Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.     

Persuasive argumentation and social comparison as determinants of attitude polarization

Several of our studies indicate that persuasive-arguments theory by itself is an adequate explanation of polarization. Sanders and Baron (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1977, 13, 303–314) criticize this research. More generally, they contend that both argumentation and comparison are involved, “with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison.” We feel that their critique is unconvincing. Relevant portions of the standard literature are reviewed to demonstrate that social comparison is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for polarization. Finally, we speculate about how persuasive-arguments theory could be extended to argument-poor settings (e.g., Asch's line comparison situation).     

A strong test of exposure effects

A strong test of exposure effects was made by eliminating confounding demand characteristics through the use of a between-subject design. Each subject viewed novel stimuli at a single frequency level, and then rated them on several affective scales. Frequency of stimulus exposure was systematically varied across subjects. Stimuli were rated more positively with increasing exposure, despite the fact that subjects were unaware of any differences in exposure frequencies, and clearly unable to identify the experimental hypothesis. An awareness of the relationship between repeated exposure and affect was thus shown to be an unnecessary condition for the occurrence of exposure effects.     

The effect of mere presence on social facilitation: An unobtrusive test

An unobstrusive experimental manipulation was used to test the hypothesis that the mere presence of others can influence an individual's performance. A task was employed for which there were no clear performance criteria, and which was very unlikely to engender evaluation aprehension. Performance times on this task (dressing and undressing in familiar and unfamiliar clothing) were compared for subjects working alone, in the presence of a passive inattentive person, and in the presence of an attentive spectator. In contrast with the Alone condition, both social conditions (Audience and Incidental Audience) enhanced performance on the well-learned aspects of the task (dressing and undressing with one's own clothing) and hindered performance on the more complex aspects (working with unfamiliar clothing). It is concluded that the mere presence of others is a sufficient condition for social facilitation and social interference effects.     

Exposure effects and associative learning

The contributions of initial stimulus affect and of associative learning to the effects of repeated stimulus exposures were examined in two experiments. Stimuli that were initially positive and stimuli that were initially negative were presented for different number of times, and subjects rated these stimuli afterward on a number of affective dimensions. In all cases, except when negative affect was associatively paired with every stimulus exposure, affective responses became increasingly more positive with increasing exposures. The results were taken to indicate that the exposure effect can overcome an initially negative stimulus affect when the conditions of the mere exposure hypothesis are satisfied. Initial stimulus affect and associative learning of affect were shown to be independent factors, the first influencing the intercept of the exposure function, the second its slope.     

Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Two experiments were conducted, the results of which give considerable support to persuasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal comparison: When a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's initial choice could be accurately inferred.     

The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information

In a series of studies, subjects were asked to make predictions about target individuals. Some subjects were given information about the target which pretest subjects had judged to be “diagnostic”—that is, had judged to be usefully predictive of the outcome. Other subjects were given a mix of information judged to be diagnostic and information judged to be “nondiagnostic” by pretest subjects—that is, judged to be of little value for predicting the outcome. Subjects given mixed information made much less extreme predictions than did subjects given only diagnostic information. It was argued that this “dilution effect” occurs because people make predictions by making simple similarity judgments. That is, they compare the information they have about the target with their conception of outcome categories. The presence of individuating but nondiagnostic information about the target reduces the similarity between the target and those outcomes that are suggested by the diagnostic information. One of the major implications is that stereotypes and other “social knowledge structures” may be applied primarily to abstract, undifferentiated individuals and groups and may be largely set aside when judgments are made about concrete, individuated people.     

Inferential processes in the forced compliance situation: A Bayesian analysis

The attribution made by an observer (O) to an actor in the forced compliance situation was regarded as a probability revision process which can be described by a Bayesian inference model. Os' perceptions of the forced compliance situation were analyzed in terms of the input components into the Bayesian model: prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the diagnostic values of the behaviors which the actor may choose. In order to test propositions made by attribution theory about such perceptions (Kelley, 1967;Messick, 1971), Os viewed actors under conditions of Low Inducement (LI) and High Inducement (HI). Before observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the conditional probabilities of compliance and refusal given each of the attitudes. After observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the posterior probabilities of the attitudes. As expected, in the LI condition, compared to the HI condition, compliance was seen as less probable and more diagnostic about the actor's attitudes, and the posterior probability of the corresponding attitude was higher. Contrary to expectations, within both conditions, compliance, compared to refusal, was seen as less diagnostic and more probable.     

