Henri Bergson: Evolution,time and philosophy

Evolutionary theory is hindered by the conflict between the apparently antagonistic principles of its two founding figures, Darwin and Lamarck. Bergson's Creative Evolution outlines the means of transcending this impasse. If the evolutionary process is conceived as enduring then the atomistic model of static genetic states is never fully realisable. In the light of this, Bergson considers the germ‐plasm to be essentially “fluid.” If there is to be influence on the germ‐line it will be primarily in terms of the manner in which the genetic data is unfolded. In order to designate this influence Bergson introduces the concept of the “tendency.” The tendency will be explicated in relation to contemporary evolutionary biology. However, as the concept signifies that which is given only in the duration in which information is elaborated, it is precluded from representation. Bergson demonstrates that it is the evolutionary principle of continuous transformation which constitutes the limit to any scientific of view. For this reason, science needs to be complemented by a philosophical account of the duration of process.     

The idea of will and organic evolution in Bergson’s philosophy of life

The idea of the élan vital is crucial for an understanding of Bergson’s metaphysical method, underpinning the way in which philosophy stands with other forms of creative activity as an endeavour of “self-overcoming,” the self or subject no longer being at the centre of thought, but understood rather as a product of the process of thinking. In placing a special emphasis on Bergson’s 1907 work, Creative Evolution, the present essay is both an acknowledgement and challenge to the shift from early interpretations of Bergson in which comparisons were made with thinkers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer, to more recent engagements centred on the theories of perception and memory. The aim of this essay is to formulate a response to the marginalized status of Creative Evolution in the “perception-based” strands of Bergson scholarship, by emphasising how Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness are a means for understanding his definition of evolutionary “creativity.” Bergson suggests that the analysis of consciousness or “will” can provide us with a way of thinking about this creative movement of life, which is not a concept of a “cause” or “origin” in the sense of a “state of nature” (substance, essence, or “being”), but rather the operation of pure tendency.     

Habit as resistance: Bergson's philosophy of second nature

Henri Bergson is one of the few philosophers who both explicitly and extensively discusses the phenomenon of habit. In view of his engagement with habit, does Bergson develop a philosophically robust account of the phenomenon? Most commentary on his account of habit refers to his early work, Matter and Memory. In this paper, I begin by arguing that Bergson's treatment of habit in Matter and Memory is problematic because it does not adequately differentiate between habit and material nature. Despite its neglect in secondary literature, Bergson also discusses habit in the first part of his final book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. With respect to this book, I subsequently show how Bergson deploys Ravaisson's distinction between instinct and habit to reconceptualize habit as the second of our two natures, our social nature. Lastly, I reconstruct Bergson's late contribution to the philosophy of habit: rather than a tendency that is hard to resist, habit is a resistance to which we tend to submit. By shedding light on the effort that we expend to adhere to them, Bergson's resistance account of habit advances an original and productive perspective on our social habits.     

A “RESOLUTE” LATER WITTGENSTEIN?

Abstract: “Resolute readings” initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well—a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall's Wittgenstein's Private Language (2007) as well as by Phil Hutchinson's “What's the Point of Elucidation?” (2007) and Rom Harré's “Grammatical Therapy and the Third Wittgenstein” (2008). The present article shows that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein's work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of “substantial nonsense” or espousing the resolute readers' preferred option of nonsense austerity. If the interpretation here is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein's radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.     

The Disarticulation of Time: the Zeitbewußtsein in Phenomenology of Perception

In an effort to reassess the status of Phenomenology of Perception and its relation to The Visible and the Invisible, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's text and his discussion of the “field of presence” in La temporalité are intended to think through the field in which time makes its appearance as one of passage. Time does not show itself as presence or in the present but manifests itself as Ablauf, as lapse or flow, an écoulement that is simultaneously an explosion, an éclatement. Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in these pages is thus legible as recovering the primordial experience of time as a self-differentiating déhiscence in its dual power of articulation and erosion. Time is thus simultaneously the vehicle of the world's appearance and of its “disarticulation”, the passage of a rhythm of affirmation and disintegration.     

WHAT CAN PIAGET OFFER LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY?

In Insight, Bernard Lonergan provides, albeit schematically, a unique philosophy of biology which he takes as having “profound differences” with the world view presented by Darwin. These turn on Lonergan's idea of “schemes of recurrence” and of organisms as “solutions to the problem of living in an environment.” His lapidary prose requires some deciphering. I present the broad lines of his philosophy of biology and argue that Jean Piaget's structuralism can shed light on Lonergan's intentions in virtue of his use of cybernetics and the isomorphism between biology and knowledge. In turn, Piaget draws on Waddington's restatement of epigenesis and I suggest that the result, “process structuralism,” is a viable alternative to the modern Darwinian synthesis.     

