Reconsidering Reid's Geometry of Visibles

In his Inquiry , Reid claims, against Berkeley, that there is a science of the perspectival shapes of objects ('visible figures'): they are geometrically equivalent to shapes projected onto the surfaces of spheres. This claim should be understood as asserting that for every theorem regarding visible figures there is a corresponding theorem regarding spherical projections; the proof of the theorem regarding spherical projections can be used to construct a proof of the theorem regarding visible figures, and vice versa. I reconstruct Reid's argument for this claim, and expose its mathematical underpinnings: it is successful, and depends on no empirical assumptions to which he was not entitled about the workings of the human eye. I also argue that, although Reid may or may not have been aware of it, the geometry of spherical projections is not the only geometry of visible figure.     

不同学段、年级学生对教师评价行为知觉的特点

学生对教师评价行为的知觉指学生对教师指向他们的评价行为的主观感受和体验,包括“明确目标”、“收集信息”、“反馈改进”、“关注过程”、“激励期望”和“沟通理解”等六个维度,前三个方面属于操作要素,后三个方面属于基础要素.本研究采用问卷法,选取小学四年级到初中三年级共746名学生作为研究对象,探讨了不同学段、年级学生对教师评价行为知觉的特点.研究结果表明:除了“激励期望”和“沟通理解”两个维度,小学生在其它维度上对教师评价行为的知觉优于初中生.小学生对教师评价行为的知觉不存在年级差异.初一学生在操作要素方面的知觉优于初二和初三学生,在基础要素方面优于初二学生.初二学生对教师评价行为的知觉出现明显的消极化倾向,在基础要素上初一和初三学生的知觉显现明显的反弹.本文对研究结果的教育意义进行了探讨.     

A Puzzle Regarding Reid's Theory of Motives

In Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid offers two different accounts of motives. According to the first, motives are the ends for which we act. According to the second, they are mental states, such as desires, that incite us to action. These two accounts, I claim, do not fit comfortably with Reid's agent causal account of human action. My project in this article is to explain why and then to propose a strategy for reconciling these two accounts with Reid's views about action.     

Bragging About One's School Grades: Gender Stereotyping and Students' Perception of Their Abilities in Science,Mathematics, and Language

Three studies examined stereotypes about the abilities of women and men and their implications for self-evaluation. All the three studies suggest that women are generally perceived as better than men in language and that men are generally perceived as better than women in science and math. Furthermore, Study 1 reveals that female university students in psychology who believe that men are better than women in science feel significantly less able in science, have lower self-esteem, and report lower school average than students who do not believe that men are better than women in science. Study 2 shows that female high school students in a language career track rate their own ability in science less highly and report lower school grades in math when gender stereotypes are salient than when they are not. Study 3 shows that male university students in science tend to rate their own ability in language less highly and report significantly lower school grades in language when gender stereotypes are activated prior to their self-evaluation than when they are not. Overall, the findings suggest that gender stereotypes can have detrimental consequences for self-concept of ability of both male and female students. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reid's Non‐Humean Theory of Moral Motives

Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind‐independent states of affairs that are grasped by reason and do not require affections to influence human beings. Reid hence holds a non‐Humean theory in which reason, alone, is not inert.     

Assumption,Union and Sanctification: Some Clarifying Distinctions

In this article I engage with the notion that Christ ought to be understood to have a fallen human nature because Christ sanctifies human nature, and it is fallen humanity that needs sanctifying. In opposition to this line of thought, I argue that the Son of God assumed an unfallen nature, but with the powers of fallenness operative within it, and that this notion is consistent with a distinct account of sanctification. In support of these claims, I develop distinctions between a conjoining union and a transferring union, and between the Chalcedonian union at the incarnation and the extension of that union on the cross. At the assumption a conjoining union occurred, not a transferring union. Christ sanctified his own nature, prior to a transferring union.     

Grades of meaning

In this paper, I lend novel support to H. P. Grice’s account of speaker meaning (GASM) by blunting the force of a significant objection. Stephen Schiffer has argued that in order to make GASM sufficient, one must add restrictions that are psychologically impossible to fulfill, thereby making GASM untenable. In what follows, I explain the elements of GASM that require it to invoke these psychologically unrealizable restrictions. I then accept Schiffer’s criticism, but modify its significance to GASM. I argue that the problem that Schiffer notes is not a reason to reject GASM, but a reason to embrace it. GASM shows that meaning is best understood as an absolute concept—an unrealizable ideal limit. Taking some inspiration from contextualist theories of knowledge attribution, I argue that my version of GASM offers a useful contextualist account of meaning attribution. Hence, pragmatic theories of meaning and communication should not wholly exclude GASM from their theorizing, at least not for the reasons that are commonly given.     