The confluence model: Parameter estimation for six divergent data sets on family factors and intelligence

Theoretical predictions, based on the confluence model, were made for data from six national surveys of intellectual performance. All six surveys relate intellectual performance scores to family configuration variables. Widely divergent patterns of relationships between the major family factors, such as birth order and family size, and intellectual performance scores characterize the six data sets. Nevertheless, the confluence model was capable of accurate prediction in all cases when all three parameters were estimated. Little accuracy was lost using only two parameters. Variations in the estimated parameter values that reflected the variations in patterns of effects could be meaningfully interpreted for their psychological significance.     

Hobbits and orcs: Acquisition of a sequential concept

Subjects solved the hobbits-orcs problem repeatedly until they made no errors on two successive solutions. Groups varied in the kind of feedback given after errors. Further support was obtained for Thomas' (this journal) conclusion that subjects organize the sequence of moves in small subsequences, rather than individual moves. Differences between feedback groups suggested that the organization is oriented forward in the problem, and this contrasts with GPS' retroactive organization of this problem. Comparison between feedback groups also leads to the conclusion that subjects learned from positive information indicating which response is correct, rather than by a process of eliminating errors or sampling new strategies after errors. Analysis of acquisition data agreed with the hypothesis of all-or-none learning at individual states, except for one state where the additional complexity was related to an ambiguity about backward moves. The general pattern of results was invariant over a change in the characters of the problem (men and elves) designed to produce a reversal of relationship between the characters concerning who was prevented from outnumbering whom.     

Perceptual supports for one-to-one correspondence in the conservation of number

This study compared provoked and spontaneous one-to-one correspondence along with two tasks having more perceptual support for correspondence. These four levels of correspondence appeared in a conservation of number condition and two conservation-related conditions (a partially static array or a static array). There were two sets of stimuli (toy animals or corks) in each condition. In opposition to Piaget's predictions, the four levels of correspondence did not differ in difficulty for kindergarteners. There was a strong order effect (p<.001) in the direction of increasing conservation over the eight trials. There was some evidence that the standard conservation condition was easier than the other two conditions. Implications for Piaget's theory are discussed.     

Toward quality criteria for collective judgments

While most organizational and social decision making is done in a group or collective mode, there are few guides or evaluative criteria for judging when a high-quality outcome has been reached. Most past studies of group decision making have been conducted in laboratories using student subjects and factual problems with correct answers as means for judging outcome quality. Such proxies are rough approximations at best of real-world conditions where value differences can be intense and problems have no correct or best answer. Drawing upon the existing literature, evaluative criteria are proposed including process, content, and outcome concerns. An instrument based upon these criteria is then applied retrospectively to six cases of ad hoc collective decision making. Using dimensional analyses, a set of more detailed evaluative factors is derived from actual participant responses. The results provide some insights into the nature of high-quality collective judgments as well as the most effective procedures for their achievement.     

Involuntary memory and the development of retrieval skills in young children

An incidental memory paradigm was used to study involuntary encoding processes and voluntary retrieval strategies in children's memory. Preschool (mean age: 4 years, 4 months) and kindergarten (mean age: 5 years, 10 months) children sorted pictures according to their color or category membership, and then received either a recall test (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). Better retention of category- than color-sorted items was observed for kindergarten children in free recall, preschool and kindergarten children in cued recall, and neither group in recognition. These results were interpreted in terms of the retrieval strategies used by children in each of the memory tasks. The importance of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary memory processes, and between acquisition and retrieval, in studies of depth-of-processing was emphasized. Developmental differences in performance appear to derive primarily from the role of voluntary search strategies in retrieval, rather than from age differences in involuntary encoding processes.