Visual Perception in Acoustically Deprived and Normally Hearing Children

In the present study an attempt was made to establish if and to what extent auditory deprivation modifies the processes of visual analysis and synthesis. The study included 54 children aged 10–16 years with hearing impairment attending the School and Educational Center for Children with Hearing Impairment in Wroc?aw (group I) and 127 children with normal hearing acuity attending public schools (group II), forming a reference group. Hearing impairment in the children of group I was from 60 to 100 dB. In 9 of these children the hearing impairment was inherited, while in some others it was acquired and resulted from rubella during the mother's pregnancy (5 subjects) or a severe disease course in childhood, for instance cerebral meningitis (4 subjects) and otolaryngologic antibiotic therapy (7 subjects). In the remaining subjects the reason for auditory deprivation was unknown. Hearing impairment, apart from genetically conditioned causes, appeared in the first months or years of life. The general intellectual level of the examined children was similar to that of their control counterparts, which was confirmed by school psychologists during a routine examination. The examination was performed by means of two tests from the Nonverbal Score of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children: Puzzles and Block Design. The children with a hearing deficit generally needed more time to perform the tasks than those with normal hearing. The investigated parameters of visual perception improved in correlation with age, but the dynamics of these changes were different in the two study groups.     

听觉丧失对听障学生时间知觉的影响

本研究采用同时判断任务和时距二分任务,探讨了听觉丧失对听障学生视觉通道的时间知觉的影响及其机制。两个系列实验结果表明,听觉丧失损伤了听障学生视觉通道的时序知觉准确性、敏感性以及时距知觉的敏感性,支持了普遍缺陷假设;但是,听障学生视觉通道的时距知觉的准确性却未受到听觉丧失的显著影响,支持了知觉补偿假设。因此,听觉丧失对听障学生视觉通道的时间知觉的影响可能是基于选择性的机制,这主要取决于不同的时间任务以及知觉属性等因素。     

Impaired Speech Perception in Poor Readers: Evidence from Hearing and Speech Reading

The performance of 14 poor readers on an audiovisual speech perception task was compared with 14 normal subjects matched on chronological age (CA) and 14 subjects matched on reading age (RA). The task consisted of identifying synthetic speech varying in place of articulation on an acoustic 9-point continuum between /ba/ and /da/ (Massaro & Cohen, 1983). The acoustic speech events were factorially combined with the visual articulation of /ba/, /da/, or none. In addition, the visual-only articulation of /ba/ or /da/ was presented. The results showed that (1) poor readers were less categorical than CA and RA in the identification of the auditory speech events and (2) that they were worse in speech reading. This convergence between the deficits clearly suggests that the auditory speech processing difficulty of poor readers is speech specific and relates to the processing of phonological information.     

The Effects of Relaxation and Postural Training on External Perception: Improvement of Visual Acuity, Visual Field, and Hearing Acuity

This study examined the effects of muscular relaxation and postural training on external perception using a visual acuity test, a visual field test, and a hearing acuity test. Eighteen undergraduate students were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. The experimental group underwent muscular relaxation and postural training. Each subject in this group was administered the tests before and after the training. Each subject in the control group carried out the tests before and after participating in a 30-min conversation with the experimenter. On all three tests, the experimental group improved significantly more than the control group.     

Hearing objects and events

Through hearing we learn about source events: events in which objects move or interact so that they vibrate and produce sound waves, such as when they roll, collide, or scrape together. It is often claimed that we do not simply hear sounds and infer what event caused them, but hear source events themselves, through hearing sounds. Here I investigate how the idea that we hear source events should be understood, with a focus on how hearing an event relates to hearing the objects involved in that event. I argue that whereas we see events such as rollings and collisions by seeing objects move through space, this cannot be how we hear them, and go on to examine two other possible models. On the first, we hear events but not their participant objects. On the second, to hear an event is to hear the appearance of an object to change. I argue that neither is satisfactory and endorse a third option: to hear a source event is to hear an object as extending through time.     

Memory for Faces and Objects by Deaf and Hearing Signers and Hearing Nonsigners

The memory of 11 deaf and 11 hearing British Sign Language users and 11 hearing nonsigners for pictures of faces of and verbalizable objects was measured using the game Concentration. The three groups performed at the same level for the objects. In contrast the deaf signers were better for faces than the hearing signers, who in turn were superior to the hearing nonsigners, who were the worst. Three hypotheses were made: That there would be no significant difference in terms of the number of attempts between the three groups on the verbalizable object task, that the hearing and deaf signers would demonstrate superior performance to that of the hearing nonsigners on the matching faces task, and that the hearing and deaf signers would exhibit similar performance levels on the matching faces task. The first two hypotheses were supported, but the third was not. Deaf signers were found to be superior for memory for faces to hearing signers and hearing nonsigners. Possible explanations for the findings are discussed, including the possibility that deafness and the long use of sign language have additive effects.     

