Frames of reference in spatial language acquisition

Languages differ in how they encode spatial frames of reference. It is unknown how children acquire the particular frame-of-reference terms in their language (e.g., left/right, north/south). The present paper uses a word-learning paradigm to investigate 4-year-old English-speaking children’s acquisition of such terms. In Part I, with five experiments, we contrasted children’s acquisition of novel word pairs meaning left-right and north-south to examine their initial hypotheses and the relative ease of learning the meanings of these terms. Children interpreted ambiguous spatial terms as having environment-based meanings akin to north and south, and they readily learned and generalized north-south meanings. These studies provide the first direct evidence that children invoke geocentric representations in spatial language acquisition. However, the studies leave unanswered how children ultimately acquire “left” and “right.” In Part II, with three more experiments, we investigated why children struggle to master body-based frame-of-reference words. Children successfully learned “left” and “right” when the novel words were systematically introduced on their own bodies and extended these words to novel (intrinsic and relative) uses; however, they had difficulty learning to talk about the left and right sides of a doll. This difficulty was paralleled in identifying the left and right sides of the doll in a non-linguistic memory task. In contrast, children had no difficulties learning to label the front and back sides of a doll. These studies begin to paint a detailed account of the acquisition of spatial terms in English, and provide insights into the origins of diverse spatial reference frames in the world’s languages.     

Parent–child interaction: Does parental language matter?

Although parental language and behaviour have been widely investigated, few studies have examined their unique and interactive contribution to the parent–child relationship. The current study explores how parental behaviour (sensitivity and non‐intrusiveness) and the use of parental language (exploring and control languages) correlate with parent–child dyadic mutuality. Specifically, we investigated the following questions: (1) ‘Is parental language associated with parent–child dyadic mutuality above and beyond parental behaviour?’ (2) ‘Does parental language moderate the links between parental behaviour and the parent–child dyadic mutuality?’ (3) ‘Do these differences vary between mothers and fathers?’ The sample included 65 children (M_age = 1.97 years, SD = 0.86) and their parents. We observed parental behaviour, parent–child dyadic mutuality, and the type of parental language used during videotaped in‐home observations. The results indicated that parental language and behaviours are distinct components of the parent–child interaction. Parents who used higher levels of exploring language showed higher levels of parent–child dyadic mutuality, even when accounting for parental behaviour. Use of controlling language, however, was not found to be related to the parent–child dyadic mutuality. Different moderation models were found for mothers and fathers. These results highlight the need to distinguish parental language and behaviour when assessing their contribution to the parent–child relationship.     

Piecing together numerical language: children's use of default units in early counting and quantification

When asked to ‘find three forks’, adult speakers of English use the noun ‘fork’ to identify units for counting. However, when number words (e.g. three) and quantifiers (e.g. more, every) are used with unfamiliar words (‘Give me three blickets’) noun‐specific conceptual criteria are unavailable for picking out units. This poses a problem for young children learning language, who begin to use quantifiers and number words by age 2, despite knowing a relatively small number of nouns. Without knowing how individual nouns pick out units of quantification – e.g. what counts as a blicket– how could children decide whether there are three blickets or four? Three experiments suggest that children might solve this problem by assigning ‘default units’ of quantification to number words, quantifiers, and number morphology. When shown objects that are broken into arbitrary pieces, 4‐year‐olds in Experiment 1 treated pieces as units when counting, interpreting quantifiers, and when using singular–plural morphology. Experiment 2 found that although children treat object‐hood as sufficient for quantification, it is not necessary. Also sufficient for individuation are the criteria provided by known nouns. When two nameable things were glued together (e.g. two cups), children counted the glued things as two. However, when two arbitrary pieces of an object were put together (e.g. two parts of a ball), children counted them as one, even if they had previously counted the pieces as two. Experiment 3 found that when the pieces of broken things were nameable (e.g. wheels of a bicycle), 4‐year‐olds did not include them in counts of whole objects (e.g. bicycles). We discuss the role of default units in early language acquisition, their origin in acquisition, and how children eventually acquire an adult semantics identifying units of quantification.     

