Existentialism and postmodernism. Continuities,breaks, and some consequences for medical theory

Since existentialism lost its influence in philosophy in the 1960s, postmodern theory has taken over criticizing basic concepts of western thought. From a postmodern point of view, the main shortcomings of existentialism is that it criticizes traditional unitarian concepts, while re-inventing new unitarian models. Against these unitarian approaches postmodernism holds that the world can only be described in terms of difference. In this article the postmodern program and its differences from existentialism are explained in reference to three concepts of western philosophy: subject, truth, and ethics. Applying these concepts, the relevance of postmodernism for medical theory is illustrated.     

Idealized laws,antirealism, and applied science: A case in hydrogeology

When is a law too idealized to be usefully applied to a specific situation? To answer this question, this essay considers a law in hydrogeology called Darcy's Law, both as it is used in what is called the symmetric-cone model, and as it is used in equations to determine a well's groundwater velocity and hydraulic conductivity. After discussing Darcy's law and its applications, the essay concludes that this idealized law, as well as associated models and equations in hydrogeology, are not realistic in the sense required by the D-N account. They exhibit what McMullin calls mathematical idealization, construct idealization, empirical-causal idealization, and subjunctive-causal idealization. Yet this lack of realism in hydrogeology is problematic for reasons unrelated to the status of the D-N account. These idealizations are also problematic in applied situations. Their problems require developing two supplemental criteria, necessary for their productive application.     

Two kinds of first-person-oriented content

In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a novel account of propositional content in general, namely based on the notion of an attitudinal object. That notion solves two major problems with Lewis’s account of contents of attitudes de se and clarifies the difference between contents of attitudes de se and contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will propose an analysis of contents of the second kind in terms of what I call first-person-based genericity, a form of genericity most explicitly expressed by sentences with generic one. I show how the overall account explains the particular semantic properties of sentences giving rise to intuitions of relative truth that distinguish them from sentences with expressions interpreted de se. I will start by introducing Lewis’s account of attitudes de se and the problems that go along with that account. Introducing the notion of an attitudinal object, I will extend the account by an account of the truth conditions of the content of attitudes de se. I then discuss the second kind of first-person-oriented content, which is associated with intuitions of relative truth, and give an account of such contents on the basis of an analysis of generic one. Again making use of attitudinal objects, I will make clear what exactly distinguishes those contents from first-person-oriented contents of the first sort.     

Cocreated Idealization in the Winnicott/Khan Analysis: Commentary on Paper by Joyce Slochower

Joyce Slochower's paper applies relational thinking in a new conceptualization of idealization and denigration, which she sees as cocreated. Building on a thorough review of the analytic literature on the clinical experience of idealization, she suggests that idealization, helpful at first, often leads to therapeutic failure. She utilizes historical material about Donald Winnicott and his analyses of Masud Khan and Harry Guntrip to open a space for discussion of a previously unexplored topic, the idealization of the patient by the analyst. Slochower suggests that Winnicott's personal vulnerability to experiences of idealization contributed to failure in his analysis of Khan and to less severe problems in the Guntrip analysis. I focus on the Khan analysis and suggest that the problem was not the idealization, which may have been inevitable, but Winnicott's apparent failure to understand and make use of it. I also suggest that, with the very same understanding, the analytic community in general would benefit from thinking about the community's idealization of Winnicott.     

Abstraction and its Limits: Finding Space For Novel Explanation

Several modern accounts of explanation acknowledge the importance of abstraction and idealization for our explanatory practice. However, once we allow a role for abstraction, questions remain. I ask whether the relation between explanations at different theoretical levels should be thought of wholly in terms of abstraction, and argue that changes of the quantities in terms of which we describe a system can lead to novel explanations that are not merely abstractions of some more detailed picture. I use the example of phase transitions as described by statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to illustrate this, and to demonstrate some details of the relationship between abstraction, idealization, and novel explanation.     

Idealization and modeling

This paper examines the role of mathematical idealization in describing and explaining various features of the world. It examines two cases: first, briefly, the modeling of shock formation using the idealization of the continuum. Second, and in more detail, the breaking of droplets from the points of view of both analytic fluid mechanics and molecular dynamical simulations at the nano-level. It argues that the continuum idealizations are explanatorily ineliminable and that a full understanding of certain physical phenomena cannot be obtained through completely detailed, nonidealized representations.     

The attitudinal view and the integration of the particular object of emotions

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative.     