L'influence du nombre sur le traitement des problèmes temporels

Notre propos concerne le développement des inferences temporelles lorsqu'il s'agit des situations symboliques. Notre hypothèse sur les aspects qualitatif et quantitatif du raisonnement est que les données numériques facilitent la résolution de la tâche, parce que ce type d'information (quantitative) conduit à la construction des règles algébriques d'intégration. Seize problèmes portant sur l'ordre d'allumage, l'ordre d'extinction et la durée relative des deux lampes (événements non cinématiques) ont été présentés à 49 sujets de 10 ans. Les problèmes sont présentés selon deux formes: une forme qualitative, où les données sont exprimées en termes relatifs “avant” et “après”, et une forme quantitative où les données sont exprimées par des nombres (par exemple, “la lampe rouge s'allume à 9 heures et la lampe verte à 11 heures”). Ainsi, les sujets doivent résoudre 32 problèmes. Deux types d'énoncés sont distingués: les énoncés décidables conduisent à une seule réponse valable et les énoncés indécidales conduisent à des solutions multiples. Les résultats montrent que (a) les problèmes temporels sont plus facilement résolus quant ils sont présentés sous forme quantitative (information numérique; et (b) les erreurs observées sous forme quantitative sont fondées sur des mécanismes cognitifs plus évolués, supposant des décentrations.     

Hume's nominalism and the Copy Principle

I consider some ways in which the Copy Principle (CP) and Hume's nominalism impinge on one another, arguing for the following claims. First, Hume's argument against indeterminate ideas isn't cogent even if the CP is accepted. But this does not vindicate Locke: the imagistic conception of ideas, presupposed by the CP, will force Locke to accept something like Hume's view of the way general terms function, the availability of abstract ideas notwithstanding. Second, Hume's discussion of nominalism provides support for the “old Hume” interpretation, that which takes the CP to be a criterion of meaningfulness, as against the “new Hume” reading, according to which it constrains what we can know. Finally, nominalism forces Hume to adopt a more complicated theory of ideas.     

On the mathematical representation of phenomena of emergence

This paper is a philosophical enquiry into the role that mathematics play in the articulation of science. It is conducted, in its essentials, in the spirit of Wittgenstein's views on the nature and function of philosophy, which are to lay bare, as it were, the manner in which we do whatever it is that we do, and then to examine the claims that we make for the deed. My conclusions should be easily accessible to those familiar with his thinking on the subject of science.

The case that has inspired the writing of this paper is not that of biology, nor is it the biological theory of evolution; rather, the case I have kept in mind while writing this paper is that of cognitive science, sometimes presented as a “science of mind” by its practitioners. It is primarily a computational theory characterized by two distinct approaches, one internal, the gist of which is that the brain/mind distinction is definitely passé; the other external, based on the view that the mark of human mentation is to be found in the ordinary use of old expressions to convey new meanings, i.e. in the Cartesian test for the existence of other minds, and its simpler computational version, the Turing test. Two intuitions underlie the paper: one, that language is obviously an adaptive characteristic of human organisms: one learns one's own mother's tongue, and feral children cannot conceptualize if first exposed to language after reaching puberty; two, empirical evidence supports the view that the “knowing brain” is different architecturally from the “untutored” one. These intuitions warrant regarding man's cognitive apparatus as an evolutionary system, and the “mind” as an emergent property.     

Nominalism and Realism. How Not to Read the Tractatus' Conception of a Name

This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by rejecting the “identity requirement.” I then consider an opposite – “realist” – interpretation, according to which Tractarian names include names of properties and relations. I argue that, although it can accommodate the “identity requirement,” the realist interpretation falls short of providing a correct interpretation of the Tractatus' conception of a name. I conclude by presenting an alternative account (to both nominalism and realism) of the Tractatus' conception of a name.     

SOCIOMETRY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORK IN AN INDIAN VILLAGE

Sociométrie et réseau de communication dans un village indien. — On compare, dans un village indien, les données sociométriques aux communications interpersonnelles qui se produisent aux différentes étapes de l'adoption de trois nouvelles techniques agricoles. La distribution des données sociométriques et celle des communications présentent la même structure: elles révèlent qu'il y a beaucoup d'isolés ou “non-communiquants” et un petit nombre de membres influents. Les “étoiles” sociométriques se trouvent être des “communicateurs-clefs” ou, tout au moins, des personnes qui communiquent davantage. De même, la plupart des “non-communiquants” sont isolés. On constate que les communications interpersonnelles sont limitées au sous-groupe sociométrique (clique), bien que les communications hors-clique ne soient pas totalement absentes. Il semble que la popularité dans le village soit fondamentalement en liaison avec l'influence personnelle, ce qui témoigne du caractère charismatique de l'autorité.     

