Some effort for some: Further evidence that scalar implicatures are effortful

Under the assumption of the principle of cooperation (Grice, 1989), a statement such as “some eels are fish” is thought to be false since it contains less information than is considered sufficient. However, the statement is logically sound since the meaning of “some” is compatible with “all”. Currently, the primary interpretation of such underinformative statements remains subject to debate. According to Levinson (2000 Levinson, S. 2000. Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalised conversational implicature, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  [Google Scholar]), the pragmatic “some but not all” interpretation is the default interpretation, while others (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) argue that this pragmatic interpretation only comes to the fore when relevant within the context and is thus considered secondary to the logical “some and perhaps all” interpretation. In this study, three factors that may influence the answer pattern are studied: task load, working memory capacity, and repetition of the statements. In Experiment 1, we used a secondary task paradigm to manipulate the cognitive load under which a number of underinformative statements had to be judged. We observed that for participants with a rather limited working memory span it is harder to reach a pragmatic interpretation under cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition of the statements. We observed that with a higher number of filler statements, participants produced fewer consistent answer patterns. This study provides further evidence against the automaticity of the pragmatic interpretation: It shows that the pragmatic interpretation requires more cognitive effort than the logical interpretation and that increasing the number of filler statements inhibits the development of a response strategy.     

The story of some: everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults.

The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of pragmatic inference.     

When people are more logical under cognitive load: dual task impact on scalar implicature

The present study introduces dual task methodology to test opposing psychological processing predictions concerning the nature of implicatures in pragmatic theories. Implicatures routinely arise in human communication when hearers interpret utterances pragmatically and go beyond the logical meaning of the terms. The neo-Gricean view (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures are generated automatically whereas relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. Participants were presented a sentence verification task with underinformative sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures like Some oaks are trees. Depending on the nature of the interpretation of Some (logical or pragmatic) the sentence is judged true or false. Executive cognitive resources were experimentally burdened by the concurrent memorization of complex dot patterns during the interpretation process. Results showed that participants made more logical and fewer pragmatic interpretations under load. Findings provide direct support for the relevance theory view.     

On some sources of metacomprehension

Metacomprehension is defined as readers' evaluations of their performance on a task, involving inferences derived from a text. In two studies metacomprehension was related to characteristics of the inferences required, in terms of 1) amount of information to be kept in long-term memory (Study 1), 2) amount of information to be kept in short-term memory (Study 2) and 3) existence of negatives (Study 2). In the first study, 41 psychology students read a text and afterwards judged 1) the correctness of a set of pragmatic inference statements, and 2) their confidence in being correct or the difficulty of judging each statement. In the second study, 81 high-school students read a text and simultaneously judged 1) the correctness of a set of logical inference statements and 2) their confidence in being correct and the difficulty of judging each statement. In both studies, metacomprehension was not significantly correlated with actual performance. The results indicate that one important source of metacomprehension consists in information processing load. In Study 1, long-term memory requirements represent this load, in Study 2, the existence of negatives.     

“At least one” problem with “some” formal reasoning paradigms

In formal reasoning, the quantifier "some" means "at least one and possibly all." In contrast, reasoners often pragmatically interpret "some" to mean "some, but not all" on both immediate-inference and Euler circle tasks. It is still unclear whether pragmatic interpretations can explain the high rates of errors normally observed on syllogistic reasoning tasks. To address this issue, we presented participants (reasoners) in the present experiments either standard quantifiers or clarified quantifiers designed to precisely articulate the quantifiers' logical interpretations. In Experiment 1, reasoners made significantly more logical responses and significantly fewer pragmatic responses on an immediate-inference task when presented with logically clarified as opposed to standard quantifiers. In Experiment 2, this finding was extended to a variant of the immediate-inference task in which reasoners were asked to deduce what followed from premises they were to assume to be false. In Experiment 3, we used a syllogistic reasoning task and observed that logically clarified premises reduced pragmatic and increased logical responses relative to standard ones, providing strong evidence that pragmatic responses can explain some aspects of the errors made in the syllogistic reasoning task. These findings suggest that standard quantifiers should be replaced with logically clarified quantifiers in teaching and in future research.     

