Cultural grounding of regret: Regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

Regret as autobiographical memory

We apply an autobiographical memory framework to the study of regret. Focusing on the distinction between regrets for specific and general events we argue that the temporal profile of regret, usually explained in terms of the action–inaction distinction, is predicted by models of autobiographical memory. In two studies involving participants in their sixties we demonstrate a reminiscence bump for general, but not for specific regrets. Recent regrets were more likely to be specific than general in nature. Coding regrets as actions/inactions revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction while specific regrets were as likely to be due to action as to inaction. In Study 2 we also generalised all of these findings to a group of participants in their 40s. We re-interpret existing accounts of the temporal profile of regret within the autobiographical memory framework, and outline the practical and theoretical advantages of our memory-based distinction over traditional decision-making approaches to the study of regret.     

Action/inaction regret as a function of severity of loss

Two studies were conducted to examine whether people who experience severe losses tend to regret their failures to act more than people that experience less severe losses. Two time points were considered, after the event (short term), and a year later (long term). In Study 1, participants responded to scenarios depicting losses varying in degree of severity. As hypothesized, protagonists in the heavy loss cases were attributed with more regrets of omission (inaction) both in the short and in the long term. In the less severe loss scenarios, action regrets decreased significantly in the long term. In Study 2, one of the severe loss scenarios from Study 1 was presented with a less severe outcome. As expected, participants generated more inaction regrets in the severe loss version. Severity of loss influenced the preference for omission regrets in both studies for the short term and the long term. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regret as autobiographical memory

We apply an autobiographical memory framework to the study of regret. Focusing on the distinction between regrets for specific and general events we argue that the temporal profile of regret, usually explained in terms of the action–inaction distinction, is predicted by models of autobiographical memory. In two studies involving participants in their sixties we demonstrate a reminiscence bump for general, but not for specific regrets. Recent regrets were more likely to be specific than general in nature. Coding regrets as actions/inactions revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction while specific regrets were as likely to be due to action as to inaction. In Study 2 we also generalised all of these findings to a group of participants in their 40s. We re-interpret existing accounts of the temporal profile of regret within the autobiographical memory framework, and outline the practical and theoretical advantages of our memory-based distinction over traditional decision-making approaches to the study of regret.     

Is regret for inaction relatively self‐enhancing?

Previous accounts of regret suggest that people report greater regret for inaction than for action because the former is longer lasting and more painful than the latter. We suggest instead that the tendency for people's greatest regrets to concern inaction more than action may be due to the relatively self‐enhancing nature of regrets for inaction. In Study 1 we asked people to think about their greatest recent regret and to code it as being due to action or inaction. In Study 2 participants described their greatest regret from across their entire life. In both studies we observed an inaction effect only amongst individuals high in self‐esteem (HSE). In Study 2 we found that the inaction effect was confined to HSE people whose greatest regret was personal in nature. These results support the claim that regret for inaction is relatively self‐enhancing and suggest that the inaction effect found in real‐life regrets may be due, in part at least, to the self‐enhancement goals of HSE individuals. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When experienced regret refuses to fade: Regrets of action and attempting to forget open life regrets

The emotional experience of regret often persists rather then fading over time. The present experiment with 101 student participants investigated whether recollecting life regrets of action, construing life regrets as psychologically open, or attempting to forget versus remember regret-related thoughts interfered with the fading of affect over a two-week interval. Results showed that regrets of action failed to show a fading affect pattern. In addition, disappointment failed to fade for regrets of inaction construed as open. Experienced regret failed to fade for regrets construed as open followed by attempts to forget regret-related thoughts. Intrusive and avoidant thoughts co-occurred with the latter disruptions in fading affect. Discussion concerns the causal relationship of memory and fading affect, and the different processes underlying fading of affect for discrete emotions.     

Sex differences in regret: all for love or some for lust?

Few sex differences in regret or counterfactual thinking are evident in past research. The authors discovered a sex difference in regret that is both domain-specific (i.e., unique to romantic relationships) and interpretable within a convergence of theories of evolution and regulatory focus. Three studies showed that within romantic relationships, men emphasize regrets of inaction over action (which correspond to promotion vs. prevention goals, respectively), whereas women report regrets of inaction and action with equivalent frequency. Sex differences were not evident in other interpersonal regrets (friendship, parental, sibling interactions) and were not moderated by relationship status. Although the sex difference was evident in regrets centering on both sexual and nonsexual relationship aspects, it was substantially larger for sexual regrets. These findings underscore the utility of applying an evolutionary perspective to better understand goal-regulating, cognitive processes.     