Jonathan Edwards and determinism

This paper argues a new interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's psychological account of human action. In Freedom of the Will (1754), Edwards adapted a sophisticated version of Newtonian determinism to the understanding of human thinking and action. Rejecting a mechanistic determinism, in which antecedent faculties “cause” actions, Edwards instead advocated a systemic view. Thus, rather than the “greatest apparent good” causing the “will,” which in turn caused an action, Edwards claimed that “The will is as the greatest apparent good,” thus grounding a systemic and dynamic account. Misunderstanding of his view has led to much confusion and a failure to properly locate Edwards within the history of American thought. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Relation numérique et travail de care : construction et entretien d’un collectif dans le cadre du portage salarial

Work relations are changing due to development of employment new forms and digital interactions. The French “portage salarial” status crystallizes these two forms of evolution, that staff and freelance employees “carried” coexist in the same organization and whose interactions are mediated. This article presents a qualitative and inductive research, conducted with grounded theory on a “portage” company's permanent employees. The results show that care work done by the company staff for the “portés” workers, not digitally mediated, can overcome the business relationship and produce a collective work. Subsequent interactions, digitally mediated, maintain this collective work.     

A Neurotic Inventory

Résumé

LA NÉVROSE DANS LE MARIAGE: I, II

Le problème a été de déterminer l'incidence approximée et quelques renseignements sur l'association des traits névrosiques dans le mariage; la section présente rapporte l'incidence totale comparée à celle des populations universitaires du měme état social, l'incidence par catégories de tendance névrosique, et l'incidence des points de tendance névrosique compris dans la catégorie nommée points de “fantaisie”. L'outil employé a été l'Echelle de Personnalité de Thurstone, et les sujets ont été des mariés des niveaux social-économiques supérieurs, au nombre de 152.

La population maritée s'est montrée définiment plus névrosique que les populations universitaires supposées être comparables, et cela est vrai pour les deux sexes. Dans la groupe des mariés et le groupe universitaire les femmes se sont montrées plus ntvrosiques que les hommes, et cette différence de sexe a été plus grande pour le groupe des mariks. Ces différences se réfléchissent dans les six catégories en lesquelles on a divisé I'échelle. Les catégories “sociale” et “fantaisie” ont produit le plus de névroses chez les femmes, et les catégories “sociale” et “extrovertie” (attitudes á I'éard du milieu non humain) chez les maris; les catégories “sexe” et “physique” ont produit le moins de névroses chez les deux sexes. Les pourcentages des incidences sont donnés (et varient de beaucoup) pour les points de la catégorie “fantaisie”, et on a formé des groupes de ces points qui montrent une différence de plus de 10% entre le groupe des mariés et celui des non mariés et entre le groupe des miles et celui des femelles.

Referat

NEUROTIZISMUS IN DER EHE (I, II)

Das Problem bestand darin, das ungefähre Vorkommen (incidence) und etwas über die Verbindung neurotischer Züge in der Ehe zu bestimmen; der vorliegende Teil berichtet über das Vorkommen im Grossen und Ganzen verglichen mit demjenigen der Collegebevölkerung gleicher sozialer Stellung, das Vorkommen in Kathegorien neurotischer Tendenzen, und das Vorkommen von Angaben neurotischer Tendenzen, die in der Kathegorie der sogennanten “Phantasie” -Angaben enthalten sind. Das dazu gebrauchte Mittel war das Thurstonesche Persönlichkeitsverzeichnis (Thurstone Personality schedule), und die Versuchspersonen waren verheiratete Paare der höheren sozialökonomischen Stände, bis zu einer Zahl von 152.

Die verheiratete Bevölkerung erwies sich als bestimmt neurotischer als die mutmasslich vergleichbare Collegebevölkerung; das traf für beide Geschlechter zu. In beiden Gruppen, der Verheirateten sowohl wie der Collegestudenten waren die Frauen neurotischer als die Männer, und diese Geschlechtsunterschiede spiegelten sich in den sechs Kathegorien wieder, in die das zur Messung dienende Verzeichnis geteilt war. “Soziale”- und “Phantasie” -Kathegorien brachten am meisten Neurotizimus bei den Frauen hervor, und “soziale” und “extroverte” (Haltungen gegenüber nicht-menschlischer Umgebung) bei den Männern; “Geschlechts”- und “physische” Kathegorien am wenigsten bei beiden Geschlechtern. Es werden die Prozente des Vorkommens (die stark varieren) für die Angaben der “Phantasie” -Kathegorie angegeben, und Gruppen werden für diejenigen Angaben aufgestellt, die mehr als 10% Unterschied zwischen den Verheirateten und ledigen und männlichen und weiblichen Gruppen aufweisen.     