Handedness shapes children's abstract concepts

Can children’s handedness influence how they represent abstract concepts like kindness and intelligence? Here we show that from an early age, right‐handers associate rightward space more strongly with positive ideas and leftward space with negative ideas, but the opposite is true for left‐handers. In one experiment, children indicated where on a diagram a preferred toy and a dispreferred toy should go. Right‐handers tended to assign the preferred toy to a box on the right and the dispreferred toy to a box on the left. Left‐handers showed the opposite pattern. In a second experiment, children judged which of two cartoon animals looked smarter (or dumber) or nicer (or meaner). Right‐handers attributed more positive qualities to animals on the right, but left‐handers to animals on the left. These contrasting associations between space and valence cannot be explained by exposure to language or cultural conventions, which consistently link right with good. Rather, right‐ and left‐handers implicitly associated positive valence more strongly with the side of space on which they can act more fluently with their dominant hands. Results support the body‐specificity hypothesis ( Casasanto, 2009 ), showing that children with different kinds of bodies think differently in corresponding ways.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

Is Structure Dependence an Innate Constraint? New Experimental Evidence From Children's Complex‐Question Production

According to Crain and Nakayama (1987) , when forming complex yes/no questions, children do not make errors such as Is the boy who smoking is crazy? because they have innate knowledge of structure dependence and so will not move the auxiliary from the relative clause. However, simple recurrent networks are also able to avoid such errors, on the basis of surface distributional properties of the input ( Lewis & Elman, 2001 ; Reali & Christiansen, 2005 ). Two new elicited production studies revealed that (a) children occasionally produce structure‐dependence errors and (b) the pattern of children's auxiliary‐doubling errors (Is the boy who is smoking is crazy?) suggests a sensitivity to surface co‐occurrence patterns in the input. This article concludes that current data do not provide any support for the claim that structure dependence is an innate constraint, and that it is possible that children form a structure‐dependent grammar on the basis of exposure to input that exhibits this property.     

Tafsir and Istifsar in the Qur'an

The more emphatic the authority of a sacred Scripture the more crucial the exegesis it receives. Yet no text is able to rise from the page and say: ‘I have been misread’. Hence the basic power of the interpreter. Tafsir or ‘interpretation’, has always been a vital task vis‐à‐vis the Qur'an. Urgent questions attend on it—who is qualified? By what skills? What range of questions will they admit? Are these circumscribed to, for example, grammar? Earlier margins? Are there excluded concerns? How far will contemporary ones be admissible? All these might be said to constitute istifsar or ‘Asking tafsir’ to be comprehensively pursued. After examining traditional techniques the article reviews ‘contextuality’, ‘abrogation’, metaphor, tadabbur (or ‘reflection') and finally, some profound implications of the Qur'an's own self‐division into Meccan and Medinan elements and how this might bear on a de‐politicization of Islamic religion in response to contemporary necessities, as faced by Islam in minority situations in many countries.     

Cultural influences on children's understanding of the human body and the concept of life

This study aimed to identify the age by which children begin to demonstrate a biological understanding of the human body and the idea that the purpose of body functioning is to maintain life. The study also explored the influence of education, culturally specific experiences and religion on knowledge acquisition in this domain. Children aged between 4 and 7 years from three different cultural backgrounds (White British, British Muslim, and Pakistani Muslim) were interviewed about the human body and its functioning. At least half of the 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds in each cultural group, and almost all 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds, referred to the maintenance of life when explaining organs' functions and so were classified as ‘life theorizers’. Pakistani Muslim children gave fewer biological responses to questions about organs' functions and the purpose of eating and breathing, but referred to life more than their British counterparts. Irrespective of cultural group, older children understood organ location and function better than younger children. These findings support Jaakkola and Slaughter's (2002, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 20, 325) view that children's understanding of the body as a ‘life machine’ emerges around the ages of 4–5 years. They also suggest that, despite many similarities in children's ideas cross‐culturally, different educational input and culturally specific experiences influence aspects of their biological understanding.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are ‘Machiavellian’ Chinese children well‐adapted in the peer group? The relationship between resource acquisition strategies and social functioning and status

