The recall and use of belief statements as bases for judgments: Some determinants and implications

When people are asked to report their beliefs in a (target) statement, they may search memory for other, “informational” propositions that bear on its validity, and may use their beliefs in these propositions as bases for their judgments. Several factors were hypothesized to affect the particular propositions that subjects are likely to recall under such conditions. Subjects first familiarized themselves with a list of informational and target propositions. Then, they reported either their beliefs in these propositions or their attitudes toward them. In a second session 1 week later, they recalled as many of the propositions as they could. Both informational and target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions were unlikely to be true. In addition, the target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions associated with them had unclear implications for their validity. Recall of one proposition was more likely to cue the recall of the other when subjects had previously reported belief in the target proposition (rather than attitudes toward it). However, it was more likely to occur when subjects had reported attitudes toward the informational proposition (rather than beliefs in it). The effects of these variables were interpreted in terms of their mediating influence on the strength of association between the informational proposition and both (a) the target proposition and (b) contextual and environmental cues in the situation where target beliefs are reported.     

Retrieval of propositional information from long-term memory

Three experiments are reported in which subjects learn propositions like A hippie is in the park. The experiments manipulate the number of such propositions involving a particular person (e.g., hippie) or a particular location (e.g., park). After learning the material, subjects are asked to judge whether particular probe propositions are from the study set. Times to make these judgments about probe propositions increase with the number of study propositions involving the person or location used in the probe proposition. A model is presented which assumes a subject simultaneously accesses memory from all concepts in a probe proposition and serially searches through all study propositions involving each concept. Search of memory terminates as soon as one search process from a concept finds the probe proposition or exhausts the study propositions attached to that concept.     

Contrast effects and their relationship to subsequent behavior

The present study attempted to apply social judgment theories to the effects of context on judgments of the importance of a social issue and on subsequent issue-related behavior. Subjects judged the importance of a target issue (recycling) in the context of either important or unimportant social issues and were subsequently asked in a separate setting for help on a local recycling project. Context produced contrast effects on rating scale judgments of the importance of recycling. These judgments, if salient, were then used as a basis for subsequent support of the recycling project. When either the initial judgment was not salient or no prior judgment of recycling was made, the importance of the context had a positive effect on amount of support for recycling, such that more help was given in the important context conditions. Results indicate that contrast effects on the ratings are response base rather than perceptual in nature, but that the rating, if salient, can serve as subsequent behavior and attitudes.     

Semantics and pragmatics of social influence: how affirmations and denials affect beliefs in referent propositions.

Ss read either affirmations or denials of target propositions that ostensibly came from either newspapers or reference volumes. Denials of the validity of a proposition that was already assumed to be false increased Ss' beliefs in this proposition. The effect generalized to beliefs in related propositions that could be used to support the target's validity. When denials came from a newspaper, their "boomerang effect" was nearly equal in magnitude to the direct effect of affirming the target proposition's validity. When Ss were asked explicitly to consider the implications of the assertions, however, the impact of denials was eliminated. Affirmations of a target proposition that was already assumed to be true also had a boomerang effect. Results have implications for the effects of both semantic and pragmatic processing of assertions on belief change.     

Explanatory Effort and Structure as Contributors to the Good Life Among University Students

Ample theory and case evidence suggest the salutary role of making sense or explaining social reality for people's well-being. However, empirical evidence in support of the proposition is slim. To examine this proposition in a testable way, the present study employed a longitudinal panel design to assess associations between earlier reasoning on later well-being among a sample of 151 university students in Hong Kong. At the first wave, it measured reasoning in terms of explanatory consolidation and explanatory effort. Explanatory consolidation referred to a student's consistent agreement or disagreement with propositions of sociological theories that explain social problems, protest, and crime. Explanatory effort concerned the student's tendency to explain social problems. At the second wave, the study measured five good-life indicators to represent well-being. Results showed that explanatory consolidation and effort have significant relations with good life characteristics that are consistent with Chinese culture. These findings support social constructionist claims about the contribution of reasoning in the educational setting.     

