A Critical Review of Self-perceptions and the Positive Illusory Bias in Children with ADHD

Despite significant functional problems in multiple domains, children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) unexpectedly provide extremely positive reports of their own competence in comparison to other criteria reflecting actual competence. This counterintuitive phenomenon is known as the positive illusory bias (PIB). This article provides a comprehensive and critical review of the literature examining the self-perceptions of children with ADHD and the PIB. Specifically, we analyze methodological and statistical challenges associated with the investigation of the phenomenon, the theoretical basis for the PIB, and the effects of sample heterogeneity on self-perception patterns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this work and providing recommendations for advancing research in this area.     

Computation and Causation

The computer's effect on our understanding of causation has been enormous. By the mid-1980s, philosophical and social-scientific work on the topic had left us with (1) no reasonable reductive account of causation and (2) a class of statistical causal models tied to linear regression. At this time, computer scientists were attacking the problem of equipping robots with models of the external that included probabilistic portrayals of uncertainty. To solve the problem of efficiently storing such knowledge, they introduced Bayes Networks and directed graphs. By attaching a causal interpretation to Bayes Networks, the philosophy of causation changed dramatically. We are now able to be extremely general about how causal structure connects to data, and systematic about when causal structures are empirically indistinguishable. In this essay I try to motivate and describe this synthesis.     

Intuitive Covariation Assessment of the Illusory Correlation

Most of the research concerned with the illusory correlation is modeled after the seminal work of D. L. Hamilton and R. K. Gifford (1976). However, S. A. Haslam and C. McGarty (1994) have voiced concerns over the dependent measures used within this paradigm. Therefore, in this study, the authors tested a new dependent variable that has high face validity. This measure was modeled after the work of J. R. McGahan and R. Wight (1989) and consisted of a set of propositional statements representing either the illusory correlation, the contingency opposite the illusory correlation, or the noncontingency. A second purpose of this study was to validate other studies that have used dependent measures modeled after the work of J. R. McGahan and R. Wight (1989). Demonstrating that this measure can be used to detect a well-documented phenomenon (i.e., the illusory correlation) would strengthen the results and conclusions from other studies. To this end, results from 2 experiments indicate that this measure does provide a valid alternative to those measures that are commonly used in illusory correlation studies. The results thereby give credence to other studies that have used similar dependent measures.     

Preattentive Perception of Multiple Illusory Line-Motion: A Formal Model of Parallel Independent-Detection in Visual Search

The phenomenon referred to as illusory line-motion (ILM; O. Hikosaka, S. Miyauchi, & S. Shimojo, 1993a) has been described as a measure of the local facilitation of attention gradient. However, J. Kawahara, K. Yokosawa, S. Nishida, and T. Sato (1996) have demonstrated a spatially parallel search for an “odd man out” in the ILM direction. Apart from showing preattentive ILM perception in terms of an analogy between line-motion and apparent motion, the authors examined whether ILM perception is possible without attention from another point of view. Four experiments revealed that the ILM target can be detected in parallel without invoking attentional facilitation and invalidated the possible contribution of attentional set in parallel ILM search. Participants were able to correctly detect the ILM target among multiple nontargets, even when the line orientation was changed from trial to trial. The authors' independent-detection model predicted ILM search performance well on several occasions. These findings strongly support a preattentive and stimulus-driven explanation of ILM perception.     

Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation

Summary  Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors (e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I evaluate the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency.     

Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation

The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting‐point the suggestion that C causes E iff (～C □→ ～E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (～E □→ ～C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre‐emption. It is found that the ‘reversed’ counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre‐emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.     

Illusory trust: Kanizsa shapes incidentally increase trust and willingness to invest

Previous research has shown that the completion of basic perceptual processes is intrinsically pleasant. In the absence of diagnostic and objective cues to trustworthiness, nondiagnostic factors such as positive affect can incidentally lead to reported and behavioral trust. On the basis of these two premises, it was tested whether positive affect from the completion of perceptual processes has implications for the formation of trust in first-time business-consumer interactions. We tested this hypothesis in four experiments, using the famous Kanizsa illusion as an exemplary perceptual process that has been shown to trigger positive affect. We found that participants trusted companies who featured a Kanizsa shape as their logo more than companies with closely matched logos that did not allow for the completion of a basic perceptual process. This was evident on self-reported (Experiment 1) as well as behavioral (Experiments 2–4) measures of trust. This effect even persisted under incentivized conditions (Experiment 4) and was partially mediated by the intrinsic pleasantness of perception (Experiment 3). These findings for the first time demonstrate that positive affect is not the only consequence of perception, but rather has further trickle-down consequences for social judgments and economic decision making. Perceptual illusions seem to elicit illusory trust. Therefore, these novel findings bear important implications not only for both logo design and marketing but also for consumer decision making.     

Intrinsic Causation in Humean Supervenience

The paper investigates whether causation is extrinsic in Humean Supervenience (HS) in the sense that being caused by is an intrinsic relation between token causes and effects. The underlying goal is to test whether causality is extrinsic for Humeans and intrinsic for anti‐Humeans in this sense. I argue that causation is typically extrinsic in HS, but it is intrinsic to event pairs that collectively exhaust almost the whole of history. 1     

Connection and Influence: A Process Theory of Causation

Summary  A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation.     