Truth table task: Working memory load,latencies, and perceived relevance

The aim of the present study is to uncover the relation between cognitive ability and the answer patterns yielded by the truth table task. According to the Classical Mental Models Theory, people with high working memory capacity answer according to two-valued or “logical” answer patterns. The Suppositional Theory and the Revised Mental Models Theory predict that the answer patterns given by the most intelligent ones are three-valued or “defective”. Correlations are examined, and in three experiments it is tested with a dual task paradigm whether a differential working memory load alters participants' answer patterns. A positive correlation is observed between cognitive ability and three-valued answer patterns, but no effect of the working memory load manipulation is revealed. With an inspection of the classification times we shed light on the processes underlying truth table judgements. We conclude that the Revised Mental Models Theory provides the best account for our results.     

Reasoning with realistic disjunctives

The research reported here investigated how people interpret and reason with disjunctive statements. Experiment 1 demonstrated a general preference for exclusive over inclusive interpretations, although this varied as a function of the context in which the statement occurred, and there were some contexts in which other, quite different, interpretations were possible. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the logical inferences subjects would draw from disjunctive statements also varied with context. It is concluded that or permits a number of different interpretations, which are determined by contextual cues. Previous research may have underestimated disjunctive reasoning performance by using contexts that lead to non-logical responses; certainly in the present experiments reasoning was generally accurate given the interpretation adopted.     

The effects of acoustic mismatch and selective listening on repetition deafness

Previous research (i.e., M. Miller & D. O. MacKay, 1994, 1996) has suggested that repetition deafness (RD), like repetition blindness, is robust to physical identity and that it consists in a failure to recall specifically the 2nd of the 2 critical targets (C1 and C2). However, some confounds due to memory load and response biases make available evidence inconclusive. Experiment 1 provided a strong test of RD between physically mismatching stimuli using a low memory load methodology. In Experiment 2, the same presentation method was combined with a selective recall task to find that RD is specific of C2. Experiments 3A and 3B showed, through an attentional manipulation, that RD is eliminated when people can successfully ignore C1 but not otherwise. It is argued that present data favor a perceptual interpretation of the RD. Furthermore, the present results support the hypothesis of recognition failure as opposed to the alternative token individuation failure hypothesis.     

Nonword repetition priming in lexical decision reverses as a function of study task and speed stress

The authors argue that nonword repetition priming in lexical decision is the net result of 2 opposing processes. First, repeating nonwords in the lexical decision task results in the storage of a memory trace containing the interpretation that the letter string is a nonword; retrieval of this trace leads to an increase in performance for repeated nonwords. Second, nonword repetition results in increased familiarity, making the nonword more "wordlike," leading to a decrease in performance. Consistent with this dual-process account, Experiment 1 showed a facilitatory effect for nonwords studied in a lexical decision task but an inhibitory effect for nonwords studied in a letter-height task. Experiment 2 showed inhibitory nonword repetition priming for participants tested under speed-stress instructions.     

"If …": Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advices and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally equivalent--"if P, then Q"--the question is: When confronted with a conditional statement, how do people know whether they are facing a promise, a threat, or something else? In other words, what is the cognitive algorithm for mapping a particular conditional statement onto its corresponding social domain? This paper introduces the pragmatic cues algorithm and the syntactic cue algorithm as partial answers to this question. Two experiments were carried out to test how well these simple satisficing algorithms approximate the performance of the actual cognitive algorithm people use to classify conditional statements into social domains. Conditional statements for promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations were collected from people, and given to both other people and the algorithms for their classification. Their corresponding performances were then compared. Results revealed that even though these algorithms utilised a minimum number of cues and drew only a restricted range of inferences from these cues, they performed well above chance in the task of classifying conditional statements as promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations. Moreover, these simple satisficing algorithms performed comparable to actual people given the same task.     

