Support with Strings: Workfare as an 'Impermissible Condition'

abstract Even if a state would have been perfectly within its rights not to provide for people's welfare at all, it might still be wrong for it to exercise that discretion conditional upon something that claimants do (like ‘look for work’). What might make some conditions morally permissible and others impermissible? One answer is in terms of the consonance of the condition with the purposes of the policy. If a policy is supposed to be for one purpose — or, morally, if it can be justified only by reference to one purpose — then that policy must not impose conditions that are appropriate only to some other purpose. It is an improper exercise of power for public officials to tack wholly inappropriate conditions onto programmes justified on some other grounds altogether. Tacking labour‐market conditions onto policies that are ostensibly designed to promote people's welfare can be a case in point.     

Skolem and the löwenheim-skolem theorem: a case study of the philosophical significance of mathematical results

The dream of a community of philosophers engaged in inquiry with shared standards of evidence and justification has long been with us. It has led some thinkers puzzled by our mathematical experience to look to mathematics for adjudication between competing views. I am skeptical of this approach and consider Skolem's philosophical uses of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem to exemplify it. I argue that these uses invariably beg the questions at issue. I say ‘uses’, because I claim further that Skolem shifted his position on the philosophical significance of the theorem as a result of a shift in his background beliefs. The nature of this shift and possible explanations for it are investigated. Ironically, Skolem's own case provides a historical example of the philosophical flexibility of his theorem.

Our suspicion ought always to be aroused when a proof proves more than its means allow it. Something of this sort might be called ‘a puffed-up proof’.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the foundations of mathematics (revised edition), vol. 2, 21.     

TO INTERPRET,OR TO BE OMNISCIENT

Abstract

Susan Moller Okin has criticized Michael Sandel's view that the family is an example of an institution that is sometimes ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ justice, and for which justice is not, under the best conditions, a virtue. She argues that he both misses the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions and that he idealizes the family, and after undertaking this ‘ground-clearing’, goes on to argue that families should be just. This paper offers a qualified defense of Sandel. I argue, first, that Sandel has not missed the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions. But I go on to argue, more centrally, that if we distinguish between what I call ‘internal’ and ‘social’ justice of the family, and look carefully at the conclusions of Okin's own arguments, we see that she has really argued for the social justice of the family, and that this can be maintained alongside Sandel's vision of the family as an institution within which considerations of justice are neither central, nor necessarily appropriate. I try to carve out space both for Sandel's vision of the family, and for Okin's substantive feminist conclusions about family-based gender injustice.     

Fichte,Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

Several commentators have argued that Hegel's account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte's idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel's account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte's conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte's account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel's account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition.     

Kant's Pragmatism

This article offers a definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, as it is used in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant's pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term ‘pragmatic’ denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term ‘pragmatic’ (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher.     

Religion and Mestrovic's postemotional society: The manufacturing of religious emotion

Work on the social theory of emotion has been growing in the last decade, but few have considered how these studies relate to the field of religion. This article is a detailed critical examination of the work of the Croatian‐American sociologist Stjepan Mestrovic and his idea of ‘postemotionalism’. It is an exploration of the implications of his work for understanding contemporary manifestations of religion. It first unfolds the context of Mestrovic's work on postemotionalism and then explores the development and meaning of the term. It follows a series of tensions in the concept between spontaneous and produced emotion and seeks to show how postemotionalism fails to consider adequately religious history, which has continually involved the process of repackaging ‘past emotions’. Despite these difficulties, Mestrovic's idea of postemotionalism is seen to provide not only a way to rethink emotion and rationality in religion, but a way of re-conceptualising so-called ‘individual’ religious emotion as part of wider political constructions developed through late capitalistic markets and the technology of mass media. Mestrovic's lack of concern with religion is considered, and the work of the French sociologist of religion Danie` le Hervieu-Le ger on ‘chain memory’ is introduced as a way of illuminating questions of religious tradition, memory and emotion in Mestrovic's work. The final section of the paper considers the ‘revivalist’ developments of Celtic Spirituality as an example of the micro-politics of postemotional religion.     

