Stances and paradigms: a reflection

This paper compares and contrasts the concept of a stance with that of a paradigm qua disciplinary matrix, in an attempt to illuminate both notions. First, it considers to what extent it is appropriate to draw an analogy between stances (which operate at the level of the individual) and disciplinary matrices (which operate at the level of the community). It suggests that despite first appearances, a disciplinary matrix is not simply a stance writ large. Second, it examines how we might reinterpret disciplinary matrices in terms of stances, and shows how doing so can provide us with a better insight into non-revolutionary science. Finally, it identifies two directions for future research: “Can the rationality of scientific revolutions be understood in terms of the dynamic between stances and paradigms?” and “Do stances help us to understand incommensurability between disciplinary matrices?”     

The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled

van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’ entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science. The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times. It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it.     

Modulation of tendon tap reflex activation of soleus motor neurons with reduced stability tandem stance

Reduced stability while standing typically decreases the soleus muscle Hoffmann (H-) reflex amplitude, purportedly to prevent the Ia afferent signal from excessively activating spinal motor neurons during the unstable stance. H-reflex measures, however, by excluding the spindle do not reflect the actual effect of the Ia pathway (i.e. the combined effects of spindle sensitivity and Ia presynaptic inhibition) on motor neuron activation, as tendon tap reflex measures can. But the effect of stance stability on soleus muscle tendon tap reflex amplitude is largely unknown. This study examined 30 young adults (mean(s), 21(2) years) as they stood in a wide stable stance position and an unstable tandem stance with a reduced base of support. Standing body sway, the amplitude of the soleus muscle tendon tap reflex, background EMG and tap force were measured in both stances. A repeated measured design t-test was calculated for each variable. Most subjects (69%) decreased tendon tap reflex amplitude when in the tandem stance position (mean decrease 11.6%), compared to the wide stance (wide stance 0.248(0.124) mV, tandem stance 0.219(0.119) mV, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.24 small) with no significant differences in background soleus and tibialis anterior EMG, and tap force across the stances. There was no relationship between the modulation of the tendon tap reflex amplitude across the stances and standing body sway in the tandem stance. Results support the idea that for most subjects examined, during a less stable stance the Ia excitation of motor neurons is decreased, likely by presynaptic inhibition, thereby avoiding potential instability in the reflex loop or saturating the reflex pathway and possibly interfering with descending control of the involved spinal motor neurons.     

The relation between preparatory stance and trunk rotation movements

The influence of preparatory stance on rotation movement reaction time of the trunk by bending of the knee and hip joint(s) was examined in 12 subjects. Four preparatory stances were examined: straight knee and hip extension (STAND), slight flexion of knee joints and hip joint (LIGHT), deep flexion (DEEP), and free initial position, i.e. that felt to be the most comfortable and effective (FREE). There was no significant influence of the preparatory stance on hip latency, but there were significant differences between the preparatory stances on response time (RT) and movement time (MT). Furthermore, using a quadratic curve fitting technique, knee joint angles of 24.8 degrees and a hip joint angle of 23.3 degrees were shown to be the optimum flexion angles in the preparatory stance for the initiation of quick trunk rotation movements. It is proposed that mechanical factors have considerably more effects on trunk rotation movements than does the nervous system.     

What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms,policies and perspectives

Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In Sect. 2 I consider van Fraassen’s argument for construing empiricism as a stance, and look at some responses to it. In Sect. 3 I outline my conception of stances as perspectives or ways of seeing, and explain how stances so understood may be justified. I illustrate this conception by way of a discussion of the model pluralist position with respect to the units of selection debate in biology, and suggest that on the model pluralist view different perspectives on the units of selection, such as the gene’s eye view, are in fact van Fraassian stances. In Sect. 4 I discuss the view put forward by Teller and Chakravartty among others that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that it is consistent with the conception of stances as perspectives. In the final section I criticise Rowbottom’s attempt to assimilate stances to Kuhnian paradigms. I argue that he has overlooked some important disanalogies between stances and paradigms, so that the comparison obscures more than it reveals.     

Skewed autonomy-relatedness in preadolescents' conceptions of their relationships with mother, father, and best friend.

Healthy adaptation within all close relationships--whether with parents, friends, or romantic partners--involves striking a balance between connectedness to and independence from the relationship partner. For some individuals, adaptation within one or more relationships is skewed, or characterized by either an excessive concern for closeness that impedes autonomy (preoccupied stance) or an excessive concern for autonomy that inhibits closeness (avoidant stance). In this study with boys and girls aged 9-14 years, children who reported a preoccupied or avoidant stance toward their mother displayed increased social impairment in the peer group over time. There were predictable associations among children's stances toward mother, father, and best friend. Children resembled their best friend in relationship stance. The study illustrates the advantages of applying common relationship constructs (e.g., autonomy-relatedness) to the study of diverse close relationships.     