The New Trolley Problem: Driverless Cars and Deontological Distinctions

Discussion of the ethics of driverless cars has often focused on supposed real-life versions of the famous trolley problem. In these cases, a driverless car is in a position where crashing is unavoidable and all possible crashes risk harm: for example, it can either continue on its current path and crash into five pedestrians or swerve and crash into one pedestrian. There are significant disanalogies between the human versions of the trolley problem and situations faced by driverless cars which affect the application and moral significance of key deontological distinctions, such as the distinction between doing and allowing harm. The application and moral significance of the doing/allowing distinction in the context of the behaviour of driverless cars depend on (a) our conception of the behaviour of driverless cars; (b) the forms of driverless cars that are developed and used; (c) the background expectations of programmers/manufacturers/owners of driverless cars and the conditions of being able to put those cars on the roads. These are as yet unsettled – and may even be undetermined. Nonetheless, trolley problems may still be useful in thinking about the ethics of driverless cars.     

Beyond Language: Using Logic to Introduce New Philosophical Distinctions

Philosophy has to be communicable in language, and therefore, whatever it has to say must be expressible in (some) language. But in order to make progress, philosophy has to gradually extend and improve its terminological apparatus. It is argued that logical formalization is a highly useful tool for discovering and confirming distinctions that are not present in ordinary language or in pre-existing philosophical terminology. In particular, it is proposed that if two usages of a word require different logical formalizations, then that is a strong reason to distinguish between them also in informal philosophy. The distinction between two types of normative conditionals, conditional veritable norms and conditional normative rules, is used as an example to corroborate this proposal.     

Distinctions that mystify: Technology versus economy and other fragmentations

The separation of technological and economic science has maintained the illusion that knowledge itself, when applied to nature, can generate industrialization. The implicit equation “TECHNOLOGY=NATURE plus KNOWLEDGE” ignores the social component of (UNEQUALO EXCHANGE. A global, thermodynamic perspective reveals that world market prices are an intrinsic aspect of the reproduction of industrial technomass. Global exchange rates have to guarantee a net transfer of “exergy” (free energy) to industrial sectors, and industrial technology, as the art of managing these thermodynamic profits, thus remains confined to a restricted social space. The accelerating destruction of the biosphere can only be checked by breaking the entropy-rewarding logic of general-purpose money. The ideas on which this article is based have grown out of a research project sponsored by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR).     

Disgust Sensitivity and Psychopathological Symptoms: Distinctions from Harm Avoidance

The present study examined the relationship between disgust sensitivity and symptoms of somatization, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, anger/hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism in a community sample. Participants (n = 121) completed the Disgust Scale-2, the Symptom Checklist-90, and the harm avoidance subscale of the Temperament and Character Inventory. Disgust sensitivity was found to be correlated with a broad range of psychopathological symptoms. However, results also indicated that these correlations were partially mediated by harm avoidance. That is, when controlling for levels of harm avoidance, the association between disgust sensitivity and psychopathological symptoms was either substantially reduced or became nonsignificant. These findings suggest that the tendency towards behavioral inhibition to avoid punishment and non-reward may partially account for the association between disgust sensitivity and a broad range of psychopathological symptoms.

Unmitigated Agency and Unmitigated Communion: Distinctions from Agency and Communion

The purpose of this paper is to establish the importance of distinguishing unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion from agency and communion. First, we examine the empirical overlap and distinctions among the four constructs. Then, we demonstrate the differential association of unmitigated agency, unmitigated communion, agency, and communion to relationship and health outcomes. We conclude that only unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion are associated with relationship difficulties and poor health. Finally, we distinguish between the difficulties of the unmitigated agency and the unmitigated communion individual by focusing on interpersonal problems.     

Minimal Theory of Causation and Causal Distinctions

Axiomathes - The Minimal Theory of Causation, presented in Graßhoff and May, 2001, aspires to be a version of a regularity analysis of causation able to correctly predict our causal...     

Activism and Powerful Others: Distinctions within the Concept of Internal-External Control

Some studies report that activists are Internals, while others claim they are Externals, holding a belief in chance, fate, and powerful others. Three new scales were constructed in order to measure belief in chance (C) as separate from expectancy for control by powerful others (P), and perceived mastery over one's personal life (I). Two studies are reported. (1.) As predicted, responses from 96 adults indicated that only a belief in chance was differentially related to involvement and information on anti-pollution activities. (2.) In factor analyzing the responses of 329 college males to the 24 items of the new scales, three main factors were identified — I, P, and C. The validity and usefulness of the tripartite division in clarifying past findings regarding the multidimensionality of I-E were discussed.