Theoretical vs. actuarial analyses of personality ratings, and other rudimentary distinctions

In their respective attempts to identify the “critical flaws” in Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel's research on the role of dialectical reasoning in intuitive personology, both Conger and Woody (1983; see preceding articles) err by obscuring a crucial distinction between judgments, which are mental phenomena, and ratings, which are behavioral phenomena. By elaborating this distinction in the present article, we explain, among other things, the following: (1) Contrary to Woody's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representation of dialectical reasoning via interactive measurement is neither equivalent to nor reducible to Anderson's weighted averaging model of impression formation. (2) Contrary to Conger's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representations of demonstrative reasoning in terms of the normal-curve equivalents of z-scores did not bias their results against the normative or ipsative models, and in fact presented those models more favorably and in a manner more consistent with the extant empirical literature on rating behavior than does the alternative Conger proposes. (3) The profile dissimilarity analyses reported by Lamiell et al. were entirely adequate for their purposes. It is concluded that Lamiell et al.'s findings stand as billed: preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions.     

Factors and fictions in person perception: A reply to lamiell,Foss, and Cavenee1

The systematic distortion hypothesis states that under difficult memory conditions judges infer what “must” have happened from their general model of what the world is like and/or find it easier to retrieve conceptually affiliated memory items. The hypothesis further states that lay conceptual schemes “tend to be innacurate with respect to how behaviors covary, confusing ‘what is like what’ with ‘what goes with what’” (Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979), and that interbehavior correlations derived from memory-based ratings cannot be considered valid evidence for the objective existence of proposed personality traits, factors or syndromes. The systematic distortion hypothesis is clarified with reference to the Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee “critique” (1980). That “critique,” it is argued, is neither a test of the systematic distortion hypothesis nor a critique. What Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee demonstrate is that the validity of the systematic distortion hypothesis does not depend upon the unrealistic assumption that observers are capable of reporting only what they expect to see.     

Systèmes de personnalité au niveau de l'individu : vers une évaluation de l'architecture sociocognitive de la personnalité

This paper addresses conceptual strategies in the assessment of intra-individual personality architecture, including the assessment of those social-cognitive structures and dynamics that contribute to personality coherence. The paper also relates social-cognitive analyses of intra-individual personality architecture to trait-theoretic analyses of inter-individual differences in the population. An overarching theme is that these alternative research traditions should be understood as approaches to different scientific problems. Unlike, for example, the lexical Big Five tradition of personality research, social-cognitive theories are concerned fundamentally with mental structures and dynamics that causally contribute to personality functioning and coherence, and with understanding how these cognitive and affective systems develop and function in interaction with the social environment. As has been explained by Lamiell (2003) and others, inter-individual analyses cannot substitute for the study of intra-individual personality dynamics and dispositions.     

Idiothetic inquiry and the toil of Sisyphus

In response to the article by Lamiell and Trierweiler (this issue), we examine the stated epistemological origins of idiothetic proposals for theory and research in personality We argue that the justification for those proposals as advanced by Lamiell and his colleagues is wholely insufficient in view of prior research on the consistency of behavior This assertion together with our identification of problems in scaling personality and personality consistencies lead us to conclude that the pursuit of the idiothetic method is both unwarranted and ineffectual     

Individual differences in neonatal “imitation” fail to predict early social cognitive behaviour

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth – and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition – is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334–1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post‐hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal “imitation” predict later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object‐directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self‐recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal “imitation” of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean r_s = 0.027, 95% CI [?0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a “like me” mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.     

Illusory conjunctions die hard: a reply to Prinzmetal, Diedrichsen, and Ivry (2001).

M. Donk (1999) showed that various data patterns that have been considered as evidence for the existence of illusory conjunctions may be due to errors of target-nontarget confusion, an account that challenges the mere existence of illusory conjunction. In a reply, W. Prinzmetal, J. Diedrichsen, and R. B. Ivry (2001) argued against this conclusion, claiming that some earlier findings can be explained only when one assumes that illusory conjunctions exist. The current article shows that Prinzmetal et al.'s claims cannot refute any of Donk's earlier conclusions, suggesting indeed that one can only conclude that "illusory conjunctions are an illusion."     

