Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

Functional dissociation between perception and action is evident early in life

The functional distinction between vision for perception and vision for action is well documented in the mature visual system. Ganel and colleagues recently provided direct evidence for this dissociation, showing that while visual processing for perception follows Weber's fundamental law of psychophysics, action violates this law. We tracked the developmental trajectory of this functional dissociation, asking whether the qualitatively different pattern observed in adults of adherence of perception but not of action to Weber's law would also be evident early in life. Children aged 5-8 and adults were asked to either estimate the size of discs (perception) or grasp discs (action) varying in diameter. Interestingly, variability of perceptual estimates increased as a function of object size in accord with Weber's law, while variability of grasping did not scale with object size, at all ages tested. This provides the first clear evidence for an early emergence of the dissociation between perception and action.     

Visual information underpinning skilled anticipation: The effect of blur on a coupled and uncoupled in situ anticipatory response

Coupled interceptive actions are understood to be the result of neural processing—and visual information— which is distinct from that used for uncoupled perceptual responses. To examine the visual information used for action and perception, skilled cricket batters anticipated the direction of balls bowled toward them using a coupled movement (an interceptive action that preserved the natural coupling between perception and action) or an uncoupled (verbal) response, in each of four different visual blur conditions (plano, +1.00, +2.00, +3.00). Coupled responses were found to be better than uncoupled ones, with the blurring of vision found to result in different effects for the coupled and uncoupled response conditions. Low levels of visual blur did not affect coupled anticipation, a finding consistent with the comparatively poorer visual information on which online interceptive actions are proposed to rely. In contrast, some evidence was found to suggest that low levels of blur may enhance the uncoupled verbal perception of movement.     

Cognition as the Cooperative Appropriation of Affordances

Michaels (2000) expressed concerns about the implications of the notion of 2 visual systems (Milner &; Goodale, 1995) for ecological psychology. This leads her to suggest a decoupling of perception and action, by which action is separate from perception. It is suggested that although Michaels noted, on the one hand, that Milner and Goodale's approach to perception is a constructivist one, she mistakenly adopts their view that separates vision for perception from vision for action. An alternative position is presented, based on a recent article (Norman, in press), in which the parallels between the 2 visual systems, dorsal and ventral, and the 2 theoretical approaches, ecological and constructivist, are elucidated. According to this dual-process approach to perception, both systems are perceptual systems. The ecological-dorsal system is the system that picks up information about the ambient environment allowing the organism to negotiate it. It is suggested that this type of perception always processes the relevant information for action and that there is no need to sever the perception-action coupling. Ecological psychology and the 2 visual systems are quite compatible, and there is no need for concern.     

A TMS study of the ventral projections from V1 with implications for the finding of neural correlates of consciousness

The study of subliminal perception in normal and brain lesioned subjects has long been of interest to scholars studying the neural mechanisms behind conscious vision. Using brief durations and a developed methodology of introspective reporting, we present an experiment with visual stimuli that gives rise to little or no subliminal perception under normal viewing conditions. Coupled with transcranial magnetic stimulation, however, we find a dissociation between correctness and conscious awareness. Furthermore, we find support for the hypothesis that the ventral projection streams from V1 are necessary for visual consciousness.     

Semantic and pragmatic integration in vision for action

According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information. This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our knowledge of vision has improved over the years, this established view has turned out to be only an approximation. This paper sets out the details of a non-modularist approach to visual perception of action possibilities and explains how to resist the lure of cognitive segregation.     

What aspects of vision facilitate haptic processing?

We investigate how vision affects haptic performance when task-relevant visual cues are reduced or excluded. The task was to remember the spatial location of six landmarks that were explored by touch in a tactile map. Here, we use specially designed spectacles that simulate residual peripheral vision, tunnel vision, diffuse light perception, and total blindness. Results for target locations differed, suggesting additional effects from adjacent touch cues. These are discussed. Touch with full vision was most accurate, as expected. Peripheral and tunnel vision, which reduce visuo-spatial cues, differed in error pattern. Both were less accurate than full vision, and significantly more accurate than touch with diffuse light perception, and touch alone. The important finding was that touch with diffuse light perception, which excludes spatial cues, did not differ from touch without vision in performance accuracy, nor in location error pattern. The contrast between spatially relevant versus spatially irrelevant vision provides new, rather decisive, evidence against the hypothesis that vision affects haptic processing even if it does not add task-relevant information. The results support optimal integration theories, and suggest that spatial and non-spatial aspects of vision need explicit distinction in bimodal studies and theories of spatial integration.     

