Testing the Ideology of Openness: The Comparative Effects of Talking,Writing, and Avoiding a Stressor on Rumination and Health

A persistent assumption across the psychological literature is that talking and writing about one's stress is inherently more beneficial than avoiding it. This study compared the effects of these stress management strategies on personal and relational health. Two hundred and fifty‐one dating individuals focused on a stressor that was a current source of rumination. Writing about one's stressor for 5 consecutive days (without talking about it) decreased anxiety the most. Talking continuously about one's stressor to a dating partner harmed the relationship more than writing about or avoiding it. The effect of talking repeatedly about one's stressor on relationship quality and brooding, however, depended upon the emotional support received from one's dating partner and the ability to reappraise (positively or neutrally) the stressor.     

Magical agents,global induction,and the internalism/externalism debate

Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism and internalism: moral responsibility does not require that one have a past but it does require that one not have certain kinds of past.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

The cogito circa AD 2000

What are we to make of the cogito (cogito ergo sum) today, as the walls of Cartesian philosophy crumble around us? The enduring foundation of the cogito is consciousness. It is in virtue of a particular phenomenological structure that an experience is conscious rather than unconscious. Drawing on an analysis of that structure, the cogito is given a new explication that synthesizes phenomenological, epistemological, logical, and ontological elements. What, then, is the structure of conscious thinking on which the cogito draws? What kind of certainty does the experience of thinking give one about one's thinking and about one's existence? What form of inference is the cogito, and what is the source of its validity and soundness? Does the cogito itself lead to an ontology of mind and body like Descartes's dualism? The discussion begins with Descartes's own careful formulations of some of these issues. Then the cogito is parsed into several different principles, the phenomenological principle emerging as basic. In due course the analysis sifts through Husserl's epistemology, Hintikka's logic (or pragmatics) of the cogito, and Kaplan's logic of demonstratives, as these bear specifically on the cogito.     

A Dilemma for Calibrationism

The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is the only constraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution.     

Foundationalism,Coherentism and Rule-Following Scepticism

Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's beliefs and applications. Holists will thus be coherentists about how one's usage is justified: showing that one's usage of a term is justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's beliefs and applications. Semantic reductionists, on the other hand, will understand such justification in a classically foundationalist fashion. Now Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of scepticism about meaning and the possibility of demonstrating the correctness of one's usage. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands justification in classically foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments, if good, lead not to a type of scepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about the justification of our usage, and thus a holist about semantic facts.     

To Have–or Not to Have–Another Child: Family Planning Attitudes,Intentions, and Behavior1

Two hundred eighty-two respondents, representing 141 married couples with either one child (N= 71 couples) or two children (N= 70 couples), were interviewed about their considerations and intentions regarding whether or not to have another child. Reports of their actual subsequent family planning behavior were obtained 12 months later via a mailed questionnaire. The data was gathered and analyzed according to Fishbein's attitude-behavior model which stipulates that the individual's actual behavior is a function of one's behavioral intention. This intention, in turn, is determined by two multiple factors: (a) the individual's beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior multiplied by his/her evaluation of those consequences, and (b) one's normative beliefs multiplied by one's motivation to comply with the perceived norms. The results provided substantial support for the model; both behavioral intention and actual behavior were successfully predicted from the attitudinal and normative components of the model. It was also shown that the behavioral intention mediates the relationship between the model's attitudinal and normative components and actual behavior.     

Competition,Recognition, and Approval-Seeking

Here I support my position in “Do Good Feminists Compete?” against the suggestion that competing with others weakens rather than strengthens one's sense of self.     

Practical Reason,Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes

This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self‐regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's sense of sympathy, rather than a genuine judgement about Reason. We judge these people because we cannot imaginatively identify with their desires and attitudes, and this is frustrating. Third, compared to the standard cognitive view, my account better explains the nature of our criticism of the “irrational,” and, by portraying “irrationality” as a cause of upset to other people, provides a better normative basis for being “rational.”     

K ⊈ E

In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one's evidence (K ? E). I argue that K ? E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one's evidence: together with a very plausible principle governing the acquisition of knowledge by non‐deductive inference based on evidence, K ? E leads, in a sorites‐like fashion, to what would seem a series of unacceptably bootstrapping expansions of one's evidence. I then develop some considerations about the functions of and conditions for evidence which are suggested by the argument against K ? E. I close by discussing the relationship of the argument with anti‐closure arguments of the style exemplified by the preface paradox: I contend that, if closure is assumed, it is extremely plausible to expect that the diagnosis of what goes wrong in the preface‐paradox‐style argument cannot be used to block my own argument.     

RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESES AND THE APOPHATIC,RELATIONAL THEOLOGY OF CATHERINE KELLER

In one of its most urgent folds, Catherine Keller's Cloud of the Impossible juxtaposes negative theology with relational theology for the sake of thinking constructively about today's global climate of religious conflict and ecological upheaval. The tension between these two theological approaches reflects her desire to unsay past harmful theological speech but also to speak into the present silences about the (perhaps im)possibility of a future that is not only to be feared. Suffusing Keller's Cloud is the related (perhaps im)possibility of living out one's life in conversation with a religious tradition having accepted the nonknowing character of its wisdom. Here, I develop the notion of “hypothetical faith” as an epistemic posture that commits itself to some particular religious tradition even as it acknowledges the unverifiability of that tradition's deepest truths. Understood as operating at the opposite end of the testability spectrum from science, religion‐as‐hypothesis provides a way of saying and unsaying one's tradition at the same time.     

Instrumental Rationality

Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends? Intuitively, it seems clear that it does. And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one's taking the means necessary to bring that end about. In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem. On the view I develop, the instrumental requirement is normative not because agents have reasons to comply with it, but because it is a normative standard intrinsic to intentional action—i.e., it is a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agency well.     

“Feeling Good in Your Own Skin” Part I: Primary Levels of Mental Organization

This two-part article (the first part published here and the second part will be published in the March 2011 Issue of the AJP), deals with the relation between a certain type of idiomatic expression, which we call somatic idioms, and what we recognize as the primary levels of mental organization. The article raises the following questions: What do we actually know about the primary levels of mental organization? What is the language's way to connect with the primary levels of mental organization? The first part of the article addresses the issue of how to describe and conceptualize the individual's earliest experiences, and how they continue to exist throughout one's adult life. The second part of the article focuses on the accessibility of the primary levels to language. Whereas most of the theories identify the primary levels as being outside of the linguistic realm, we suggest that some idiomatic expressions are the language's way to get in touch or connect with the primary levels. Therefore, the goals of the present article are to (1) characterize the primary levels of mental organization differently from the ways in which other psychoanalytic schools have done up until now; (2) reveal how language manages to find a way to connect with these primary levels, which are not outside of the linguistic realm, as has been previously suggested; and (3) exemplify the frequency and wide range of mental states—not only those which are pathological or extreme—in which the primary levels can be identified.     

Open‐Mindedness as Engagement

Open‐mindedness is an under‐explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open‐minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open‐minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open‐mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration.     

Remaking the She-Devil: A Critical Look at Feminist Approaches to Beauty

Cosmetic surgery provides a problematic case for feminist theorizing about femininity and women's relationship with their bodies. Feminist accounts of femininity and beauty are unable to explain cosmetic surgery without undermining the women who opt for it. I argue that cosmetic surgery may have less to do with beauty and more to do with being ordinary, taking one's life into one's own hands, and determining how much suffering is fair.     

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for conciliationism appeal to a principle Christensen [2011] dubs Independence. Independence says that evaluations of the beliefs of those with whom one disagrees should not be made on the basis of one's initial reasoning about p. In this paper, I show that this principle is false. I also show that two weaker principles that vindicate conciliationism are either false, unmotivated, or both.     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

Coming to Terms With Invisible Disability—Beyond Empathic Resonance: Commentary on Paper by Lauren Levine

For the clinician as for any parent, having a child with cognitive disabilities heightens one's sense of vulnerability and insufficiency. One is confronted with unbearably intractable limits, which generates doubt about one's therapeutic potential. The ability to empathize with a parent's distress is crucial, but only the starting point in treating a patient whose child is disabled. What may be most constructive is the dialectic between the analyst's relative detachment (involving compassion but also a willingness to dredge up disavowed negative feeling) and the parent's attached dismay. Lacanian and existentialist theories remind us that, whether normal or handicapped, we are all existentially in a state of lack. This perspective provides a useful touchstone for analyzing the experience of disability in one's own life and that of one's patients.

In further response to Lauren Levine's paper, it is argued that it is tricky to prove (beyond showing that a training analysis promotes maturation in the broadest sense) that a given aspect of an analyst's own personal analysis resulted in the capacity to heal a particular patient. The point can be made most persuasively when the actual analytic exchange, messy and circuitous as it may be, is offered in great detail.     

What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?

Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find those reasons compelling. The article then briefly looks at some implications of this conclusion.