Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist

Anti‐luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti‐luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti‐luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge.     

Subject‐Involving Luck

In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck.     

Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Sometimes You Feel Like a Nut, Sometimes You Don't: Citizens' Ambivalence About Abortion

Recent research has recognized that many people simultaneously hold positive and negative attitudes about important political issues. This paper reviews the concept of attitudinal ambivalence and introduces a survey measure of ambivalence adapted from the experimental literature. An analysis of two statewide telephone surveys of Florida voters reveals that (1) a number of voters have ambivalent attitudes about abortion rights; (2) the amount of ambivalence varies according to the circumstances (elective versus traumatic) under which an abortion is obtained; (3) ambivalence about elective abortions is essentially unrelated to ambivalence about traumatic abortions; (4) voters who support abortion rights are more ambivalent about elective abortions than about traumatic abortions, whereas the pattern is reversed for abortion rights opponents; and (5) extreme views in support of or opposition to abortion rights can sometimes mitigate the amount of ambivalence felt by voters.     

Strokes of Luck

This essay aims to reorient current theorizing about luck as an aid to our discerning this concept's true philosophical significance. After introducing the literature's leading theories of luck, it presents and defends counterexamples to each of them. It then argues that recent luck theorists’ main target of analysis—the concept of an event's being lucky for a subject—is parasitic on the more fundamental notion of an event's being a stroke of luck for a subject, which thesis serves as at least a partial diagnosis of the leading theories’ failure. Next, it develops an analysis of strokes of luck that utilizes insights from the recent luck literature. Finally, having set out a comprehensive new analysis of luck—the Enriched Strokes Account of lucky events—the essay revisits the initial counterexamples to the literature's leading theories and argues that the Enriched Strokes Account properly handles all of them.     

Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms (rather than probabilistic) and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event‐relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so‐called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck.     

Intentional Forgiving as a Counseling Intervention

Forgiveness has been represented in counseling literature as an effective means of promoting personal and relational development. Despite this, a concise set of guidelines to direct counselors in the use of forgiveness has yet to be proposed. The author presents theological and counseling understandings of forgiveness and delineates contexts in which counselors have promoted forgiveness in clients. Drawing on the increasing base of counseling-related literature concerning the importance of forgiveness, the author defines and proposes guidelines for a counseling approach called “intentional forgiving,” an intervention in which clients are directed to forgive someone who has wounded them.     

Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems

(1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter are conscious of what they are doing.     

The Machinations of Luck

Luck is at issue when it is a matter of pure chance that a result of significant positive of negative value ensues for someone. Luck differs from fate, which pivots on an individual's condition, and from fortune, which pivots on an individual's talent and effort. It is by luck that you are rich when you win the lottery, by fortune if your wealth comes from talent and hard work, and by fate if you inherit those millions. On this basis luck lies beyond anyone's rational control. With risk (R) as the probability of failure in a chancy situation and the stake (S) as the difference between a favorable and an unfavorable outcome, luck (L) can be measured as the product of these quantities: L = R × S. The condition of humankind in an uncertain world being as it is, luck cannot be eliminated as a key factor of our existence, be it in cognitive, practical, or ethical regards.     

依恋类型对主动遗忘的影响

成人依恋可以在依恋回避和依恋焦虑两个维度进行分析。不安全依恋的个体在依恋关系中持续感受到一种不安全感,因此个体往往采用心理防御策略来摆脱这种不安全感。对于许多不愉快的事件,个体常常也会采用类似的防御策略进行抑制,以减少自身的消极体验。主动遗忘是指个体有意识地避免回想某一目标对象而导致的遗忘现象,其可能与高回避个体的停用策略十分相似。为探讨对于依恋相关的记忆内容,高回避个体是否能够成功进行主动遗忘以规避负面情绪,或是防御失败引起依恋系统激活,反而更多回忆起相关记忆内容,本实验采用Think/No-Think(TNT)范式进行研究,以依恋相关故事作为对被试的依恋启动操作,设计了2(启动:依恋启动vs.依恋未启动)×3(主动遗忘:Think vs.No-Think vs.Baseline)×2(依恋维度得分:高vs低)混合设计研究不同依恋类型主动遗忘能力的影响。实验结果显示,TNT操作与回避类型与启动操作的交互作用显著,高依恋回避个体在受到依恋相关启动时表现出优秀的主动遗忘能力,而在未受到启动时则不能有效地遗忘依恋相关负性词对; 而低依恋回避个体则表现相反,在受到启动材料威胁时无法成功主动遗忘,而在未受启动条件下可以成功遗忘要求内容。对于不同焦虑类型的被试来说,其主动遗忘能力与启动操作无关,高焦虑类型被试表现出更强的主动遗忘能力,并从依恋内部工作模型角度进行了分析。     

The Moral Luck of Rules

The text reflects on the view of morality, according to which its central elements are rules that make a society efficient, bringing the greatest benefit. I show that rules represent a part of our “circumstantial luck,” and that their particularity often makes life more difficult. As we tend to internalise rules and interpret spontaneously the situations of our lives in their terms, we may be, in the cases of unfeasible rules, prone to view ourselves as failure. Generally, rule-like statements (including moral rules) more naturally serve as tools for reflection on our past (failures) than as guidelines for the future. The presence of rules in our lives thus calls for compassion towards those who have failed in terms of the rules that they acknowledge.     

Précis of Justice,Luck, and Knowledge*

Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (JLK) contributes to recent developments in two areas, moral responsibility and distributive justice. Prominent luck‐neutralizing approaches to distributive justice, exemplified in work by Cohen and by Roemer, argue that justice requires equal distribution of goods for which people aren't responsible. Such views of justice haven't focused attention on responsibility itself. Meanwhile, responsibility has been illuminat‐ingly articulated in work including, and influenced by, Frankfurt's seminal essays. My book brings these separate lines of work, on justice and on responsibility, into contact, examining how the new articulation of responsibility constrains the roles responsibility can play in distributive justice. Part I focuses on responsibility and its inverse correlate, luck; Part II assesses responsibility‐based approaches to justice in light of preceding arguments about responsibility. (See JLK, 4–5 on responsibility, reactive attitudes, and accountability.)