Moore's paradox

G. E. Moore famously noted that saying ‘I went to the movies, but I don't believe it’ is absurd, while saying ‘I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it’ is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of ‘believes’ changes across first-person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the truth conditions of any moorean utterance contradict its accuracy conditions. Thus we diagnose a contradiction in how the moorean utterance represents things as being; so we can do justice to the intuition that a Moore-paradoxical utterance is in some way senseless, even if we know what proposition it expresses.     

The experience of ‘healing stories’ in the life narrative: A grounded theory

‘healing stories' are part of an emergent narrative literature in psychology and counselling. This research explored the subjective experience of ‘healing stories’ within the context of individual's life narratives. A grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) method of analysis was used to generate and analyse six participant's life narratives. Analysis of these accounts revealed three categories. The first is the context of struggle that preceded the healing process. participants told of struggle in their relationships with others as well as turmoil in their experience of themselves. The second category, the healing process reflected the participants' growing awareness of life's existential givens (Yalom, 1980). This represented a personal exploration that opened lparticipants to a ‘healing story’ that offered them an insight into choices and possibilities for liberation. The third category illustrated that in the ongoing struggle the ‘healing story’ has continued to provide inspiration in the participants' lived experience as an ‘evoked companion’ (Stern, 1985). This research posited a core dynamic whereby participants' experience of their ‘healing story’ provided not only an initial inspiration that was healing but also, in their ongoing struggle, the ‘healing story’ continued to inspire their lived experience.     

Calvin Versus the Calvinists? The Case of John Preston (1587-1628)

Abstract

It has long been popular when considering the relationship between Reformation and Post-Reformation theology, to emphasize doctrinal discontinuities to the extent that even John Calvin is pitted against the Calvinists. R.T. Kendall's influential thesis in this regard is still seen as authoritative by some, despite numerous critiques. This article presents a new critique of Kendall's thesis by focusing on John Preston, one of Kendall's case studies for the alleged defection of English Calvinism from Calvin. Kendall uses Preston as an example of how Calvinism's doctrine of limited atonement, in contrast to Calvin's doctrine of universal redemption, allegedly resulted in a compromising of Reformed teaching on faith and assurance. It is here demonstrated that, ironically, Preston actually held to a form of universal redemptionism, and hence Kendall's argument backfires. In an attempt to understand how such a misreading of history could have arisen, this article cautions against a ‘zoom lens’ approach that all too often trades in short quotations taken out of context. It goes on to explore, through the ‘wide angle lens,’ aspects of the broader historical context of Reformation and Post-Reformation theologians, taking Martin Bucer as a further example. It is argued that ecclesiology and sacramentology—factors that Kendall intentionally avoided—are crucial in fostering a more historically and theologically sensitive appraisal of the appropriation of Reformation theology in a post-Reformation world.     

Hegel's notion of Aufheben

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ‘rise above the mere “either‐or”; of understanding’ have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either‐or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either‐or depends, for example, on the categories of Being and Not‐Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either‐or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ‘falls apart’. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either‐or, we must, at the same time, ‘rise above’ that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ‘immanent transformation’ in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent.     

Rethinking ‘Enthusiasm’: Christoph Blumhardt on the Discernment of the Spirit

This article uses resources from the theology of Christoph Blumhardt to argue that Luther was mistaken in identifying a necessary theological connection between ‘enthusiastic’ views of the Spirit and naive anthropology. It demonstrates that Blumhardt successfully combined an abiding concern over the problem of spiritual self‐deception together with a pneumatology that affirmed the importance of affective experience of the Spirit not mediated exclusively by the proclaimed Word of Scripture, through a conviction that the most reliable sign of the Spirit's activity is ‘negative’, in suffering and visceral encounter with divine judgement, in the first instance. This critical ‘enthusiasm’ helps explain Blumhardt's singular critique of the nationalistic ‘Spirit of August’ from the start of World War I.     

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.     

Some considerations about personality structure in child psychosis

This paper begins by describing the three main areas that can be addressed in seeking to bring about change in parent?–?infant work, and questions the extent to which a brief therapy model may be generally effective. Following a clinical example, there is a discussion of the nature of the process of change with this particular population. Drawing on ideas from Paula Heimann and others it is suggested that the ‘ghost in the nursery’ described by Fraiberg represents an ‘unassimilated object’ that may frequently be projected on to the infant but is also likely to appear elsewhere. It is argued that, especially if therapy relieves the infant of this projection, it will most often manifest its presence in the couple's relationship. In consequence, it is this relationship that should be a primary focus for our interventions, particularly as this also provides the essential context for the infant's psychological development.     

