Test-Anxiety,inferential reasoning and working memory load

Abstract

Subjects high and low in test-anxiety were presented with an inferential reasoning task requiring the verification of necessary and unnecessary inferences. The task was performed whilst holding either two or six digits in memory. On the verification task, the performance of high-test-anxious subjects was slower and less accurate than that of the low-test-anxious subjects. In addition, unnecessary inferences took longer to process than necessary inferences for the high-test-anxiety group only. The high-test-anxious subjects studied the memory loads for longer than the low-test-anxious group, but their recognition accuracy did not differ. Findings support Eysenck and Calvo's (Cognition and Emotion, 6, 409–434, 1992) processing efficiency theory. The high-test-anxious group's performance on the sentence verification task was impaired overall, and was particularly impaired when performing the unnecessary inference task. However, we also demonstrated that the high-test-anxious group's performance on a secondary memory task was unimpaired as a result of increased effort.     

The role of working memory capacity in autobiographical retrieval: Individual differences in strategic search

Remembering previous experiences from one's personal past is a principal component of psychological well-being, personality, sense of self, decision making, and planning for the future. In the current study the ability to search for autobiographical information in memory was examined by having college students recall their Facebook friends. Individual differences in working memory capacity manifested itself in the search of autobiographical memory by way of the total number of friends remembered, the number of clusters of friends, size of clusters, and the speed with which participants could output their friends' names. Although working memory capacity was related to the ability to search autobiographical memory, participants did not differ in the manner in which they approached the search and used contextual cues to help query their memories. These results corroborate recent theorising, which suggests that working memory is a necessary component of self-generating contextual cues to strategically search memory for autobiographical information.     

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

A multinomial model is used to disentangle the respective contributions of reasoning processes and response bias in conclusion-acceptance data that exhibit belief bias. A model-based meta-analysis of 22 studies reveals that such data are structurally too sparse to allow discrimination of different accounts of belief bias. Four experiments are conducted to obtain richer data, allowing deeper tests through the use of the multinomial model. None of the current accounts of belief bias is consistent with the complex pattern of results. A new theory of belief bias is proposed that assumes that most reasoners construct only one mental model representing the premises as well as the conclusion or, in the case of an unbelievable conclusion, its logical negation. New predictions derived from the theory are confirmed in 4 additional studies.     

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form. This paper presents a mental models-based account, which explains these findings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types. We propose that belief bias may reflect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one's processing-attributable to working-memory overload-is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in confidence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments, with participants being more confident in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic figure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the figural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants' articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between highand lowspatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.     

Individual differences in category learning: sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more

We examined whether individual differences in working memory influence the facility with which individuals learn new categories. Participants learned two different types of category structures: rule-based and information-integration. Successful learning of the former category structure is thought to be based on explicit hypothesis testing that relies heavily on working memory. Successful learning of the latter category structure is believed to be driven by procedural learning processes that operate largely outside of conscious control. Consistent with a widespread literature touting the positive benefits of working memory and attentional control, the higher one’s working memory, the fewer trials one took to learn rule-based categories. The opposite occurred for information-integration categories - the lower one’s working memory, the fewer trials one took to learn this category structure. Thus, the positive relation commonly seen between individual differences in working memory and performance can not only be absent, but reversed. As such, a comprehensive understanding of skill learning - and category learning in particular - requires considering the demands of the tasks being performed and the cognitive abilities of the performer.     

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.     

Individual differences in sentence memory

Results from an experiment with two parts are presented in this paper. In part one, participants listened to sentences containing two, three, four, or five clauses, and were asked questions about the content of the sentences. The results of part one demonstrate that an important unit of representation in sentence memory is the clause, and not some other component of discourse structure. In part two, the same group of participants performed eight different short-term storage/working memory tasks. A composite complex span score was computed for each participant based on three working memory tasks closely based on Daneman & Carpenter's (1980) reading span task. This working memory measure was significantly correlated with the participants' performance on the sentence memory task in part one. A second working memory measure—N-back—was also significantly correlated with the participants' performance on the sentence memory task, and there was no correlation between their performance on the complex span task and the N-back task. It is therefore concluded that (i) working memory consists of a number of dissociable components; and (ii) memory for sentences taps into more than one of these working memory components. Furthermore, the high correlations of sentence memory with the complex span and the N-back tasks (neither of which are language processing tasks) suggests that memory for sentences is not simply a result of linguistic experience; rather, it is likely that an independent working memory component contributes to participants' performance on the sentence memory task.     

Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.     

