Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.     

Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

A ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist (in some form or other). I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical (hence, according to the moral error theorist, ontologically problematic) if and only if epistemic reasons are.     

对条件克隆人的伦理辨析

目前,我们还要讨论克隆人的原因是,克隆技术仍在进行,假设人的克隆技术发展已经成熟,而且用于人道的目的,这种更加理性化的讨论应该是目前学术界关于克隆人的伦理争议的方向.因此,我们可以在克隆技术已经成熟的假设下更深一步的、有目的地讨论克隆人的伦理问题,当把克隆人的目的缩减在如下较合理的范围中,便可更深一步地、更有针对性地探讨克隆人的伦理问题.     

Ethical Research in Delirium: Arguments for Including Decisionally Incapacitated Subjects

Here we describe how more important findings were obtained in a delirium study by using an informal assessment of mental capacity, and, in those who lacked capacity, obtaining consent later when or if capacity returned or a proxy was found. From a total of 233 patients 23 patients lacked capacity as judged by our informal capacity judgment and 210 did not. Of those who lacked capacity, 13 agreed to enter in the study. Six of them regained capacity later. When these 13 participants were excluded from analysis, significant findings were no longer evident. These results show that by the inclusion of subjects who lacked capacity the results of analyses of the condition from whish they suffer are altered. We suggest that this approach to the study of delirium is more ethical than the usual system of strict exclusion of people who lack capacity to give consent and for whom assent is not available.     

From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity

Sandra Harding is working on the reconstruction of scientific objectivity. Lorraine Daston argues that objectivity is a concept that has historically evolved. Her account of the development of “aperspectival objectivity” provides an opportunity to see Harding's “strong objectivity” project as a stage in this evolution, to locate it in the history of migration of ideals from moral philosophy to natural science, and to support Harding's desire to retain something of the ontological significance of objectivity.     

Objectivity,diversity, democracy: locating social theory in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Objectivity and Diversity</Emphasis>

Reprising and revising a question from Longino regarding an earlier phase of standpoint theory, I raise some issues regarding the place of a substantive normative social theory in the strong objectivity project in Harding’s recent book, Objectivity and Diversity. I offer reasons to think the issue needs to be reframed in the co-constructionist and pluralist setting of the new book but that interesting issues continue to arise in thinking about the philosophical resources feminist philosophies of science can or might rely on.     

对新冠病毒肺炎危重症患者引入缓和医疗的伦理论证

新型冠状病毒肺炎尚无治疗特效药和疫苗。在继续加强防控的同时,把有限的资源优先放在探索对重症和危重症患者的支持性治疗,积极建立和完善对重症、危重症患者及其家属的缓和医疗等方面,有利于患者群体利益最大化,经得起伦理辩护。缓和医疗有助于改善患者预后,降低住院病死率,有效缓解患者濒死痛苦;对医患双方而言,如果死亡已无可避免,帮助临终者走得平安、少些痛苦,是医学对患者最后的人文关怀。     

Companions in Presence: Animal Assistants and Eldercare

Honoring the scholarship and teaching of Professor William M. Clements, this critically reflective essay expands the possibilities for a ministry of presence. The paper argues that animals can be helpful companions in care with elderly adults. The author draws from experiential stories, object relations theory, process theology, and empirical studies, to argue the beneficial aspects of animal assistants for human care receivers and caregivers. A creation-inclusive relational theology informs strategies for care.     

Group‐Based Shame and Guilt: Emerging Directions in Research

Research on the role of emotion in social identity, group processes, and intergroup conflict is burgeoning. This paper examines recent research on group‐based shame and guilt and describes important themes in this research. Guilt and shame are distinguished by different appraisals and motivations in intergroup contexts. Group‐based shame is associated with threats to group‐image and motivations to protect and repair that image. In contrast, group‐based guilt is associated with efforts to repair and apologize for ingroup wrongdoing. Current research is expanding in several important directions. First, the scope of emotions is expanding beyond that of shame and guilt to consider the roles of emotions such as ingroup‐directed anger in situations that may also provoke group‐based shame and guilt. Second, people’s motivations to avoid feeling group‐based shame and guilt are becoming better understood, particularly in relation to different aspects of social identification. Finally, we argue that dynamic processes in emotion expression and experience, particularly due to the relation between perpetrator and victim groups, are an important future direction in research on group‐based shame and guilt.     

Demand/Withdraw Patterns in Serial Arguments: Implications for Well‐Being

Serial arguing has been linked to relational difficulties. We extend this research by looking at the relationship between demand/withdraw patterns enacted during argumentative episodes and aversive reactions after the episode has ended in romantic relationships (N = 219). We found that individuals who initiated the first confrontation often reported they did so because they were very upset and they initiated a self‐demand/partner‐withdraw pattern that was repeated in subsequent episodes. The self‐demand/partner‐withdraw pattern was positively related to experiencing intrusive thoughts and feelings about the episode, attempts to avoid such thoughts and feelings, a hyperaroused state, and disruption of everyday activities. Individuals who were originally confronted by their partners report that their partners demanded they change and they withdraw, and this pattern was repeated in typical episodes. This pattern is more strongly related to stress than was self‐demand/partner‐withdraw and was equally predictive of attempts to avoid thinking about the event. However, the partner‐demand/self‐withdraw sequence was not strongly related to most of the other aversive episodic reactions.