On the universality of the attribution‐affect model of helping

Although Pilati et al.'s (2014) findings question the strong quantitative universality of the attribution‐affect model of helping, they are consistent with a weak form of quantitative universality, as well as with the qualitative universality of the theory. However, universality is put into question by previous studies revealing significant and sizeable between‐study differences in the strength of the causal paths postulated by the theory. These differences may in part reflect differences in the type of helping situations studied.     

Nomothetic and idiothetic measurement in personality

Lamiell (1981, 1982a) has recently advanced an idiographic approach to the measurement of personality that he has labeled “idiothetic” In contrast to classical nomothetic strategies, the idiothetic method of scaling personality traits discounts normative transformations of attribute scores and, according to Lamiell, provides the basis for a useful index of cross–situational behavior consistency An analysis of Lamiell's procedures indicates several problems with the idiothetic approach to personality assessment and with the proposed measure of behavior consistency Notable is the fact that the method does not account for base rates of behavior in situations and, therefore, may suggest anomalous interpretations of personality characteristics and of behavior consistencies It is argued that conventional nomothetic methods are sufficient for the goals of explaining and predicting behavior     

“IF I WERE GOD”: EINSTEIN AND RELIGION

Designed as an introductory lecture for the conference “Einstein, God and Time,” this essay provides a brief survey of three sets of relations—between Einstein and time, God and time, and Einstein and God. The question is raised whether Einstein's rejection of absolute time held any implications for theology. It is argued that, despite Einstein's denial and his exemplary caution, the fact that Isaac Newton had associated absolute space and absolute time with a deity who constituted them meant that a revisitation of theological questions was inevitable. Consideration is then given to the time‐lessness and changelessness of God, with a brief reference to eschatological issues. The question whether there might be parallels between the renunciation of Newtonian time by physicists and by Christian theologians is discussed with reference to recent commentary on the eschatological thinking of Jürgen Moltmann. Whether Einstein himself would have sympathized with these theologies is to be doubted, given his antipathy to anthropomorphic and anthropopathic concepts of deity. Finally, in exploring Einstein's sometimes whimsical use of theological language, it becomes necessary to acknowledge that his well‐known affirmation of the complementarity of science and religion rested on a distinctive construction of religion that allowed him to say he was a “deeply religious unbeliever.” Attempts to categorize his convictions, or to appropriate them for conventional theistic purposes, miss their subtlety and their apophatic resonances.     

The Hermann grid illusion revisited

The Hermann grid illusion consists of smudges perceived at the intersections of a white grid presented on a black background. In 1960 the effect was first explained by a theory advanced by Baumgartner suggesting the illusory effect is due to differences in the discharge characteristics of retinal ganglion cells when their receptive fields fall along the intersections versus when they fall along non-intersecting regions of the grid. Since then, others have claimed that this theory might not be adequate, suggesting that a model based on cortical mechanisms is necessary [Lingelbach et al, 1985 Perception 14(1) A7; Spillmann, 1994 Perception 23 691 708; Geier et al, 2004 Perception 33 Supplement, 53; Westheimer, 2004 Vision Research 44 2457 2465]. We present in this paper the following evidence to show that the retinal ganglion cell theory is untenable: (i) varying the makeup of the grid in a manner that does not materially affect the putative differential responses of the ganglion cells can reduce or eliminate the illusory effect; (ii) varying the grid such as to affect the putative differential responses of the ganglion cells does not eliminate the illusory effect; and (iii) the actual spatial layout of the retinal ganglion cell receptive fields is other than that assumed by the theory. To account for the Hermann grid illusion we propose an alternative theory according to which the illusory effect is brought about by the manner in which S1 type simple cells (as defined by Schiller et al, 1976 Journal of Neurophysiology 39 1320-1333) in primary visual cortex respond to the grid. This theory adequately handles many of the facts delineated in this paper.     

