Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective

A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.     

Libet-style experiments,neuroscience, and libertarian free will

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will, but that Libet-style experiments have not done that so far.     

Attitudes and evaluations: a social cognitive neuroscience perspective

Automatic evaluations are crucial for survival, but conscious self-reflection enables the formulation of nuanced evaluations to serve long-term goals. To operate effectively, both automatic and reflective evaluative processes need to integrate stored representations from previous experience (attitudes) with current contexts and goals, but contexts and goals have a more prominent role in reflective evaluation. Recent neuroimaging data provide new insights into the structure and function of evaluation and the dynamic ways that attitudes and reflective processing contribute to evaluation. In this paper, we propose a new iterative-reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation that highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in the reprocessing of evaluative information. This model makes predictions that inform social-cognitive and cognitive-neuroscientific accounts of evaluation.     

The neuroscience of "free will"

Advances in neuroscience over the past 40 or more years are causing a re-visiting of an old debate: Does man possess free will over his actions, or do forces out of his control determine his behavior? Philosophers and biologists since the beginning of recorded history have taken positions on each side of the debate. Recent discoveries of brain activation prior to conscious awareness and genetic conditions that induce impulsive violent behavior are fortifying the perspective that biological determinism is basic to the human condition. But some contemporary thinkers are conflicted in this viewpoint since “free will” is a necessary element for self-determination and for attributing personal responsibility for one's actions. Hence, modifications of strict determinism have emerged which try to incorporate the features of determinism enforced by neuroscience findings with some element of “free will”, making the two seemingly opposed positions compatible. How successful this will be to rescue “free will” in the long term depends on future discoveries in neuroscience and genetics. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

Creativity and schizotypy from the neuroscience perspective

Behavioral research has revealed that some cognitive features may be similar between creative and psychotic/schizophrenic-like thoughts. In this study, we addressed the potential link between creativity and schizotypy at the level of the brain by investigating functional patterns of brain activity (using functional magnetic resonance imaging) during creative cognition in preselected groups with low versus high psychometrically determined schizotypy. Our findings revealed an association between the originality component of creativity and reduced deactivation of right parietal brain regions and the precuneus during creative cognition, congruent with the idea that more-creative people may include many more events/stimuli in their mental processes than do less-creative people. Similarly, the high-schizotypy group showed weaker deactivation of the right precuneus during creative cognition. The fact that originality and schizotypy show similar functional brain activity patterns during creative ideation (i.e., reduced deactivation of the right precuneus) strongly supports the contention that similar mental processes may be implicated in creativity and in psychosis proneness.     

Understanding vulnerability for depression from a cognitive neuroscience perspective: A reappraisal of attentional factors and a new conceptual framework

We propose a framework to understand increases in vulnerability for depression after recurrent episodes that links attention processes and schema activation to negative mood states, by integrating cognitive and neurobiological findings. Depression is characterized by a mood-congruent attentional bias at later stages of information processing. The basic idea of our framework is that decreased activity in prefrontal areas, mediated by the serotonin metabolism which the HPA axis controls, is associated with an impaired attenuation of subcortical regions, resulting in prolonged activation of the amygdala in response to stressors in the environment. Reduced prefrontal control in interaction with depressogenic schemas leads to impaired ability to exert attentional inhibitory control over negative elaborative processes such as rumination, leading in turn to sustained negative affect. These elaborative processes are triggered by the activation of negative schemas after confrontation with stressors. In our framework, attentional impairments are postulated as a crucial process in explaining the increasing vulnerability after depressive episodes, linking cognitive and biological vulnerability factors. We review the empirical data on the biological factors associated with the attentional impairments and detail how they are associated with rumination and mood regulation. The aim of our framework is to stimulate translational research.     

价值观的稳定性与可变性：基于认知神经科学的视角

价值观的稳定性和可变性一直是该领域争论的焦点所在。近些年来, 研究者开始从认知神经科学的角度来探讨导致价值观稳定性差异的机制问题。已有的神经反应证据表明, 当某种价值观是基于道义主义的绝对规则来进行认知建构的, 或与自我概念在表征上存在一致性时, 其更倾向于保持稳定的状态; 若非如此, 便可能会在外界影响(如他人劝说)下发生重要程度上的改变。未来需要进一步丰富和完善认识价值观稳定性与可变性关系的认知神经加工模型, 并探索价值观长效改变背后的认知神经机制, 以促进理论研究在价值观教育中的实践和应用。     

Guilty,free, and wise: Determinism and psychopathy diminish learning from negative emotions

Emotional experiences can bring about personal growth. For instance, feeling guilty may prompt one to learn from a mistake, and this learning can bring about different and better future behavior. Three studies found that belief in free will facilitated learning from emotional experiences, as inducing participants to disbelieve in free will was associated with reduced learning. Emotional responsiveness, as defined by low psychopathy scores, also facilitated learning from emotional experiences (Studies 2 and 3). The degree of learning associated with emotional experiences was measured by self-rating (Study 1), independent evaluations of lessons learned (Study 2), and whether participants joined a campus recycling program (after being made to feel guilty about an environmental transgression; Study 3).     

Facets of psychopathy, heart rate variability and cognitive function

The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the four facets of Hare's Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991; Bolt, Hare, Vitale, & Newman, 2004) were related to physiological and cognitive mechanisms. Fifty-three male prisoners participated in this study. Physiological responses were measured as heart rate variability (HRV) and heart rate (HR). Cognitive functions were measured using a continuous performance test (CPT; California Computerized Assessment Package, Abbreviated version) and a working memory test (WMT); based on Baddeley & Hitch (1974). The regression analysis of the HRV revealed that the interpersonal facet explained most of the variance during baseline (28%), CPT (16%), and WMT (12%). This was also true for the HR data during baseline (28%), CPT (20%), WMT (10%), and recovery (13%). The antisocial facet explained 10% of the variance only during baseline. Subjects scoring high compared to low on the interpersonal facet also showed better cognitive functioning. The study suggests that the different facets were differently associated with both physiological and cognitive functions.     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Autonomy,decisions, and free will

Can humans make decisions? Can machines? What ethical questions arise from using robotics in the education of children? Or in elderly care? These were some of the topics of the interdisciplinary college (IK), which took place from the 25th of March to the 1st of April in Günne, next to Lake Möhne. During this one-week spring school, more than 40 well-known lecturers from around the globe gave 170 participants an insight into a cornucopia of topics surrounding “autonomy, decisions, and free will”.