Attributions of intergroup bias and outgroup homogeneity to ingroup and outgroup others

The research in this article explores the structure and content of attributed intergroup beliefs: to what extent do perceivers think others of their ingroup and their outgroup display intergroup evaluative bias and outgroup homogeneity? We report studies that address this question in ethnicity, gender, and nationality intergroup contexts. In all of these, we show that perceivers attribute to others more biased intergroup beliefs than they themselves espouse. Even when perceivers themselves do not show intergroup bias or outgroup homogeneity, they attribute such biases to others, both others from their ingroup and others from their outgroup. We argue that such attributed intergroup beliefs are fundamentally important to expectations concerning intergroup interaction. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies

This research examined the role of different forms of positive regard for the ingroup in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on others’ recognition. We hypothesized that collective narcissism should be especially likely to foster outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity, on the other hand, should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. In Study 1, the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of outgroup actions was positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated ingroup or outgroup members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in outgroup conspiracies but not in ingroup conspiracies, while non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity predicted lower conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the ingroup or the outgroup.     

Sources of respect: the effects of being liked by ingroups and outgroups

We investigated the effects of ingroup and outgroup sources of respect, defined as positive social evaluations of self, on group members' emotional reactions and collective self‐esteem. We used both natural group memberships (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory groups (Study 3). We expected that the positive effects of respect derived from an ingroup would not hold when derived from an outgroup source. In Study 1 (N = 294) respect was manipulated as deriving either from ingroup or outgroup. Although respect produced a positive emotional reaction irrespective of source, collective self‐esteem was only enhanced by an ingroup source. In Study 2 (N = 248), we investigated the concurrent effects of ingroup respect and outgroup respect. As in Study 1, ingroup and outgroup respect both produced positive emotional reactions, but collective self‐esteem was only affected by ingroup respect. Additionally, outgroup respect intensified the shame people experienced due to lack of ingroup respect. In Study 3 (N = 66), participants were immersed in experimental groups and ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated orthogonally. Interactive effects of the two sources of respect indicated that high outgroup respect could not compensate for low ingroup respect, and if anything had an adverse effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of lay beliefs about group transgressions in acceptance of responsibility for ingroup harm-doing

Denial of responsibility by perpetrator groups is the most common response to group-based transgressions. Refusal to acknowledge responsibility has dire consequences for intergroup relations. In this research we assessed whether shifting lay beliefs about group-based transgressions in general influences acceptance of responsibility for a specific ingroup transgression. In two experimental studies we manipulated lay beliefs about group transgressions as reflecting either a group's stable character (i.e., a global defect construal) or a specific characteristic (i.e., a specific defect construal). Specific defect construals (compared to global defect construals) increased acceptance of ingroup responsibility by increasing group malleability beliefs, but reduced acceptance of ingroup responsibility by reducing the ingroup's perceived moral failure. These effects were moderated by ingroup superiority in Study 1, but not Study 2. We draw implications for our understanding of mechanisms of denial of responsibility, identity threat, and coping with this threat.     

Exclusion,intergroup hostility,and religious fundamentalism

The goal of the present study was to examine whether exclusion leads to increased intergroup hostility and stronger fundamentalist religious beliefs. Using Cyberball, we examined how adolescents from different ethnic groups in the Netherlands (of Moroccan, Turkish, and Dutch descent with either Muslim, Christian, or secular beliefs) responded to being included or excluded by ethnic in- and outgroup members. We expected that exclusion by ethnic outgroup members would represent a categorization threat and would result in greater hostility. We hypothesized that exclusion by ethnic ingroup members would represent an acceptance threat and would result in responses that reduce uncertainty and increase one's chances of being accepted by others (e.g., a stronger endorsement of fundamentalist religious beliefs). The results revealed that among all ethnic groups, exclusion by ethnic outgroup members led to more hostility toward the co-players and the co-players' ethnic group than exclusion by ethnic ingroup members. This was mediated by the extent to which people attributed their exclusion to the racist attitudes of their co-players. Among Muslims and Christians, exclusion by ethnic ingroup members led to more support for fundamentalist beliefs. We discuss the theoretical extension that these results provide, and practical issues raised regarding the consequences that may occur through the marginalization of religious and ethnic groups.     

Dominant group members in intergroup interaction: safety or vulnerability in numbers?

An experiment examined how low- and high-prejudice dominant group members' (LPs' and HPs') reactions to intergroup contact were affected by whether they were accompanied by fellow ingroup members who exhibited prejudice-relevant behavior. Participants answered questions alone or in a group and then estimated how they were viewed by an observer who was an ingroup or an outgroup member. HPs believed that they were viewed more negatively by an outgroup member in the individual than the group condition. LPs showed the opposite effect, which led them to evaluate the outgroup member more negatively in the group condition. All participants in the group condition expected an outgroup member to exaggerate their similarity to the other ingroup members present, and LPs evaluated the other ingroup members more negatively when the observer was an outgroup member. The results suggest that intergroup attitudes guide the types of intergroup contact situations that are experienced most positively.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.     

