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Edmund Runggaldier 《Topoi》1989,8(2):97-103
The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano. 相似文献
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Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
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Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
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Michelle Montague 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):171-192
My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases
of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as
sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks
to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this
paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.
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Michelle MontagueEmail: |
5.
Jan Slaby 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(4):429-444
This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling.
The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook
the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is
that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian
accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions
and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit
and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy
of mind.
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Jan SlabyEmail: |
6.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
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Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
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Freeman WJ 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2008,42(2):137-143
Perception is an intentional action through space in time by which the finite brain explores the infinite world. By acting,
the brain thrusts its body into the future space–time of the world while predicting the sensory consequences. Through perceiving
its actions and their results, it remembers its predictions, its actions, and their consequences. To perform these operations
the brain, through chaotic dynamics, constructs and uses finite perceptual matrices of space–time and infers causation. Perceived
time differs from world time in ways that are determined by the neural mechanisms of intentionality. In particular, perception
of the self in action, through the mechanism of preafference, gives structure and content to the concepts of continuity, contiguity,
duration, temporal order, cause, and effect. We expand our perceptual scales beyond kinesthesia by converting time into space
by use of clocks and calendars. Remembered time differs from perceived time in being dependent on awareness, which makes it
episodic, fragmentary, and subject to large variations in rates of time lapse in the flow of meanings. The attribution of
causal agency to objects and events in the world results from the experience of temporal sequencing in the action–perception
cycle: “I act” [cause] “I feel” [effect] during Piaget’s somatomotor phase in early human development.
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Walter J. FreemanEmail: URL: http://sulcus.berkeley.edu |
8.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):79-95
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we
should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of
intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is
not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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Uriah KriegelEmail: |
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Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
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Charles B. CrossEmail: |
11.
Peter-Paul Verbeek 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):387-395
This article investigates the types of intentionality involved in human–technology relations. It aims to augment Don Ihde’s
analysis of the relations between human beings and technological artifacts, by analyzing a number of concrete examples at
the limits of Ihde’s analysis. The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of “cyborg intentionality,” which all involve
specific blends of the human and the technological. Technologically mediated intentionality occurs when human intentionality takes place “through” technological artifacts; hybrid intentionality occurs when the technological actually merges with the human; and composite intentionality is the addition of human intentionality and the intentionality of technological artifacts.
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Peter-Paul VerbeekEmail: |
12.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
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Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
13.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):65-77
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction
requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience.
I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the
association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates
considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought
and judgment.
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Hannah GinsborgEmail: |
14.
Benjamin Sachs 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):73-83
In this essay I defend the claim that all reasons can ground final requirements. I begin by establishing a prima facie case
for the thesis by noting that on a common-sense understanding of what finality is, it must be the case that all reasons can
ground such requirements. I spend the rest of the paper defending the thesis against two recent challenges. The first challenge
is found in Joshua Gert’s recent book, Brute Rationality. In it he argues that reasons play two logically distinct roles –
requiring action and justifying action. He argues, further, that some reasons – ‘purely justificatory’ reasons – play only
the latter role. Jonathan Dancy offers the second challenge in his Ethics Without Principles, where he distinguishes between
the ‘favoring’ and ‘ought-making’ roles of reasons. While all reasons play the former role, some do not play the latter, and
are therefore irrelevant to what one ought to do. My contention is that both Gert and Dancy are going to have trouble accounting
for our intuitions in a number of cases.
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Benjamin SachsEmail: |
15.
Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Sokolowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):167-175
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does
this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are
more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology
to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary
and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato
and Kant.
相似文献
Robert SokolowskiEmail: |
16.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
17.
Dimitris Platchias 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):31-46
According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan,
Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press,
Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose
for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual
redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not a property of one’s experience but an externally constituted property of the
perceived physical object. In this sense, qualia are out there, in the external world. Here, I argue that the main representationalist
arguments to this effect, if successful, establish no more than a symmetrical supervenience relation between representational
content and qualia, and that a supervenience relation alone (albeit symmetrical) doesn’t suffice for identity. This supervenience
thesis between qualia and representational content leaves open the question as to the essential nature of qualia.
相似文献
Dimitris PlatchiasEmail: |
18.
Tsuda I 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2008,42(2):153-156
I would like to deal with a process that numbers are generated by the interaction between consciousness and memory, associated
with time with a finite width. It is pointed out that this process can be related with the emergence of preafference. It is
concluded that only humans can create numbers, whereas animals simply produce ‘random’ sequences of symbols because they lack
intentionality to search for an appropriate internal observation window that makes intention and memory compatible.
相似文献
Ichiro TsudaEmail: |
19.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
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David PhillipsEmail: |
20.
Daniel Cohen 《Sophia》2009,48(2):143-150
It is sometimes argued that if God were to exist, then the actual world would be the best possible world. However, given that
the actual world is clearly not the best possible world, then God doesn’t exist. In response, some have argued that the world
could always be improved with the creation of new people and that there is thus no best possible world. I argue that this
reasoning gives rise to an instance of Parfit’s mere addition paradox and should thus be rejected. Others (Robert Adams, in particular) have argued that the actual world may, in fact, be the
best possible world, at least for all actual people. I argue that this reasoning gives rise to Parfit’s non-identity problem and should thus be rejected.
相似文献
Daniel CohenEmail: |