Hebb repetition effects for non-verbal visual sequences: determinants of sequence acquisition

We report four experiments premised upon the work of Horton et al. [(2008). Hebb repetition effects in visual memory: The roles of verbal rehearsal and distinctiveness. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(12), 1769–1777] and Page et al. [(2013). Repetition-spacing and item-overlap effects in the Hebb repetition task. Journal of Memory and Language, 69(4), 506–526], and explore conditions under which the visual Hebb repetition effect is observed. Experiment 1 showed that repetition learning is evident when the items comprising the non-repeated (filler) sequences and the repeated (Hebb) sequences are different (no-overlap). However, learning is abolished when the filler and Hebb sequences comprise the same items (full-overlap). Learning of the repeated sequence persisted when repetition spacing was increased to six trials (Experiment 2), consistent with that shown for verbal stimuli (Page et al., 2013). In Experiment 3, it was shown that learning for the repeated sequence is accentuated when the output motor response at test is also repeated for the Hebb sequence, but only under conditions of no-overlap. In Experiment 4, repetition spacing was re-examined with a repeated motor output response (a closer methodological analogue to Page et al., 2013). Under these conditions, the gradient of Hebb repetition learning for six trial repetition intervals was markedly similar to that for three trial intervals. These findings further support the universality of the Hebb repetition effect across memory and are discussed in terms of evidence for amodality within-sequence memory.     

The role of working memory in decoding emotions

Decoding facial expressions of emotion is an important aspect of social communication that is often impaired following psychiatric or neurological illness. However, little is known of the cognitive components involved in perceiving emotional expressions. Three dual task studies explored the role of verbal working memory in decoding emotions. Concurrent working memory load substantially interfered with choosing which emotional label described a facial expression (Experiment 1). A key factor in the magnitude of interference was the number of emotion labels from which to choose (Experiment 2). In contrast the ability to decide that two faces represented the same emotion in a discrimination task was relatively unaffected by concurrent working memory load (Experiment 3). Different methods of assessing emotion perception make substantially different demands on working memory. Implications for clinical disorders which affect both working memory and emotion perception are considered.     

Truth table tasks: The relevance of irrelevant

Two types of truth table tasks are used investigating mental representations of conditionals: a possibilities-based and a truth-based one. In possibilities tasks, participants indicate whether a situation is possible or impossible according to the conditional rule. In truth tasks participants evaluate whether a situation makes the rule true or false, or is irrelevant with respect to the truth of the rule. Comparing the two-option version of the possibilities task with the truth task in Experiment 1, the possibilities task yields logical answer patterns whereas the truth task yields defective patterns. Adding the irrelevant option to the possibilities task in Experiment 2 leads to a considerable amount of defective patterns in the possibilities task, but still to more logical patterns in the possibilities task than in the truth task. Experiment 3 shows that directionality matters since rule-to-situation tasks yield more logical answer patterns than do situation-to-rule tasks. We conclude that both task types are not comparable as such since wording, number of options and directionality influence the results.     

ACTIVITÉ MÉTACOGNITIVE DE L'ENFANT ET DIFFICULTÉ DE LA TÂCHE COGNITIVE

The influence of the type of difficulty of a cognitive task on metacognitive activity (metacognitive experiences and metacognitive strategies) was studied in six- and eight-year-old children. Children had to make decisions about the correspondence of statements and drawings presented in pairs one after the other, starting either with a statement, or with a picture. They encounter two kinds of difficulties: (1) one due to the information conveyed by drawing (non-correspondence with the statement); (2) another due to the order in which the statements and drawings are presented: when the drawing comes first the child must retain it in his memory until a statement can guide him in his decoding of it; this difficulty is unexpected given the expectations the child has due to the cognitive task proposed. The principal findings were as follows: (1) Compared to the six-year-olds, the eight-year-olds demonstrated three times more metacognitive control strategies for expressing information, more cognitive skills (reasoning), and a higher level of performance (understanding and recall). (2) The two types of difficulties do not have the same effects: (a) the difficulty due to the information conveyed by the drawing leads to an increase in the latency time; the performance (understanding) is not as good; (b) in the case of difficulty due to the statement-drawing order, twice as many verbalizations expressing metacognitive experiences and a decrease in the latency time were observed. The interpretation of the findings underscores the importance for the child of the indicators he has to orient him in mobilizing metacognitive and cognitive activities.     

