Critical individualism: Whitehead's metaphysics and critique of liberalism

Conclusion Whitehead's metaphysics contains an accurate portrayal of concrete human existence - one which can serve as a ground for criticizing the abstractions into which liberalism has fallen. His critical individualism, his insistence both on the individual as the seat of all value and on our essential connectedness to one another in modern society, is a call for liberalism to restore concrete meaning to its fundamental notions of individuality and freedom. However, his suggestions that the core values of liberalism can be actualized if we but reaffirm Plato's ancient equation of knowledge with virtue rests on an optimism that is difficult to sustain apart from a compensatory metaphysical dogma. We can appropriate Whitehead's criticism of liberalism, but if we can no longer convince ourselves of a metaphysical vision that supports faith in Plato's equation, we must look elsewhere for suggestions as to how liberalism can be revitalized.     

共和主义与自由主义:一个思想史的考查

本文旨在从思想史的角度,对共和主义与自由主义这两大西方政治文化传统之间的关系做一个初步的考查。本文首先概括了古典共和主义的基本理念,然后探讨了自由主义对它的继承与超越,最后试图从中获得两点启示。     

马基雅维里的共和主义政治观

创建自由共和国是马基雅维里的终极理想.他的共和国所要遵循的政治原则是通过一系列共和主义核心语汇体现出来的,概而言之就是在国家层面上实行法的统治,在社会层面上弘扬公民美德.这两方面相辅相成,决定并维护着自由国家的性质.     

在霍布斯和马基雅维里之间——哈林顿共和主义的思想底色

作为古典共和主义者的杰出代表,哈林顿虽然对霍布斯思想批评有加,但是无论他思考政治的哲学前提,还是他对共和机制的探讨,与霍布斯所开创的现代的立场与方法都有很明晰的继承关系。     

Political liberalism and global justice

This article argues that political liberalism, of the type formulated by John Rawls and Charles Larmore and further developed in Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, is superior to more comprehensive political views both in domestic and in global affairs. Perfectionist liberalism as advocated by John Stuart Mill and Joseph Raz attempts to erase existing religions and replace them with the religion of utility or autonomy. This is wrong, because in the ethico-religious environment of reasonable disagreement that we inhabit all comprehensive forms of political morality pose a threat to people's liberty and equality. Only thin and narrow conceptions of value like the ones suggested by Rawls, Larmore, Sen, and Nussbaum can guarantee the respect for diversity that is needed in a pluralistic world. Although Rawls famously failed to extend this idea from domestic to transnational matters, the argument of the article is that not only do the principles of political liberalism apply to global matters, but that the reasons why they apply to global affairs are even more compelling transnationally than they are domestically.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.