Capturing Shadows: On Photography,Causation, and Absences

Many photographs seem to be images of absences: for instance, a photograph of a shadow seems to be an image of an absence, as shadows are plausibly thought of as being absences of light. Absence photography is puzzling, however, as, first, it is a common idea that photographs can only be images of things that have caused them, and, second, it is unclear whether absences can cause anything. In this paper, I look at various ways to unravel the puzzle. Along the way, I also hope to cast some light on the idea that photography is a causal medium.     

Spinoza on Composition,Causation, and the Mind's Eternity

Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind is often understood as the claim that the mind has a part that is eternal. I appeal to two principles that Spinoza takes to govern parthood and causation to raise a new problem for this reading. Spinoza takes the composition of one thing from many to require causal interaction among the many. Yet he also holds that eternal things cannot causally interact, without mediation, with things in duration. So the human mind, since it is the idea of a body existing in duration, cannot have an eternal part. In order to solve this problem, I propose an aspectual reading of Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind: the mind itself is eternal, under one of its aspects.     

Guilt assessment after retracted voluntary and coerced-compliant confessions in combination with exculpatory or ambiguous evidence

We investigated how voluntary confessions, coerced-compliant confessions, and no-confessions influenced guilt assessments in combination with other exculpatory or ambiguous evidence. In three experiments (total N = 808), participants studied case information and provided guilt assessments. As expected, in Experiment 1 and 2a, (i) voluntary confessions to protect a family member elicited stronger guilt attributions than no-confessions and (ii) ambiguous evidence led to stronger guilt attributions than exculpatory evidence. In Experiment 2b, voluntary confessions to protect a group-member (but not to protect a family-member) elicited stronger guilt attributions than no-confessions. Exculpatory eyewitness evidence elicited stronger guilt attributions than exculpatory DNA evidence and participants assigned more weight to exculpatory DNA than eyewitness evidence. Participants were able to discount coerced-compliant confessions when they received information about the interrogations (Experiments 2a/b), but did not consistently consider risk factors for (voluntary) false confessions outside the interrogation room when assessing guilt.     

Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.     

Distant Causation in <Emphasis Type="Italic">C</Emphasis>+

The action language C+ of Giunchiglia, Lee, Lifschitz, McCain and Turner is a high-level, logical formalism for the representation of domains involving action and change. However, one cannot directly express relationships which hold between states more than one time-step distant, or even say that one action determines another at the next time. We present C+_timed, a generalization of C+ which removes these limitations. As for C+, translations to the language of causal theories are given. We also define a new kind of transition system called a ‘run system’ to provide a graphical semantics. Finally, we show how domains involving prohibition and permission can be modelled, by incorporating the ideas of another extension of C+.     

Does a Positive Bias Relate to Social Behavior in Children With ADHD?

This study examines whether positively biased self-perceptions relate to social behaviors in children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as compared to control children. The social behaviors of children with ADHD (n = 87) were examined relative to control children (CTL; n = 38) during a laboratory-based dyadic social interaction task. Children with ADHD were subgrouped into those with a positive illusory bias (PIB) in their self-perceptions (ADHD + PIB) versus those without such a bias (ADHD – PIB). Using a behavioral coding system adapted for this study, ADHD + PIB, ADHD – PIB, and CTL participants were compared on objectively coded social behaviors occurring within the context of the social interaction task. Whereas both ADHD groups displayed more disruptive behavior than controls, only the ADHD + PIB group displayed less prosocial behavior and less effortful behavior. This study breaks new ground by examining positively biased self-perceptions as they relate to social behavior in children with ADHD and provides promising new insight into the social problems experienced by these children.     

The Inherent Empirical Underdetermination of Mental Causation

It has become a popular view among non-reductive physicalists that it is possible to devise empirical tests generating evidence for the causal efficacy of the mental, whereby the exclusion worries that have haunted the position of non-reductive physicalism for decades can be dissolved once and for all. This paper aims to show that these evidentialist hopes are vain. I argue that, if the mental is taken to supervene non-reductively on the physical, there cannot exist empirical evidence for its causal efficacy. While causal structures without non-reductive supervenience relations can be conclusively identified in ideal discovery circumstances, it is impossible, in principle, to generate evidence that would favour models with mental causation over models without. Ascribing causal efficacy to the mental, for the non-reductive physicalist, is a modelling choice that must be made on the basis of metaphysical background theories or pragmatic maxims guiding the selection among empirically indistinguishable models.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

因果论分析疾病的不典型首发症状

疾病首发症状的不典型是导致误诊误治的重要原因,本文就疾病首发症状的不典型进行哲学分析,通过举例阐述如何在临床上运用因果联系的思维方法识别不典型首发症状,以及因果联系在首发症状不典型病例应用中的注意事项。最后,文章分析了由因果理论得出的病因诊断和对因治疗医疗模式在临床运用中的重要性及其发展前景。