Introduction: The Coming of the Knowledge Society and the Challenges for the Future of Europe

This paper explicates the philosophical and epistemological background of the MIRRORS project, which is the starting point of the various contributions in this issue. Developments in the philosophy of science will be discussed, especially the watershed work of Kuhn, in order to analyze further developments in the sociology of science, particularly starting from the Strong Programme. Finally, it will be shown how a multidisciplinary approach in Science & Technology (S&T) studies, as opposed to an interdisciplinary one, is to be preferred. Specifically, the connection between this approach and the modelling and idealizational approaches to science is stressed and defended as the best available approach for the formation of a conscientious democratic knowledge-based society.     

Nesselroade and Molenaar's Measurement Concerns and Proposals: An Introduction

In this special section Nesselroade and Molenaar (N & M) propose a provocative new approach to measurement invariance. When measures are collected repeatedly over time (e.g., daily diary studies), a potentially unique measurement model relating the items to the underlying construct can be created for each individual. If hypothesized causal paths specified between constructs (e.g., frustration → aggression) can be constrained to be equal across the individuals, a model with idiographic measurement of the constructs, but with nomothetic structural relationships can be specified. Three commentaries react to N & M's proposal. Revelle and Wilt challenge the priority given by N & M to unique individual measurement structures, arguing that between subjects differences in structural relationships are empirically important and meaningful. Markus's uses David Hume's framework to raise philosophy of science challenges for N & M's approach. Maydeu-Olivares challenges the incremental validity of N & M's approach, arguing that N & M's approach is unlikely to improve the prediction of between subjects criteria. Finally, N & M present a rejoinder to the three commentaries.     

A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES: DISSONANCE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RATIONALITY

Abstract. The relation between rationality in science and rationality in moral discourse is of interest to philosophers and sociologists of science, to educators and moral philosophers. Apparently conflicting conceptions of rationality can be detected at the core of two current socio-educational controversies: the creationievolution controversy and that concerning "moral education." This paper takes as its starting point the recorded views of participants in these controversies; exhibits the contradictions and their effect on the public; relates these contradictions to developments in the philosophy and history of science; and suggests, in a preliminary way, one approach for dealing with the problem.     

READING DUNS SCOTUS: FROM HISTORY TO PHILOSOPHY

One cannot insert Duns Scotus directly into contemporary debates of theology without first of all recalling and recounting his place in the history of metaphysics understood as a transcendental science. It is only then, and starting from philosophical arguments, that one will be able to engage thoughts about God—i.e., do "theology"—in such as way as not to betray God's transcendence.     

EZ does it! Extensions of the EZ-diffusion model

In this rejoinder, we address two of Ratcliff’s main concerns with respect to the EZ-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 2008). First, we introduce “robust-EZ,” a mixture model approach to achieve robustness against the presence of response contaminants that might otherwise distort parameter estimates. Second, we discuss an extension of the EZ model that allows the estimation of starting point as an additional parameter. Together with recently developed, user-friendly software programs for fitting the full diffusion model (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007; Voss & Voss, 2007), the development of the EZ model and its extensions is part of a larger effort to make diffusion model analyses accessible to a broader audience, an effort that is long overdue.     

Center-periphery relations and transformation of post-soviet science

The republics of the former USSR need a new science and technology (S&T) policy. The main question concerns the relevance of innovation studies and practical recommendations in developed countries to S&T policy in the new independent states. The participation of the republics of the USSR in scientific research has been of a dual nature. Sharing the independent S&T policy of the superpower, they were the periphery dependent on the center (in Moscow). Now, the S&T sphere of the former republics should be dependentnot on the political center of the Soviet Union, but on the world science center. The inversion urges an adequate change in the objectives, resources, and mechanism of the transformation of post-Soviet science. Moreover, new S&T policy must be based on the specific socioeconomic situation, including the traditions of the social organization of science. His research interests include sociology of science and science and technology policy.     

Philosophy of Science in the Twenty‐First Century

Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science.     

Social machines: a philosophical engineering

In Weaving the Web (2000), Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain” (201–202). The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which has in turn resulted in several calls for a “philosophical engineering” (Halpin 2013; Hendler & Berners-Lee 2010); Halpin et al. 2010). This paper is a first attempt to respond to this call, by combining contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science with epistemology. The idea of philosophical engineering implies that a sufficiently good conception of Social Machines should be of both theoretical and practical advantage. To demonstrate how the present approach can satisfy both objectives it will be used in order to address one of Wikipedia’s (the most famous Social Machine to date) most worrying concerns—i.e., the current and ongoing decline in the number of its active contributors (Halfacker et al. 2012).     