The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationship between resource acquisition strategies, social functioning and social status in Chinese children. A sample of nearly 500 Chinese children in elementary schools in Shanghai, China, participated in this study. The authors divided the sample into five resource acquisition strategies; based on self‐reported use of coercive and pro‐social strategies of resource control, they were ‘bistrategic controllers’ (Machiavellians), ‘coercive controllers’, ‘pro‐social controllers’, ‘non‐controllers’, or ‘typicals’. The results revealed that bistrategic controllers were the most effective in resource control, followed by pro‐social and coercive controllers: non‐controllers were the least effective. It also indicated that bistrategic and coercive controllers exhibited poor social functioning and low peer status; in contrast, ‘typical’ controllers emerged as possessing positive social functioning and high peer status. In addition, non‐controllers were not at risk with regard to social competence. The results indicate specific cultural ‘meanings’ of different resource acquisition strategies in Chinese children.     

The philosopher and the Fly Bottle

Wittgenstein said that what he does in philosophy is ‘to show the fly out of the fly bottle’ (Philosophical Investigations¶309). He is, himself, both the fly, his alter-ego, and the philosopher who turns the fly around. This is a transformation in his vision of and perspective on those matters which tempted him, through the questions it posed for him, into the bottle, there to be trapped – trapped into a form of scepticism, realism, or one of its many reductionist satellites, for instance. The transformation which releases him into the open takes philosophical work which unearths unspoken assumptions and subjects them to criticism. As for the movement into and out of the bottle, this is the philosophical journey in the course of which the philosopher comes to a new understanding of the matters he questioned in a way that led him into the bottle. To come to such a better understanding, therefore, the philosopher has to have the courage of his temptations and not be afraid to give up what he holds on to. What he learns in coming out of the bottle belongs to the work that frees him from the compelling pictures that held him captive within the space of opposed theories held together by common assumptions. It cannot be acquired or conveyed independently of such work. It is in this sense that philosophy is a struggle with difficulties which each philosopher has to face and work through himself. The difficulties are not in him, but they are his– they are difficulties for him. He has to work on them. That is why, while he can learn from others, he cannot borrow from them, build on or go on from what they have established. In the first section of the paper I put on some flesh on this. But what I provide is still a thumb-nail sketch. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ is itself a philosophical question, like any other, and can only be ‘answered’ like them. It is only that with which we are familiar – in our mastery of the language we speak or in our experience of life –that can raise philosophical questions for us. Thus contrast ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘what is thinking?’ with ‘what is cancer?’, ‘what is osmosis?’. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ similarly can only be asked by a philosopher, someone who has asked and struggled with its questions. Otherwise it is a request for information to which the full answer is: you have to study philosophy if you really want to find out. It follows that what I say about the way philosophical questions are to be answered applies equally to the question about the nature of philosophy. Hence I can do no other than provide a thumb-nail sketch for those who have themselves struggled with philosophical questions. As for what I provide in the following three sections, they are no more than illustrations of a way of working on those sample questions – questions on which hopefully the reader will have thought himself. I am able to offer such illustrations only because I have myself been caught up by these questions and have worked on them and discussed them more fully elsewhere (see Bibliography).     

Children's implicit attitude acquisition: Evaluative statements succeed,repeated pairings fail

From the earliest ages tested, children and adults show similar overall magnitudes of implicit attitudes toward various social groups. However, such consistency in attitude magnitude may obscure meaningful age‐related change in the ways that children (vs. adults) acquire implicit attitudes. This experiment investigated children's implicit attitude acquisition by comparing the separate and joint effects of two learning interventions, previously shown to form implicit attitudes in adults. Children (N = 280, ages 7–11 years) were taught about novel social groups through either evaluative statements (ES; auditorily presented verbal statements such as ‘Longfaces are bad, Squarefaces are good’), repeated evaluative pairings (REP; visual pairings of Longface/Squareface group members with valenced images such as a puppy or snake), or a combination of ES+REP. Results showed that children acquired implicit attitudes following ES and ES+REP, with REP providing no additional learning beyond ES alone. Moreover, children did not acquire implicit attitudes in four variations of REP, each designed to facilitate learning by systematically increasing verbal scaffolding to specify (a) the learning goal, (b) the valence of the unconditioned stimuli, and (c) the group categories of the conditioned stimuli. These findings underscore the early‐emerging role of verbal statements in children's implicit attitude acquisition, as well as a possible age‐related limit in children's acquisition of novel implicit attitudes from repeated pairings.     

Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

How Do Children Restrict Their Linguistic Generalizations? An (Un‐)Grammaticality Judgment Study

A paradox at the heart of language acquisition research is that, to achieve adult‐like competence, children must acquire the ability to generalize verbs into non‐attested structures, while avoiding utterances that are deemed ungrammatical by native speakers. For example, children must learn that, to denote the reversal of an action, un‐ can be added to many verbs, but not all (e.g., roll/unroll; close/*unclose). This study compared theoretical accounts of how this is done. Children aged 5–6 (N = 18), 9–10 (N = 18), and adults (N = 18) rated the acceptability of un‐ prefixed forms of 48 verbs (and, as a control, bare forms). Across verbs, a negative correlation was observed between the acceptability of ungrammatical un‐ prefixed forms (e.g., *unclose) and the frequency of (a) the bare form and (b) alternative forms (e.g., open), supporting the entrenchment and pre‐emption hypotheses, respectively. Independent ratings of the extent to which verbs instantiate the semantic properties characteristic of a hypothesized semantic cryptotype for un‐ prefixation were a significant positive predictor of acceptability, for all age groups. The relative importance of each factor differed for attested and unattested un‐ forms and also varied with age. The findings are interpreted in the context of a new hybrid account designed to incorporate the three factors of entrenchment, pre‐emption, and verb semantics.     

Is Eusebius of Caesarea a ‘Nicene’? A Contribution to the Notion of Conciliar Theology

Amidst recent explorations in conciliar theology by Timothy Pawl and others, pressing questions about our theological readings of the councils have arisen – are we to treat the theology of the councils as unique to their historical context? Or as a unified body of ‘conciliar’ theology? This paper addresses these questions, using Eusebius of Caesarea as a unique example of Nicene theology. It defines the metrics for evaluating different definitions of the term ‘Nicene’ by distinguishing between judgements and concepts. Then, it ‘measures’ Eusebius’ theology according to the two proposed definitions. Finally, it offers constructive comments for conciliar theology, claiming that conceptual language is clarified through the councils, even if its interpretation is not immediately fixed.     

The alchemy of training

Abstract: Training in Zurich has its own special character but also is marked by the very fact that it is in Zurich. Zurich radiates its own distinct energy and carries a specific historical significance in the world of analytical psychology. This, like all things with psychic energy, has a spectrum of meaning. This spectrum, as well as the ‘spirit’ of the place, will be critically examined, taking into account the ‘blessings’ and ‘curses’ of such genius loci. Training in Zurich is experientially based and is first and foremost an initiation: an initiation into symbolic life, or rather life where symbol plays an important role. Training is understood to involve a transformation of one's self, much like the 8^th century alchemist Morienus Romanus understood the opus as a ‘human transformation system’. It is not merely an education. The requirement of ‘immersion’ is core to the experience of becoming an analyst in Zurich and this sets up a valuable discomfort between rational intellectual learning and intuitive experience, between knowing and not‐knowing. How does this dis‐serve the making of an analyst? What is implicit in this immersion and its discomfort? Does it have a role in today's emphasis on clinical and empirical training? Does Zurich still offer something unique and valuable in the world of training, or is it passé? From these questions, the dichotomy of what is ‘urgent’ and ‘essential’ in training will be examined.     

