The delocalized mind. Judgements,vehicles, and persons

Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful entities (vehicles). Persons, who engage in social practices of deontic scorekeeping (Brandom), and who are thus able to produce appropriate inferential behaviour, enact conceptual mental episodes and the basis of their supervenience.     

Perception,meaning, and mind

Earlier versions of this paper were read in the Philosophy department at the University of Helsinki, in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh, at Vanderbilt University, at the Indiana Philosophical Association, and at the Institute for Logic and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston. I am grateful for very helpful comments on each of these occasions, and I am especially appreciative to John Haugeland, Mark Johnson, and George McClure for their comments and suggestions. Thanks, too, to Robert Solomon who urged me to amplify my claims about perceptual meaning.     

George A. Miller, language, and the computer metaphor of mind

This article asks why the analogy between humans and computers was understood by cognitive psychologists to mean that "minds exist and that it is our job as psychologists to study them". Earlier psychologists, such as Clark Hull, used analogies between humans and complex machines such as telephone switchboards to defend a rigorous behaviorism. How, then, did the computer metaphor of mind come to be seen as the root concept underlying a paradigm shift from behaviorism to cognitivism? To answer this question, this article examines the life and work of George A. Miller, one of the most prominent of a generation of psychologists who began their careers as "good behaviorists" but later came to embrace cognitivism.     

Enacting musical emotions. sense-making,dynamic systems,and the embodied mind

The subject of musical emotions has emerged only recently as a major area of research. While much work in this area offers fascinating insights to musicological research, assumptions about the nature of emotional experience seem to remain committed to appraisal, representations, and a rule-based or information-processing model of cognition. Over the past three decades alternative ‘embodied’ and ‘enactive’ models of mind have challenged this approach by emphasising the self-organising aspects of cognition, often describing it as an ongoing process of dynamic interactivity between an organism and its environment. More recently, this perspective has been applied to the study of emotion in general, opening up interesting new possibilities for theory and research. This new approach, however, has received rather limited attention in musical contexts. With this in mind, we critically review the history of music and emotion studies, arguing that many existing theories offer only limited views of what musical-emotional experience entails. We then attempt to provide preliminary grounding for an alternative perspective on music and emotion based on the enactive/dynamic systems approach to the study of mind.     

Ecology in mind,mindful practices

In many areas of writing and social practice it has become commonplace to think of people and organizations as having content-specific characteristics (e.g., traits, attitudes, structures), and as conducting internal and external processes (intra and interpersonal, intra- and inter-organizational...). The approach taken here is very different. Relational processes form the “starting point”, these being viewed as the medium within which social realities and learning are socially constructed. More precisely, relational processes are said to construct (1) people and things and (2) relations-as social realities. It is suggested that relations very often are constructed as being between separate and opposed entities; these being viewed as relations of “either/or”. However, relations also may be constructed as “both/and”, which invites a view of learning as participation by treating self and other as joined. It is this participative or ecological view that is explored here. An ecological view invites serious consideration of ways of relating that are: diverse-rather than homogenized; slow-rather than fast; and capable of constructing deep knowledges, e.g., that are less closely tied to conceptual language and to a disembodied sense of “I”, “outside” of nature. Discussion briefly points to some mindful (mind-full) practices that embrace, for example, self-reflecting ways, reflection on frames and questions, and reflection on conceptual ways of knowing.     

静心·净心·尽心——《道德经》读后感

老子之著《道德经》,蕴含了丰富的人生哲理。千百年来,上至帝王将相,下至平民百姓,无不从这部人类文明史上的智慧宝典中汲取治国安民、修身养性、立人处世的精髓。当今社会科学发达,社会经济高速发展,人们的物质财富越来越殷实,而精神财富却越来越贫乏,道德沦丧的现象日益严重。假酒、假奶粉、毒大米、毒火腿;坑、拐、蒙、骗;贪污、腐败等等触目惊心的社会问题时见报端。“堂堂正正做人,兢兢业业工作”的呼声日益强烈。物欲横流的现实生活中,如何去面对金钱、地位、美女的诱惑呢?我们同样可以在《道德经》这部圣典中汲取睿智,找出答案,那就…     

Unity,ontology, and the divine mind

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - In his landmark book on philosophical theology, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry, Mark Johnston develops a panentheistic metaphysic of the...     

Extended mind,functionalism and personal identity

Synthese - In this paper, I address one recent objection to Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s functionalist argument for the extended mind thesis (EM). This objection is posed by Kengo...