MARKETS AND MORALITY

For most of human history, economic systems were personal in nature—people normally interacted with people they knew personally and knew well. Today's modern market economies are impersonal—people normally interact with people they do not know personally. The historical movement from personal to impersonal systems was necessary for societies to develop the specialization of labor needed for modern production technologies. That is, the high standards of living in the developed world are due to these impersonal systems. However, the ethical systems theologians apply to modern market systems were developed for personal societies and are often inappropriate for impersonal societies. In this article, we develop the differences between personal and impersonal systems, examine the writings of a number of theologians who are very critical of market economies, and attempt to show how a different ethical approach is needed.     

CONTEXTUALISM, SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE

§I schematizes the evidence for an understanding of 'know' and of other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute meta-linguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of psychological bias caused by salience effects. §IV suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of scepticism have such consequences. §V argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility.     

KNOWLEDGE, SPEAKER AND SUBJECT

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.     

COMPARATIVE ETHICS, A COMMON MORALITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This essay is a brief attempt to summarize and evaluate the contributions that Democracy and Tradition makes to the field of comparative ethics. It is argued that the potential impact of these contributions would be strengthened by engagement with the common morality already imbedded in international human rights norms.     

THE BROTHERS BONHOEFFER ON SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND THEOLOGY

On one level this is a case study in science, religion, and morality, with special attention to the consequences for morality of science's embeddedness in society. On another level this is the science-and-theology dialogue between the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his brother Karl-Friedrich, a physicist. The influence of Karl-Friedrich and the brothers' exchanges on Dietrich's prison theology receives special attention. Because this study is set in Germany in the 1930s and 40s, and Karl-Friedrich's work intersected Germany's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, the discussion leads to Los Alamos and the Manhattan Project. The attention there is to the interplay of science, religion, and morality at the time the bomb was detonated at the Trinity site.