Outcome Feedback Effects on Under- and Overconfident Judgments (General Knowledge Tasks)

Effects of outcome feedback on overconfident and underconfident judgments were investigated. It was hypothesized that outcome feedback had a twofold effect on confidence judgments, corrective and confidence increasing, the latter effect operating only when the items to be judged are related and/or nonindependent. The proposed hypothesis implies two predictions which were tested in two experiments: (1) If the items are nonindependent and related, outcome feedback will reduce bias and improve calibration of underconfident judgments; by contrast, the feedback will neither reduce bias nor improve calibration in the case of overconfident judgments. (2) If, on the other hand, the items are independent and unrelated, outcome feedback will reduce underconfidence as well as overconfidence bias and improve calibration in both cases. The obtained results provided strong support for the first prediction, while the second prediction was not supported. Although the differences between with- and without-feedback groups on the dependent variables were in the expected direction, they were nonsignificant.     

Demonstrating and eliminating the aggregation effect in physical skill tasks

Confidence judgments can be elicited in multiple ways. One of these procedures is to provide confidence judgments regarding each of a number of cases (individual judgments). A second procedure is to provide confidence judgments about a set of items (an aggregate judgment). Much research has demonstrated an aggregation effect—that individual judgments are more confident than aggregate judgments—within the cognitive knowledge domain. However, this effect has not previously been investigated with physical performance skill tasks. In three experiments, participants gave individual and aggregate judgments regarding the number of successful tosses they would make in either a ring toss, ping‐pong toss, or basketball toss task. In keeping with the aggregation effect, individual judgments were more confident than were aggregate judgments of success. Additionally, we eliminated the aggregation effect in Experiments 2 and 3 by employing a case‐specific base rate manipulation. Consistent with previous research with cognitive tasks, these results suggest that individual confidence judgments for physical skill tasks are determined primarily by characteristics associated with the individual case to be judged, whereas aggregate confidence judgments are determined by a more general evaluation of one's ability in the domain. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ethics,Identity and the Boundaries of the Person

Abstract

Ethical theories and theories of the person constrain each other, in that a proposition about the person may be a reason for or against an ethical proposition, and conversely. An important class of such propositions about the person concern the boundaries of the person. These boundaries enclose a person's defining properties, which constitute his identity. A person's identity may partly determine and partly be determined by his ethical judgments. An equilibrium between one's identity and one's ethical judgments is the counterpart, at the personal level, of the philosophical ideal of reflective equilibrium between a theory of the person and an ethical theory.     

To link, to infer, to understand

A model of linkage in text processing is proposed: An external proposition and an inference belonging to one frame are superimposed to constitute understanding. A text containing four academic subjects was presented orally to students who recalled it in writing. After transforming the recalls into propositions they are entered into a nonmetric multidimensional scaling to yield a text space. The subjects' interest choices among items of the four aspects are scaled to render an interest space. The decomposition ob both as subspaces of a common space yields an angle as their overall similarity and indicates the degree of predictability from interests. As the aggregate of inferences shows directedness, correlated with volitional-motivational orientation, and inference base is assumed to intervene. It is concluded that recipients try to superimpose and thereby construct a primary stage of processing. This allows for a very general algorithm of parallel information processing (holographic thesis), perhaps constructing the properties we are used to. Motivated perception, knowledge influence, schema-directedness and contribution to coherence are rivalled out as an explanation of this process.     

An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

A Factor Analysis Of Individual Social Desirability Scale Values

The factorial structure of individual judgments of social desirability scale value (SDSV) was studied by factor analyzing a 112 (college students) by 100 (MMPI items) data matrix of individual judgments of SDSV in two ways. One analysis was factoring by item (R technique) while the second analysis was factoring by subject (Q technique). A large general SD factor appeared when subject intercorrelations were factored, but no such general factor was identified when item intercorrelations were factored. Evidence was also presented that the large general SD factor was highly correlated with mean or normative SDSVs.     

More historical dimensions of commonsense knowledge: Spiritual consolation for the depressed

Ss were given 15 propositions derived from the neoclassical canon of advice on spiritual consolation for the depressed and were asked either to rate the extent of their personal agreement with each and to predict the average ratings for the group, or to say whether they regarded each proposition as ‘true’ or ‘not true’ and to predict the percentage of the group that would choose ‘true’ for each proposition. The observed and mean predicted rank orders were compared within and between methods; all correlations were high, positive, and significant. The results suggest that people's higher-order ideas about other people's ideas include notions about the intensity of beliefs as well as about the proportion of believers. Contemporary developments of those propositions which a clear majority of the present Ss endorsed are discussed.     