ON THE TENACITY OF CHRISTIAN ANTI‐JUDAISM1

Joachim of Fiore's three ages of Father, Son and Spirit demonstrated that the supersessionist gambit Christianity had introduced against Judaism is a logic any successor can employ. Modernity (cf. modo, “now”) is constituted by a relentless supersessionist logic; the modern issue is less supersessionism than a conflict of supersessionisms. Christianity has repeatedly overspiritualized God's “bodily covenant” with Israel (Wyschogrod). This distortive tendency is intensified in modernity by Christianity's anxiety that it too will appear old/“Jewish” vis‐à‐vis a new New Testament of infinite spiritual freedom (cf. Romanticism.) One corrective would be for Christianity to return to a more Jewish understanding of election.     

UZNADZE'S SET AND SECOND LANGUAGE LEARNING

L'A. classe en “ bons ” (N = 40) et en “ mauvais ” (N = 40), des élèves qui étudient le français (seconde langue) en comparant le total des notes normalisées obtenues à des tests de compréhension du français écrit et oral aux notes normalisées obtenues à un test d'aptitude scolaire (SCAT). Il pose en hypothèse que si L'on fait des mesures de fixation et d'extinction d'un “ set ” en matière de sensibilité bilité tactile, on trouvera des différences entre les “ bons ” et les “ mauvais ”. Reprenant la méthode d'Uznadze, il constate qu'entre les deux types d'élèves, il n'y a pas de différence significative (p > .05) dans le nombre d'essais nécessaires à la fixation d'un “ set ”, mais que, par contre, il y a une différence significative dans le nombre d'essais nécessaires à L'extinction du “ set ” : pour les élèves qui sont bons dans L'apprentissage d'une seconde langue, le nombre d'essais nécessaires à L'extinction est plus faible.     

Critical Notice: Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism,Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume's series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’” (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle” of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume's (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’” (2008, 3)? Or does Hume's skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature” (290)? Russell's controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume's fundamental intentions in the Treatise” is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume's irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.     

Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness

Abstract

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful.

My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought.     

A COGNITIVE-STYLE APPROACH TO CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH1

Styles cognitifs et recherches ‘interculturelles. — L'utilisation, dans les recherches interculturelles, des données, concepts et méthodes relevant du “style cognitif” (mode de fonctionnement caractérisant un individu dans ses activités perceptives et intellectuelles) présente un grand nombre d'avantages méthodologiques. Comme le démontrent les nombreuses études qui ont été consacrées à un style cognitif privilégié qui correspond à la dimension “global-articulé”, les styles cognitifs sont fondamentaux dans L'étude du développement; ils peuvent être mesurés par des techniques objectives; les tests utilisables peuvent être appliqués avec validité et ils ont un sens pour des populations qui sont de niveau mental tout à fait différent; ils ont été conçus en relation avec des manières particulières d'élever les enfants, de telle sorte qu'ils peuvent servir à identifier les résultats de ces méthodes dans L'étude comparative des schèmes de socialisation. Les mêmes relations entre les premières expériences familiales et les différences inter-individuelles au long du continuum “global-articulé” qui avaient été originellement observées dans des milieux occidentaux, L'ont été également dans des milieux non occidentaux. De plus, on a trouvé dans le style cognitif modal de certains groupes non occidentaux, les différences qu'on avait pu prédire sur la base des différences observées dans la manière d'élever les enfants. La fréquence des différences dues au sexe en matière de style “articulé” ou “global” dans un grand nombre de cultures, amène à penser que L'étude du rôle que joue le sexe dans le développement cognitif pourrait être une voie féconde pour la recherche interculturelle.     

From One Testament to the Other

Translation of Paul Ricoeur, “D'un testament à l'autre” Translator's Preface: This essay, part of the section “Essais d'herméneutique biblique” in Ricoeur's Lectures 3: aux frontières de la philosophie, is one example of the later Ricoeur's increasing willingness to let theology and philosophy speak to each other. I would like to draw readers’ attention to two moves made here by Ricoeur: (1) the way in which his philosophical hermeneutics opens the way for a biblical ontology rooted in Exodus 3:14, and (2) the way his theory of metaphor reveals the same implied ontology behind 1 John 4:8.