Taking a new look at looking at nothing

A crucial question in cognitive science is how linguistic and visual information are integrated. Previous research has shown that eye movements to objects in the visual environment are locked to linguistic input. More surprisingly, listeners fixate on now-empty regions that had previously been occupied by relevant objects. This 'looking at nothing' phenomenon has been linked to the claim that the visual system constructs sparse representations of the external world and relies on saccades and fixations to extract information in a just-in-time manner. Our model provides a different explanation: based on recent work in visual cognition and memory, it assumes that the visual system creates and stores detailed internal memory representations, and that looking at nothing facilitates retrieval of those representations.     

When looking back to nothing goes back to nothing

Previous research showed that the eyes revisit the location in which the stimulus has been encoded when visual or verbal information is retrieved from memory. A recent study showed that this behavior still occurs 1 week after encoding, suggesting that visual, spatial and linguistic information is tightly associated with the oculomotor trace and stored as an integrated memory representation. However, it is yet unclear whether looking behavior simply remains stable between encoding and recall or whether it changes over time in a more fine-tuned manner. Here, we investigate the time course of looking behavior during recall in multiple sessions across 1 week. Participants encoded visual objects presented in one of the four locations on the computer screen. In five sessions during the week after encoding, they performed on a visual memory recall task. During retrieval, participants looked back to the encoding location, but only in the recall sessions within 1 day of encoding. We discuss different explanations for the temporal dynamics of looking behavior during recall, searching for the role of eye movements in memory.     

Revisiting the looking at nothing phenomenon: Visual and semantic biases in memory search

When visual stimuli remain present during search, people spend more time fixating objects that are semantically or visually related to the target instruction than looking at unrelated objects. Are these semantic and visual biases also observable when participants search within memory? We removed the visual display prior to search while continuously measuring eye movements towards locations previously occupied by objects. The target absent trials contained objects that were either visually or semantically related to the target instruction. When the overall mean proportion of fixation time was considered, we found biases towards the location previously occupied by the target, but failed to find biases towards visually or semantically related objects. However, in two experiments the pattern of biases towards the target over time provided a reliable predictor for biases towards the visually and semantically related objects. We therefore conclude that visual and semantic representations alone can guide eye movements in memory search, but that orienting biases are weak when the stimuli are no longer present.     

Feeling nothing: Numbness and emotional absence

I argue that it is possible for a subject to undergo experiences of emotional absence, during which she becomes aware of her own failure to be moved by the world around her. Just as a part of one's body feels numb when it manifestly fails to incur the ordinary sensory consequences of transactions at the surface of the skin, so an individual feels emotional absence when her affective condition manifestly fails to vary in predictable ways as she navigates her surroundings. Experiences of emotional absence, such as feeling numb with shock or grief, feeling unamused, or feeling fearless, are not simply flat or neutral states of awareness, but can bear psychological and epistemic significance for the agent.     

Busy doing nothing: Evidence for nonaction-effect binding

Research on voluntary action has focused on the question of how we represent our behavior on a motor and cognitive level. However, the question of how we represent voluntary not acting has been completely neglected. The aim of the present study was to investigate the cognitive and motor representation of intentionally not acting. By using an action-effect binding approach, we demonstrate similarities of action and nonaction. In particular, our results reveal that voluntary nonactions can be bound to an effect tone. This finding suggests that effect binding is not restricted to an association between a motor representation and a successive effect (action-effect binding) but can also occur for an intended nonaction and its effect (nonaction-effect binding). Moreover, we demonstrate that nonactions have to be initiated voluntarily in order to elicit nonaction-effect binding.     

Stress responsivity among dysmenorrheic women at different phases of their menstrual cycle: more ado about nothing

Dysmenorrheic and nondysmenorrheic women in the follicular, luteal and menstrual phase of their menstrual cycle participated in a stressful laboratory procedure. Pulse rate, pulse volume and skin conductance were measured continuously during baseline, during confrontation of three stressful tasks (i.e. stress-reactivity periods) and following each confrontation (i.e. stress-recovery periods). The hypothesis that dysmenorrheic Ss in the menstrual phase of their cycle would show greater stress responsitivity was generally not confirmed, and the broader contention that women differ in their stress responsivity as a function of their menstrual cycle phase was shown to be of questionable validity.     

Mother nature's tolerant ways: Why non-genetic inheritance has nothing to do with evolution

Recently a number of theorists have suggested that evolution can use non-genetic or environmental inheritance to pass on adaptations (e.g. [Mameli, M. (2004). Nongenetic selection and nongenetic inheritance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55, 35-71]). Furthermore, it has been suggested that non-genetic, or environmental factors, can play a central role in the process of evolution that is not captured by the neo-Darwinian view which places natural selection centre stage (e.g. [Odling-Smee, J. J., Laland, K. N., & Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution. New Jersey: Princeton University Press]). In this paper we present and clarify neo-Darwinian theory and then take issue with the notions of contemporary gene-centred selection and inheritance that non-genetic inheritance theorists have used. We claim that they have misunderstood the distinction and relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic inheritance and we clarify this with a number of examples from the behavioural and biological sciences. According to this analysis there is no such thing as biologically independent non-genetic inheritance, all extrinsic inheritance is a consequence of traits and dispositions that are intrinsic to an organism and intrinsic design can only be explained through neo-Darwinism. We point to the implications this view has for current conceptions of cultural evolution.     