Discrepant fluency increases subjective truth

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that perceptual fluency affects truth judgments especially when the fluency has changed. Participants were asked to judge the truth of statements that were printed in different colors. Perceptual fluency was manipulated by color contrast. Change versus no change of fluency was manipulated by using preceding statements that had the same or a different contrast. As expected, highly fluent statements were judged as more probably true than statements with a low fluency but this effect occurred only when the high fluency meant a change from previous fluency. The role of discrepancies in subjective experiences in terms of their informativeness for social judgments is discussed.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism,Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.     

Effects of alcohol intoxication on metamemory and on retrieval from long-term memory

In a balanced-placebo design, people expected either an alcohol drink or placebo drink and consumed either alcohol (1 ml/kg) or placebo. Shortly thereafter, each person attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions (e.g., "What is the capital of Chile?"), made confidence judgments about the accuracy of recall, made feeling-of-knowing judgments on all nonrecalled items, and received a recognition test. Unanticipated outcomes included: Alcohol intoxication significantly hindered recall from long-term memory, contrary to previous conclusions that alcohol does not affect retrieval; people's expectancy of alcohol had no significant effect on memory or metamemory performance, contrary to its established effects on other kinds of performance; and alcohol intoxication produced no significant overconfidence in judgments about recall or in feeling-of-knowing judgments, contrary to the overconfidence produced in other kinds of judgments such as an intoxicated person's assessment of his driving ability. This last outcome implies that alcohol intoxication does not produce a general lowering of the threshold for confidence but rather has effects that are situation specific.     

Understanding conjunction effects in probability judgments: the role of implicit mental models

Subjective probability judgments often violate a normative principle in that the conjunction of two events is judged to be more likely than the probability of either of the two events occurring separately. Most previous explanations of these conjunction effects have assumed that probability judgments depend on some psychological relation (e.g. representativeness) between the constituents mentioned explicitly in the stimulus information. In contrast, the present approach highlights the fundamental role of implicitly inferred information. Participants are assumed to transform the explicit stimulus information into implicit mental models in their attempt to make sense of the experimental task. Probability judgments should then reflect the degree of activation of such a mental model in memory given a set of propositions, rather than the quantitative fit or likelihood of the propositions themselves. Two studies are reported which provide converging evidence for the proposed mental model approach. In the first study, using graded conjunctions of one to five propositions, probability judgments are shown to vary as a function of the activation of a mental model rather than the likelihood of the component events. In a second study, a priming procedure is employed to activate mental models that either fit an event conjunction or do not, leading to an increase or decrease of conjunction effects in probability judgment. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

The representation of time and location in memory for sentences

Two theoretical approaches to the representation of Time and Location Markers in Memory were contrasted. According to predictions derived from one approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for two-proposition sentences and sentences with a single proposition and a Time or a Location marker. According to the other approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for one-proposition sentences and sentences with a Time or a Location Marker. Propositional structure and the level of within-sentence associations were orthogonally varied to create eight within-subject experimental conditions. Ninety subjects studied 40 sentences and were required to recall then. Four dependent variables were used: number of sentences completely recalled, number of sentences partially recalled, number of sentences where information was lost from within the proposition, and number of sentences where a complete proposition was lost. The results suggest that Time and Location markers are represented in memory as arguments in a proposition rather than as separate propositions. Level of associations within the sentence seems to have a different effect when the sentence is composed of one or two propositions. The results also suggest that there may be differences between the representations of Time and Location markers.     

Revelation without presentation: Counterfeit study list yields robust revelation effect

This study explores the revelation effect, a recognition memory phenomenon that occurs when test items (or related items) are specially processed before recognition judgment. These revealed items, whether targets or lures, receive a positive response bias. Although the effect occurs across various conditions, it has not been shown to occur when participants make judgments unrelated to episodic memory. We investigated whether the effect would occur when a recognition decision was nominally one of episodic memory, but when a complete episodic event had not occurred. Specifically, participants listened to noise that allegedly masked a list of words (in fact, no words existed). A revelation effect occurred with this pseudo-subliminal procedure, suggesting that the revelation effect need not rely on stimuli recalled through episodic memory but only a specific event to recall. The effect did not occur when participants simply guessed whether words were on an unheard list or made semantic judgments.