Further evidence for mixed emotions

Emotion theorists have long debated whether valence, which ranges from pleasant to unpleasant states, is an irreducible aspect of the experience of emotion or whether positivity and negativity are separable in experience. If valence is irreducible, it follows that people cannot feel happy and sad at the same time. Conversely, if positivity and negativity are separable, people may be able to experience such mixed emotions. The authors tested several alternative interpretations for prior evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur in bittersweet situations (i.e., those containing both pleasant and unpleasant aspects). One possibility is that subjects who reported mixed emotions merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 1-3 by asking subjects to complete online continuous measures of happiness and sadness. Subjects reported more simultaneously mixed emotions during a bittersweet film clip than during a control clip. Another possibility is that subjects in earlier studies reported mixed emotions only because they were explicitly asked whether they felt happy and sad. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 4-6 with open-ended measures of emotion. Subjects were more likely to report mixed emotions after the bittersweet clip than the control clip. Both patterns occurred even when subjects were told that they were not expected to report mixed emotions (Studies 2 and 5) and among subjects who did not previously believe that people could simultaneously feel happy and sad (Studies 3 and 6). These results provide further evidence that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.     

Me against we: in-group transgression, collective shame, and in-group-directed hostility

People can experience great distress when a group to which they belong (in-group) is perceived to have committed an immoral act. We hypothesised that people would direct hostility toward a transgressing in-group whose actions threaten their self-image and evoke collective shame. Consistent with this theorising, three studies found that reminders of in-group transgression provoked several expressions of in-group-directed hostility, including in-group-directed hostile emotion (Studies 1 and 2), in-group-directed derogation (Study 2), and in-group-directed punishment (Study 3). Across studies, collective shame-but not the related group-based emotion collective guilt-mediated the relationship between in-group transgression and in-group-directed hostility. Implications for group-based emotion, social identity, and group behaviour are discussed.     

The role of anticipated regret in escalation of commitment

This research tests the general proposition that people are motivated to reduce future regret under escalation situations. This is supported by the findings that (a) escalation of commitment is stronger when the possibility of future regret about withdrawal is high than when this possibility is low (Studies 1a and 1b) and (b) escalation of commitment increases as the net anticipated regret about withdrawal increases (Studies 2a and 2b). Furthermore, the regret effects in the 4 studies were above and beyond the personal responsibility effects on escalation. This research indicates that people in escalation situations are simultaneously influenced by the emotions they expect to experience in the future (e.g., anticipated regret) and by events that have happened in the past (e.g., responsibility for the initiating previous decision).     

Me against we: In-group transgression,collective shame,and in-group-directed hostility

People can experience great distress when a group to which they belong (in-group) is perceived to have committed an immoral act. We hypothesised that people would direct hostility toward a transgressing in-group whose actions threaten their self-image and evoke collective shame. Consistent with this theorising, three studies found that reminders of in-group transgression provoked several expressions of in-group-directed hostility, including in-group-directed hostile emotion (Studies 1 and 2), in-group-directed derogation (Study 2), and in-group-directed punishment (Study 3). Across studies, collective shame—but not the related group-based emotion collective guilt—mediated the relationship between in-group transgression and in-group-directed hostility. Implications for group-based emotion, social identity, and group behaviour are discussed.     

Self-reflection and feelings of self-worth: When Rosenberg meets Heisenberg

The more people think about their attitude toward some issue, the stronger their attitude becomes. The present research examined whether this strengthening effect also applies to self-evaluative attitudes. In four studies, we had some participants complete a self-evaluation measure before rating their momentary feelings of self-worth (Studies 1, 2, and 4) or implicit self-feelings (Study 3). In all four studies, evaluative self-reflection led low self-esteem participants to feel worse about themselves and high self-esteem participants to feel better about themselves. We did not find this self-esteem polarization effect when more general emotions of happiness and sadness were measured (Study 2) or when participants reflected on non-evaluative aspects of themselves (Study 4). These findings suggest that evaluative self-reflection has different consequences for low self-esteem people than for high self-esteem people, and that order effects in personality research may represent actual changes in self-feelings rather than methodological confounds.     

When talking makes you feel like a group: The emergence of group-based emotions

Group-based emotions are emotional reactions to group concerns and have been shown to emerge when people appraise events while endorsing a specific social identity. Here we investigate whether discussing a group-relevant event with other group members affects emotional reactions in a similar way. In two experiments, we confronted participants with an unfair group-relevant event, while manipulating their social identity and whether they discussed the event or an unrelated topic. Our major finding is that having group members discuss the unfair group-relevant event led to emotions that were more negative than in the irrelevant discussion and comparable to those observed when social identity had been made salient explicitly beforehand. Moreover, it also generated group-based appraisals of injustice (Experiment 1) and group-based identity (Experiment 2). This research sheds new light not only on the consequences of within-group sharing of emotions for the unfolding of intergroup relations but also on the nature of group-based emotions.     

I feel our pain: Antecedents and consequences of emotional self-stereotyping

According to Intergroup Emotions Theory people categorized as group members experience the emotions of their ingroup as a consequence of that membership. Four experiments showed that participants converged toward what they believed to be their specific ingroup’s distinct emotional experience when reporting emotions as group members, but not when reporting emotions as individuals. Such self-stereotyping of ingroup emotions occurred for an experimentally fabricated ingroup as well as a range of naturally occurring groups. Demonstrating the roots of this process in categorization, self-stereotyping was increased when motivations to affiliate were amplified and was moderated by ingroup identification. The adoption of ingroup emotions changed participants’ cognitive processing in a predictable way, demonstrating that emotional self-stereotyping involved the experience rather than merely the expression of group-based emotions. Self-stereotyping of ingroup emotions is thus one mechanism by which group-based emotions are shared and can be changed.     

Feeling bad about being sad: the role of social expectancies in amplifying negative mood

Our perception of how others expect us to feel has significant implications for our emotional functioning. Across 4 studies the authors demonstrate that when people think others expect them not to feel negative emotions (i.e., sadness) they experience more negative emotion and reduced well-being. The authors show that perceived social expectancies predict these differences in emotion and well-being both more consistently than-and independently of-personal expectancies and that they do so by promoting negative self-evaluation when experiencing negative emotion. We find evidence for these effects within Australia (Studies 1 and 2) as well as Japan (Study 2), although the effects of social expectancies are especially evident in the former (Studies 1 and 2). We also find experimental evidence for the causal role of social expectancies in negative emotional responses to negative emotional events (Studies 3 and 4). In short, when people perceive that others think they should feel happy, and not sad, this leads them to feel sad more frequently and intensely.     

When Sadness Comes Alive,Will It Be Less Painful? The Effects of Anthropomorphic Thinking on Sadness Regulation and Consumption

Prior consumer research has studied the impact of anthropomorphism on product perception and evaluation. This research explores how anthropomorphic thinking influences people's experience of emotions and subsequent consumption behavior. Based on research on emotion regulation and the psychological process of detachment, we show that individuals instructed to anthropomorphize sadness (i.e., think of sadness as a person) report less experienced sadness afterward (Studies 1 and 2A). The same result is observed for its opposite, happiness, such that anthropomorphic thinking dilutes happiness (Study 2B). We argue that this reduction of emotion occurs because anthropomorphic thinking increases the perceived distance between the self and the anthropomorphized emotion, thereby creating a feeling of detachment. Evidence for a detachment process is found via measurement (Studies 3 and 4) and a theory‐guided moderation, with the effect lessening when sadness is seen as a dependent (vs. independent) person (Study 3). These findings have implications for consumer behavior. When sadness is ameliorated by anthropomorphic thinking, people tend to display better self‐control in subsequent consumption, as manifested by a greater likelihood of choosing a healthier or more practical product (Studies 4 and 5).     

When feeling bad is expected to be good: emotion regulation and outcome expectancies in social conflicts

According to the instrumental approach to emotion regulation, people may want to experience even unpleasant emotions to attain instrumental benefits. Building on value-expectancy models of self-regulation, we tested whether people want to feel bad in certain contexts specifically because they expect such feelings to be useful to them. In two studies, participants were more likely to try to increase their anger before a negotiation when motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) a negotiation partner. Participants motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) their partner expected anger to be more useful to them, and this expectation in turn, led them to try to increase their anger before negotiating. The subsequent experience of anger, following random assignment to emotion inductions (Study 1) or engagement in self-selected emotion regulation activities (Study 2), led participants to be more successful at getting others to concede to their demands, demonstrating that emotional preferences have important pragmatic implications.     

Escaping affect: how motivated emotion regulation creates insensitivity to mass suffering

As the number of people in need of help increases, the degree of compassion people feel for them ironically tends to decrease. This phenomenon is termed the collapse of compassion. Some researchers have suggested that this effect happens because emotions are not triggered by aggregates. We provide evidence for an alternative account. People expect the needs of large groups to be potentially overwhelming, and, as a result, they engage in emotion regulation to prevent themselves from experiencing overwhelming levels of emotion. Because groups are more likely than individuals to elicit emotion regulation, people feel less for groups than for individuals. In Experiment 1, participants displayed the collapse of compassion only when they expected to be asked to donate money to the victims. This suggests that the effect is motivated by self-interest. Experiment 2 showed that the collapse of compassion emerged only for people who were skilled at emotion regulation. In Experiment 3, we manipulated emotion regulation. Participants who were told to down-regulate their emotions showed the collapse of compassion, but participants who were told to experience their emotions did not. We examined the time course of these effects using a dynamic rating to measure affective responses in real time. The time course data suggested that participants regulate emotion toward groups proactively, by preventing themselves from ever experiencing as much emotion toward groups as toward individuals. These findings provide initial evidence that motivated emotion regulation drives insensitivity to mass suffering.     

Seeking security or growth: a regulatory focus perspective on motivations in romantic relationships

Using a multimethod approach, we examined how regulatory focus shapes people's perceptual, behavioral, and emotional responses in different situations in romantic relationships. We first examined how chronic regulatory focus affects romantic partners' support perceptions and problem-solving behaviors while they were engaged in a conflict resolution discussion (Study 1). Next, we experimentally manipulated regulatory focus and tested its effects on partner perceptions when individuals recalled a prior conflict resolution discussion (Study 2). We then examined how chronic regulatory focus influences individuals' emotional responses to hypothetical relationship events (Study 3) and identified specific partner behaviors to which people should respond with regulatory goal-congruent emotions (Study 4). Strongly prevention-focused people perceived their partners as more distancing and less supportive during conflict (Studies 1 and 2), approached conflict resolution by discussing the details related to the conflict (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more agitation (Study 3). Strongly promotion-focused people perceived their partners as more supportive and less distancing (Studies 1 and 2), displayed more creative conflict resolution behavior (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more sadness and a favorable outcome with more positive emotions (Study 3). In Study 4, recalling irresponsible and responsible partner behaviors was associated with experiencing more prevention-focused emotions, whereas recalling affectionate and neglectful partner behaviors was associated with more promotion-focused emotions. The findings show that regulatory focus and approach-avoidance motivations influence certain interpersonal processes in similar ways, but regulatory focus theory also generates novel predictions on which approach-avoidance models are silent.     

Proud Americans and lucky Japanese: cultural differences in appraisal and corresponding emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion propose that the emotions people experience correspond to their appraisals of their situation. In other words, individual differences in emotional experiences reflect differing interpretations of the situation. We hypothesized that in similar situations, people in individualist and collectivist cultures experience different emotions because of culturally divergent causal attributions for success and failure (i.e., agency appraisals). In a test of this hypothesis, American and Japanese participants recalled a personal experience (Study 1) or imagined themselves to be in a situation (Study 2) in which they succeeded or failed, and then reported their agency appraisals and emotions. Supporting our hypothesis, cultural differences in emotions corresponded to differences in attributions. For example, in success situations, Americans reported stronger self-agency emotions (e.g., proud) than did Japanese, whereas Japanese reported a stronger situation-agency emotion (lucky). Also, cultural differences in attribution and emotion were largely explained by differences in self-enhancing motivation. When Japanese and Americans were induced to make the same attribution (Study 2), cultural differences in emotions became either nonsignificant or were markedly reduced.     

When fiends become friends: the need to belong and perceptions of personal and group discrimination

The present article examines the role that the need to belong (NTB) plays in people's judgments of personal and group discrimination and in the attributions people make for potentially discriminatory evaluations. The authors hypothesized that the NTB motivates people to conclude that (a) whereas they rarely experience personal discrimination, (b) their fellow in-group members do experience discrimination. In Study 1, people high in the NTB reported experiencing lower than average levels of personal and higher than average levels of group discrimination. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of the NTB yielded similar results. In Study 3, women who were motivated to be accepted by a bogus male participant were less likely to attribute his negative evaluations of their work to prejudice.     

On the Role of Specific Emotions in Autonomous and Controlled Motivated Behaviour

In the present study, we study the effect of four specific emotions (i.e. happiness, relaxation, depression, and anxiety) on autonomous and controlled motivated behaviour. Drawing on the componential approach to emotions, we argue that because different emotions have a different action readiness—the readiness to engage with the environment—they also have a different impact on autonomous and controlled motivated behaviour. To test this hypothesis, we performed two studies. In the first one, 50 participants took part in an experience sampling study in which they reported their emotions (happiness, relaxation, depression, and anxiety) and autonomous and controlled motivated behaviour 10 times a day for 7 consecutive days. In the second study, 217 students participated in a lab experiment in which we studied the effect of induced anxiety, depression, happiness, and relaxation on autonomous motivated behaviour. The results showed how specific emotions predict autonomous motivated behaviour and that the relationship between the different emotions and autonomous motivated behaviour depends on the emotion under study. By doing so, we demonstrated the important role of emotions in the elicitation of autonomous motivated behaviour. Copyright © 2014 European Association of Personality Psychology     

It's a bittersweet symphony: simultaneously mixed emotional responses to music with conflicting cues

Some evidence indicates that emotional reactions to music can be organized along a bipolar valence dimension ranging from pleasant states (e.g., happiness) to unpleasant states (e.g., sadness), but songs can contain some cues that elicit happiness (e.g., fast tempos) and others that elicit sadness (e.g., minor modes). Some models of emotion contend that valence is a basic building block of emotional experience, which implies that songs with conflicting cues cannot make people feel happy and sad at the same time. Other models contend that positivity and negativity are separable in experience, which implies that music with conflicting cues might elicit simultaneously mixed emotions of happiness and sadness. Hunter, Schellenberg, and Schimmack (2008) tested these possibilities by having subjects report their happiness and sadness after listening to music with conflicting cues (e.g., fast songs in minor modes) and consistent cues (e.g., fast songs in major modes). Results indicated that music with conflicting cues elicited mixed emotions, but it remains unclear whether subjects simultaneously felt happy and sad or merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. To examine these possibilities, we had subjects press one button whenever they felt happy and another button whenever they felt sad as they listened to songs with conflicting and consistent cues. Results revealed that subjects spent more time simultaneously pressing both buttons during songs with conflicting, as opposed to consistent, cues. These findings indicate that songs with conflicting cues can simultaneously elicit happiness and sadness and that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.     

Advantaged group's emotional reactions to intergroup inequality: the dynamics of pride, guilt, and sympathy

Three studies establish intergroup inequality to investigate how it is emotionally experienced by the advantaged. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychology students' emotional experience of their unequal job situation with worse-off pedagogy students. When inequality is ingroup focused and legitimate, participants experience more pride. However, when inequality is ingroup focused and illegitimate, participants experience more guilt. Sympathy is increased when inequality is outgroup focused and illegitimate. These emotions have particular effects on behavioral tendencies. In Study 2 group-based pride predicts greater ingroup favoritism in a resource distribution task, whereas group-based sympathy predicts less ingroup favoritism. Study 3 replicates these findings in the context of students' willingness to let young immigrants take part in a university sport. Pride predicts less willingness to let immigrants take part whereas sympathy predicts greater willingness. Guilt is a weak predictor of behavioral tendencies in all studies. This shows the specificity of emotions experienced about intergroup inequality.     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。     

Subliminal priming and persuasion: Striking while the iron is hot

Three studies demonstrated that subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition (thirst in Studies 1 and 2; sadness in Study 3) influenced behavior (in Study 1) and enhanced the persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal (in Studies 2 and 3) when people were motivated to pursue the goal (when they were thirsty in Studies 1 and 2; when they expected to interact with another person in Study 3). These results suggest that subliminal priming can be used to enhance persuasion, but only when certain conditions are met. Both the priming of goal-relevant cognitions and the motive to pursue the goal were necessary for ads targeting the goal to be more persuasive. The implications of these results for the role of functionality in subliminal priming and for the use and abuse of subliminal priming in persuasion are discussed.     

Preferences for sadness when eliciting help: Instrumental motives in sadness regulation

This investigation tested whether people are more willing to experience and express sadness, the more useful they expect sadness to be. Building on assumptions about the function of sadness, we predicted that people would expect sadness to be more useful when eliciting help to prevent a loss (vs. not). In Study 1, we examined preferences for sadness and its expected usefulness when eliciting donations for the sake of preventing a loss (vs. not). In Study 2, participants expected to elicit help to prevent a loss (vs. attain a benefit). In both studies, participants expected sadness to be more useful and were more willing to experience and express sadness when eliciting help to prevent a loss (vs. other reasons). Furthermore, the more useful participants expected experiencing and expressing sadness to be, the more willing they were to experience and to express sadness, respectively. We discuss the implications for research on emotion regulation.