Depth perception: cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) respond to visual texture density gradients

Studies concerning the perceptual processes of animals are not only interesting, but are fundamental to the understanding of other developments in information processing among non-humans. Carefully used visual illusions have been proven to be an informative tool for understanding visual perception. In this behavioral study, we demonstrate that cuttlefish are responsive to visual cues involving texture gradients. Specifically, 12 out of 14 animals avoided swimming over a solid surface with a gradient picture that to humans resembles an illusionary crevasse, while only 5 out of 14 avoided a non-illusionary texture. Since texture gradients are well-known cues for depth perception in vertebrates, we suggest that these cephalopods were responding to the depth illusion created by the texture density gradient. Density gradients and relative densities are key features in distance perception in vertebrates. Our results suggest that they are fundamental features of vision in general, appearing also in cephalopods.     

Visual perception in 'low vision'

'Low vision' has an international classification as an impairment of vision that is defined by loss of visual acuity and the size of the visual field. Functional classification that would depict capability to use vision in different activities has not yet been agreed upon. Abnormal visual information leads to changes in visual perception, and brain-damage-related visual impairment may alter or prevent one or several cognitive visual functions. Abnormal visual perception opens a window into brain mechanisms that the psychophysicists otherwise do not have. Together with clinicians, psychophysicists can help visually impaired persons to understand the nature of their disability by thoroughly studying the nature of the altered image and the profile of cognitive visual functions.     

坡度知觉及其影响因素的研究进展

人们对于地表斜坡的知觉是非常不准确的,通常表现为对坡度估计过高。但是,研究发现,在以行为的方式对坡度进行模拟时,所模拟的坡度值却与实际坡度基本一致。这种面对同一视觉线索出现的视知觉与行为不一致的现象即为坡度知觉中的“知觉-行为分离”。本文回顾了影响坡度知觉的各种因素,涉及视觉线索、认知判断、感觉通道、生理状态以及报告方式等方面的研究,并对坡度知觉的未来研究进行了展望。     

不相关言语对视觉觉察的影响

前人多在记忆层面探讨不相关言语效应(the Irrelevant Speech Effect, ISE), 而本文选择在意识觉察(conscious awareness)阶段观察这一现象。所有实验均采用视觉掩蔽及听觉输入不相关声音的视听交互方式。实验1在安静、纯音及不相关言语3种听觉背景下让被试对简单图片做视觉觉察判断, 结果发现不相关言语干扰了视觉觉察, 而纯音则未产生干扰。实验2在相同的3种听觉背景下要求被试对复杂图片做视觉觉察判断, 结果同实验1。实验3采用事件相关电位技术, 在同样的3种听觉背景下观察被试对简单图片做视觉觉察判断时的脑电变化, 结果发现不相关言语干扰了视觉觉察负波的形成, 验证了行为学研究的结果。本文结果表明不相干言语在视觉意识觉察阶段就对被试的行为产生了干扰。     

S-R compatibility and response selection

In serial stage models, perception and action are usually thought to be linked to each other by an S-R translation mechanism. However, phenomena of S-R compatibility suggest a more direct relationship between perceptual and action domains. We discuss behavioral and psychophysiological evidence that irrelevant stimulus information automatically activates response codes, but then decays over time.

In a series of reaction time studies and electrophysiological experiments, we investigated both temporal and functional properties of the assumed automatic response activation process. We found that the amount of interference due to irrelevant spatial information depends upon how long its availability precedes that of the information relevant for response selection. This indicates that response activation decays rather quickly. If response-relevant and irrelevant spatial information are simultaneously available, electrophysiological measurements show that automatic activation of the spatially corresponding response rises soon after stimulus onset, but then dissipates and gets replaced by the activation of the response indicated by the relevant stimulus attribute.

We conclude that these findings do not support a pure translation account, but rather suggest the presence of two parallel and (at least partially) independent routes from perception to action: A direct route, allowing for automatic activation of response codes if stimulus and response features overlap, and an indirect route linking S and R codes in an arbitrary manner. Via the direct route responses may be primed independent of task-specific contingencies, while the correct response is selected via the indirect route. This use suggests that (a) the transmission of stimulus information to response stages does not (fully) depend on task relevance and that (b) different stimulus features can be transmitted asynchronously and independently from one another.     

See what you’ve done! Active touch affects the number of perceived visual objects

Previous research has shown that visual perception is affected by sensory information from other modalities. For example, sound can alter the visual intensity or the number of visual objects perceived. However, when touch and vision are combined, vision normally dominates—a phenomenon known asvisual capture. Here we report a cross-modal interaction between active touch and vision: The perceived number of brief visual events (flashes) is affected by the number of concurrently performed finger movements (keypresses). This sensorimotor illusion occurred despite little ambiguity in the visual stimuli themselves and depended on a close temporal proximity between movement execution and vision.     