Untangling the Debate: The Ethics of Human Enhancement

Human enhancement, in which nanotechnology is expected to play a major role, continues to be a highly contentious ethical debate, with experts on both sides calling it the single most important issue facing science and society in this brave, new century. This paper is a broad introduction to the symposium herein that explores a range of perspectives related to that debate. We will discuss what human enhancement is and its apparent contrast to therapy; and we will begin to tease apart the myriad intertwined issues that arise in the debate: (1) freedom & autonomy, (2) health & safety, (3) fairness & equity, (4) societal disruption, and (5) human dignity.

De re modality,generic essences,and science

Conclusion I have taken the traditional problem of the seeming interdependence of identity concepts and essentialistic concepts and the attendant difficulties with circularity as a starting point in my consideration of recent attempts to provide accounts ofde re essences. Having distinguished between theories of individual and generic essences, I have shown how a linguistic device based upon a new approach to referring expressions has, perhaps, provided some advance in the understanding of individualde re essences. I have argued that, however efficacious these linguistic devices may be in dealing with individual essences, they are of no help in dealing with generic essences. I considered, therefore, one of the recent attempts to use science as the arbiter ofde re essences and concluded that such attempts will not, ultimately, solve the traditional problem of circularity. That problem remains, arising in different forms to thwart different attempts to account forde re generic essences.     

Generalizations,Cultural Essentialism,and Metaphorical Gulfs

An ongoing debate in comparative research is about whether we should see cultural diversities as manifestations of essential differences or as superficial variations on a universal blueprint. Edward Slingerland has pointed to cognitive science and the use of embodied metaphors to emphasize the universality of concept formation and cognition across cultures. He suggests that this should quiet the “cultural essentialists” who take fundamental differences in Eastern and Western thinking as their starting points. Michael Puett has also leveled a critique of cultural essentialism in support of a presuppositionless approach, and Slingerland’s conclusions seem to offer him support. However, I will argue that even if all modern humans are broadly similar in metaphor use and cognitive processes, research in the humanities must continue to account for the differences implied by the particular metaphors employed and emphasized in diverse traditions. I contend that responsible hermeneutic practice does this through provisional, yet indispensable, generalizations.     

The Ontology of Mutualism

Abstract

The homeokinetic approach to behavior (applied to humans, the approach is described in Iberall & McCulloch, 1969; and more generally in Soodak & Iberall, 1978) is extended in this article to argue that free will is exercised at a temporal scale of approximately 6 s. The homeokinetic theory of complex physical systems, including living systems, analyzes activity into component sets of oscillators, action modes, each with a characteristic time scale. A full set of nested time scales involved can be thought of as a spectrum. In this article, I argue that a survey of human action modes, as a spectral analysis, allows for the free election of acts only at the 6-s scale.

Intention (per Hebb, see Wolman, 1973, p. 437): central guidance of behavior by an enduring system that maintains its independence despite sensory input. Volition: act of willing or choosing.

This article is concerned with establishing a physical foundation for such actions in mammals, particularly human.     

The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.     

Use of Technology to Provide Mental Health Care for Racial and Ethnic Minorities: Evidence,Promise, and Challenges

Mental health disparities among racial and ethnic minorities (R&EM) are well documented. Some of the variables driving these disparities are limited care availability, difficulty accessing services, and attitudinal barriers. Although no single approach will eliminate all these obstacles, the use of technology to provide mental health services represents a paradigmatic shift in care delivery that could reduce unmet mental health need. Despite increasing evidence supporting the feasibility and efficacy of behavioral intervention technologies (BITs), such evidence is more limited among R&EM. For BITs to truly reduce disparities in care, these interventions need to overcome common barriers to treatment that disproportionally affect R&EM. This article reviews the empirical support of different BIT modalities with R&EM. We then provide informed clinical recommendations for the use of BITs with these groups, as well as a case example illustrating these guidelines. We conclude this article by discussing future directions that can inform the development and refinement of BIT approaches for R&EM.     

« Contexte évaluatif,règles d’équité et d’égalité. Une approche stratégique de la justice distributive. »

This article must be considered within the framework of research on distributive justice in the organisational context (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Colquitt and Jackson, 2002). The aim is to propose an analysis from a political point of view of the orientation towards equity and equality rules. We take as a starting point the model of political decision in the organisational context by Murphy and Cleveland (1995). The political approach postulates that one cannot pertinently give an account of the managers’ decision modes without locating them in their daily context of human relations management, and their management strategy. We will examine the links between the context of immediate management and the managers’ choices for equity or equality. The results of two studies will be presented. They tend to legitimate the relevance of this approach.     