反事实思维与后悔的关系：调节模式的调节作用

已有研究表明反事实思维越多则后悔越强烈。本研究试图通过两项实验分别探讨特质性、情境性调节模式是否影响反事实思维与后悔之间的关系。结果表明：特质性调节模式及情境性调节模式均对反事实思维与后悔之间的关系具有调节作用,具体来说,针对情境性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微,评估模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越强烈;针对特质性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微。     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

Buyer's remorse or missed opportunity? Differential regrets for material and experiential purchases

Previous research has established that experiential purchases tend to yield greater enduring satisfaction than material purchases. The present work suggests that this difference in satisfaction is paralleled by a tendency for material and experiential purchases to differ in the types of regrets they elicit. In 5 studies, we find that people's material purchase decisions are more likely to generate regrets of action (buyer's remorse) and their experiential purchase decisions are more likely to lead to regrets of inaction (missed opportunities). These results were not attributable to differences in the desirability of or satisfaction provided by the two purchase types. Demonstrating the robustness of this effect, we found that focusing participants on the material versus experiential properties of the very same purchase was enough to shift its dominant type of regret. This pattern of regret is driven by the tendency for experiences to be seen as more singular--less interchangeable--than material purchases; interchangeable goods tend to yield regrets of action, whereas singular goods tend to yield regrets of inaction.     

后悔的一致性模型:理论和证据

重新检验Ｇｉｌｏｖｉｃｈ和Ｍｅｄｖｅｃ的后悔时间性模型。该模型认为,与假设思维有关的短期后悔的研究结果相反,人们日常生活中最大的后悔（长期后悔）多是“不做”而不是“做”的后悔。该文认为这一理论上的矛盾来自于双方对“做／不做”概念以及“做－不做”规律适用范围的不同理解。该研究使用这一新的分类方法,发现和短期后悔一样,至少一半的长期后悔来自于“状态改变”的后悔。这此基础上提出后悔的一致性模型,认为长期     

To accept or not to accept a job offer: Examining inaction inertia in an organizational context

The purpose of this research was to investigate inaction inertia in a job offer context. Across two studies, we examined the influence of two situational factors (Study 1) and one dispositional factor (Study 2) on inaction inertia in a job offer context. Participants were asked to imagine they had to pass up an initial offer in which they were interested, but that they received a similar but less attractive offer (lower salary) later. Study 1 findings revealed participants in the loss‐framed condition were more likely to accept the second offer than participants in the neutral condition only when they were asked to imagine they were switching careers, versus being laid off. Study 2 results showed that maximizing tendency significantly and negatively predicted the likelihood to accept the second job offer. Exploratory analyses revealed that anticipated regret did not mediate the relationships between any of the factors and inaction inertia, suggesting that anticipated regret was not the causal mechanism underlying the occurrence of inaction inertia in the current research. Overall, this research shed light on the ways inaction inertia may be experienced in a job offer context.     

失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

Looking forward to looking backward: the misprediction of regret

Decisions are powerfully affected by anticipated regret, and people anticipate feeling more regret when they lose by a narrow margin than when they lose by a wide margin. But research suggests that people are remarkably good at avoiding self-blame, and hence they may be better at avoiding regret than they realize. Four studies measured people's anticipations and experiences of regret and self-blame. In Study 1, students overestimated how much more regret they would feel when they "nearly won" than when they "clearly lost" a contest. In Studies 2, 3a, and 3b, subway riders overestimated how much more regret and self-blame they would feel if they "nearly caught" their trains than if they "clearly missed" their trains. These results suggest that people are less susceptible to regret than they imagine, and that decision makers who pay to avoid future regrets may be buying emotional insurance that they do not actually need.     

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.     

The role of interpersonal harm in distinguishing regret from guilt

Regret and guilt are emotions that are produced by negative outcomes for which one is responsible. Both emotions have received ample attention in the psychological literature; however, it is still unclear to what extent regret and guilt represent distinct psychological processes. We examined the extent to which the distinction between interpersonal harm (negative outcomes for others) and intrapersonal harm (negative outcomes for self) is crucial in differentiating these two emotions. In a series of 3 studies we found that guilt is predominantly felt in situations of interpersonal harm, whereas regret is felt in both situations of interpersonal harm and intrapersonal harm. Moreover, the results show that in situations of interpersonal harm the phenomenology of regret shares many, but not all features with the phenomenology of guilt. We conclude that the emotion processes resulting from interpersonal and intrapersonal harm are clearly distinct, but that regret as an emotion label is applied to both types of processes whereas the emotion label guilt is primarily used to refer to experiences of interpersonal harm. Implications for emotion research are discussed.     

What we regret most... and why

Which domains in life produce the greatest potential for regret, and what features of those life domains explain why? Using archival and laboratory evidence, the authors show that greater perceived opportunity within life domains evokes more intense regret. This pattern is consistent with previous publications demonstrating greater regret stemming from high rather than low opportunity or choice. A meta-analysis of 11 regret ranking studies revealed that the top six biggest regrets in life center on (in descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure. Study Set 2 provided new laboratory evidence that directly linked the regret ranking to perceived opportunity. Study Set 3 ruled out an alternative interpretation involving framing effects. Overall, these findings show that people's biggest regrets are a reflection of where in life they see their largest opportunities; that is, where they see tangible prospects for change, growth, and renewal.