Theater of lies: The letter to D'Alembert and the tragedy of self-deception

Though Rousseau is recognized to have treated the problem of self-knowledge with great sensitivity, very little is known about a centrally important aspect of that treatment—his understanding of self-deception. I reconstruct this conception, emphasizing the importance of purposive but sub-intentional processes that work to enhance agents' self-esteem. I go on to argue that Rousseau's fundamental concern about the theater is its capacity to manipulate these processes in ways that make spectators both complicit in their own falsification and vulnerable to elite domination. This argument, with its focus on the pervasive and often subconscious character of self-deception, not only problematizes an influential reading of Rousseau which emphasizes the epistemic availability of the “true” or “sincere” self, but also highlights the ongoing civic and moral threat posed by self-deceptive mental states.     

Intimacy,Autonomy and (Non) Domination

Accounts of autonomy which acknowledge the importance of non‐domination – that is, of being structurally protected against arbitrary interference with one's life – face an apparent problem with regards to intimate relationships (whether romantic or otherwise). By their very nature, such relations open us up to psychological and material suffering that would not be possible absent the particular relationship; even worse, from the non‐domination point of view, is that this vulnerability seems to be structural in a way exactly analogous to (for example) workplace or social domination. If being powerless to prevent an employer causing me harm constitutes domination at work, then what relevant differences can support the intuition that being powerless to prevent my partner causing me comparable pain is not autonomy‐hostile? I argue for the reassuring view that the obligations and possibility of pain arising from such relations aren't necessarily dominating; they would be so only if we believed that any obligation we have not explicitly agreed to is a restriction on our autonomy, and that is false. I conclude with a note of caution: even though intimate relations aren't necessarily dominating, they will often be contingently so if they take place in a wider social context of domination – such as that which we currently inhabit.     

Rousseau's three revolutions

Rousseau's relation to the French Revolution – and in particular his status as the Revolution's precursor or predictor or progenitor – has been often examined. Yet almost no sustained attention has been given to what is arguably Rousseau's most significant and explicit statement on revolution and its role in civilization's development. This paper calls attention to this statement and argues for its key significance on three fronts: first, for how it organizes Rousseau's conjectural history of civilization in the second Discourse; second, for the insight it offers into the processes of Rousseau's pre‐Hegelian philosophy of history; and third, for the normative political implications of its standard for measuring the relative progress of inequality in a given society at a given time.     

McDowell’s Alternative Conceptions of the World

Abstract

Feminists have interpreted Rousseau's attitudes to women as characteristic of a patriarchal ideology in which passion, nature and love are associated with the feminine and repressed in favour of masculine reason, culture and justice. Yet this reading does not cohere with Rousseau's adulation of nature, nor with the repression of writing and culture in favour of natural speech which Derrida finds in his texts. This paper uses Rousseau's accounts of his personal experiences to resolve this conflict and to develop a more complex understanding of Rousseau's attitudes to women. The reading emphasizes that Rousseau operated with a triadic picture in which reason, the passions of the heart and the passions of the body are distinguished. The discussion of Derrida's reading of Rousseau gives rise to some reflections on the relationship of speech and writing to subjectivity, autonomy and women's oppression.     

Types of sexual transference and countertransference in psychotherapeutic work with children and adolescents

The question of normal sexuality begins to arise in the treatment of severely sexually abused or sexually offending patients. The author suggests that it is an interesting and delicate moment during the process of recovery when less perverse, more normal sexuality appears mixed with, or even disguised by, the more habitual perverse fantasies. Writers in the adult field have drawn distinctions between perverse, eroticized and normal erotic transferences, and between Oedipal and post-Oedipal sexuality. Some have also distinguished between countertransferences in the analyst of an erotised versus a normal erotic nature. The paper discusses whether these distinctions could have any relevance for child patients. Freud and Klein have taught us much about the child's sexuality in relation to his interest in and attraction to his parents as sexual beings. But can we also detect some origins in earlier experiences in infancy of the child's later capacity to feel himself a sexual being capable of being wanted by an other? How might such a feeling of sexual self-worth differ from narcissism and from sexualised exhibitionism? The paper asks how therapists might deal with such problems and such possibly healthy developments.     

‘Necessity’ and ‘provability’ in the later wittgenstein

I present a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic and mathematics. This interpretation, like others, emphasizes Wittgenstein's attempt to reconcile platonistic and constructivistic approaches. But, unlike other interpretations, mine explains that attempt in terms of Wittgenstein's position about the relations between our concepts of necessity and provability. If what I say here is correct, then we can rescue Wittgenstein from the charge of naive relativism. For his relativism extends only to provability, and not to necessity.     

Exploitation as Domination: A Response to Arneson

In a recent paper in this journal, Richard Arneson criticizes the domination account of exploitation and attributes it to me and Allen Wood. In this paper, I defend the domination account against Arneson's criticisms. I begin by showing that the domination view is distinct from the vulnerability‐based view defended by Wood. I also show that Alan Wertheimer's influential account of exploitation is congenial to the domination view. I then argue that Arneson's own fairness‐based view of exploitation generates false negatives and trivializes the concept of exploitation, rendering it entirely parasitic on the notion of unfairness.     

