Mind,Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language

Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001 Todes S 2001 Body and World Cambridge MA MIT Press  ) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994 McDowell J 1994 Mind and World Cambridge MA Harvard University Press  ) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical‐perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual “all the way down” only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical “all the way up”. This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism.     

Body,Mind and Bonds

In this paper, after reviewing some of the controversial concepts of psychosomatics, and their historical development as well as some of their theoretical and clinical consequences, I propose a vincular point of view of this type of pathology, with some dreams of a psychosomatic patient where different aspects of the proposed model can be observed.     

Mind,Soul and Spirit: Conceptions of Immaterial Identity in Different Cultures

The cognitive science of religion has recently focused attention on whether concepts of mind, soul, and spirit derive from the same or different intuitive foundations of immaterial identity. The present research is the first to look at intuitions about these three concepts simultaneously in different cultures. Methodologically, hypothetical transplants or transfers of minds or brains have been commonly used to examine the development of inferences about the continuity of mental identity despite bodily displacement. The present research extends the transfer paradigm to compare inferences about transfers of “soul” and “spirit” as well as the “mind.” American, Brazilian, and Indonesian undergraduate participants were presented with a series of scenarios in which a character's soul, mind, or spirit is transferred to another character's body. Participants made judgments about the consequences of such transfers on behaviors selected to potentially differentiate underlying intuitive categories. Results indicate that intuitions of soul, spirit, and mind do appear to draw from different but overlapping intuitions, which are recruited in different ways depending on religion and country. For American and Indonesian participants, the mind transfer was judged more often to result in a displacement of cognitive attributes compared to bodily, social, and moral attributes. Across the three countries, the transfer of spirit led more frequently to judgments about displacement of passion than of ability; religiosity was associated with giving more weight to the transfer of the soul, thus resulting in a greater displacement of all types of attributes. The results emphasize the importance of considering how different intuitive foundations, such as essentialism, intuitive psychology, and vitalism, might be recruited by culture to highlight different aspects of immaterial identity.     

Mind, World and Language: McDowell and Kovesi

The ideas of John McDowell concerning the relations between mind, world and language are brought into contact with those of Julius Kovesi, with a view to seeing whether the latter can illuminate and flesh out the former. McDowell's dialectic in Mind and World is expounded and reviewed, hinging on the notion of 'conceptual second nature' as his suggested way of showing that there is nothing mysteriously non–natural in human animals learning to find their way about both in a world characterised by lawlike connections and in one characterised by rational connections. Kovesi's redrawing, in Moral Notions , of the Aristotelian material/formal metaphysical distinction as one between the logical elements of concepts, is adduced to show how the world is 'shot through' with concepts and reasons: the formal elements of concepts are nothing other than the reasons we have for collecting varied features of the material world under a concept, to meet our bodily and social needs. The mind can then be treated as a set of acquired capacities and dispositions to become conversant with these features and with the corresponding needs. Some possible objections to this bringing together of the two sets of ideas are briefly examined, and overall conclusions drawn.     

形神俱妙--道教身体观的现代阐释

性命、形神、身心、肉体和精神、元神和识神、精气神、身心意等都是道教表达身心的术语,它们在不同历史时期常常交换着使用,但道教看重身体却始终一贯.身体在道教里是一切存在的基础,即是体验的领域又是体验的媒介,是其他价值得以实现的起点和场所.人与外界通过身体而交通.身体还具有文化的意义,人的自然属性和社会属性皆被身体所呈现.存在是在身体里的存在,离开了身体,无从谈心灵和精神.道教对于身体的深刻认识和高度重视在世界宗教中可谓独树一帜.     

Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul,Body and Survival

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Brain,Mind, World: Predictive Coding,Neo-Kantianism,and Transcendental Idealism

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism?     

Behavioral ethics for Homo economicus,Homo heuristicus,and Homo duplex

In this article we explore how assumptions about human nature may influence the ways one might try to promote ethical behavior in organizations. We summarize two common views of human nature in organizational research—Homo economicus and Homo heuristicus. We then extend these views by putting forward a third view of human nature initially proposed by Emile Durkheim—Homo duplex—which describes human beings as moving back and forth between a lower (individual) and higher (collective) level. We suggest that the Homo duplex view is uniquely equipped to account for variables of interest to organizational scholars because of its attention to a fundamental tension: People in organizations can be both selfish and groupish, and the balance between those tendencies influences the ethical profile of the organization in complex ways. We end with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the Homo duplex view for behavioral ethics researchers.