A Practitioner's Guide to Successful Coalitions

The highly complex practice of building successful community coalitions is explored. Key dimensions related to coalition success are identified and best practices are delineated. Nine dimensions are explored that are critical to coalition success: coalition readiness, intentionality, structure and organizational capacity, taking action, membership, leadership, dollars and resources, relationships, and technical assistance. Two coalition case studies follow the discussion of dimensions and illustrate the journey traveled to create successful community coalitions.     

Interparty Attitudes in Chile: Coalitions as Superordinate Social Identities

This paper reports a survey (N  =  1,465) conducted in Chile that was conceived to understand the role of coalition identification as an important sociopsychological mechanism for promoting positive affects toward own-coalition party members in a multiparty system, above and beyond interparty political differences. Participants judged their own political party, parties within coalitions (fellow coalition members and opposing parties), and political coalitions as a whole on affective dimensions (trust, liking, and admiration). The results provide substantial support for the five hypotheses addressed in the study. Overall, perceived interparty distance and political identity threat had a negative impact on affect toward coalition party members. Above and beyond these effects, identification with the coalition positively predicted affect toward allies. Ingroup party affect was positively correlated with affect toward own-coalition party members and own coalition as a whole, but was not negatively associated with affect toward opposing-coalition parties. Moreover, the relationship between own-party affect and affect toward own-coalition party members was mediated by affect toward own coalition. Overall, evidence for the benefits of promoting coalition identification in a multiparty system is provided and discussed alongside the limitations and practical implications derived from the study.     

Strength-is-Weakness: The (ir)relevant relation between resources and payoffs in coalition formation

A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers who control many resources are often excluded from coalitions by bargainers who control few resources, the Strength-is-Weakness effect. We argue that this effect is contingent on whether resources provide a legitimate claim to be included in a coalition. Across three incentivized coalition experiments (n = 2745; 915 triads), three participants (player A had four resources, player B had three resources, player C had two resources) negotiated about a payoff of 90 monetary units. Depending on condition, these resources were obtained randomly, earned, or earned and proportionally linked to the payoff. Results showed player As were less included when resources were obtained randomly and more often included in coalitions when resources were earned and/or proportionally linked to the payoff. This provides evidence that the Strength-is-Weakness is contingent on the legitimacy of the resources.     

The development of a mental health coalition: A case study

Described the development of a local-level mental health coalition to advocate for housing and community support programs for psychiatric consumer/survivors. Resource mobilization theory was used as a framework from which to view and understand the origins, goals, tactics, and outcomes of the coalition. Data were presented indicating that the coalition played a role in obtaining increased funding for housing and community support programs. Also, there was an emphasis on consumer/survivor and family participation in the change process. Benefits and limitations of the coalition after 6 years of operation were reviewed and compared with other advocacy coalitions in mental health. Thanks to Wendy Czarny, Peter Dunn, Mary Earls, John Lord, Ken Parsons, Isaac Prilleltensky, Harvey Simmons, and the reviewers for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Story Coalitions: Applying Narrative Theory to the Study of Coalition Formation

This article explores the potential of incorporating narrative theory into the study of coalition formation. Following a discussion of the role of narratives in group‐formation processes in a coalition‐driven dynamic, we offer a theoretical framework to examine the ways political stories espoused by people are mirrored by the partisan system. We integrate theoretical assumptions of narrative studies with coalition‐formation theories in an attempt to frame coalition‐formation models in terms of voters' political stories. We test our theoretical framework by simulating various possible coalitions in the Israeli 2009 elections and assess the results based upon data from an exit poll survey.     

Empowerment praxis in community coalitions

Community coalitions address a wide variety of community problems, espousing a community development processes that promotes individual and collective self-determination. They offer a promising venue for the study of empowerment of individuals and organizations. This study utilizes data from members of 35 community coalitions organized for the prevention of alcohol and other drug problems to address the following questions: What individual characteristics are related to the psychological empowerment of coalition members? What organizational characteristics are related to the collective empowering of members? What organization characteristics are related to a coalition being organizationally empowered to succeed in achieving its objectives? At the individual level, psychological empowerment was most strongly related to individuals' participation levels, sense of community, and perceptions of a positive organizational climate. At the group level, the strongest predictors of collective empowering (our operationalization of the empowering organization) were net benefits of participation, commitment, and positive organization climate. Psychological empowerment and positive organizational climate were the two predictors of organizational effectiveness (the empowered organization). Implications and limitations of these findings are discussed.     

