Folk theory of social change

People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market‐based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society's future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross‐cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross‐cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.     

Faith development theory: a case for paradigm change

Despite its influence, James Fowler's theory of faith development is in need of fundamental reappraisal. Doubts over Fowler's use of a structural model of human development and the adequacy of his research techniques have been added to in recent years by his inadequate response to the challenge of post‐modern thought. It is suggested that, despite Fowler's position, key elements of the theory are very much in tune with post‐modern thought and if the abandonment of the theory's underlying structuralism were to be allowed, these might be taken to point a constructive way forward.     

Moments of change in psychoanalytic theory: Discussion of a new theory of psychic change

This commentary briefly summarizes the model proposed by the Boston Group and attempts to place it in the context of attachment theory and other integrational attempts between cognitive science and psychoanalysis. The clinical implications of these ideas are considered, with particular reference to therapeutic technique and the role of the therapist, as a “new object.” Some suggestions for the further development of the model are considered, in particular the observational study of the therapeutic process, the use of some classical psychoanalytic ideas such as transference, and the need for using the model to encourage technical innovation in psychoanalysis. © 1998 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health     

Ongoing change in psychoanalytic theory implications for analysis of religious experience

Hans Loewald (1980) once made the distinction between ghosts and ancestors, the former always wanting to return to the land of the living, the latter being able to rest in peace and live forth through their progeny in the present generation. Extending this metaphor, Stephen Mitchell (1991) has noted that the intellectual integrity and vitality of psychoanalysis depends on our shifting our view of Freud from an unburied ghost who haunts us to an honored ancestor. I argue that perhaps nowhere is Freud's enduring presence greater than in psychoanalytic perspectives on religion, and it is often as an unburied ghost. Ongoing change in psychoanalytic theory, however, affords respectful amendment to his work in a way that allows Freud to be a dearly honored ancestor from whom we are all psychoanalytic descendents. Three developments in psychoanalytic theory have special implication for the analysis of religious experience. These areas of change pertain to contemporary understanding of illusion, narrative, and social constructivism. I offer in conclusion seven points for further consideration.     

Discovery,theory change and structural realism

In this paper I consider two accounts of scientific discovery, Robert Hudson’s and Peter Achinstein’s. I assess their relative success and I show that while both approaches are similar in promising ways, and address experimental discoveries well, they could address the concerns of the discovery sceptic more explicitly than they do. I also explore the implications of their inability to address purely theoretical discoveries, such as those often made in mathematical physics. I do so by showing that extending Hudson’s or Achinstein’s account to such cases can sometimes provide a misleading analysis about who ought to be credited as a discoverer. In the final sections of the paper I work out some revisions to the Hudson/Achinstein account by drawing from a so-called structural realist view of theory change. Finally, I show how such a modified account of discovery can answer sceptical critics such as Musgrave or Woolgar without producing misleading analyses about who ought to receive credit as a discoverer in cases from the mathematical sciences. I illustrate the usefulness of this approach by providing an analysis of the case of the discovery of the Casimir effect.     

How the growth of science ends theory change

This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta-induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are false. The defense starts with the observation that at least 80% of all scientific work ever done has been done since 1950, proceeds with the claim that practically all of our most successful theories were entirely stable during that period of time, and concludes that the projection of refutations of successful theories to the present is unsound. In addition to this defense, the paper offers a framework through which scientific realism can be compared with two types of anti-realism. The framework is also of help to examine the relationships between these three positions and the three main arguments offered respectively in their support (No-miracle argument, pessimistic meta-induction, underdetermination).     

Two parameters measure apparent change during repetitive stimulation

In two studies subjects observed a 127 mm skeletal white diamond rotating around its vertical axis while binocularly fixating a white dot immediately behind it and 1.273 m away against a black background for 10 min. They spontaneously reported many different apparent changes. Contrary to previous studies, reversals of direction of rotation were neither the first nor the most common change and sometimes never occurred. When reversals were not stressed and reports of any change were requested, the latency of the first response correlated with the total number of new form reports but neither correlated with the transition rate between forms. On repeated testing all three measures are highly reliable. The rate at which new forms appear is therefore independent of transition rate. Current ways of describing similar effects by smooth curves fitted to group data confound the two parameters, or fail to recognise that nonreversal reports are very common.     

