The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state

Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness. The vegetative state is characterized by wakefulness without awareness. Recent functional neuroimaging results have shown that some parts of the cortex are still functioning in 'vegetative' patients. External stimulation, such as a painful stimulus, still activates 'primary' sensory cortices in these patients but these areas are functionally disconnected from 'higher order' associative areas needed for awareness. Such studies are disentangling the neural correlates of the vegetative state from the minimally conscious state, and have major clinical consequences in addition to empirical importance for the understanding of consciousness.     

The therapy of power and the power of therapy

Constructivism's ontology-based epistemology considers reality an expression of strictly subjective cognitive processes. Taking the conceptpower as an example, theeigen-dynamics of connecting these subjective constructions of reality in the socialization process are compared with this ontological epistemology. The qualities of such dynamics cannot be concluded from ontology. An alternative approach is taken here which proceeds from a sociological orientation, describes the structure and dynamics of power relations in the differentiation process of social systems, and applies to families and family therapy for an example. The conclusion draws attention to the necessity of a critical notion of power to permit discussion of ethical questions in the context of systems theory as well.Originally published as part of a special issue on the power metaphor guestedited by Klaus G. Deissler inZeitschrift fur systemische Therapie (1986),4, 243–252. Translated by S. Awodey.     

The process of rational-emotive therapy

This paper describes the process of rational-emotive psychotherapy. Not a “how to do it” cookbook, it distinguishes RET as following four overlapping stages, called rational-emotive psychodiagnosis, rational-emotive insight, and rational-emotive working through I and II. The reader is encouraged to use this model of RET's process to understand what is done in RET and why.     

The technique of psychoanalytic therapy

This article is reproduced in translation a half century after its original presentation by Dr. Horney. It was her first psychoanalytic publication and her first article on psychoanalytic technique. In it we get glimpses of future directions of her thinking and of the spirit of research and investigation which so characterized her life's work — Editor.     

Data on the role of the frontal cortex in vegetative behavior

A homeostatic conditional reflex (CR) was elaborated to the effect of repeated inhalations in rats of a gas mixture containing 8 per cent oxygen. The effect of the conditional response was opposite to that of the unconditional one. After ablation of the frontal cortex, the conditional reaction disappeared. The repeated administration of 40 mg/kg of histamine resulted in a tolerance to the temperature lowering effect of histamine similar to the habituation. An injection of distilled water brought about dishabituation. Tolerance was not influenced by the ablation of the frontal cortex, but the dishabituating effect of distilled water was absent.     

The termination phase of combined therapy

Three different kinds of termination are described and discussed. In combined therapy the group can help to resolve and clarify the meanings of moves to terminate therapy. The role of the therapist's countertransferences in this stage of the work is important to consider, and here, too, the group is an important part of the work. The author sees termination as an important part of the treatment process. In combined therapy it may be more complex but it also allows for a fuller exploration of the relevant issues.     

The ethical foundations of behavior therapy

In this article, I am concerned with the ethical foundations of behavior therapy, that is, with the normative ethics and the meta-ethics underlying behavior therapy. In particular, I am concerned with questions concerning the very possibilty of providing an ethical justification for things done in the context of therapy. Because behavior therapists must be able to provide an ethical justification for various actions (if the need arises), certain meta-ethical views widely accepted by behavior therapists must be abandoned; in particular, one must give up ethical subjectivism, ethical skepticism, and ethical relativism. An additional task is to show how it is possible to provide a nonsubjective, nonskeptical, and nonrelativistic moral justification for an ethical statement. Although this is a monumental task, I provide a rough sketch of such a model, one that is congenial to the value judgments underlying behavior therapy.