The role of sensory modality in age-related distraction: a critical review and a renewed view

Selective attention requires the ability to focus on relevant information and to ignore irrelevant information. The ability to inhibit irrelevant information has been proposed to be the main source of age-related cognitive change (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Although age-related distraction by irrelevant information has been extensively demonstrated in the visual modality, studies involving auditory and cross-modal paradigms have revealed a mixed pattern of results. A comparative evaluation of these paradigms according to sensory modality suggests a twofold trend: Age-related distraction is more likely (a) in unimodal than in cross-modal paradigms and (b) when irrelevant information is presented in the visual modality, rather than in the auditory modality. This distinct pattern of age-related changes in selective attention may be linked to the reliance of the visual and auditory modalities on different filtering mechanisms. Distractors presented through the auditory modality can be filtered at both central and peripheral neurocognitive levels. In contrast, distractors presented through the visual modality are primarily suppressed at more central levels of processing, which may be more vulnerable to aging. We propose the hypothesis that age-related distractibility is modality dependent, a notion that might need to be incorporated in current theories of cognitive aging. Ultimately, this might lead to a more accurate account for the mixed pattern of impaired and preserved selective attention found in advancing age.     

Perception of Size of Movement Patterns

Physiological data suggest that perception and memory of kinesthesis may differ depending on whether a movement pattern is actively commanded or passively induced. An attempt was made to demonstrate a difference between these two types of movements by employing a cross-modal visual recognition test of size perception. Absolute and algebraic errors in the matching of kinesthesis with vision were measured. Positive algebraic errors were seen indicating that subjects’ perception for the size of kinesthetic movement patterns was magnified as compared to vision. Active kinesthesis was matched with vision more accurately than was passive kinesthesis, and the data yielded information about the differential contribution of active and passive muscle compartments to the global kinesthetic perception of voluntary movement. Cross-modal matching of kinesthesis with vision was in certain cases as accurate as visual intramodal matching. It was argued that active kinesthesis has internal references, and vision has external references to facilitate the similar-size recognition performance.     

Visual sensing without seeing

Abstract— It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., seeing). The studies reported here show that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or sense) the change even though they have no visual experience of it. The subjective difference between sensing and seeing is mirrored in several behavioral differences, suggesting that these are two distinct modes of conscious visual perception.     

Image reconstruction and Gestalt formation in human spatial vision

A sampling theoretical and experimental framework for the study of spatial vision is introduced. It is suggested that spatial Gestalt perception can be fruitfully analyzed by applying the concepts and methods of modern spatial filtering theory as they are known in the theory of image sampling and reconstruction. Demonstrations of the sampling processes in spatial vision are given and an experimental method for estimating the spatial reconstruction power of the human visual system is described. The experimental results presented suggest that high spatial frequency information has a special significance for human vision. Evidently, high frequency information is transmitted more easily through the visual system than has been generally assumed on the basis of contrast sensitivity studies.     

Are there unconscious perceptual processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of unconscious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and colleagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dorsal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious perceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information processing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I conclude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes.     

Automated vision occlusion-timing instrument for perception–action research

Vision occlusion spectacles are a highly valuable instrument for visual-perception–action research in a variety of disciplines. In sports, occlusion spectacles have enabled invaluable knowledge to be obtained about the superior capability of experts to use visual information to guide actions within in-situ settings. Triggering the spectacles to occlude a performer’s vision at a precise time in an opponent’s action or object flight has been problematic, due to experimenter error in using a manual buttonpress approach. This article describes a new laser curtain wireless trigger for vision occlusion spectacles that is portable and fast in terms of its transmission time. The laser curtain can be positioned in a variety of orientations to accept a motion trigger, such as a cricket bowler’s arm that distorts the lasers, which then activates a wireless signal for the occlusion spectacles to change from transparent to opaque, which occurs in only 8 ms. Results are reported from calculations done in an electronics laboratory, as well as from tests in a performance laboratory with a cricket bowler and a baseball pitcher, which verified this short time delay before vision occlusion. In addition, our results show that occlusion consistently occurred when it was intended—that is, near ball release and during mid-ball-flight. Only 8% of the collected data trials were unusable. The laser curtain improves upon the limitations of existing vision occlusion spectacle triggers, indicating that it is a valuable instrument for perception–action research in a variety of disciplines.     

Action history influences eye movements

Recent research has revealed that simple actions can have a profound effect on subsequent perception – people are faster to find a target that shares features with a previously acted on object even when those features are irrelevant to their task (the action effect). However, the majority of the evidence for this interaction between action and perception has come from manual response data. Therefore, it is unknown whether action affects early visual search processes, if it modulates post-attentional-selection processes, or both. To investigate this, we tracked participants’ spontaneous eye movements as they performed an action effect task. In two experiments we found that participants looked more quickly to the colour of an object they had previously acted on, compared to if they had viewed but not acted on the object, showing that action influenced early visual search processes. Additionally, there was evidence for post-selection effects as well. The results suggest that prior action affects both pre-selection and post-selection processes – spontaneously guiding attention to, and maintaining it on, objects that were previously important to the observer.