Was It One of Us? How People Cope with Misconduct by Fellow Ingroup Members

How do group members cope with misconduct by members of their own group? Strong evidence for a positive bias in people's evaluations of their own group and its members suggests that an ingroup perpetrator is likely to be treated more leniently than an outgroup perpetrator. However, research has also demonstrated a “Black Sheep‐Effect”, such that ingroup members who deviate negatively from relevant ingroup norms are evaluated and punished even more harshly than outgroup deviants. Both reactions – positive ingroup bias and the Black Sheep Effect – may serve the same goal, namely maintaining positive regard for the ingroup. In this paper, we present several moderators that have been shown to affect responses to negative ingroup deviance. We propose a model that incorporates and organizes these moderators in order to predict whether negatively deviant ingroup members will receive especially lenient or rather harsh and negative evaluations from their fellow ingroup members.     

We Are the World—and They Are Not: Prototypicality for the World Community,Legitimacy, and Responses to Global Inequality

The relation between developed and developing countries is characterized by inequalities that sometimes hinder actions against worldwide problems. The current research presents an intergroup approach, based on the ingroup projection model, towards an analysis of psychological processes that perpetuate global inequality on a social group level. Precisely, we argue that people from developed countries perceive their group as more prototypical for the world population than they perceive people from developing countries. These perceptions of ingroup prototypicality should in turn relate to legitimacy beliefs and predict unfavorable behavioral intentions towards developing countries. We present two studies that corroborate our hypotheses: In Study 1, participants from a developed country perceived their ingroup as more prototypical for the superordinate group (i.e., world population) than the outgroup (i.e., developing countries), which in turn was related to beliefs that global inequality is legitimate. This finding was replicated in Study 2, and the predicted effect of ingroup prototypicality on behavioral intentions was mediated by legitimacy beliefs. These findings demonstrate that intergroup processes can contribute to perpetuating global inequality.     

Convergent and divergent responses to emotional displays of ingroup and outgroup

In the present research, we test the assumption that emotional mimicry and contagion are moderated by group membership. We report two studies using facial electromyography (EMG; Study 1), Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Study 2), and self-reported emotions (Study 2) as dependent measures. As predicted, both studies show that ingroup anger and fear displays were mimicked to a greater extent than outgroup displays of these emotions. The self-report data in Study 2 further showed specific divergent reactions to outgroup anger and fear displays. Outgroup anger evoked fear, and outgroup fear evoked aversion. Interestingly, mimicry increased liking for ingroup models but not for outgroup models. The findings are discussed in terms of the social functions of emotions in group contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Effects of trustors' social identity complexity on interpersonal and intergroup trust

Although previous literature has revealed the effect of a single social identity on trust, only few studies have examined how multiple social identities affect trust in others. The present research examined the effects of trustors' social identity complexity on their level of trust toward another person (interpersonal trust), outgroup members (outgroup trust), and ingroup members (ingroup trust). Study 1, which was a correlational study, indicated that trustors' social identity complexity was positively related to their interpersonal and outgroup trust. Three experimental studies were performed to identify causal relationships. Study 2 found that activating trustors' high social identity complexity produced high levels of interpersonal trust, and Studies 3 and 4 found that this effect was more pronounced when the trustee was an outgroup member (outgroup trust) rather than an ingroup member (ingroup trust). The implications of these results for social harmony are discussed.     

A cleansing fire: Moral outrage alleviates guilt and buffers threats to one’s moral identity

Why do people express moral outrage? While this sentiment often stems from a perceived violation of some moral principle, we test the counter-intuitive possibility that moral outrage at third-party transgressions is sometimes a means of reducing guilt over one’s own moral failings and restoring a moral identity. We tested this guilt-driven account of outrage in five studies examining outrage at corporate labor exploitation and environmental destruction. Study 1 showed that personal guilt uniquely predicted moral outrage at corporate harm-doing and support for retributive punishment. Ingroup (vs. outgroup) wrongdoing elicited outrage at corporations through increased guilt, while the opportunity to express outrage reduced guilt (Study 2) and restored perceived personal morality (Study 3). Study 4 tested whether effects were due merely to downward social comparison and Study 5 showed that guilt-driven outrage was attenuated by an affirmation of moral identity in an unrelated context.     

Intergroup contact between professional groups: Two evaluation studies

We report two studies which evaluate practically-oriented programmes of interprofessional contact involving doctors and social workers. The evaluation is based on the ‘contact hypothesis’ in intergroup relations, and highlights four sets of dependent measures: background perceptions, ingroup and outgroup ratings, knowledge, and judgements about work with outgroup partners and experienced contact. Consistent with the contact hypothesis, both studies revealed an improvement in outgroup attitudes, evidence of mutual intergroup differentiation (acknowledged superiority of ingroup and outgroup on independent dimensions), and increased outgroup knowledge. Greater change in Study 2 is interpreted in terms of its longer duration, and the opportunity it provided for contact with multiple outgroup members, compared with a single outgroup partner in Study 1. These findings from field studies are consistent with results from published laboratory experiments.     