Hearing shape

In 4 experiments, participants listened to suspended occluded objects set into vibration by a pendular hammer. In Experiment 1, participants provided analogue measures of the heights and widths of 3 rectangular steel plates equal in area and weight. The same report method and rectangular dimensions were used in Experiment 2 with 3 plates each of steel, wood, and Plexiglas. Heights and widths were distinguished and perceived in similar proportions to the actual dimensions regardless of material composition. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants successfully identified circular, triangular, and rectangular plates of a single material (Experiment 3) and of 3 different materials (Experiment 4). Discussion focuses on the dependency of perceived dimensions on the physical properties and linear dimensions of the plates and the acoustic structure determined by the solutions to the 2-dimensional wave equation.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Perception and knowledge

Knowledge concerning the object, scene, or event in a conscious propositional form generally does not affect perception. By and large, perception is autonomous with respect to thought. That is because perception is stimulus bound and is based on mental contents, lawful principles and rules that are unconscious and in a form very different from such consciously represented propositional knowledge. Exceptions to this generalization can occur if the stimulus is ambiguous and can support a cued or suggested interpretation or one in line with what is known to be present as well as it can support the perception that occurs spontaneously. How the representation of the given, consciously apprehended knowledge can enter into the unconscious events that govern perception is not known, but it is suggested that such knowledge accesses memories and it is these memories that can affect perception.Since knowledge of this kind can affect perception, it is important to ensure that subjects in experiments are naive. Otherwise we will confuse spontaneous perceptions with those that only occur when suggested and the distinction is theoretically important. In certain cases, knowledge leads to an intentional intervention in the process of achieving a percept, the mechanism of which is not known. However, this kind of effect may be based on a process of imagining or visualizing of objects or events that dovetails with the proximal stimulus and it is the imagining that leads to the perception.Knowledge in the form of stored representations of past visual experience (or of phylogenetic ‘experience’) can affect perception in various ways: it enables recognition and interpretation to occur; it enables perceptual discrimination among similar members of a category to occur; it can lead to perceptual enrichment effects; it provides internal solutions which can then be accessed in cases where perceptual problem solving occurs; it provides rules or laws concerning geometrical optics on the basis of which phenomena such as perceptual constancy and the like can be achieved; it can lead to the recalibration of tactual or visual sensation. However, before such top-down effects of past experience can occur bottom-up processes must first achieve a preliminary perception. That perception provides the bridge to the relevant stored representations which are accessed on the basis of similarity.     

Incontinence and Perception

The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence or render it inexplicable, I argue that genuine incontinence would require three components: first, a distinction between the types of judgments simultaneously present in the agent; second, the Aristotelian idea that not all of those types of judgments can be directly action-guiding; and third, that the judgments that are action-guiding can be pre-conceptual perceptions. I then use elements of Collingwood's aesthetics to make the case that although such pre-conceptual perceptions would not be propositional judgments and the relationship between them and the behaviors of the agent could not be causal, those behaviors could still qualify as incontinent actions.     

Perception and corrigibility

Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.     

Perception and tonus

Abstract.— A review is given of the achievements of more than one hundred years of research concerning the influence of muscular tonus on the perceptual phenomena related to human spatial orientation. The tonal conditions of both the extrinsic eye muscles and the complex system of skeletal muscles have been shown to have decisive influence on "egocentric localization". The factual median is perceived as being displaced in the direction of the side of the body with greater tonus. This is the case whether the tonic asymmetry is experimentally induced or natural. Corresponding to this fact, a spot of light in the dark situated at the factual eye level will be perceived as being situated above the experienced eye level. The influence on egocentric localization exercised by prolonged fixation of greater or smaller parts of the muscular system (especially of the eye muscles) is pointed out. This "fixation effect" seems to be in accordance with conceiving the postural system of the body by analogy with a servo-mechanical system, the feed-back part of which is restrained.     

Hearing Spaces

In this paper I argue that empty space can be heard. This position contrasts with the generally held view that the only things that can be heard are sounds, their properties, echoes, and perhaps sound sources. Specifically, I suggest that when sounds reverberate in enclosed environments we auditorily represent the volume of space surrounding us. Clearly, we can learn the approximate size of an enclosed space through hearing a sound reverberate within it, and so any account that denies that we hear empty space must instead show how beliefs about volumes of space can be derived indirectly from what is heard. That is, if space is not auditorily represented when we hear sounds reverberate, what is? I consider whether hearing reverberation can be thought of as hearing a distinct sound, hearing echoes, or hearing a property of a sound. I argue that experiences of reverberation cannot be reduced to the perception of any of these types and that therefore empty space is represented in auditory perceptual content. In the final section I outline two ways in which space might be represented.     

Perception and Belief

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent
There are two main issues to address. the first is that 'collateral' beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) 'non-epistemic'perception can be understood only by employing the concept of 'epistemic'perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with 'doxastic'force.