The influence of affective statements on performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks

Consumers are often exposed to brand names presented concurrently with information such as brand claims and warnings, prior to making product choices. As implicit memory has been implicated in the consumer choice process, two experiments were conducted to assess the influence of additional information, namely simple positive and negative statements, on implicit and explicit memory tasks. In Experiment 1, the mere presence of additional statements at study significantly reduced performance on a two‐alternatives forced recognition task. However, the same manipulation had no effect on implicit preference judgement task performance. The valence of the accompanying information had no effect on either task. In Experiment 2, using modified implicit and explicit choice tasks, performance on the former was unaffected by statement valence, whereas the latter task was. Hence, positive priming was obtained for brand names previously shown with negative information. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to both implicit memory and consumer choice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The phonological loop in task alternation and task repetition

It has recently been proposed that task repetition is easier than task alternation because the appropriate task settings are already present in working memory, whereas during task alternation task settings must be retrieved from long-term memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). The present study tested whether the phonological loop is involved in keeping the relevant task settings active in working memory. It may then be expected that concurrent articulatory suppression would diminish the facilitation associated with task repetition because the phonological loop could no longer maintain the appropriate task settings active in working memory. Both during task repetition and task alternation the relevant task settings should then be retrieved from long-term memory. Three dual-task experiments were conducted. The results of Experiment 1 were in support of our prediction. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and showed that the task settings probably represent the adequate response mappings. Experiment 3 ruled out the involvement of the visuo-spatial sketchpad and more general coordination demands during dual tasking.     

The phonological loop in task alternation and task repetition

It has recently been proposed that task repetition is easier than task alternation because the appropriate task settings are already present in working memory, whereas during task alternation task settings must be retrieved from long-term memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). The present study tested whether the phonological loop is involved in keeping the relevant task settings active in working memory. It may then be expected that concurrent articulatory suppression would diminish the facilitation associated with task repetition because the phonological loop could no longer maintain the appropriate task settings active in working memory. Both during task repetition and task alternation the relevant task settings should then be retrieved from long-term memory. Three dual-task experiments were conducted. The results of Experiment 1 were in support of our prediction. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and showed that the task settings probably represent the adequate response mappings. Experiment 3 ruled out the involvement of the visuo-spatial sketchpad and more general coordination demands during dual tasking.     

Pupil Dilation as a Measure of Processing Load in Simultaneous Interpretation and Other Language Tasks

The present study tested whether the pupillary response can be applied to study the variation in processing load during simultaneous interpretation. In Experiment 1, the global processing load in simultaneous interpretation as reflected in the average pupil size was compared to that in two other language tasks, listening to and repeating back an auditorily presented text. Experiment 1 showed clear differences between the experimental tasks. In Experiment 2, the task effect was replicated using single words as stimuli. Experiment 2 showed that momentary variations in processing load during a lexical translation task are reflected in pupil size. Words that were chosen to be more difficult to translate induced higher levels of pupil dilation than did easily translatable words. Moreover, repeating back words in a non-native language was accompanied by increased pupil dilations, in comparison to repetition in the subject's native language. In sum, the study lends good support to the use of the pupillary response as an indicator of processing load.     

Dream rebound of suppressed emotional thoughts: the influence of cognitive load

Initial evidence suggests that suppressing a thought prior to sleep results in subsequent dreaming of that thought. The present research examined the influence of cognitive load on dreaming following suppression. In Experiment 1, 100 participants received either a suppression instruction or no instruction for an intrusive thought prior to sleep, and subsequently completed a dream diary. Participants instructed to suppress reported dreaming about the target thought more than controls; dream rebound was predicted by poorer performance on a working memory task. In Experiment 2, 126 participants received either a suppression instruction or no instruction for an intrusive thought prior to sleep, and half of participants also had cognitive load of learning a 9-digit number. Participants receiving the suppression instruction under cognitive load reported greater dream rebound than other participants. These findings indicate that thought suppression prior to sleep leads to dream rebound, and this effect is enhanced by cognitive load.     

Making disjunctions exclusive

This work examines how people interpret the sentential connective "or", which can be viewed either inclusively (A or B or both) or exclusively (A or B but not both). Following up on prior work concerning quantifiers (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003), which shows that the common pragmatic interpretation of "some", some but not all, is conveyed as part of an effortful step, we investigate how extra effort applied to disjunctive statements leads to a pragmatic interpretation of "or", or but not both. Experiment 1 compelled participants to wait for three seconds before answering, hence giving them the opportunity to process the utterance more deeply. Experiments 2 and 3 emphasized "or", either by visual means ("OR") or by prosodic means (contrastive stress) as another way to encourage participants to apply more effort. Following a relevance-theoretic line of argument, we hypothesized that conditions encouraging more processing effort would give rise to more pragmatic inferences and hence to more exclusive interpretations of the disjunction. This prediction was confirmed in the three experiments.