When being disadvantaged grows into vengeance: The effects of asymmetry of interest and social rejection in social dilemmas

In public good dilemmas, group members often differ in the extent to which they benefit from provision of the public good (asymmetry of interest). In the current paper, we argue that people may readily accept such financial differences in interest when their social needs are met by being accepted by the others. When people are socially rejected, however, members having a low rather than a high interest in the public good may display negative emotional and retributive reactions. This reasoning was supported by the findings of a first experimental study in which we manipulated people's interest in the public good and social rejection. These effects were replicated in a second experimental study and it was further shown that this two‐way interaction between social rejection and interest in the public good was moderated by people's social value orientation. The negative reactions to low interest (vs. high interest) in the public good when being socially rejected were especially prominent among group members with a proself orientation. Taken together, the current studies illustrate the importance of studying how financial and social needs interact to determine emotional and retributive actions in social dilemmas. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Group-Based Binding Pledge as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. Two hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.     

Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.     

Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation

Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay‐offs in a symmetric two‐person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Social Norms and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Context and Feedback

Drawing from research on social norms, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that people behave more competitively in social dilemmas involving economic decisions compared to those involving noneconomic decisions. We also proposed that people would compete more if they see that others have unexpectedly competed in a prior situation and cooperate more when others have unexpectedly cooperated in a previous situation. Further, we hypothesized that if others behave consistently with expectations, such behaviors (either cooperative or competitive) would not affect subsequent behavior. One hundred ninety-five under graduate students participated in an experiment in which they made choices in two different social dilemma games. Results support the hypotheses, and the discussion addresses the implications of the study for research on social norms and decision making.     

Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).     

Changes in cooperative behaviour and belief in finitely repeated social dilemmas

Economic and psychological studies have determined the tendency to improve cooperation in initial interactions in which people are required to contribute in public good games. The current study examined the behavioural changes of individuals during finite interaction times. Participants were invited to make decisions twice in a step‐level public good game, and their belief in achieving the collective interest was measured. Participants were divided into three groups based on their first decisions. Results showed that high contributors demonstrated high levels of contribution in their subsequent interactions, whereas low and equal contributors increased their levels of contribution after the initial interaction. Additionally, the cooperative level of low contributors increased along with their cooperative belief. The theoretical and practical implications of changes of behaviour and belief in repeated social dilemmas were identified.     

“Seeing is believing”: The effects of facial expressions of emotion and verbal communication in social dilemmas

In social dilemmas, verbal communication of one's intentions is an important factor in increasing cooperation. In addition to verbal communication of one's intentions, also the communication of emotions of anger and happiness can influence cooperative behavior. In the present paper, we argue that facial expressions of emotion moderate verbal communication in social dilemmas. More specifically, three experiments showed that if the other person displayed happiness he or she was perceived as honest, trustworthy, and reliable, and cooperation was increased when verbal communication was cooperative rather than self‐interested. However, if the other person displayed anger, verbal communication did not influence people's decision behavior. Results also showed interactive effects on people's perceptions of trustworthiness, which partially mediated decision behavior. These findings suggest that emotion displays have an important function in organizational settings because they are able to influence social interactions and cooperative behavior. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions

Two resource dilemmas, the commons dilemma, in which individuals take from a common resource, and the public goods problem, in which individuals give to a common good, were experimentally compared. Although they provide equivalent outcomes, the two dilemmas involve different frames of reference and are not psychologically equivalent. We also examined sanction systems, which involve contributions by individuals in the dilemma to provide rewards and penalties for cooperation. The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that public goods problems ("give dilemmas") activate greater loss aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas ("take dilemmas"), and that this effect is moderated by sanction systems. No difference between dilemmas was obtained when either the reward or penalty sanction was present, indicating that sanctions cause a shift in frame of reference to the aspiration of obtaining the reward or avoiding the penalty. The penalty sanction and especially the reward sanction produced greater cooperation. Also, as expected, loss aversion heightened exploitation: when the others were cooperative, a give dilemma generated less cooperation than a take dilemma. In Experiment 2, we extended the concept of frame and loss aversion to the structure of sanction systems, finding that subjects were more likely to contribute to a "take sanction" than to a "give sanction." We discuss potential sources of reference points and loss aversion in resource dilemmas and the likely impact on cooperation.     

Twilight of a Dilemma: A Réplique

In light of the nine open peer commentaries, we further explicate the social projection model and highlight its boundaries. We acknowledge that our model—like any extant model—cannot account for all the available empirical data. Yet the model is strong because it explains cooperation in a variety of social dilemmas and experimental games while deploying only one psychological construct as a parameter. Compared with its competitors, the social projection model more openly recognizes the struggle with uncertainty a person caught in a social dilemma must confront. In a series of simulations (and brute math), we show that cooperation can survive when players (humans) stay the Bayesian course.     

Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms--"strong" and "weak" reciprocity--that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a "narrow" and a "wide" reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in "real-world" situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation "in the wild." In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing.     

实验社会心理学中的社会困境

社会困境是指个体理性会导致集体非理性这样的情境。大量实证研究考察社会困境中合作行为的机制,然而缺乏系统的理论框架。实验室研究中所用的社会困境可以从4个方面来分类：“给-游戏”与“拿-游戏”、两人困境与多人困境、对称与非对称困境以及重复与非重复困境。综合而言,以往实验研究主要从个体差异、任务结构以及知觉与策略等3个方面考察影响社会困境的因素,这些影响因素可以整合在一个概念框架中。未来的研究尚需要联合多个学科,澄清研究变量之间的关系,并继续丰富相关概念和理论     

社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

A Probabilistic Model of Criticality in a Sequential Public Good Dilemma

A public good (PG) is a commodity or service made available to all members of a group: its provision depends on the voluntary contribution of its members. Once provided, all members can enjoy the benefits of the PG, regardless of whether they contributed or not; hence, there is a temptation to “free-ride” in the hope that others will contribute. Rapoport (1987) showed that an important factor that affects cooperation (contribution) in a PG dilemma is the extent to which a group member is critical in providing it. Erev and Rapoport (1990) tested a game-theoretic model that yields deterministic predictions about the effects of criticality on cooperation in public good dilemmas. Based on research by Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996), we propose a probabilistic model of criticality. The model is tested and found to fit empirical data. Extensions of the model to situations with uncertain group size or provision point are discussed.     

Utilitarians Are Not Always Fair and the Fair Are Not Always Utilitarian: Distinct Motives for Cooperation1

This paper investigates the effect of utilitarianism and fairness motives on cooperative behavior in a real‐life, large‐scale social dilemma while also looking at the moderating effect of various situational factors on this relationship. Perceived criticality of the situation and high‐efficacy beliefs are shown to increase cooperation of utilitarians more than they increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive. Ownership of the problem and the expected cooperation of others on the other hand are shown to increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive more so than they increase cooperation of utilitarians. Implications of these findings for increasing cooperation in social dilemmas are discussed.     

Decision-induced focusing in social dilemmas: give-some, keep-some, take-some, and leave-some dilemmas

Previous research on asymmetric social dilemmas has suggested that public good dilemmas evoke different choice behaviors than do resource dilemmas. The authors propose that these differences reflect a differential focus that is dependent on the way decisions are generally presented in the dilemma types. In agreement with this, the results of 2 experimental studies suggest that, in public good dilemmas, group members are less focused on the consequences of their actions for the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they give to the public good than when deciding how many endowments they keep for themselves. In resource dilemmas, group members are less focused on the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they leave in the collective resource than when deciding how many endowments they take.     

“追名弃利”：权力动机与社会存在对亲社会行为的影响

目前关于权力动机的研究主要关注权力动机的阴暗面, 但是对权力动机的积极面尚不清楚。本研究从公平与合作行为的角度出发, 分别采用最后通牒博弈和公共物品博弈任务, 探讨不同权力动机水平个体在内隐(眼睛线索)或外显(他人在场)社会存在下的亲社会行为是否不同。结果发现, 在眼睛线索或他人在场条件下, 相对于低权力动机者, 高权力动机者表现出更高的公平与合作水平。然而当没有社会存在线索时, 高低权力动机者的亲社会行为没有显著差异。结果提示高权力动机者出于名誉和地位的策略考虑, 也会表现出积极的亲社会行为。     

How to overcome the detrimental effects of noise in social interaction: the benefits of generosity

Interpersonal misunderstanding is often rooted in noise, or discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes for an interaction partner due to unintended errors (e.g., not being able to respond to an E-mail because of a local network breakdown). How can one effectively cope with noise in social dilemmas, situations in which self-interest and collective interests are conflicting? Consistent with hypotheses, the present research revealed that incidents of noise exert a detrimental effect on level of cooperation when a partner follows strict reciprocity (i.e., tit for tat) but that this effect can be overcome if a partner behaves somewhat more cooperatively than the actor did in the previous interaction (i.e., tit for tat plus 1). Also, when noise was present, tit for tat plus 1 elicited greater levels of cooperation than did tit for tat, thereby underscoring the benefits of adding generosity to reciprocity in coping with noise in social dilemmas. The Discussion outlines implications of the present work for theories focusing on self-presentation and attribution, communication, and trust and prorelationship behavior.     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology