I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons

The widely touted discovery of mirror neurons has generated intense scientific interest in the neurobiology of intersubjectivity. Social neuroscientists have claimed that mirror neurons, located in brain regions associated with motor action, facial recognition, and somatosensory processing, allow us to automatically grasp other people's intentions and emotions. Despite controversies, mirror neuron research is animating materialist, affective, and embodied accounts of intersubjectivity. My view is that mirror neurons raise issues that are directly relevant to feminism and cultural studies, but interventions are needed for the work to be compatible with nonreductionist critical thought. In this article I critique the dominant neuroscientific account of mirror neurons, called embodied simulation theory. I draw from feminist epistemologies as well as alternative interpretations of mirror neurons in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to consider mirroring as situated, embodied perception.     

Surfacing the depths: thoughts on imitation,resonance and growth

This paper examines some of the research on imitation that shows it to be much more than simply a behavioural or reflex response, but rather an aspect of the growth of genuine social and psychological interaction and part of an intersubjective process that includes the representation of object relationships. Differentiations between mind, behaviour and emotion may no longer stand up in the light of much of the new neuroscientific and other research of recent years, and the fact that thoughts and feelings have physiological and neuronal correlates. I will look at some of research about ‘mirror neurons’ as a way of trying to bridge such gaps. I will try to integrate some of these thoughts in an extended clinical example of a 4-year-old girl with some autistic features who was seen for intensive psychotherapy. In this I will examine the role of affect attunement, imitation, mirroring and the need to amplify emotional states as part emotional development.     

Realism,Reliabilism, and the ‘Strong Programme’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens’s proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme’s principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate a reliabilism which has been freed from its inessential ties to naturalism. Unlike naturalistic epistemologists, the Strong Programme’s sociologistic reliabilist insists that all scientific facts are the product of both natural and social causal phenomena. Anticipating objections, I draw on Wittgenstein’s rule‐following considerations to explain how the sociologistic reliabilist can account for standard intuitions about the objective elements of knowledge. I also explain how the Strong Programme theorist can distinguish between a belief’s seeming reliable and its being reliable.

?Ich setzte

?den Fuß in die Luft,

?und sie trug.

?(Hilde Domin)     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

Die Erfahrung des Anderen. Phänomenologie,Behaviorismus und Spiegelneuronen

The recent discovery of a mirror neuron system sets a challenge for a philosophy of experience such as phenomenology, because in humans and monkeys the mirror system seems to transform seen actions into an inner representation of these actions. This paper tries to outline the guidelines of a transcendental-phenomenological analysis of alterity, different from empirical research. The transcendental research must provide a criterion for interpreting the results of empirical science. On this basis the paper compares the phenomenological analysis of alterity with some results of neuroscientific research. It is argued that Edmund Husserl presents an analysis that enables us to avoid misinterpretations of the role and function of the mirror neuron system.

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Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy

The current renewal of interest in empathy is closely connected to the recent neurobiological discovery of mirror neurons. Although the concept of empathy has been widely deployed, we shall focus upon one main psychological function it serves: enabling us to understand other peoples’ intentions. In this essay we will draw on neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical literature in order to investigate the relationships between mirror neurons and empathy as to intention understanding. Firstly, it will be explored whether mirror neurons are the neural basis of our empathic capacities: a vast array of empirical results appears to confirm this hypothesis. Secondly, the higher level capacity of reenactive empathy will be examined and the question will be addressed whether philosophical analysis alone is able to provide a foundation for this more abstract level of empathy. The conclusion will be drawn that both empirical evidence and philosophical analysis can jointly contribute to the clarification of the concept of empathy.     

Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning1

Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.     

Skills and Knowledge - Nothing but Memory?

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.     

Barriers and facilitators of physical activity and sport participation among young transgender adults who are medically transitioning

Background: Transgender people (those who feel incongruence between the gender they were assigned at birth and their gender identity) engage in lower levels of physical activity compared to cisgender (non-transgender) people. Several factors have been shown to affect physical activity engagement in the cisgender population; however, the physical activity experiences of young transgender adults have not been explored. It is therefore the aim of the current study to understand what factors are associated with physical activity and sport engagement in young transgender adults who are medically transitioning.

Method: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 young transgender adults (18–36 years) who had initiated their medical transition at a transgender health service in the United Kingdom. The data were analyzed using thematic analysis.

Results: Two main themes were identified: (1) barriers and (2) facilitators to physical activity and sport. Overall, the young transgender adults were insufficiently active due to inadequate changing facilities, body dissatisfaction, fears surrounding “passing” and not being accepted by others. At the same time, participants were motivated to engage in physical activity to increase their body satisfaction and gender congruence. However, participants felt there was a lack of safe and comfortable spaces to engage in physical activity and sport.

Conclusion: Young transgender adults who are medically transitioning experience several barriers to physical activity and sport, despite being motivated to be physically active. Initiatives to facilitate young transgender adults' ability to put their motivations into practice (i.e. to be more physically active) are needed.     

Explanation and Understanding: Action as “Historical Structure”

The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some cases these sciences commit what I call an “external contradiction”.

Broken mirror: The intertwining of therapist and client stories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA)

In recent years, there has been a great deal of attention given to the potential increased risk of vicarious traumatisation (VT) for clinicians with a history of childhood sexual abuse.

I am curious about whether the silencing, which has been ubiquitous within society, is also prevalent within the therapeutic profession. I wonder if therapists with a history of abuse feel they have to bracket their experience, and if this limits the potential for positive transformation.

In this paper, I draw upon my narrative study of therapists with a history of abuse. The methodology followed was narrative inquiry with two therapists in addition to an autoethnography. I used ‘narrative analysis’ to analyse the data. The findings of the study covered themes of transgenerational trauma, ‘the wounded healer’, caregivers’ responsibility in communal cultures and dissociation.

In this paper, I will consider the part dissociation plays when there is a shared history of trauma, and the ways in which dissociative enactments within the consulting room themselves may be part of the mutual healing. For this paper, only extracts from interviews with one of my participants will be included.     

Digging Deeper: Why Metaphysics is More Than a Toolbox

Steven French (J Gen Philos Sci,  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9401-8, 2018) proposes a vindication of “scientifically disinterested” metaphysics that leaves little room to its original ambitions. He claims that (1) as a discipline that looks to find out truths about the world, it is untenable; and that (2) rather, its vindication lies in its use as a “toolbox” of concepts for a philosophical discipline that does have a claim at getting us closer to truth—the philosophy of science, and more specifically of physics. I respond to both his main claims. The first claim, I argue, neglects what I call (with Ralf Busse) “archaeological” metaphysics, which tries to impose some order on phenomena by “digging deeper” from the less to the more fundamental, or from the less to the more abstract questions. The second claim imposes a hierarchical relation between metaphysics and philosophy of science which should, I argue, be replaced with a more egalitarian picture of philosophy.     

A defence of Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation

Calls to decolonise the university and revise what we research and teach is a challenge that ought to be taken up by those working in African philosophy and philosophy in Africa, more generally. Often, the thought is that such decolonisation will involve a complete subversion, destruction or deconstruction of colonial attitudes, processes and concepts. A more moderate proposal for decolonisation of philosophy can be found, however, which is Kwasi Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation. In this paper, I defend the project from two categories of objection, what I call the decolonisation and methodology objections. I argue that the objections are misdirected and unfair because they fail to recognise the theoretical backing of Wiredu’s wider work. The critical reflection central to Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation can be a genuinely helpful and viable route to take when tackling the challenges of decolonising philosophy.     

BRITISH ORTHODOX JEWRY 1945–1990: SWING TO THE RIGHT OR SHIFT TO THE CENTRE?

For almost two decades Jewish historians and sociologists have been tracing and debating the “swing to the right” among American Orthodox Jews. This phenomenon has no precise definition, but can be summarized as the contention that since the 1970s there has been a move within centrist Orthodoxy toward stricter halakhic positions, based more on text than tradition, and that there has also been a tightening of philosophical and theological positions, for example regarding the age of the universe, evolution and the veracity of talmudic science and medicine. More recently, British Jewry began to be the subject of a similar analysis. Geoffrey Alderman, Miri Freud-Kandel and, to some extent, Todd Endelman, have made the case that there was a swing to the right among Orthodox Jews in Britain. They argue that it can be traced to the 1960s or even 1950s and that it has continued and gathered momentum. I have taken a different position from these scholars. In this article I want to develop my ideas on the basis of further evidence and thought and taking into account objections to my work.

In this article I will first clarify my existing analysis of the period 1945–1970 in the light of criticisms. Second, I will expand my explanation of developments in British Jewry in that period, offering an alternative explanation to that of a straightforward swing to the right. Finally, I will examine the period from 1970–1990 and provide an initial account of the changes that took place. Some of these could be labelled a swing to the right but I will argue they are better understood as a specifically British phenomenon; more of a ‘shift to the centre’, and with rather different causes and consequences. This article makes no claims to being final or definitive, but only one step forward (I hope) in our understanding.     

Reconsidering Relativistic Causality

I discuss the idea of relativistic causality, i.e., the requirement that causal processes or signals can propagate only within the light‐cone. After briefly locating this requirement in the philosophy of causation, my main aim is to draw philosophers’ attention to the fact that it is subtle, indeed problematic, in relativistic quantum physics: there are scenarios in which it seems to fail.

I set aside two such scenarios, which are familiar to philosophers of physics: the pilot‐wave approach, and the Newton–Wigner representation. I instead stress two unfamiliar scenarios: the Drummond–Hathrell and Scharnhorst effects. These effects also illustrate a general moral in the philosophy of geometry: that the mathematical structures, especially the metric tensor, that represent geometry get their geometric significance by dint of detailed physical arguments.     

Book reviews

History of Islamic Philosophy Seyyed Hossein Nasr & Oliver Leaman, Editors, 1996 London, Routledge Part I, xx+ 780 pp., Part II, xiv + 428 pp., hb ISBN 0415 05 6675, £120.00

Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism: the Mahāyāna context of the Gaudapādiya‐Kārikā Richard King, 1995 Albany, State University of New York Press xii + 341 pp., pb $19.95

Vaisnavism: its philosophy, theology and religious discipline S.M. Srinwasa Chari, 1994 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass xxxviii + 383 pp., pb Rs. 350

Vaisnavism: contemporary scholars discuss the Gaudiya tradition Steven J. Rosen (Ed.), 1992 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994 ix + 354 pp., pb Rs. 160

Cultural Realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history Alastair Iain Johnston, 1995 Princeton, Princeton University Press xiii + 367 pp., hb ISBN 0691029962, $39.50

Laughing at the Tao: debates among Buddhists and Taoists in medieval China Livia Kohn, 1995 Princeton, Princeton University Press xii + 281 pp. hb (price not given)

Pantheism. A Non‐theistic Concept of Deity Michael P. Levine, 1994 London, Routledge xii + 388 pp., hb £45 ISBN 0415070643     

The Inner Game of Sport: is Everything in the Brain?

The article deals with the following: (1) Three brain imaging studies on athletes are evaluated. What do these neuroscientific studies tell us about the brain and mind of the athlete? (2) Empirical investigations will need a neuro-theory of mind if they are to make the leap from neural activity to the mental. The article looks at such a theory, Gerald Edelman's ‘Neural Darwinism’. What are the implications of such a theory for sport science and philosophy of sport? (3) The article appreciates some of the neurosciences applications, but questions the hope of giving a complete theory of mind.     

Religions and States. A New Typology and a Plea for Non-Constitutional Pluralism

Political philosophy has difficulties to cope with the complexity and variety of state-religions relations. Strict separationism is still the preferred option amongst liberals, deliberative and republican democrats, socialist and feminists. In this article, I develop a complex typology based on comparative history and sociology of religions. I summarize my reasons why institutional pluralist models like plural establishment or non-constitutional pluralism are attractive not only for religious minorities but for religiously deeply diverse societies in general. Most attention is paid defending associative democracy, the most flexible and open variety of institutional pluralism, against realist objections that group representation is incompatible with liberal democracy, that it leads to stigmatization and bureaucratization, that it strengthens undemocratic leaders, that it leads to an ossification of the status quo, and, most importantly, that it is inherently divisive undermining social cohesion and political unity. In my refutation of these objections I try to show that it helps to integrate minority religions into liberal democratic policies compatible with reasonable pluralism and to prevent religious and political fundamentalism.