“When I Was Young” The Idealization of the Interchangeability of Phases of Life

This paper presents the concept of the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as an enhancement, or rather as a further development of Alfred Schutz’s general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. It claims that the according figure of thought is a constitutive part of acts of understanding in everyday life where, in order to understand each other, individuals of different age-groups have to overcome the difference of perspectives that are attached to their particular ages. This is accomplished by a specific assumption that is also applied in the case of intrasubjective, autobiographical understanding. By discussing its sociological significance as well as its philosophical background, this paper introduces the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as a fundamental and universal figure of understanding.     

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

The association of idealization and intimacy factors with condom use in gay male couples

The purpose of this study was to assess the relationship of idealization and three specific intimacy factors (relationship satisfaction, excitement, and closeness) to reported condom use in gay male couples. It was expected that there would be negative associations of idealization and the intimacy factors with condom use. Both members of 45 gay male couples completed a questionnaire that assessed these factors. This study found (a) idealization to have a significant negative correlation with condom use, suggesting that the more the individuals idealized each other, the less likely that condoms were used during sex; (b) a significant negative association between relationship satisfaction and condom use, implying that as the couples experienced more satisfaction within their relationships, condom use decreased; (c) a significant negative correlation between excitement and condom use, suggesting that as excitement increased, condom use decreased; and (d) no significant association between closeness and condom use.     

Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception,inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems

This review asks whether observers can obtain information about others’ intentions from observation of their actions; and if so, whether this process is performed using direct perceptual or inferential processes (prominent examples of each being the intention understanding theory of mirror neuron function, and mentalizing accounts of intention understanding, respectively). I propose four conditions that should be fulfilled in order to support a direct perception account, and suggest that only two of these conditions are supported by the existing data. I then propose and review three further sources of evidence which have the potential to inform this debate, concluding that the data do not support the direct perception account. In particular, mirror neurons may be involved in lower-level processes of action perception, but there is no evidence to support their involvement in the type of higher-level intention understanding that is proposed by the direct perception account.     

Understanding and the Norm of Explanation

I propose and defend the hypothesis that understanding is the norm of (the speech act of) explanation. On this proposal, an explanation should express understanding. I call this the understanding account of explanation. The understanding account is supported by social and introspective observations. It is also supported by the relationship between knowledge and understanding, on the one hand, and assertion and explanation, on the other.     

No need for pedestals: Idealization does not predict better relationships among Asians

The authors tested whether partner idealization was positively associated with relationship quality among 105 intraracially dating Asian American couples (Study 1) and 98 Chinese couples (Study 2) through two methods. The commonly used residual‐based approach found, in both samples, the positive associations between idealizing a partner and relationship quality previously documented among European/European Americans. In contrast, the piece‐wise regression analysis, which distinguished between idealization and derogation, found few positive associations between idealizing a partner and relationship quality. Similarly, being the object of idealization rarely predicted greater relationship quality for either sample, even when perceived idealization was tested. Derogation, however, predicted relationship outcomes. Therefore, future studies should focus on negative behaviors or attitudes (or the lack thereof) in understanding relationship outcomes.     

The I of the storm-relations between self and conscious emotion experience: comment on Lambie and Marcel (2002)

J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel (2002) outlined a framework for understanding varieties of conscious emotion experience. In their analysis, the self plays an important role in conscious emotion experience. In this critique, however, the authors propose that Lambie and Marcel's presentation of the self needs further specification if it is to account for varieties of conflicted emotional experience, particularly those characteristic of dissociative states. The authors propose that a more elaborated self-construct is necessary to account for these phenomena involving either the "splitting off of significant self-related concerns or the existence of multiple self-constructs. These arguments are illustrated by clinical and subclinical case examples.     

The breadth and boundaries of a self‐psychological immersion in shame a one‐and‐a‐half‐person perspective

Shame colors other feelings and perceptions about the self. From reflections about his own personal experiences and observations regarding a particular manic‐depressive patient, the author discusses the evolution of his current clinical and theoretical understanding of shame. The framework of analytic self psychology is offered as a particularly useful perspective from which to consider shame, with its emphasis on the concept of selfobject to account both for shame's development (through selfobject misattunement and unresponsive‐ness) and for its amelioration (through empathic mirroring, idealization, and twinning). A developmental sequence for shame is advanced reflecting limitations in selfobject responsiveness, and problems are noted in the ability of current self psychology theory to fully account for the alleviation of shame. The self plays its part in the construction of those selfobjects needed to ease shame, representing the “one‐and‐a‐half‐person psychology”; of the paper's subtitle. Finally, the important role of countertransference shame is considered through a clinical example of therapist disclosure of his own shame to his patient, utilized in order to repair an interrupted kinship selfobject transference.