Hierarchical Bayesian estimation and hypothesis testing for delay discounting tasks

A state-of-the-art data analysis procedure is presented to conduct hierarchical Bayesian inference and hypothesis testing on delay discounting data. The delay discounting task is a key experimental paradigm used across a wide range of disciplines from economics, cognitive science, and neuroscience, all of which seek to understand how humans or animals trade off the immediacy verses the magnitude of a reward. Bayesian estimation allows rich inferences to be drawn, along with measures of confidence, based upon limited and noisy behavioural data. Hierarchical modelling allows more precise inferences to be made, thus using sometimes expensive or difficult to obtain data in the most efficient way. The proposed probabilistic generative model describes how participants compare the present subjective value of reward choices on a trial-to-trial basis, estimates participant- and group-level parameters. We infer discount rate as a function of reward size, allowing the magnitude effect to be measured. Demonstrations are provided to show how this analysis approach can aid hypothesis testing. The analysis is demonstrated on data from the popular 27-item monetary choice questionnaire (Kirby, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(3), 457–462 2009), but will accept data from a range of protocols, including adaptive procedures. The software is made freely available to researchers.     

THE MODERN STUDY OF MYTH AND ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE

The history of the modern study of myth can be divided into two main categories: that which sees myth as the primitive counterpart to natural science, itself considered overwhelmingly modern, and that which sees myth as almost anything but the primitive counterpart to natural science. The first category constitutes the nineteenth‐century approach to myth. The second category constitutes the twentieth‐century approach. Tylor and Frazer epitomize the nineteenth‐century view. Malinowski, Eliade, Bultmann, Jonas, Camus, Freud, and Jung epitomize the twentieth‐century approach. The question for the twenty‐first century is whether myth can be brought back to the physical world, but in a way compatible with science. The case of the myth of Gaia will be considered as a possible way of doing so.     

A Comparison of Health Communication Models: Risk Learning Versus Stereotype Priming

Health communication research and practice have been strongly influenced by the protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983), the health belief model (Becker, Haefner, Kasl, et al., 1977; Becker, Haefner, & Maiman, 1977; Rosenstock, 1974), and similar conceptualizations. I refer to these as risk learning models because the goal is to teach new information about health risks and the behaviors that will minimize those risks. These models have garnered a substantial amount of empirical support and are apparently quite useful to practitioners (Conner & Norman, 1996). The goal of this article is to describe a less familiar, but complementary, approach to persuading people to avoid risky behaviors, which I will refer to as the stereotype priming model (Bargh, 1989; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995). The goal is to make salient preexisting social stereotypes about people who do or do not behave as advocated. The stereotype priming model posits that the stereotypes that we possess regarding the personality traits of groups of people (e.g., smokers, drunk drivers, marijuana users, people with suntans) to a large extent govern our behavior. In this view, it is sometimes useful to capitalize on and reinforce preexisting stereotypes in order to encourage healthy, and/or discourage unhealthy, behaviors. This article reviews the traditional risk learning models and evidence that supports them, provides corresponding information for the stereotype priming model, compares and contrasts the models, and discusses how the stereotype priming model might be used to design health communications campaigns.     

The Tacit Epistemology of the GMO Debate: A Case Study

The issue of biotechnology has been chosen in the MIRRORS project in order to analyze the sometimes uneasy relationship between science and society. After analyzing the situation of biotechnology regarding the GMO debate in Spain, France and Italy during a previous MIRRORS Workshop (This MIRRORS Workshop is entitled European Policies and Knowledge Society, held in Catania on December 15th 2008, during the which the undersigned, Anna Benedetta Francese and Cinzia Rizza discussed three papers about this topic [see the MIRRORS website www.mirrors-project.it]), in this essay I have tried to tackle the relationship science–society, focalizing my attention on the epistemological and methodological problems behind the biotechnology debate that are often not clearly expressed, remaining mainly tacitly presupposed. I will take as a starting point some questions about the role of science in society and about the way science is used by policy makers in decision-making processes. These questions are fundamental in order to analyze (and possibly to propose salvation strategies) the existing problems of the relationship between science and society which has assumed, especially nowadays, more conflictual aspects. Our Research Team firmly holds that it is not possible to tackle this topic without an in-depth discussion of the most significant epistemological questions regarding research, discussions, and methods of biotechnology.     

Kuhn and the science of religion

Ever since the challenge to the ‘received’ view of the philosophy of science—a view epitomized by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel—the status of science has been questioned. If radical critics of the received view—critics including Kuhn, Laudan, Feyerabend, the Edinburgh Strong Programme, and Latour—are right, can science, which means natural science, still be considered objective? Can it still be deemed the model of objectivity to be emulated by the social sciences and even by the humanities? Because religious studies is commonly assumed to fall short of the standards of objectivity of the natural sciences and even of the social sciences, what bearing does criticism of conventional philosophy of science have on it? Specifically, can the religionist approach to religion, the approach that purports to be the sole appropriate one for religious studies, be defended? Does radical philosophy of science, by challenging the objectivity of scientific claims, make the world safe for religious ones? This article will focus on the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn and will seek to determine what use defenders of religious studies can make of it.