Age, memory load, and individual differences in working memory as determinants of class-inclusion reasoning.

We studied the effects of individual differences in speak-span scores and variations in memory demands on the class-inclusion performance of 10-, 13-, and 15-year-old children. The speak-span task was an age-appropriate modification of Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading-span task and was considered to be a measure of global resources. The age variable was assumed to be a global index of skill development, and some of the specific skills hypothesized to be important in class-inclusion reasoning were estimated using a mathematical model. The results from both regression analyses and the mathematical model indicated that differences in age, speak span, and memory load all affected performance. Surprisingly, the effects of speak span and memory load were independent. However, the effects of each of these variables depended on the age level of the participants. Based on these findings, we argued that (a) resources vary continuously with age, (b) both skill level and global resources should be varied in developmental studies of problem solving, and (c) resource theories (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) should be modified to account for developmental change.     

The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.

In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.     

Happiness increases verbal and spatial working memory capacity where sadness does not: Emotion,working memory and executive control

The effects of emotion on working memory and executive control are often studied in isolation. Positive mood enhances verbal and impairs spatial working memory, whereas negative mood enhances spatial and impairs verbal working memory. Moreover, positive mood enhances executive control, whereas negative mood has little influence. We examined how emotion influences verbal and spatial working memory capacity, which requires executive control to coordinate between holding information in working memory and completing a secondary task. We predicted that positive mood would improve both verbal and spatial working memory capacity because of its influence on executive control. Positive, negative and neutral moods were induced followed by completing a verbal (Experiment 1) or spatial (Experiment 2) working memory operation span task to assess working memory capacity. Positive mood enhanced working memory capacity irrespective of the working memory domain, whereas negative mood had no influence on performance. Thus, positive mood was more successful holding information in working memory while processing task-irrelevant information, suggesting that the influence mood has on executive control supersedes the independent effects mood has on domain-specific working memory.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and enumeration

Two experiments are reported in which subjects performed working memory and enumeration tasks. In the first experiment, subjects scoring low on the working memory task also performed poorly on the attention-demanding "counting" portion of the enumeration task. Yet no span differences were found for the non-attention-demanding "subitizing" portion. In Experiment 2, conjunctive and disjunctive distractors were added to the enumeration task. Although both high and low working memory span subjects were adversely affected by the addition of conjunctive distractors, the effect was much greater for the low-span subjects. Implications from these findings are that differences in working memory capacity correspond to differences in capability for controlled attention.     

Effects of emotional content on working memory capacity

Emotional events tend to be remembered better than neutral events, but emotional states and stimuli may also interfere with cognitive processes that underlie memory performance. The current study investigated the effects of emotional content on working memory capacity (WMC), which involves both short term storage and executive attention control. We tested competing hypotheses in a preregistered experiment (N?=?297). The emotional enhancement hypothesis predicts that emotional stimuli attract attention and additional processing resources relative to neutral stimuli, thereby making it easier to encode and store emotional information in WMC. The emotional impairment hypothesis, by contrast, predicts that emotional stimuli interfere with attention control and the active maintenance of information in working memory. Participants completed a common measure of WMC (the operation span task; Turner, M. L., &; Engle, R. W. [1989]. Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 127–154) that included either emotional or neutral words. Results revealed that WMC was reduced for emotional words relative to neutral words, consistent with the emotional impairment hypothesis.     

Age differences in proactive interference in verbal and visuospatial working memory

Abstract

In a free recall situation, subjects can predict, with some degree of accuracy, which words they will subsequently recall. This study focused on the question of why subjects often recall words to which they assign low prediction ratings. This problem was approached by comparing the properties of recall-not-predicted (RNP) and recall-predicted (RP) words which appeared in subjects' recall protocols. No differences were found between the two types of items (RNP and RP) in retrieval monitoring. The two types of items were differentiated by whether subjects could recollect the actual occurrence of the recalled items in the study list (“remember” responses) or not (“know” responses). Furthermore, the recall of RNP items, but not RP items, was improved by retrieval prompts. These results were taken to support the position that weakly encoded items may be recalled if they encounter a highly favourable retrieval environment, not anticipated by subjects during study.     

