Conflict and Compromise in International Calvinism: Ysbrand Trabius Balck's Pastoral Mediations in Exile and Beyond

Abstract

The life of frequent banishment and exile of the respected minister, Ysbrand Trabius Balck (c.1530-c.1600), offers an opportunity to see a refugee pastor in action and to witness the practical concerns that faced the Reformed Church, both while ‘under the cross’ and after establishment. Balck's early Reformed ministerial post was in Antwerp, which he left for exile to Emden, Germany, shortly after the outbreak of iconoclasm in the Netherlands. After Emden, he left for England, where he served as pastor in four congregations of Dutch refugees before returning to Antwerp ten years later. Subsequent turbulence caused additional periods of exile from Antwerp, including stints in Leiden, Poland, and Friesland. Balck's experience in international refugee networks led him to be called to serve as a mediator in congregational conflicts; here his practical experiences kept him aware of the local situations that he needed to consider in any conflict resolutions. This article investigates Balck's practical role as negotiator and mediator in three controversies involving charity and church discipline: first and foremost during his brief Emden exile, which has been overlooked by scholars, and two more widely known episodes in Leiden. Such an investigation underscores the complicated reality of international Calvinism, as the exile experience and his pastoral obligations sharpened Balck's firm doctrinal convictions while at the same time causing him to emphasize accommodation and striving to find ways to live together despite conflict.     

Calvinism and psychoanalysis: A comparative study

Summary Although the title of this essay suggests a comparison of psychoanalysis and Calvinism, I have chosen to compare primarily the two leaders of these movements. On many points they shared similar beliefs. Certain of these areas have been highlighted and discussed briefly: ascetic tendencies, work, religion, concepts of God and of man, actions as symptoms, and predestination and determinism.     

Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets

Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman (1998) have shown that real-life regrets for actions and inactions correspond to different emotional states. When people regret something they have done they experience painful “hot” emotions such as disgust or guilt, whereas when the regret is about a failure to act they rather experience wistful emotions. In four questionnaire studies, we have tested the hypothesis that regrettable actions elicit a particular subcategory of these hot emotions: the self-conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and anger toward oneself). These studies used different methodologies and all converged to show that self-conscious emotions were the only hot emotions to be systematically greater for action regrets than for inaction regrets. A similar pattern was observed for judgments of responsibility and morality. We emphasize the theoretical and methodological implications of these results in the discussion.     

对康德的道德形而上学基础的追问及存在论意义上的超越

康德的道德哲学与其政治哲学是逻辑一致的,康德认为正义的优先性在于人先天的自由,而自由的主体坚持正义和遵从道德,则在于人的实践理性自身具有的善良意志,康德就这样通过自由、实践理性、善良意志等概念为道德奠定了基础。然而它仍然是先验的、空洞的,唯有从道德是人存在的方式这一存在论的根基处入手,才能理解道德并使其获得自身存在的坚实根基。     

Reflexivity and its Radical Form: Implications for the Practice of Humanistic Psychotherapies

Reflexivity has been defined as self-awareness, and radical reflexivity as awareness of self-awareness. Based on a qualitative research study of the client's experience of psychotherapy, clients’ reflexivity and radical reflexivity are applied to the concepts of moral evaluation and freedom of will. These concepts in turn are related to psychotherapy clients’ relationship with self and with the therapist. It is shown how the nature of these relationships provides a rationale for decisions on the appropriateness of the therapist's direction of the therapeutic process. In addition, specific interventions to offset the power differential between the client and therapist are specified. It is concluded that unconscious determinants of experience and action notwithstanding, clients’ self-aware agency plays a significant role in their engagement in therapy.

Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience

Recent episodes of public dissent (such as the demonstrations against G8 policies) raise the issue of the psychological processes triggered in obeying and disobeying the authority. Even if obedience to authority is an important aspect of social life and it plays a key role in maintaining social order, the concept of obedience has been studied in social psychology mainly in terms of its destructive aspects. Besides, most of the studies have overlooked the role of disobedience in the authority relationship. Disobedience may be conceived of as a protest that undermines the legitimacy of the authority or it can represent an instrument for controlling the legitimacy of the authority's demands, becoming a factor protecting against authoritarianism. In this article, a new perspective on the study of the relationship between the individual and the authority is put forward, considering obedience and disobedience as parallel concepts, each having constructive and destructive aspects.     

Salience,Imagination, and Moral Luck

One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question.     