On (the) nothing: Heidegger and Nishida

Two major twentieth century philosophers, of East and West, for whom the nothing is a significant concept are Nishida Kitarō and Martin Heidegger. Nishida’s basic concept is the absolute nothing (zettai mu) upon which the being of all is predicated. Heidegger, on the other hand, thematizes the nothing (Nichts) as the ulterior aspect of being. Both are responding to Western metaphysics that tends to substantialize being and dichotomize the real. Ironically, however, while Nishida regarded Heidegger as still trapped within the confines of Western metaphysics with its tendency to objectify, Heidegger’s impression of Nishida was that he is too Western, that is, metaphysical. Yet neither was too familiar with the other’s philosophical work as a whole. I thus compare and assess Nishida’s and Heidegger’s discussions of the nothing in their attempts to undermine traditional metaphysics while examining lingering assumptions about the Nishida–Heidegger relationship. Neither Nishida nor Heidegger means by “nothing” a literal nothing, but rather that which permits beings in their relative determinacy to be what they are and wherein or whereby we find ourselves always already in our comportment to beings. Nishida characterizes this as a place (basho) that negates itself to give rise to, or make room for, beings. For Heidegger, being as an event (Ereignis) that clears room for beings, releasing each into its own, is not a being, hence nothing. We may also contrast them on the basis of the language they employ in discussing the nothing. Yet each seemed to have had an intuitive grasp of an un/ground, foundational to experience and being. And in fact their paths cross in their respective critiques of Western substantialism, where they offer as an alterantive to that substantialist ontology, in different ways, what I call anontology.     

Retracted: When nothing compares to me: how defensive motivations and similarity shape social comparison effects

While similarity typically breeds social comparison, all information gained from social comparisons is not equally influential. Three studies illustrate the situations in which individuals defensively interpret social comparison information such that they incorporate information that reflects positively on the self and disregard negative information. Study 1 extends previous research to show that self‐threat broadens the conditions under which defensive interpretations occur to include those in which similarity is ambiguous. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that defensive interpretations are less likely to occur when individuals are affirmed or when the comparison information is unimportant. These findings suggest that the impact of social comparisons on self‐views is determined by both similarity of comparison targets and the motives of the perceiver. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards effective treatment of eating disorders: nothing is as practical as a good theory

There is much room for improvement in the treatment of eating disorders, anorexia nervosa in particular. It is argued that for more effective treatment a radical change in thinking and doing is needed. First, the wide-spread multicausal model of eating disorders must be abandoned and replaced by (a) fundamental strategic research into the most parsimonious explanation of eating disorders and (b) interventions solely directed on the specific maintaining mechanisms. Second, evidence-based working is needed in mental health care. In daily practice, two of three psychotherapists do not treat their eating disordered patients with the best treatment available, i.e. cognitive behaviour therapy. The Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport tried to improve the care for eating disorder patients by the nomination of several specialist hospital units. These units are, however, not selected for their treatment quality or the use of evidence-based treatment protocols. It is argued that this ministerial operation will not increase the supply of effective treatment. The Minister obviously should have done two other things to improve the amount and quality of treatment supply for eating disorders: First, she better could invest in a broad array of workshops, training and supervision programs in cognitive behaviour therapy for all psychotherapists working with eating disorders. Second, since nothing is so practical as a good theory, the facilitation of research into parsimonious models of the relevant mechanisms as well as the experimental tests of interventions on these mechanisms would have been a promising move to effective treatment.     

Reading through a noisy channel: why there's nothing special about the perception of orthography

The goal of research on how letter identity and order are perceived during reading is often characterized as one of "cracking the orthographic code." Here, we suggest that there is no orthographic code to crack: Words are perceived and represented as sequences of letters, just as in a dictionary. Indeed, words are perceived and represented in exactly the same way as other visual objects. The phenomena that have been taken as evidence for specialized orthographic representations can be explained by assuming that perception involves recovering information that has passed through a noisy channel: the early stages of visual perception. The noisy channel introduces uncertainty into letter identity, letter order, and even whether letters are present or absent. We develop a computational model based on this simple principle and show that it can accurately simulate lexical decision data from the lexicon projects in English, French, and Dutch, along with masked priming data that have been taken as evidence for specialized orthographic representations.     

Searching for nothing: placing zero on the temporal continuum

Animal Cognition - Generalization allows responses acquired in one situation to be transferred to similar situations. For temporal stimuli, a discontinuity has been found between zero and non-zero...     

Retraction statement: When nothing compares to me: how defensive motivations and similarity shape social comparison effects

The following article from European Journal of Social Psychology, “When nothing compares to me: How defensive motivations and similarity shape social comparison effects” by Diederik A. Stapel and Camille S. Johnson, published online on 26 September 2006 in Wiley Online Library ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ), has been retracted by agreement between the co‐author, the journal Editor in Chief, Tom Postmes, and John Wiley and Sons Ltd. The retraction has been agreed following the results of an investigation into the work of Diederik A. Stapel ( https://www.commissielevelt.nl/ ). The Levelt Committee has determined that this article contained data that was fabricated by Diederik A. Stapel. His co‐author was unaware of his actions, and not in any way involved. REFERENCE Stapel, D. A. &; Johnson, C. S. (2007). When nothing compares to me: how defensive motivations and similarity shape social comparison effects. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 824–838. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.390