Differences between probability and frequency judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity

Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and search efficiency

In two experiments, we examined how various learning conditions impact the relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and memory search abilities. Experiment 1 employed a delayed free recall task with semantically related words to induce the buildup of proactive interference (PI) and revealed that the buildup of PI differentially impacted recall accuracy and recall latency for low-WMC and high-WMC individuals. Namely, the buildup of PI impaired recall accuracy and slowed recall latency for low-WMC individuals to a greater extent than what was observed for high-WMC individuals. To provide a circumstance in which previously learned information remains relevant over the course of learning, Experiment 2 required participants to complete a multitrial delayed free recall task with unrelated words. Results revealed that with increased practice with the same word list, WMC-related differences were eventually eliminated in interresponse times (IRTs) and recall accuracy, but not recall latency. Thus, despite still accumulating larger search sets, low-WMC individuals searched LTM as efficiently as high-WMC individuals. Collectively, these results are consistent with the notion that under normal free recall conditions, low-WMC individuals search LTM less efficiently than do high-WMC individuals because of their reliance on noisy temporal–contextual cues at retrieval. However, it appears that under conditions in which previously learned items remain relevant at recall, this tendency to rely on vague self-generated retrieval cues can actually facilitate the ability to accurately and quickly recall information.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict sleep-dependent memory consolidation

Decades of research have established that "online" cognitive processes, which operate during conscious encoding and retrieval of information, contribute substantially to individual differences in memory. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that "offline" processes during sleep also contribute to memory performance. However, the question of whether individual differences in these two types of processes are related to one another remains unanswered. We investigated whether working memory capacity (WMC), a factor believed to contribute substantially to individual differences in online processing, was related to sleep-dependent declarative memory consolidation. Consistent with previous studies, memory for word pairs reliably improved after a period of sleep, whereas performance did not improve after an equal interval of wakefulness. More important, there was a significant, positive correlation between WMC and increase in memory performance after sleep but not after a period of wakefulness. The correlation between WMC and performance during initial test was not significant, suggesting that the relationship is specific to change in memory due to sleep. This suggests a fundamental underlying ability that may distinguish individuals with high memory capacity.     

Examining variation in working memory capacity and retrieval in cued recall

Groups of individuals often work together to generate solutions to a problem. Subsequently, one member of the group can plagiarise another either by recalling that person's idea as their own (recall-own plagiarism), or by generating a novel solution that duplicates a previous idea (generate-new plagiarism). The current study examines the extent to which these forms of plagiarism are influenced by the quality of the ideas. Groups of participants initially generated ideas, prior to an elaboration phase in which idea quality was manipulated in two ways: participants received feedback on the quality of the ideas as rated by independent judges, and they generated improvements to a subset of the ideas. Unconscious plagiarism was measured in recall-own and generate-new tasks. For recall, idea improvement led to increased plagiarism, while for the generate-new task, the independent ratings influenced plagiarism. These data indicate that different source-judgement processes underlie the two forms of plagiarism, neither of which can be reduced simply to memory strength.     

Beyond quantity: Individual differences in working memory and the ordinal understanding of numerical symbols

In two different contexts, we examined the hypothesis that individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity are related to the tendency to infer complex, ordinal relationships between numerical symbols. In Experiment 1, we assessed whether this tendency arises in a learning context that involves mapping novel symbols to quantities by training adult participants to associate dot-quantities with novel symbols, the overall relative order of which had to be inferred. Performance was best for participants who were higher in WM capacity (HWMs). HWMs also learned ordinal information about the symbols that lower WM individuals (LWMs) did not. In Experiment 2, we examined whether WM relates to performance when participants are explicitly instructed to make numerical order judgments about highly enculturated numerical symbols by having participants indicate whether sets of three Arabic numerals were in increasing order. All participants responded faster when sequential sets (3-4-5) were in order than when they were not. However, only HWMs responded faster when non-sequential, patterned sets (1-3-5) were in order, suggesting they were accessing ordinal associations that LWMs were not. Taken together, these experiments indicate that WM capacity plays a key role in extending symbolic number representations beyond their quantity referents to include symbol-symbol ordinal associations, both in a learning context and in terms of explicitly accessing ordinal relationships in highly enculturated stimuli.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict retrieval-induced forgetting

Selectively retrieving a subset of previously studied information enhances memory for the retrieved information but causes forgetting of related, nonretrieved information. Such retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) has often been attributed to inhibitory executive-control processes that supposedly suppress the nonretrieved items' memory representation. Here, we examined the role of working memory capacity (WMC) in young adults' RIF. WMC was assessed by means of the operation span task. Results revealed a positive relationship between WMC and RIF, with high-WMC individuals showing more RIF than low-WMC individuals. In contrast, individuals showed enhanced memory for retrieved information regardless of WMC. The results are consistent with previous individual-differences work that suggests a close link between WMC and inhibitory efficiency. In particular, the finding supports the inhibitory executive-control account of RIF.