“Idiographic” vis-à-vis “idiodynamic” in the historical perspective of personality theory: Remembering Gordon Allport, 1897–1997

The centenary of Gordon W. Allport provides an occasion for reappraising his special position regarding uniqueness in personality. Allport's theory of personality, as first presented in his 1937 textbook, highlighted the idiographic in conjunction with the nomothetic approach, and the fundamental unit in his formulation was the trait. He described common and unique traits as well as the unique organization of traits. In contradistinction, the idiodynamic orientation, introduced by Saul Rosenzweig in 1951 and, in more detail in 1958, focused on events which over a lifespan constitute an idioverse—a population of phenomenological events. Allport's original emphasis on the idiographic and his later confusion concerning idiodynamics, can, in considerable measure, be understood by recognizing the role of religious spirituality in his conception of the person. That conception, which derived from an early religious indoctrination, asserted itself with renewed vigor in his later years. His scientific conception of personality thus remained unconsummated, subordinated by him to the unsolvable mysteries of ontology which properly belong, he believed, in the domain of faith. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Reducing faking on personality tests: Testing a new faking‐mitigation procedure in a U.S. job applicant sample

Faking has remained a major concern for organizations using self‐report personality measures for selection. Scholars recenlty developed a new middle‐warning faking‐mitigation procedure. The present replication study was the first field test in the United States using 193 applicants for an entry‐level position in a New York‐based consulting firm. Results replicated most of Fan et al.'s findings including (a) the middle‐warning significantly lowered fakers' personality scores over retesting, whereas the control message had little influence on nonfakers; (b) the above warning effect carried over to personality scales that were not retested; and (c) the persistent tendency of potential fakers rising to the top of personality score distribution was weakened. In addition, applicants' perceptions were not being negatively affected by the warning.     

Testing the status-legitimacy hypothesis: Predicting system justification using objective and subjective socioeconomic status in China and the United States

The status-legitimacy hypothesis proposes that those who are most disadvantaged by unequal social systems are even more likely than members of more advantaged groups to provide ideological support for the very social system that is responsible for their disadvantages. Li, Yang, Wu, and Kou (2020, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin) sought to expand the generalizability of this hypothesis by testing it in China, addressing inconsistencies surrounding the empirical support for this hypothesis by postulating that the construct of status should be separated into an objective and subjective status marker. They reported that objective socioeconomic status (SES; income and education) negatively predicted system justification, while subjective SES positively predicted system justification. In the present study we attempt to replicate and extend the work of Li et al. in a cross-cultural comparison of demographic stratified quota online samples in China and the United States. We test the status-legitimacy hypothesis using objective and subjective SES to predict system justification using cross-sectional and cross-lagged regression analyses. We received partial support for Li et al.'s findings. Specifically, subjective SES positively predicted system justification for both societies during cross-sectional and cross-lagged longitudinal analyses. However, we failed to replicate Li et al.'s findings surrounding objective SES in China during cross-sectional and cross-lagged analyses.     

A Multiple‐Channel Model of Task‐Dependent Ambiguity Resolution in Sentence Comprehension

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton (1998) found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so‐called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension (parsing) because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model (URM), assumes that parsing is non‐deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira (2008) have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task‐dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task‐dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self‐paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task‐dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task‐driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings.     

The basis of the Bourdon illusion

Day (1990) and Day, Mitchell, and Stecher (1990) recently reported new data on the Bourdon illusion, showing that the effect occurs in novel variations of the classic figure--for example, with orthogonal and parallel test edges--and also that it occurs in the haptic modality. Day (1990) criticized theories of the Bourdon effect proposed by Wenderoth, Criss, and van der Zwan (1990), Wenderoth and O'Connor (1987a, 1987b), and Wenderoth, O'Connor, and Johnson (1986), and proposed his own "perceptual compromise" hypothesis. It is argued that Day has inaccurately portrayed the Wenderoth et al. theory, and that his own hypothesis lacks predictive power because it lacks any reference to neural mechanisms. Day's theory is thus unable to account for extant data, including his own. It is demonstrated how Day's novel experiments provide insights into the mechanisms of the Bourdon effect, and also how the Wenderoth et al. theory can account for the new data of Day (1990) and Day et al. (1990).     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