Feuerbach and the Philosophy of Critical Theory

It is a hallmark of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory that it has consistently made philosophical reflection a central component of its overall project. Indeed, the core identity that this tradition has been able to maintain arguably stems from the fact that a number of key philosophical assumptions have been shared by the generations of thinkers involved in it. These assumptions form a basic ‘philosophical matrix’, whose main aim is to allow for a ‘critique of reason’, the heart of the critique of modern society, which emphasises the collective, historically situated and naturalistically grounded nature of rationality. In this matrix, Feuerbach's place has been only a minor one. This paper aims to show that there is more to be retrieved from Feuerbach for critical theory than at first meets the eye. The first section identifies key conceptual features that are shared by the central authors of the Frankfurt School. They signal a collectivist and materialist shift from Kant to Marx via Hegel. This shift is well adumbrated in Feuerbach's emphasis on the ‘intersubjective’ and social dependency of the subject. However, Feuerbach's decisive philosophical contribution lies in his insistence on the ‘sensuous’ modalities of intersubjectivity, that is, on the fact that the dependency of subjects on others for the formation of their capacities is mediated and expressed not only through language and other symbolic forms, but also and primarily through embodiment. This Feuerbachian ‘sensualism’ is a rich, original philosophical position, which is not soluble in Marx's own version of materialism. In sections II and III, I highlight the legacy of Feuerbach's sensualism in two areas of critical theory: first, in relation to the critical epistemology that grows out of the ‘philosophical matrix’ consistently used by critical theorists; and secondly, in relation to the arguments in philosophical anthropology that are mobilized to promote the critical project. In these two areas, Feuerbach's sensualism – his insistence on the embodied dimensions of cognition and action – represents a useful resource to resist the tendency of critical theory to translate its foundation in the critique of reason into a narrowly rationalistic enterprise.     

Developing a Validity Argument Through Abductive Reasoning with an Empirical Demonstration of the Latent Class Analysis

This article proposes and demonstrates a methodology for test score validation through abductive reasoning. It describes how abductive reasoning can be utilized in support of the claims made about test score validity. This methodology is demonstrated with a real data example of the Canadian English Language Proficiency Index Program (CELPIP)-General test—a program assessing functional English language ability in the community and workplace. Abductive reasoning seeks the enabling conditions through which a claim about a person's ability makes sense. For example, it makes sense that a person has strong functional language proficiency if he or she has been regularly using English to write emails and meet with colleagues at work. A valid test score should be affected by the extent of a person's engagement with such enabling conditions. Empirical evidence that warrants such an abductively reasoned claim is illustrated through a latent class analysis within a structural equation model. Evidence is examined to investigate whether certain classes of test takers who have been differentially engaging in the enabling conditions do, in fact, predict a person's CELPIP-General performance. The steps of the methodology are summarized in the closing section.     

Kant on Recognizing Beauty

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Food and violence: Childhood violence and emotional abuse as complicating factors in the inpatient treatment of eating disorders

SUMMARY

This paper considers the treatment, on an inpatient eating disorders ward, of patients who have suffered violence and emotional abuse during childhood. The complex web of relationships surrounding these patients is discussed, and it is suggested that there are multiple transferences — to the institution, to various members of staff, and to other patients — and that splitting of these transferences is inevitable. Staff experience powerful countertransference feelings, related to the patient's violent history. A central task for the staff team as a whole is to understand and contain the patient's disturbance — taking on, tolerating, and processing the projections. This demands the close working-together of the members of the multidisciplinary team, so that staff can together openly examine the patient's interaction with them and their own emotional responses to the patient and to other members of staff. If these responses are not understood by the ward staff, they can lead to conflict and inappropriate decisions. On the other hand, if the staff team together can build up a picture of the patient's relationships on the ward, and their meaning for the patient, this picture, like a particular projection of the world in an atlas, provides a ‘map’ of the patient's inner world. This ‘map’ can be used by the staff team in navigating their interactions with the patient. It can also assist the psychotherapist in her work to help the patient recognise and, eventually, own the split-off parts of herself.     

IS THERE A TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method.