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.”     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

Control,responsibility, and moral assessment

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view

One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterisation of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope which, according to them, characterises these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate proposing an original, deflationary view in which perceptions of basic-rights violation and injustice are fundamental for the folk understanding of harmful transgressions as moral transgressions in Turiel's sense. In this article we elaborate and refine our deflationary view, while reviewing the debate, addressing various criticisms raised against our perspective, showing how our perspective explains the existent evidence, and suggesting new lines of inquiry.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

The search for freedom in extreme sports: A phenomenological exploration

Participation in extreme sports is continuing to grow, yet there is still little understanding of participant motivations in such sports. The purpose of this paper is to report on one aspect of motivation in extreme sports, the search for freedom. The study utilized a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology. Fifteen international extreme sport participants who participated in sports such as BASE jumping, big wave surfing, extreme mountaineering, extreme skiing, rope free climbing and waterfall kayaking were interviewed about their experience of participating in an extreme sport. Results reveal six elements of freedom: freedom from constraints, freedom as movement, freedom as letting go of the need for control, freedom as the release of fear, freedom as being at one, and finally freedom as choice and responsibility. The findings reveal that motivations in extreme sport do not simply mirror traditional images of risk taking and adrenaline and that motivations in extreme sports also include an exploration of the ways in which humans seek fundamental human values.     

Pondering “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today's World”: A Protestant Missiological Reflection

The article explores “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today's World” (MOCT), one of the six official documents issued by the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church that took place on the island of Crete in 2016. It is the first official Orthodox statement on mission ever published. The aim of the present article is to offer a reflection of MOCT from a Protestant missiological perspective. The article argues that MOCT interprets mission as the service of the church to the world, motivated by love. It goes on to discuss six major thematic areas of the statement, namely, the dignity of the human person; freedom and responsibility; peace and justice; peace and the aversion of war; the attitude of the church toward discrimination; and the mission of the Orthodox Church as a witness of love through service. The article seeks to provide a constructive critique of MOCT, assessing both its weaknesses and its assets. It concludes by saying that despite certain theological question marks, the new Orthodox mission document represents an invaluable contribution to the ecumenical discussion on mission and evangelism.     

Moral perfectionism and moral values,virtues, and judgments: A preliminary investigation

Moral perfectionism has a long tradition in philosophical inquiry, but so far has been ignored in psychological research. This article presents a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism exploring its relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments. In three studies, 539 university students responded to items of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990) adapted to measure personal moral standards (PMS) and concern over moral mistakes (CMM) and completed measures of moral values, virtues, and forgiveness, gratitude, and wrong behavior judgments. When partial correlations were computed controlling for the overlap between PMS and CMM, PMS showed positive correlations with moral values, virtues, reciprocal helping, forgiveness, and condemnation of wrong behaviors. In contrast, CMM showed a positive correlation only with indebtedness and a negative correlation with self-reliance. The present findings, while preliminary, suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that may help explain individual differences in moral values, virtues, and judgments.     

Integrating moral and achievement variables to predict doping likelihood in football: A cross-cultural investigation

ObjectivesIn our study, we had two objectives. Our first objective was to test a social-cognitive model of doping in sport. In this model, we examined moral variables (i.e., moral disengagement, moral identity, anticipated guilt) and performance motivational climate as predictors of doping likelihood and whether performance motivational climate moderates the relationship between moral disengagement and doping likelihood. The second objective was to determine whether this model is invariant across sex and country.DesignWe used a cross-sectional design.MethodParticipants were 1495 (729 females) elite football players (mean age 20.4 ± 4.4) recruited from 97 teams in the UK, Denmark and Greece. They completed questionnaires measuring the aforementioned variables.ResultsMoral disengagement positively predicted doping likelihood both directly and indirectly via anticipated guilt. The direct relationship was significant only when performance climate was perceived as average or high. Moral identity negatively predicted doping likelihood via both moral disengagement and anticipated guilt; and performance climate positively predicted doping likelihood. The model was largely invariant across sex and country.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that young elite football players in the UK, Denmark and Greece are less likely to use banned substances to enhance their performance, if they consider being moral an important part of who they are, and if they perceive a low performance climate in their team. Moral identity is likely to trigger feelings of guilt associated with the use of banned substances and to mobilize moral disengagement mechanisms. Our findings highlight the importance of moral variables in deterring the use of banned substances in sport.