More human than you: attributing humanness to self and others

People typically evaluate their in-groups more favorably than out-groups and themselves more favorably than others. Research on infrahumanization also suggests a preferential attribution of the "human essence" to in-groups, independent of in-group favoritism. The authors propose a corresponding phenomenon in interpersonal comparisons: People attribute greater humanness to themselves than to others, independent of self-enhancement. Study 1 and a pilot study demonstrated 2 distinct understandings of humanness--traits representing human nature and those that are uniquely human--and showed that only the former traits are understood as inhering essences. In Study 2, participants rated themselves higher than their peers on human nature traits but not on uniquely human traits, independent of self-enhancement. Study 3 replicated this "self-humanization" effect and indicated that it is partially mediated by attribution of greater depth to self versus others. Study 4 replicated the effect experimentally. Thus, people perceive themselves to be more essentially human than others.     

Reaction time methodology and the aphasic patient: a reply to Hagoort (1988)

P. Hagoort (1988, Brain and Language, 36, 335-348) suggests that the results of an experiment conducted with aphasic patients reported by W. Milberg, S. E. Blumstein, and B. Dworetzky (1987, Brain and Language, 31, 138-150) are "difficult to interpret in terms of a selective access model for normal processing because of a confound caused by the use of repeated lexical decision targets." We argue that the use of repeated lexical decision targets and other methodological compromises are necessary for using the lexical decision reaction time paradigm with aphasic patients. Furthermore, the minor differences between our data and those presented by Hagoort do not undermine our claims concerning semantic processing in different subgroups of aphasics, nor our comparisons of these patients to normal subjects.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.     

Dietary restraint in college women: Fear of an imperfect fat self is stronger than hope of a perfect thin self

We predicted that the perceived likelihood of acquiring a hoped-for thin self would mediate perfectionistic strivings on dietary restraint, and that the perceived likelihood of acquiring a feared fat self would mediate perfectionistic concerns on dietary restraint. We also predicted that the mediation pathway from perfectionistic concerns to dietary restraint would have a greater impact than that from perfectionistic strivings. Participants were 222 female college students who reported their height and weight and completed measures of perfectionism, the likelihood of acquiring the feared fat and hoped-for thin selves, and dietary restraint. Statistical analyses revealed that the perceived likelihood of acquiring the feared fat self mediated both perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings on dietary restraint, and that the mediating pathway from perfectionistic concerns to dietary restraint was greater than that from perfectionistic strivings. Implications for future research and eating pathology interventions are discussed.     

Animates are better remembered than inanimates: further evidence from word and picture stimuli

In three experiments, we showed that animate entities are remembered better than inanimate entities. Experiment 1 revealed better recall for words denoting animate than inanimate items. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with the use of pictures. In Experiment 3, we found better recognition for animate than for inanimate words. Importantly, we also found a higher recall rate of “remember” than of “know” responses for animates, whereas the recall rates were similar for the two types of responses for inanimate items. This finding suggests that animacy enhances not only the quantity but also the quality of memory traces, through the recall of contextual details of previous experiences (i.e., episodic memory). Finally, in Experiment 4, we tested whether the animacy effect was due to animate items being richer in terms of sensory features than inanimate items. The findings provide further evidence for the functionalist view of memory championed by Nairne and coworkers (Nairne, 2010; Nairne & Pandeirada, Cognitive Psychology, 61:1–22, 2010a, 2010b).     

Response expectancy theory and application: A decennial review

Response expectancy is the anticipation of automatic, subjective, and behavioral responses to particular situational cues. More than a decade of research in diverse laboratories indicates that response expectancies are important considerations in designing and administering treatments and prevention programs for such problems as anxiety disorders, depression, substance abuse, and sexual dysfunction. Response expectancy also plays a central role in the effects of antidepressive medication, psychotherapy, and hypnosis. In addition, studies of the effects of placebos reveal that response expectancies can produce lasting changes in pain, anxiety, depression, alertness, tension, sexual arousal, alcohol craving and consumption, aggression, asthma, warts, and contact dermatitis. The veracity of many self-reported placebo effects have been corroborated by changes in physiological function.     