The pull of the group: Conscious conflict and the involuntary tendency towards conformity

Is the reason that majorities exert an undue influence on the actions of individuals revealed through changes in subjective experience? Using an adaptation of the response interference paradigm (Morsella, Wilson, et al., 2009) in which participants are trained to introspect on their own experience of conscious conflict, two studies reported here show that the mere act of recalling counter-majority stances or opinions is associated with stronger subjective effects than recalling stances or opinions that coincide with majorities. Thus, an intention to conform to a majority (even when the majority is known to be wrong, as shown in the second study) seems to interfere with people’s recall of their own stance or opinion. These results provide novel evidence for recent yet under-supported suggestions that majorities can influence individuals even when it is improper or illogical because human social cognition is primarily and involuntarily cooperative at the implicit level.     

Stances and Epistemology: Values,Pragmatics, and Rationality

Bas van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. This paper discusses the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. It argues that stances may be justified pragmatically, in terms of both their epistemic fruits and their coherence with our values, both epistemic and non‐epistemic. It also examines van Fraassen's version of epistemological voluntarism, which has received considerable attention of late, and shows that it provides a theoretical framework, and approach to epistemology, within which the pragmatic and value‐based forms of justification appropriate to stance choice find a natural home.     

How to be a Normative Expressivist1

Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.     

A puzzle about voluntarism about rational epistemic stances

The philosophy of science has produced numerous accounts of how scientific facts are generated, from very specific facilitators of belief, such as neo-Kantian constitutive principles, to global frameworks, such as Kuhnian paradigms. I consider a recent addition to this canon: van Fraassen’s notion of an epistemic stance—a collection of attitudes and policies governing the generation of factual beliefs—and his commitment to voluntarism in this context: the idea that contrary stances and sets of beliefs are rationally permissible. I argue that while scientific inquiry inevitably favours a high degree of consensus in our choices of stance, there is no parallel constraint in the case of philosophical inquiry, such as that concerned with how scientific knowledge should be interpreted. This leads, in the latter case, to a fundamental and apparently irresolvable mystery at the heart of stance voluntarism, regarding the grounds for choosing basic epistemic stances.     

Thinking with Your Hypothalamus: Reflections on a Cognitive Role for the Reactive Emotions

In "Freedom and Resentment," P. F. Strawson argues that the "profound opposition" between the objective and reactive stances is quite compatible with our rationally retaining the latter as important elements in a recognizably human life. Unless he can establish this, he has no hope of establishing his version of compatibilism in the free will debate. But, because objectivity is associated so intimately with the rationally conducted explanation of action, it is not clear how the opposition of these stances is compatible with the rationality of the reactive attitudes. More to the point, it is not clear how an intellectual activity like shifting from the reactive to the objective stance can dispel reactive attitudes without thereby also rationally disqualifying them. I solve this puzzle by drawing on the idea that one cognitive component of emotions is the rationally optional "shift of attention." a feature which in turn helps to explain a lot about the role reactive emotions can play in the fixation of belief.     

Broad stance conditions change postural control and postural sway

Intuitively, a broad stance (i.e., standing with the feet farther apart than usual) should significantly improve postural stability. However, this intuition was not confirmed in quiet stance. Hence, a motion analysis system (markers attached to the trunk and head) and a force platform were used to investigate 13 healthy, young adults who performed 8 trials in standard and broad stances. In broad stance, the medialateral center of pressure (COP) sway mean power frequency was expected to be greater, whereas the variability (standard deviation) of COP, head, and trunk sway and the mean velocity of head and trunk sway was expected to be significantly lower. Accordingly, adoption of a broad stance significantly increased the medialateral mean power frequency of COP sway; decreased the standard deviation of medialateral COP, trunk, and head sway; and decreased the medialateral mean velocity of head sway. A broad stance was also associated with lower variability for head and COP sways in the anteroposterior axis. Unexpectedly, an effect of trial repetition was found for the variability of medialateral trunk sway. This was probably due to the break halfway through the study. In practical terms, broad stance conditions can improve postural control in the medialateral and anteroposterior axes.     

Indicatives,Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g., “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances toward the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project—remain constant—when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances—neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives—are conveyed by conversational implicatures.     

Using Egalitarian Items to Measure Men’s and Women’s Family Roles

This study was designed to show that measuring gender ideology by egalitarian items might be problematic, as gender egalitarianism is not simply the reverse of gender traditionalism and includes very different stances. Egalitarian items are likely to lead to an insufficient discrimination between traditional and non-traditional respondents. While the former often ignore the egalitarian stance, the latter hold different egalitarian positions which prevents agreement with any specific item. Empirical evidence is reported from quantitative and qualitative data: an international survey based on random samples (n?=?5.692) and a cognitive study, which was conducted in Germany by both internet (n?=?889) and telephone (n?=?285). Here, the selection of a response category was analyzed by using probing questions.     