Women as wives and rulers in Martin Luther's theology

This article offers a theological analysis of Martin Luther's complex view on women and their role in society, focusing on his exposition of the narratives of creation and fall in the Lectures on Genesis. Luther's understanding of women is defined by an ostensible paradox. On the one hand, Luther claims that all women are equal to men in relation to God and hold the power to rule over the earth, which they execute as leaders of the household. On the other hand, Luther passes on a traditional view of women being of a weaker nature and argues that wives have to subordinate to their husbands. I interpret this understanding of women as an outcome of Luther's theological anthropology based on his doctrine of justification. Men and women are equal as priests and kings in relation to God and authorized to manage their relationship with him, to teach and pray for others, and to disobey authority that interferes with this faith relation. As sinners, though, they must submit to authority to suppress sin. Both men and women exercise authority through their gender-specific callings in the earthly hierarchies, which constitute God's created order. However, women have to subordinate to their husbands in order to suppress sin. The article discusses whether this complex view on women promoted patriarchal social structures or whether the freedom and equality of the spiritual realm over time filtered through to the role of women in society, paving the way for their liberation.     

“Like a Fanciful Kind of Half Being”: Mary Wollstonecraft's Criticism of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau

The article investigates the philosophical foundations and details of Mary Wollstonecraft's criticism of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau's views on the education and nature of women. I argue that Wollstonecraft's criticism must not be understood as a constructionist critique of biological reductionism. The first section analyzes the differences between Wollstonecraft's and Rousseau's views on the possibility of a true civilization and shows how these differences connect to their respective conceptions of moral psychology. The section shows that Wollstonecraft's disagreement with Rousseau's views on women was rooted in a broad scope of philosophical disagreement. The second section focuses on Rousseau's concept of nature, and I argue that Rousseau was neither a biological determinist nor a functionalist who denied that nature had any normative significance. The section ends with a discussion of Wollstonecraft's criticism of Rousseau's application of the distinction between the natural and the artificial. The third section focuses on Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's claim that there are different standards for the perfectibility of men and women. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the claim that Aristotle would have provided Wollstonecraft with the philosophical tools she needed for her criticism of Rousseau.     

Causes and Counterparts

It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast events’.     

Heidegger,Sociality, and Human Agency

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.     

Relatio as Modus Essendi : The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation

The context in which medieval theologians discuss 'relation' is nearly always a trinitarian one. They have to solve an awkward problem: to explain how in God the persons are identical with the divine essence, yet different among themselves. In this paper I want to argue that Henry of Ghent's interest in the nature of the Trinity acted as an impetus towards the development of his theory of the nature of relations. In this context the accounts of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome will be considered as important for understand18 ing Henry's account. Henry's positive account of relations stems from Avicenna. For Henry, a relation is not an aliquid but has two modes of being, both as an accident and as a relative. Henry's attempt to think the nature of relation leads to him developing a relational ontology.     

The psychogenesis of the ego: notes on Freud's 'case of homosexuality in a woman'

This paper examines Freud's (1920) case study 'The psychogenesis of homosexuality in a woman' in the light of the second topography that was being elaborated in his theoretical writing at that time. The analysis of the ego and its defence mechanisms, which was to become such an important part of clinical technique in Anglo-American psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy and psychodynamic counselling, is not set out explicitly in any of Freud's case studies. However, in this last case study presented by Freud, it is possible to see how an attention to family dynamics, Oedipal structures and patterns of identification set the stage for the new notion of the ego to emerge. This 'turning point' in theory and clinical technique is also, in this case, intimately related to theories of sexuality, and Freud's own assumptions about homosexuality and heterosexuality are considered here in relation to his account of the ego.     

Inscrutability and its Discontents

That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's “Problem of the Many.” Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word “rabbit,” they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that “When I use ‘rabbit,’ I refer to rabbits” is made true by the meaning of the word “refer.” The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics—questions of others’ meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language—is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place.     

The Influence of Occupational Status on Role Conflict in Women

Questionnaires on eight role-conflict categories (time management, relations with husband, household management, financial, child care, expectations for self, expectations of others, and guilt) were administered to 518 women. A role-conflict hierarchy was established, those areas centering around the woman's view of herself being the most stressful. Level of occupational status was found to be a significant variable in six of the categories. Professional women and housewives tended to give similar responses and to demonstrate the least amount of role conflict. Implications of this study for counselors were discussed.     

“Ubi Patria – Ibi Bene”: The Scope and Limits of Rousseau's Patriotic Education

Does the inculcation of patriotic sentiments in the hearts of patriotsrender them invulnerable to the malady of self-alienation experiencedotherwise by citizens of the “atomist” state? Rousseau, as will be shownin this paper, provided a positive answer to this question. Accordingly,he accorded utmost importance in his political and educational writingto the education for patriotism. The purpose of this paper is to offer acritical assessment of Rousseau's education for patriotism. I suggestthat when successfully implemented, this education leads to theestrangement and effacement of the self, giving rise to a malady similarto the one Rousseau wanted to cure. If Rousseau's patriotic educationcan really prevent the experience of self-alienation arising due to alack of a community one can call one's own, this very education givesalso rise to the experience of self-alienation arising upon theemergence of a tight-knit patriotic community. Such a community leavesno room for the development of the individual's (or the patriot's)unique talents and the pursuit of his or her self-regarding goals andencourages the emergence, over again, of the experience ofself-alienation.     

Sexual Experience: Foucault,Phenomenology, and Feminist Theory

This paper explicates Foucault's conception of experience and defends it as an important theoretical resource for feminist theory. It analyzes Linda Alcoff's devastating critique of Foucault's account of sexuality and her reasons for advocating phenomenology as a more viable alternative. I agree with her that a philosophically sophisticated understanding of experience must remain central for feminist theory, but I demonstrate that her critique of Foucault is based on a mistaken view of his philosophical position as well as on a problematic understanding of phenomenology.