Offline consolidation supersedes prior knowledge benefits in children's (but not adults’) word learning

Prior linguistic knowledge is proposed to support the acquisition and consolidation of new words. Adults typically have larger vocabularies to support word learning than children, but the developing brain shows enhanced neural processes that are associated with offline memory consolidation. This study investigated contributions of prior knowledge to initial word acquisition and consolidation at different points in development, by teaching children and adults novel words (e.g., ballow) that varied in the number of English word‐form “neighbours” (e.g., wallow, bellow). Memory for the novel word‐forms was tested immediately after training, the next day and 1 week later, to assess the time‐course of prior knowledge contributions. Children aged 7–9 years (Experiments 1, 3) and adults (Experiment 2) recalled words with neighbours better than words without neighbours when tested immediately after training. However, a period of offline consolidation improved overall recall and reduced the influence of word‐form neighbours on longer term memory. These offline consolidation benefits were larger in children than adults, supporting theories that children have a greater propensity for consolidating phonologically distinctive language information. Local knowledge of just a single word‐form neighbour was enough to enhance learning, and this led to the individual differences in word recall that were related to adults’ global vocabulary ability. The results support the proposal that the relative contributions of different learning mechanisms change across the lifespan, and highlight the importance of testing theoretical models of word learning in the context of development.     

Adults' representations of the Earth: Implications for children's acquisition of scientific concepts

When children are asked to draw the Earth they often produce intriguing pictures in which, for example, people seem to be standing on a flat disc or inside a hollow sphere. These drawings, and children's answers to questions, have been interpreted as indicating that children construct naïve, theory‐like mental models of the Earth (e.g. Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992 ). However, recent studies using different methods have found little or no evidence of these mental models, and report that many young children have some scientific knowledge of the Earth. To examine the reasons for these contrasting findings, adults (N = 350) were given the drawing task previously given to 5‐year‐old children. Fewer than half of the adults' pictures were scientific, and 15% were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings. Up to half of the answers to questions (e.g. ‘Where do people live?’) were non‐scientific. Open‐ended questions and follow‐up interviews revealed that non‐scientific responses were given because adults found the apparently simple task confusing and challenging. Since children very probably find it even more difficult, these findings indicate that children's non‐scientific responses, like adults', often result from methodological problems with the task. These results therefore explain the discrepant findings of previous research, and support the studies which indicate that children do not have naïve mental models of the Earth.     

Brain bases of morphological processing in Chinese‐English bilingual children

Can bilingual exposure impact children's neural circuitry for learning to read? To answer this question, we investigated the brain bases of morphological awareness, one of the key spoken language abilities for learning to read in English and Chinese. Bilingual Chinese‐English and monolingual English children (N = 22, ages 7–12) completed morphological tasks that best characterize each of their languages: compound morphology in Chinese (e.g. basket + ball = basketball) and derivational morphology in English (e.g. re + do = redo). In contrast to monolinguals, bilinguals showed greater activation in the left middle temporal region, suggesting that bilingual exposure to Chinese impacts the functionality of brain regions supporting semantic abilities. Similar to monolinguals, bilinguals showed greater activation in the left inferior frontal region [BA 45] in English than Chinese, suggesting that young bilinguals form language‐specific neural representations. The findings offer new insights to inform bilingual and cross‐linguistic models of language and literacy acquisition.     

Individual differences in the shape bias in preschool children with specific language impairment and typical language development: theoretical and clinical implications

We investigated whether preschool children with specific language impairment (SLI) exhibit the shape bias in word learning: the bias to generalize based on shape rather than size, color, or texture in an object naming context (‘This is a wek; find another wek’) but not in a non‐naming similarity classification context (‘See this? Which one goes with this one?’). Fifty‐four preschool children (16 with SLI, 16 children with typical language [TL] in an equated control group, and 22 additional children with TL included in individual differences analyses but not group comparisons) completed a battery of linguistic and cognitive assessments and two experiments. In Experiment 1, children made generalization choices in object naming and similarity classification contexts on separate days, from options similar to a target object in shape, color, or texture. On average, TL children exhibited the shape bias in an object naming context, but children with SLI did not. In Experiment 2, we tested whether the failure to exhibit the shape bias might be linked to ability to detect systematicities in the visual domain. Experiment 2 supported this hypothesis, in that children with SLI failed to learn simple paired visual associations that were readily learned by children with TL. Analyses of individual differences in the two studies revealed that visual paired‐associate learning predicted degree of shape bias in children with SLI and TL better than any other measure of nonverbal intelligence or standard assessments of language ability. We discuss theoretical and clinical implications.