Response conflict theory,error rates and hybrid processing: A reply to McLeod

McLeod (1977) has proposed a parallel processing model of the psychological refractory period quite similar to an earlier model most recently adumbrated by Kantowitz (1974a). This article corrects some erroneous statements made by McLeod about the testability of the response conflict model and emphasizes the importance of error data in distinguishing among conceptually similar models of the PRP effect.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Becoming who you are: An integrative review of self‐determination theory and personality systems interactions theory

One of the enduring missions of personality science is to unravel what it takes to become a fully functioning person. In the present article, the authors address this matter from the perspectives of self‐determination theory (SDT) and personality systems interactions (PSI) theory. SDT (a) is rooted in humanistic psychology; (b) has emphasized a first‐person perspective on motivation and personality; (c) posits that the person, supported by the social environment, naturally moves toward growth through the satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. PSI theory (a) is rooted in German volition psychology; (b) has emphasized a third‐person perspective on motivation and personality; and (c) posits that a fully functioning person can form and enact difficult intentions and integrate new experiences, and that such competencies are facilitated by affect regulation. The authors review empirical support for SDT and PSI theory, their convergences and divergences, and how the theories bear on recent empirical research on internalization, vitality, and achievement flow. The authors conclude that SDT and PSI theory offer complementary insights into developing a person's full potential.     

源于“反常”终于“常理”的禀赋效应

如果忽略收入影响和交易成本, 愿意为一样物品支付的价格应等于愿意出售的价格。而塞勒教授却发现, 现实生活中有一些“反常”现象, 个体会对自己所拥有的物品赋予更高的价值, 造成“愿意支付价格”和“愿意出售价格”的不一致。塞勒利用预期理论中的损失厌恶对这些反常现象进行解释, 并将该现象称为禀赋效应(endowment effect)。此后, 众多研究者从不同角度对该效应进行了探索和论证。文章详细梳理了禀赋效应的多种解释机制, 包括损失厌恶、心理所有权理论、偏差的认知过程以及进化的观点等, 论证了禀赋效应符合“常理”的原因, 同时也探讨了禀赋效应在商业销售策略和政府拆迁政策等方面的应用前景。     

Things are always more complicated than you think: An open systems approach to the organizational effects of computer-automated technology

The effects of computerized office and factory automation are examined. An open systems framework is used to organize this literature. The review suggests that the benefits of technology are derived from theintermediate effects of the technology on organizational processes (the task structure, personnel system, formal structure, and informal organization). Thus, it is misleading to examine thedirect effects of computerized technology on organizational outcomes such as profits and satisfaction. Some of the effects of technology on the organizational processes are inevitable (e.g., changes in informal communication patterns). Others are determined less by the technology than by management decisions. The key to achieving success with computerized technology is matching changes in organizational processes to each other, as well as to the technology and the larger environment of the organization.Ann Majchrzak is currently Associate Professor of Human Factors at the Institute of Safety and Systems Management at the University of Southern California. She has recently written two books on the subject of technological change. Katherine J. Klein is an Assistant Professor of Industrial and Organizational Psychology in the Psychology Department of the University of Maryland at College Park.     

Prospective and retrospective evaluations of experiences: how you evaluate an experience depends on when you evaluate it

Prior research (cf. Soman & Shi, 2001 ) has shown that obstacles and periods of low progress in an experience reduce the evaluation of that experience. In this research, we propose that the temporal distance between the obstacle and the time of making the evaluation moderates the effect of the obstacle. Consequently, an early (late) obstacle reduces prospective (retrospective) evaluation more significantly than a late (early) obstacle. In two experiments, we find support for this temporal proximity hypothesis. Further, differences between prospective and retrospective evaluations disappeared when the data were analyzed in terms of temporal distance, suggesting that the judgment policies underlying prospective and retrospective evaluations were the same. We also show that it is possible to create pairs of paths such that one of the two paths would be preferred when viewed in prospect, but the other path might be preferred in retrospect. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

I saw it for longer than you: the relationship between perceived encoding duration and memory conformity

The memory conformity effect is when people's memories become similar to one another's following a discussion. The present study examined whether an individual's beliefs in the quality of their memory, relative to another person's, mediates susceptibility to memory conformity. Perceived encoding duration was manipulated by telling dyad members that one person had encoded a set of pictures for either half or twice as long as their partner. In fact, actual encoding duration was the same for all participants. Dyad members each encoded slightly different versions of otherwise identical pictures and discussed them prior to an individual free recall test. Participants who believed that they had encoded the pictures for half as long as their partner were more susceptible to memory conformity, as indicated by their increased tendency to report errant items at test that had been encountered from their partner rather than items that they had actually seen. This effect of perceived encoding duration on memory conformity was mediated through response order. A source monitoring test found that these unseen items were errantly attributed to the pictures approximately 50% of the time. The findings are discussed in relation to the role of metamemory in susceptibility to memory conformity.     

When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattentional blindness and task instructions

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for.