Stretching the boundaries: strategic perceptions of intragroup variability

We hypothesised that people would strategically alter their perceived intragroup variability on ingroup‐threatening traits in order to maintain positive perceptions of their self and their ingroup. Specifically, we predicted that people would perceive (1) greater relative outgroup homogeneity and (2) greater general intragroup variability on ingroup negative and outgroup positive traits. We confirmed the outgroup homogeneity prediction in a minimal group experiment (N=80) and a gender group experiment (N = 164). In a second gender group experiment (N = 137), we found that ingroup size moderated this effect: only minority group members showed the predicted pattern of outgroup homogeneity. Evidence for the general intragroup variability prediction was less conclusive. We discuss the results in terms of variability strategies. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward an Understanding of Religious Tolerance: Quest Religiousness and Positive Attitudes Toward Religiously Dissimilar Others

We interact frequently with individuals with religious beliefs that vary from our own. Although we may naturally prefer interacting with religiously similar others, individuals vary in their attitudes toward religiously dissimilar others. In the present set of studies, we examined how variability in quest religiousness affects religious tolerance. In Study 1 (N = 159), we found that quest religiousness in Christian undergraduates was associated with positive attitudes toward both non-Christian religious groups and atheists. In Study 2, 118 Christian undergraduates evaluated vignettes regarding a devout moral or an average morality Christian (ingroup) or Muslim (outgroup). Participants preferred moral targets relative to less moral targets. However, when rating moral targets, participants high in quest religiousness preferred the Muslim target (religious outgroup member), whereas those low in quest religiousness preferred the Christian target (religious ingroup member). We discuss implications for the links between quest religiousness and religious tolerance.     

Seeing the world with the eyes of the outgroup — The impact of perspective taking on the prototypicality of the ingroup relative to the outgroup

The positive effect of perspective taking on favorable attitudes towards stigmatized individuals and outgroups is well established (Batson et al., 1997). We draw on the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) to better understand the processes underlying this effect. Based on their egocentric perspective, ingroup and outgroup members have different representations of the superordinate group (perspective divergence) so that the ingroup is perceived as more relatively prototypical of the superordinate group, leading to negative outgroup evaluation. We hypothesize that the positive effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes is due to a reduction of relative ingroup prototypicality. Across three studies with different manipulations of perspective taking, we found that participants who were taking the perspective of an outgroup member evaluated the outgroup more positively and were less inclined to perceive their ingroup as more relatively prototypical. The effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes was mediated by relative ingroup prototypicality.     

Stereotype activation and self-regulation by conservatives and liberals in political encounters

We examined stereotyping and its effect on self-regulation in preparation for inter-ideological interactions. Turkish conservative and liberal students anticipated interacting with a political outgroup (vs. ingroup) member and the accessibility of outgroup and ingroup stereotypes was measured. Conservatives in both outgroup and ingroup interaction conditions showed higher accessibility for outgroup stereotypes. Liberals, however, showed lower accessibility for both outgroup and ingroup stereotypes in both conditions. Liberals’ suppression of stereotypes about the anticipated partner led to worse self-regulation when the anticipated partner was conservative but better self-regulation when the partner was liberal. Conservatives’ stereotype accessibility did not affect their self-regulation. These findings show that liberals may tend to rely on self-regulatory resources to suppress their stereotypes while anticipating inter-ideological interactions, while conservatives rely on stereotypes to navigate such interactions.     

A joke is just a joke (except when it isn't): cavalier humor beliefs facilitate the expression of group dominance motives

Past research reveals preferences for disparaging humor directed toward disliked others. The group-dominance model of humor appreciation introduces the hypothesis that beyond initial outgroup attitudes, social dominance motives predict favorable reactions toward jokes targeting low-status outgroups through a subtle hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth: cavalier humor beliefs (CHB). CHB characterizes a lighthearted, less serious, uncritical, and nonchalant approach toward humor that dismisses potential harm to others. As expected, CHB incorporates both positive (affiliative) and negative (aggressive) humor functions that together mask biases, correlating positively with prejudices and prejudice-correlates (including social dominance orientation [SDO]; Study 1). Across 3 studies in Canada, SDO and CHB predicted favorable reactions toward jokes disparaging Mexicans (low-status outgroup). Neither individual difference predicted neutral (nonintergroup) joke reactions, despite the jokes being equally amusing and more inoffensive overall. In Study 2, joke content targeting Mexicans, Americans (high-status outgroup), and Canadians (high-status ingroup) was systematically controlled. Although Canadians preferred jokes labeled as anti-American overall, an underlying subtle pattern emerged at the individual-difference level: Only those higher in SDO appreciated those jokes labeled as anti-Mexican (reflecting social dominance motives). In all studies, SDO predicted favorable reactions toward low-status outgroup jokes almost entirely through heightened CHB, a subtle yet potent legitimatizing myth that "justifies" expressions of group dominance motives. In Study 3, a pretest-posttest design revealed the implications of this justification process: CHB contributes to trivializing outgroup jokes as inoffensive (harmless), subsequently contributing to postjoke prejudice. The implications for humor in intergroup contexts are considered.     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.