On the science of Rorschach research

Wood et al.'s (1999b) article contained several general points that are quite sound. Conducting research with an extreme groups design does produce effect sizes that are larger than those observed in an unselected population. Appropriate control groups are important for any study that wishes to shed light on the characteristics of a targeted experimental group and experimental validity is enhanced when researchers collect data from both groups simultaneously. Diagnostic efficiency statistics--or any summary measures of test validity--should be trusted more when they are drawn from multiple studies conducted by different investigators across numerous settings rather than from a single investigator's work. There should be no question that these points are correct. However, I have pointed out numerous problems with specific aspects of Wood et al.'s (1999b) article. Wood et al. gave improper citations that claimed researchers found or said things that they did not. Wood et al. indicated my data set did not support the incremental validity of the Rorschach over the MMPI-2 when, in fact, my study never reported such an analysis and my data actually reveal that the opposite conclusion is warranted. Wood et al. asserted there was only one proper way to conduct incremental validity analyses even though experts have described how their recommended procedure can lead to significant complications. Wood et al. cited a section of Cohen and Cohen (1983) to bolster their claim that hierarchical and step-wise regression procedures were incompatible and to criticize Burns and Viglione's (1996) regression analysis. However, that section of Cohen and Cohen's text actually contradicted Wood et al.'s argument. Wood et al. tried to convince readers that Burns and Viglione used improper alpha levels and drew improper conclusions from their regression data although Burns and Viglione had followed the research evidence on this topic and the expert recommendations provided in Hosmer and Lemeshow's (1989) classic text. Wood et al. oversimplified issues associated with extreme group research designs and erroneously suggested that diagnostic studies were immune from interpretive confounds that can be associated with this type of design. Wood et al. ignored or dismissed the valid reasons why Burns and Viglione used an extreme groups design, and they never mentioned how Burns and Viglione used a homogeneous sample that actually was likely to find smaller than normal effect sizes. Wood et al. also overlooked the fact that Burns and Viglione identified their results as applying to female nonpatients; they never suggested their findings would characterize those obtained from a clinical sample. Wood et al. criticized composite measures although some of the most important and classic findings in the history of research on personality recommend composite measures as a way to minimize error and maximize validity. Wood et al. also were mistaken about the elements that constitute an optimal composite measure. Wood et al. apparently ignored the factor-analytic evidence that demonstrated how Burns and Viglione created a reasonable composite scale, and Wood et al. similarly ignored the clear evidence that supported the content and criterion related validity of the EMRF. With respect to the HEV, Wood et al. created a z-score formula that used the wrong means and standard deviations. They continued to use this formula despite being informed that it was incorrect. Subsequently, Wood et al. told readers that their faulty z-score formula was "incompatible" with the proper weighted formula and asserted that the two formulas "do not yield identical results" and "do not yield HEV scores that are identical or even very close." These published claims were made even though Wood et al. had seen the results from eight large samples, all of which demonstrated that their wrong formula had correlations greater than .998 with the correct formula. At worst, it seems that Wood et al. (199     

Ghazāli and the Ash'arites

It has been widely accepted that the thought of al‐Ghazāli was broadly in line with the Ash'arite approach to theology, which came to have a dominant role in Islamic thought for the last thousand years. Recently, though, many commentators have argued that this is a misconception, and that there are many instances where Ghazāli produces arguments and opinions which are not compatible with Ash'arism. It is argued here that these examples do not establish that the general line of Ghazāli's thought is not Ash'arite. The fact that on occasion he is prepared to use the language of his opponents does not invalidate the Ash'arite basis of his thought. It is quite possible to adhere to a philosophical view about how reality is and at the same time use the language of those who have a different view without committing oneself to that different form of expression. Although the revisionist approach to the interpretation of Ghazāli is interesting and often perceptive, it does not lead to any necessity to question his adherence to Ash'arite principles in general.     

“It Can Happen to You”: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk Management

This essay provides a critical analysis of rape prevention since the 1980s. I argue that we must challenge rape prevention's habitual reinforcement of the notion that fear is a woman's best line of defense. 1 suggest changes that must be made in the anti‐rape movement if we are to move past fear. Ultimately, I raise the question of what, if not vague threats and scare tactics, constitutes prevention.