Two studies of Piaget's theory of moral judgment

The relationship between conservation skills and subjective responsibility (SR) in moral judgment was examined in two studies. The Kohlberg ontogenetic priority hypothesis stating that conversation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of SR was pitted against the common structural basis hypothesis advanced by Damon. Piaget's notion of heteronomy as a combination of preoperational thought and unilateral respect was studied by using the behavioural independence tasks by Subbotsky as indicators of unilateral respect. A teaching experiment using Galperin's and Obukhova's method to induce conservation indicated significant transfer from conservation to SR. SR was found to be more susceptible to regression over a 3–month period than conservation. Conservers were less likely to regress on SR than nonconservers. Unilateral respect was related to objective responsibility but not to conservation. Taken together the data fail to support Kohlberg's ontogenetic priority hypothesis and only partially support the Piaget and Damon model of a common underlying structure. It is concluded that SR judgments largely reflect individual judgmental strategies and the effect of conservation on SR is intepreted in terms of increasing cross-situational consistency in the use of these strategies.     

Item response theory and the measurement of clinical change

An instrument's sensitivity to detect individual-level change is an important consideration for both psychometric and clinical researchers. In this article, we develop a cognitive problems measure and evaluate its sensitivity to detect change from an item response theory (IRT) perspective. After illustrating assumption checking and model fit assessment, we detail 4 features of IRT modeling: (a) the scale information curve and its relation to the bandwidth of measurement precision, (b) the scale response curve and how it is used to link the latent trait metric with the raw score metric, (c) content-based versus norm-based score referencing, and (d) the level of measurement of the latent trait scale. We conclude that IRT offers an informative, alternative framework for understanding an instrument's psychometric properties and recommend that IRT analyses be considered prior to investigations of change, growth, or the effectiveness of clinical interventions.     

On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction

This paper is concerned with formal aspects of the logic of theory change, and in particular with the process of shrinking or contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition. It continues work in the area by the authors and Peter Gärdenfors. The paper defines a notion of safe contraction of a set of propositions, shows that it satisfies the Gärdenfors postulates for contraction and thus can be represented as a partial meet contraction, and studies its properties both in general and under various natural constraints.     

Two item response theory models for analysing normative forced‐choice personality items

This paper proposes two unidimensional item response theory (IRT) models for analysing normative forced‐choice personality items. Both models are derived from a common theoretical framework and arise as a result of different assumptions regarding the mechanism of choice. The simplest mechanism gives rise to the one‐parameter normal‐ogive model. The second mechanism gives rise to a new IRT model, which is closely related to the Coombs–Zinnes probabilistic unfolding model. The second model is compared theoretically to the normal‐ogive model in terms of item characteristic curves and amount of item information. Next, procedures for estimating the respondent and the item parameters in the second model are described. Finally, both models are empirically compared by using two well‐known personality measures.     

Hermeneutics and Religious Understanding Part Two: towards a critical theory for religious education

The previous article offered an account of the hermeneutics implicit in religious education from 1960 to the present. It was suggested that an uncritical reliance on the traditions of romanticism and postmodernism serves to impair the emergence of religious literacy. Here an attempt is made to plot the contours of a critical hermeneutical theory for religious education, drawing on the resources of linguistic hermeneutical theory provided by the critical realism of Gadamer and Habermas.     

Learning as change of coordination dynamics: theory and experiment

Learning of coordination patterns was investigated theoretically from the point of view of a dynamic theory of biological coordination and with reference to recent experiments on the learning of relative timing patterns. The theory is based on theoretical and experimental work showing that coordinated movement is characterized not only by the actually performed pattern of coordination but by an entire dynamics of coordination. Theoretically, such dynamics are captured as equations of motion of relevant collective variables. Experimentally, signatures of these underlying dynamics can be found in the temporal stability of coordination patterns, which can be assessed through various stability measures as well as through processes of pattern change. We argue that not only intrinsic coordination tendencies, but also specific behavioral requirements, be they perceived, memorized, or intended, must be expressed in terms of such dynamics. The concept of behavioral information captures such requirements as part of the coordination dynamics. We expound two hypotheses on the nature of learning in this framework. First, we assume that at each point during the learning process the system is governed by a well-defined coordination dynamics. This equation of motion evolves with learning so as to acquire an attractor solution near the to-be-learned pattern. Second, we hypothesize that this change of the coordination dynamics, captured by the time course of memorized behavioral information, can itself be ascribed to an additional layer of dynamics, the slower learning dynamics. Testable consequences of these views are discussed in the light of recent experimental findings on the learning of a relative phase in rhythmic movement: (a) Learning affects dynamic properties of performed coordination patterns, in particular, their stability; (b) the change of the coordination dynamics due to learning leads to specific changes of behavior also under conditions other than the learned condition, namely, to systematic deviation toward the learned patterns; (c) learning may lead to instabilities in the coordination behavior if initial and learned performance differ sufficiently; and (d) the dynamic properties of the performed coordination patterns are distinct on the two time scales of learning and of performance.