Coalition formation in characteristic function games: Competitive tests of three theories

Two experiments tested the bargaining, minimum resource, and minimum power theories of coalition formation in situations involving different payoffs for some of the winning coalitions (characteristic function games). In the first experiment, a triadic resource distribution was employed and payoffs for the coalitions were specified in such a way that each of the three theories predicted the formation of a different coalition. The coalition predicted by minimum power theory formed the most frequently, and the mean divisions of the payoffs among coalition members were also closest to the predictions of minimum power theory. However, the most frequent coalition was not only the one predicted by minimum power theory, it was also the one having the largest payoff per member. There-fore, a second experiment was conducted, which employed a tetradic resource distribution and specified the coalition payoffs in such a way that (a) each of the theories predicted the formation of a different coalition and (b) none of the predicted coalitions was the one with the largest payoff per member. Although the mean payoff divisions in the coalitions in this experiment were closest to those predicted by bargaining theory, the coalition that formed most frequently was not one of those predicted by any of the theories. Rather, it was the one having the largest payoff per member. None of the three theories is able to account adequately for the results of both experiments. The difficulties that the theories have in dealing with coalition formation in situations in which there are different payoffs for winning are discussed.     

How Has the Economic Downturn Affected Communities and Implementation of Science‐Based Prevention in the Randomized Trial of Communities That Care?

This study examined implications of the economic downturn that began in December 2007 for the Community Youth Development Study (CYDS), a longitudinal randomized controlled trial of the Communities That Care (CTC) prevention system. The downturn had the potential to affect the internal validity of the CYDS research design and implementation of science-based prevention in study communities. We used archival economic indicators and community key leader reports of economic conditions to assess the extent of the economic downturn in CYDS communities and potential internal validity threats. We also examined whether stronger economic downturn effects were associated with a decline in science-based prevention implementation. Economic indicators suggested the downturn affected CYDS communities to different degrees. We found no evidence of systematic differences in downturn effects in CTC compared to control communities that would threaten internal validity of the randomized trial. The Community Economic Problems scale was a reliable measure of community economic conditions, and it showed criterion validity in relation to several objective economic indicators. CTC coalitions continued to implement science-based prevention to a significantly greater degree than control coalitions 2 years after the downturn began. However, CTC implementation levels declined to some extent as unemployment, the percentage of students qualifying for free lunch, and community economic problems worsened. Control coalition implementation levels were not related to economic conditions before or after the downturn, but mean implementation levels of science-based prevention were also relatively low in both periods.     

When three is not always two against one: Coalitions in experimental three-person cooperative games

Four models of coalition formation are tested in a computer-controlled experiment in which three players negotiated to form coalitions in order to gain rewards for themselves. Formation of the grand coalition of all three players as well as any of the three possible 2-person coalitions is permitted. The results indicate that the grand coalition is the most likely to form, followed by the coalition between the two strongest players. The individually rational bargaining set model of coalition formation is supported over an egalitarian model, the Shapley value, and the coalitionally rational bargaining set model. Various measures of the progress of negotiations are introduced, examined, and discussed in an effort to provide an increased data base for the establishment of a behavioral theory of bargaining and coalition formation.     

Get angry, get out: The interpersonal effects of anger communication in multiparty negotiation

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation.     

Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups

In this chapter we present a social utility approach to coalition formation. The central tenet of our approach is that outcome allocations and partner selection in multiparty situations are affected by self-interest and fairness. Inspired by the social utility model we argue that the relative weight assigned to both components is affected by structural aspects of the situation and individual characteristics of the negotiators. We first investigate how coalition bargainers substantiate their coalition demands. We show that bargainers are self-serving in their choice of allocation rules, indicating that perceptions of fairness can be coloured by self-interest. Second, we investigate how the alignment of self-interest and fairness fosters the formation of coalitions that maximise the payoffs of its members. Finally, we present a series of experiments that expands the notion of being fair to those who are excluded from a coalition. We show that bargainers are reluctant to benefit themselves when this harms the outcomes of others and that this is dependent on personal factors (e.g., social value orientations), situational factors (e.g., the valence of outcomes), and whether bargainers negotiate in an interindividual or in an intergroup setting.     

Community Coalition Building—Contemporary Practice and Research: Introduction

Over the last 20 years, coalition building has become a prominent intervention employed in communities across America. Coalitions provide community psychologists and those in related fields with a chance to work with whole communities and to better understand how to create community change. As we reflect on the past two decades of community coalition building, there are many questions to be answered about this phenomenon. Why has there been such an upsurge in community coalition building activity? What is the impact of this activity? What have we as students of community learned? What are the questions that we need to be asking to improve the effectiveness of coalition building efforts and their evaluation? This set of articles will review the state of the art of community coalition building in both practice and research. The structure of the articles reflects a collaborative process, with multiple contributors from different disciplines, using a variety of formats. Because this is an evolving phenomenon where the questions asked are as important as the lessons learned, many of the major sections include dialogues with community experts from across the country and from multiple fields, including community psychology, public health, political science, public administration, and grassroots organizing.     

亲子三角关系的性别差异

亲子三角关系指父母发生冲突时,子女主动或被动卷入其中而形成的不平衡的“父亲—子女—母亲”三角关系,通常包括代罪羔羊、亲职化和跨代联盟三大类型,与儿童青少年的内外化行为问题等密切关联。在有关亲子三角关系的发生特点及其影响是否具有性别一致性的问题上,既有研究结论尚存在分歧。这可能与人口学变量的差异和性别角色观念的变迁等因素有关。国内大陆在该领域的研究近乎为零。未来需通过开展本土研究,细化人口学变量和综合运用多种测量方法与指标,采用追踪设计等厘清该问题。     

Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games

In coalition formation experiments, which coalitions will form and how players in coalitions will allocate their jointly gained rewards are typically predicted as a function of the players' relative power. In this paper, we isolated two logically independent sources of a player's power: the player's contribution to the rewards obtainable by coalitions of which he may be a member (“quota power”), and the number of distinct coalitions which a player may join (“positional power”). The separation of the two types of power is clearly shown in apex games, where a single player (Apex) attempts to lure any of the other players (Base) from the coalition of all Bases. A series of four-person computer-controlled apex and nonapex characteristic function games, varying with respect to the relationship of quota power to positional power, were played by 15 quartets of male players. Quota power was strongly manifested in all outcome measures, while positional power appeared only as a bias toward equal allocations of reward when coalitions among players of equal positional power formed. Neither of two social psychological theories that are applicable, pivotal power and weighted probability theory, predicted coalition frequencies. In a test of five solution concepts, the competitive bargaining set predicted payoff allocations better than either of the two aforementioned theories, the kernel, or an equal-split model.     

Coalition formation: Political attitudes and power

In this study 2 theories have been tested: Minimum Range theory (de Swaan, 1970; Leierson, 1970) and Minimal Resource theory (Caplow, 1956; Riker, 1962; Gamson, 1964). In an experimental simulation (Runkel and McGrath, 1972)political attitudes (left, centre and right) and power differences (40 seats in parliament, 30 seats and 20 seats) have been induced. The results suggest that in the beginning of the bargaining process people communicate about the composition of the coalition programme. The minimal range theory may explain this behaviour: parties with more similar ideological interests do coalesce. Later on, one more often bargains about the division of the outcomes, i.e. portfolios. Minimum Resource theory only partly explains the formed coalitions. Minimal winning coalitions, which are predicted by Minimum Resource theory, are formed more often within centre-left-coalitions. This is not the case for centre-right-coalitions. It is discussed that the link between the parity norm and minimal winning coalitions, which is assumed by Minimum Resource theory, possiblv does not hold in this experiment. The parity norm being used by right together with centres strong position leads to the frequent occurrence of minimal winning centre-left-coalitions.     

Coalitions and Family Problem Solving with Preadolescents in Referred,At-Risk,and Comparison Families

This study tested the hypothesis that the mother-father coalition, parent-child coalitions, and parental warmth expressed toward the child are associated with family problem solving in families with a preadolescent child referred for treatment of behavior problems (n = 30 ), families with a child at-risk for conduct disorder (n = 68 ), and a sample of comparison families (n = 90 ). Referred and at-risk families displayed less effective problem solving. A regression analysis, which controlled for gender of the child, family structure, family income, marital satisfaction, and severity of child problems, showed that strong parental coalitions were linked to low levels of family problem solving in at-risk and referred families. Parent-child coalitions had little apparent impact while parental warmth was highly correlated with better family problem solving. The results may be interpreted as evidence for a tendency for parents in at-risk and referred families to “scapegoat” a preadolescent during family problem-solving sessions. This may undermine progress on family problem solutions and may complicate family-based prevention and treatment programs that use family problem-solving sessions.     

Coparenting and Toddler's Interactive Styles in Family Coalitions

The current study examined the coparenting and toddler's interactive styles in family coalitions. According to structural family theory, boundaries between generations are clear in alliances, but disturbed in coalitions: the parents look to the child to regulate their conflictual relationship and the child attempts to meet this need. In a normative sample studied longitudinally during the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation (LTP, N=38), 15 coalition cases were detected. Styles of coparenting and of child's interactions were determined and compared in coalition and alliance cases at 18 months. Findings confirm the structural family model by showing the specific ways in which the coparenting and the toddler's interactive styles are associated in 3 different patterns of coalitions: binding, detouring, and triangulation. They illustrate how the child's triangular capacity, or her ability to simultaneously communicate with both parents, is used to regulate the parents' relationship. They suggest that the LTP observational paradigm is a promising assessment method of early family interactions. They point to the importance of assessing early the child's contribution to family coalitions.     

COALITION AND COMMUNICATION

Based on the premises that communication behavior varies as a function of social relationships and that coalitions in triads are a significant form of social structure, this study explored forms of communication behavior related to processes of coalition formation and termination. As expected, communication accessibility was greater within the coalition than between the excluded person and members of the coalition, but communication content differed only in the relative frequency of expressions of negative sentiment. Accessibility did not differ significantly between coalescing partners prior to, during, and subsequent to their coalition, but there were significantly more “pressure” statements in the negotiations prior to coalition. The utility of a three-person iterated matrix game was demonstrated for studies of communication and coalition, and the implications of the choice of a unit of analysis for the study of communication were discussed.