也部分揭示了与人们风险决策有关的脑区。近年来,通过采用功能性核磁共振等脑成像手段对预期理论的一些核心成分进行的研究表明,涉及到人们风险决策的脑区主要有前额叶、纹状体、脑岛与杏仁核。未来的研究可以从预期理论的产生根源、个体发展以及遗传基因等角度进行进一步的探讨。     

Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.     

Advocacy, prejudice, and role modeling in the deaf community

Prejudiced attitudes toward deaf people are a well-established phenomenon (Higgins & Nash, 1982; Moores, 1982; Quigley & Kretschmer, 1982). In recent years, however, a new phenomenon has appeared, and some members of the deaf population now openly express prejudice against the hearing (Boros & Stuckless, 1982; Nash & Nash, 1981). The phenomenon may be an interesting example of Allport's (1954) classical analysis: The victims of the prejudice may tend to reciprocate and/or internalize the prejudice to which they have been exposed. The purpose of our analysis is to examine this phenomenon in more detail, particularly from the perspective of social learning theory as described by Bandura and Walters (1963), Walters (1966), and Bandura (1977).