The Stationary-Gaze Task Should Not Be Systematically Used as the Control Task in Studies of Postural Control

In studies of postural control, a control task is often used to understand significant effects obtained with experimental manipulations. This task should be the easiest task and (therefore) engage the lowest behavioral variability and cognitive workload. Since 1983, the stationary-gaze task is considered as the most relevant control task. Instead, the authors expected that free looking at small targets (white paper or images; visual angle: 12°) could be an easier task. To verify this assumption, 16 young individuals performed stationary-gaze, white-panel, and free-viewing 12° tasks in steady and relaxed stances. The stationary-gaze task led to significantly higher cognitive workload (mean score in the National Aeronotics and Space Administration Task Load Index questionnaire), higher interindividual body (head, neck, and lower back) linear variability, and higher interindividual body angular variability—not systematically yet—than both other tasks. There was more cognitive workload in steady than relaxed stances. The authors also tested if a free-viewing 24° task could lead to greater angular displacement, and hence greater body sway, than could the other tasks in relaxed stance. Unexpectedly, the participants mostly moved their eyes and not their body in this task. In the discussion, the authors explain why the stationary-gaze task may not be an ideal control task and how to choose this neutral task.     

Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account

Abstract

Gareth Evans and others have argued that our intentional attitudes are transparent to facts in the world. This suggests we can know them by looking outwards to the world rather than inwards to our minds. Richard Moran uses this idea of transparency in his account of self-knowledge. Critics have objected to his account on several counts. For example, Jonathan Way has argued that irrational attitudes can give ordinary self-knowledge when they are not transparent and that there are rational attitudes that are not transparent. I argue here that these objections fail because Way does not fully consider the two different kinds of self-knowledge, ‘ordinary’ and evidence-based, that differentiate the two stances that Moran claims a subject can have towards his attitudes. It is the differences between these two stances and the implications of these that motivate Moran’s account, rather than whether the formed attitude is rational or irrational, as long as the subject avows it from the deliberative stance, focuses on the attitude’s object and conforms to the transparency condition as Moran sets this out.     

Stances on Assisted Suicide by Health and Social Care Professionals Working With Older Persons in Switzerland

This qualitative study investigated the personal and professional stances of 40 health and social care professionals confronted with assisted suicide of older persons living in nursing homes or supported by social welfare or home care and support services in French-speaking Switzerland. Requests of assisted suicide triggered questions with regard to the professional mission, the quality of accompaniment, values, and ethical principles. Four types of stances emerged from the analysis performed according to the principles of the grounded theory: favorable in principle, professional compromise, personal compromise, and opposed in principle. Each stance results from the combination of several dimensions: personal or professional concordance or compatibility with assisted suicide; implication in, and impact of, the process; appreciation of the process; and satisfaction with the resources at disposal. The differentiated stances adopted by professionals depend largely on their way of interpreting their mission, deontology, and the relationship to the older person.     

Stance,feeling and phenomenology

This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique.     

Smaller muscle mass is associated with increase in EMG–EMG coherence of the leg muscle during unipedal stance in elderly adults

Age-induced decline in the ability to perform daily activities is associated with a deterioration of physical parameters. Changes occur in neuromuscular system with age; however, the relationship between these changes and physical parameters has not been fully elucidated. Therefore, in this study, we aimed to determine the relationship between neuromuscular system evaluated using a coherence analysis of the leg muscles and physical parameters in community-dwelling healthy elderly adults. The participants were required to stand still in bipedal and unipedal stances on a force plate. Then, electromyography (EMG) was recorded from the tibialis anterior (TA) and medial and lateral gastrocnemius (MG/LG) muscles, and intermuscular coherence was calculated between the following pairs: TA and MG (TA–MG), TA and LG (TA–LG), and MG and LG (MG–LG). Furthermore, gait speed, unipedal stance time, and muscle mass were measured. EMG–EMG coherence for the MG–LG pair was significantly greater in the unipedal stance task than in the bipedal one (p = .001). Multiple linear regression analysis revealed that the muscle mass of the leg was negatively correlated with the change in the β-band coherence for the MG–LG pair from bipedal to unipedal stance (R² = 0.067, standard β = −0.345, p = .044). As the β-band coherence could reflect the corticospinal activity, the increased β-band coherence may be a compensation for the smaller muscle mass, or alternatively may be a sign of changes in the nervous system resulting in the loss of muscle mass.