共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Luca Ferrero 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):403-430
There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent’s capacity
to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits
us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by
satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive
view of the diachronic will: the rationale for it is that it makes possible to engage in activities with a radically novel
temporal structure, activities that are not merely continuous over time, but temporally integrated and unified. These activities
are essential to our form of life and to our existence as temporally unified agents. The instrumental and cognitive benefits,
if any, are merely secondary to the ontological ones.
相似文献
Luca FerreroEmail: |
2.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
3.
Chrisoula Andreou 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):415-422
A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical
rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with
the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality
and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice
situation—which I refer to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just
described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality
than current debate suggests.
相似文献
Chrisoula AndreouEmail: |
4.
Daniel Giberman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):297-311
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity
are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose
facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these
objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies.
The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
相似文献
Daniel GibermanEmail: |
5.
Anand Vaidya 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):191-212
Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism
is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds.
In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis,
and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument
explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.
相似文献
Anand VaidyaEmail: |
6.
Mark Owen Webb 《Sophia》2009,48(1):35-42
A philosophical theory of religion ought to meet four criteria: it should be extensionally accurate, neutral, phenomenological,
and non-circular. I argue that none of the popular theories of religion meet all these criteria, and that, in particular,
the extensional accuracy criterion and the non-circularity criterion can’t be met without sacrificing extensional accuracy.
I conclude that, therefore, religions do not form a kind, and so, there is no such thing as religion.
相似文献
Mark Owen WebbEmail: |
7.
We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until
such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
相似文献
Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |
8.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
9.
Bernhard Hommel 《Cognitive processing》2005,6(1):3-14
Perceptual processes play a central role in the planning and control of human voluntary action. Indeed, planning an action is a sensorimotor process operating on sensorimotor units, a process that is based on anticipations of perceptual action effects. I discuss how the underlying sensorimotor units emerge, and how they can be employed to tailor action plans to the goals at hand. I also discuss how even a single action can induce sensorimotor binding, how intentionally implemented short-term associations between stimuli and responses become autonomous, how feature overlap between stimulus events and actions makes them compatible, and why action plans are necessarily incomplete.
相似文献
Bernhard HommelEmail: |
10.
Andrew Pavelich 《Sophia》2007,46(1):7-20
Many theists believe that God is continuously acting to sustain the universe in existence. One way of understanding this act
of sustenance is to see God as actually creating the universe anew at each moment. This paper argues against the coherence
of this view by drawing out some of its consequences. I argue that the re-creationist must deny the causal efficacy of created
f things, as well as the identity of things across time. Most problematically, I argue that re-creationism ultimately denies
the reality of time itself.
相似文献
Andrew PavelichEmail: |
11.
Cain Samuel Todd 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):187-211
This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability
of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments.
I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding
non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that
the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called
‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue
that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible
and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident
that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at
all.
相似文献
Cain Samuel ToddEmail: |
12.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
13.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
14.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
相似文献
Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
15.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):1-21
I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the
metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I
maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides
the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views
of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of
temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account – in terms of change – is irredeemably problematic.
And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which
provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the
world.
相似文献
M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
16.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
17.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
18.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
19.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |
20.
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):191-208
I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive
evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to
the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits
of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational.
相似文献
D. S. Neil Van LeeuwenEmail: |